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Abstract
That Most Perfidious Institution is a study of Africans - slaves and slave 
owners - and their central roles in both the expansion of slavery in the early 
nineteenth century and attempts to reform servile relationships in the late 
nineteenth century. The pivotal place of Africans can be seen in the interaction 
between indigenous slave-owning elites (aristocrats and urban Euro-African 
merchants), local European administrators, and slaves themselves. My 
approach to this problematic is both chronologically and geographically 
comparative. The central comparison between Senegal and the Gold Coast 
contrasts the varying impact of colonial policies, integration into the trans-Atlantic 
economy; and, more importantly, the continuity of indigenous institutions and the 
transformative agency of indigenous actors. By evaluating the different outcomes 
of attempted reforms both in these regions in general and within sub-regions and 
societies, this dissertation develops a fuller picture of both slave agency and the 
resistance of slave owners.
Slavery in these regions during the nineteenth century was characterised 
by a normative model in which local elites were able to resist, divert, and 
appropriate metropolitan attempts to end or restrict their access to and control of 
slaves, often with the cooperation of administrators. This contrasted with the 
ability of slaves to liberate themselves or to take part in mass emancipations in 
certain situations, illustrating the circumstances under which the political- 
economic hegemony of slave-owners could be circumvented. The general 
‘failure’ of emancipation masks a series of compromises, negotiations, and self­
liberations which took place largely outside the official record. However, the 
continuity of indigenous social attributes - especially the social/kinship 
characteristics of indigenous slavery - constrained the ability of slaves to effect 
their liberations. This situation could be transformed only by the introduction of 
new economic opportunities, the decreasing reliance of administrators on slave 
owners, and politicisation and social change amongst slaves themselves.
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CHAPTER 1: An Introduction
Historiography
This dissertation is a comparison of the transformation, reform, and attempted 
abolition of slavery in French Senegal and the British Gold Coast in the nineteenth 
century. Comparative studies such as this one are by definition studies in opposition. 
In some respects, this makes it difficult for the author to achieve the specificity of a 
purely local study. However, the tension inherent in the contrast of places and times 
can also reveal overarching themes; and this, in turn, can aid our interpretation of 
evidence of continuity and change at the local level.
In his influential 1983 synthesis Transformations in Slavery, Paul Lovejoy 
pointed out that the discourse on slavery in Africa has in particular lacked such 
studies, pointing out that this topic “has suffered from the opposite problem to that of 
over-synthesis... There are some brilliant local studies, which have their own 
implications in terms of the study of slavery in general, but these... suffer from a 
failure to place the particular case in the context of Africa as a whole, or even 
specific regions within Africa.”1
Lovejoy was writing at the crest of a renewed academic interest in African 
slavery. Historians of African descent such as Walter Rodney had begun to 
investigate the evolution of slavery in several regions of West Africa in the late 
1960s2 and during the next decade monograph-length studies had been produced 
on servitude in areas as diverse as Zanzibar and Sierra Leone. 3 The regions of 
Senegal north of the Gambia River and southern Ghana, the subjects of this study, 
were no exception. The French priest and missionary Frangois Renault compiled a 
framework study of the origins and impact of French policies on slavery in Senegal 
while historians at Dakar’s Institut Fondamental d ’Afrique Noire also approached the 
problematic of emancipation, most notably M’Baye Gueye’s seminal article on 
emancipation in St. Louis and Goree.4 Meanwhile in 1982 the African-American
1 Lovejoy, Paul, Transformations in Slavery, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, p.xi.
2 Rodney, Walter, H ow Europe Underdeveloped Africa, London, 1972. See also Rodney, Walter, “African 
Slavery and other forms of social oppression on the upper Guinea Coast in the context of the Atlantic slave 
trade.”, Journal o f African H istoryl 1966 (7), 431 — 443.
3 Cooper, Frederick, Plantation Slavery on the East African Coast, New Haven, 1977. Grace, John, Domestic 
Slaveiy in West Africa, Frederick Muller, London, 1975.
4 Renault, Frangois, Liberation D ’esclaves e t Nouvelle Servitude, Les Nouvelles Editions Africaines, Dakar, 
1976. Gueye, M ’Baye, “Le fin de l ’esclavage a Saint-Louis et a Goree en 1848", Bulletin de PInstitut 
Fondamental d ’Afrique Noire, 1966 (28), pp.637-656.
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historian Ray Kea published a superb study of seventeenth century society in the 
Gold Coast, including a number of insights on the socio-political and economic roles 
of slaves.5
Paul Lovejoy thus had a variety of materials to draw from when writing 
Transformation in Slavery. In addition to a number of regional studies, the Africanist 
community’s interpretation of slavery had been advanced by comparative 
anthropological studies such as Orlando Patterson’s Slavery and Social Death,6 and 
by Igor Kopytoff and Suzanne Mier’s anthology of anthropological and historical 
studies, Slavery in Africa7 As a result, Lovejoy was able to effectively identify and 
approach a number of major issues introduced by regionally-based studies. Among 
these were themes in domestic and trade servitude; the impact of transformations 
wrought by Islam, the Atlantic slave trade and its abolition; and manumission and 
emancipation.
The modern study of emancipation, of which this dissertation forms a part, 
arose out of this dynamic discourse on slavery. For his chapter on “The abolitionist 
impulse”, for example, Lovejoy drew heavily upon a recently published and 
somewhat revisionist article of emancipation on the Gold Coast by Gerald 
McSheffrey, in which McSheffrey stressed for the first time the agency of slaves in 
emancipating themselves in this region.8 McSheffrey’s article formed only one 
contribution to a growing discourse on emancipation in the Gold Coast. During the 
same period, Raymond Dumett analysed the formation of anti-slavery ordinances 
from the perspective of the British colonial apparatus9, and Marion Johnson began to 
study the supply of slaves to and from what would become the Northern Territories.10 
These two historians collaborated to produce a 1988 chapter engaging with 
McSheffrey’s arguments and outlining further research questions which could 
contribute to our understanding of emancipation in the Gold Coast and other regions
5 Kea, Ray, Settlements, Trade and Polities in the Seventeenth-Century Gold Coast, Johns Hopkins University, 
Baltimore, 1982.
6 Patterson, Orlando, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass, 1982.
7 Kopytoff, Igor and Suzanne Miers, (eds.), Slavery in Africa: historical and anthropological perspectives, 
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1977.
8 McSheffrey, Gerald, “Slavery, Indentured Servitude, Legitimate Trade, and the Impact of Abolition in the 
Gold Coast, 1874-1910: A  Reappraisal”, Journal o f  African History, 1983 (24), pp.349-368.
9 Dumett, Raymond, “Pressure groups, Bureaucracy, and the Decision-Making Process: The case of slavery, 
abolition, and colonial expansion in the Gold Coast, 1874", Journal o f Imperial and Commonwealth History, 
1981 (9), pp.193-215.
1(1 Johnson, Marion, “The Slaves of Salagah”, Journal o f African History, 1986 (27), pp. 341-362.
of modern Ghana.11
Dumett and Johnson’s article appeared in an anthology on emancipation, The 
End of Slavery in Africa?2 Edited by Suzanne Miers and Richard Roberts, this 
volume was promoted as a sequel to Slavery in Africa and included studies 
encompassing diverse regions of Africa. Perhaps most importantly, it proposed a 
theoretical and comparative framework for exploring a number of themes, such as 
the role of the colonial state, modes of liberation, the ‘ambiguities’ of freedom, and 
the impact of emancipation on indigenous societies.13
Another contributor to Miers and Roberts’ volume was Martin Klein, who wrote 
on slave agency and emancipation in Coastal Guinea.14 Klein was an increasingly 
important figure in the study of slavery and emancipation in French West Africa, and 
in 1993 he produced the seminal anglophone article on emancipation across French 
colonial West Africa.15 His work did draw on that of Gueye and Renault, but it also 
added new dimensions both by exploring African initiatives and by expanding the 
field geographically to encompass the French protectorates as well as Senegal 
colony. Building on the foundation of this article, and aided by some recent excellent 
studies of emancipation in West Africa such as Lovejoy and Hogendorn’s work on 
northern Nigeria and Ibrahim Sundiata’s exploration of post-emancipation Fernando 
Po and the Bight of Biafra16, Klein in 1998 published a monograph on emancipation 
in French West Africa, including Senegal, entitled Slavery and Colonial Rule in 
French West Africa?7 This volume is, in many ways, a model for addressing the 
questions of colonial imposition of reforms to slavery, the extent and characteristics
11 Dumett, Raymond and Marion Johnson, “Britain and the Suppression of Slavery in the Gold Coast Colony, 
Ashanti, and the Northern Territories”, in Suzanne Miers and Richard Roberts, eds., The End o f  Slavery in 
Africa, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1988.
1 Miers, Suzanne and Richard Roberts, eds., The End o f Slavery in Africa, University of Wisconsin Press, 
Madison, 1988.
13 Kopytoff, Igor, “The Cultural Context of African Abolition”, in Suzanne Miers and Richard Roberts, eds.,
The End o f Slavery in Africa, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1988. Roberts, Richard and Suzanne 
Miers, “The End of Slavery in Africa”, Suzanne Miers and Richard Roberts, eds., The End o f Slavery in Africa, 
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1988.
14 Klein, Martin, “Slave Resistance and Slave Emancipation in Coastal Guinea”, in Suzanne Miers and Richard 
Roberts, eds., The End o f Slavery inAfi-ica, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1988.
15 Klein, Martin, “Slavery and Emancipation in French West Africa”, in Klein, Martin, ed., Breaking the 
Chains: Slavery, Bondage and Emancipation in Modern Africa and Asia, University of Wisconsin Press, 
Madison, 1993.
16 Lovejoy, Paul and Jan Hogendorn, Slow Death for Slavery: the course o f abolition in Northern Nigeria 1897- 
1936, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. Sundiata, Ibrahim, From Slaving to Neoslavery: The 
Bight o f Biafra and Fernando Po in the Era o f Abolition, 1827-1930, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 
1996.
17 Klein, Martin, Slaveiy and Colonial Rule in French West Africa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
UK, 1998
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of slavery in several regions, and the initiatives of slaves. Nevertheless, its generous 
scope, while achieving a necessary synthesis, forced Klein to concentrate on certain 
major regional transformations rather than following more subtle local trends.
Interest in slavery on the Gold Coast has similarly accelerated. Much 
of the new research has been carried out by a Ghanaian scholar, Kwabena Opare- 
Akurang, who has written intensive articles dealing with both colonial policy and 
slave agency in the post-emancipation Gold Coast.18 Opare-Akurang’s work has 
provided new perspectives but raised interesting questions as to the interpretation of 
the actions of both Europeans and indigenous peoples. Emancipation also forms an 
important component of the recent work of Peter Haenger, whose excellent study of 
slavery and reform deals largely with the impact of the Basel Mission on slaveholding 
but also illuminates a number of other issues surrounding the end of legalised 
slavery on the Gold Coast.19
Conceptual Framework
With the recent profusion of studies of emancipation in Senegal and the Gold 
Coast, any new work on the topic would have to represent a significant advance on 
previous literature. This study makes such advances in three ways: the use of 
innovative sources, an approach that prioritises the agency of Africans and Euro- 
Africans; and finally a comparative scope.
Despite the relatively developed discourse on emancipation into the two 
regions which this study encompasses, several sources have traditionally been 
under-utilised. Among these are missionary sources. The Archives de la 
Congregation de Saint-Esprit (ACSE) in Villejuif, France, as well as those of the 
Basel Mission (BMS) in Basel and the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society 
(WMMS) are used in this dissertation largely as supporting evidence for generally 
accepted assertions previously understood only through rather sketchy 
administrative sources. More importantly, the sources they contain illuminate the 
role of missionary groups in shaping the outcome of emancipation, which for the 
CSE and WMMS at least has been generally unexplored. A number of BMS sources
18 Opare-Akurang, Kwabena, “The Administration of the Abolition Laws, African Response and Post- 
Proclamation Slavery in the Gold Coast 1874-1940”, Slavety and Abolition, 1998 (19), pp.149-166. Opare- 
Akurang, Kwabena, “Slavery and Abolition in the Gold Coast: Colonial Modes of Emancipation and African 
Initiatives”, Ghana Studies, 1998 (1), pp.11-34.
19 Haenger, Peter, Slaves and Slave Holders on the Gold Coast: Towards an Understanding o f  Social Bondage
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were also made available to me through the assistance of Veit Arlt, as well as in 
abstracts translated by Paul Jenkins.20
This study also undertakes an in-depth analysis of important but underutilised 
archival sources such as the Colonial Judicial (SCT) files of the National Archives of 
Ghana. The new quantitative and qualitative data contained in these records are 
central to my discussion of the post-emancipation period for the Gold Coast. 
Sources in the Central Region Archives of the Gold Coast (NAG-CR) were also 
useful in illuminating events in the western regions of the Protectorate. Together, all 
of these sources assisted in the interpretation of events beyond the understanding 
generated by previous sources and complemented my research at the Public 
Records Office (PRO), National Archives of Ghana (NAG), Archives Nationales, 
Section d ’Outre-Mer (ANSOM), and Archives Nationales du Senegal (ANS).
However, this new information would represent only moderate advances upon 
the works of Klein, Dumett and Johnson and of Opare-Akurang if this dissertation did 
not undertake an original approach. This work is intended to meet perceived gaps in 
exploring the central role of Africans -  slaves and slave-owners -  in the process of 
reform and emancipation. While not primarily an ethnographic study of indigenous 
societies, it is an attempt to place Africans as agents both in the formulation of 
implemented colonial policy toward slavery and in the success and failure of reforms 
culminating in emancipation. It therefore incorporates an appraisal of the conditions 
under which reform, abolition, and emancipation could occur, and places this within 
the framework of emancipation developed in the historical discourse. The dynamic 
positions and strategies of slaves, slave-owners, and Europeans are discussed 
against the backdrop of a changing local environment and the conflicting demands of 
European metropoles for both stable, profitable African colonies and the abolition of 
indigenous slavery. By locating Africans within this model, this study illuminates the 
role of slave owners in shaping reform, as well as the agency of slaves in formulating 
modes of liberation and desertion, negotiating settlements, and developing post­
emancipation means of existence.
in West Africa, ed. by J.J. Shaffer and Paul Lovejoy, P. Schlettwein, Basel, Switzerland, 2000.
20 Jenkins, Paul, “Abstracts from the Gold Coast Correspondence of the Basel Mission”, Unpublished.
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Map 1.1 The Gold Coast region with principal towns and polities
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The Comparative scope
The most important feature of this study, and its greatest innovation, is that it 
undertakes a comparison between two geographically and ethnically distinct African 
regions which nevertheless underwent comparable transformational processes 
which resulted in both dissimilar and similar results. By comparing the experiences 
of (French) Senegal and the (British) Gold Coast, this dissertation makes significant 
advances in addressing two problematics central to the discourse on emancipation: 
whether European-initiated emancipation generally represented continuity or 
transformation, and the relative importance of internal (African) and external 
(European) agency.
By the era of the Atlantic Slave Trade, the regions that would become the 
Gold Coast and Senegal had been formed by divergent local geographies and by 
transformative events, in both cases largely initiated from the interior. Senegalese 
polities had been formed through a series of immigrations from the great states of 
the Western Soudan. In the south, the Sereer states of the Siin-Saalum delta had 
been created by an influx of Manding lineages driven by the expansion of the Mali 
Empire. In the north, the Wolof-led states of the Jolof Confederation, the Fulbe- 
dominated Fuuta Toro, and the Tukolor monarchs of Tekrur based their states on the 
Sudanic model in which authority over people was more important than control of the 
dry sahel land.21 As a result, these states developed complex social stratifications 
based on three principal categories: freemen, servile artisan castes, and slaves.22 
Immigrants from the north and east had also brought with them the revolutionary 
ideas of Islam.
The Gold Coast had also been receptive to immigrants from the dry interior, 
particularly the Akan peoples -  the Guan, Fante, and Twi speaking populations.23 
The Akan migrants absorbed a number of pre-existing groups only a few of which, 
such as the Ga-Adangme of the Accra coastal plain, remained largely independent. 
Within the region, the fertility of the bush and fecund highlands provided a food
21 For more on this period, see Barry, Boubacar, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1998. Also, Gellar, Sheldon, Senegal: An African Nation between Islam and the 
West, Westview Press, Boulder, 1995, p.10.
22 In Waalo these were the geer, the nyeenyo, and the dyaam respectively. Barry, Boubacar, Le Royaume de 
Waalo: le Senegal avant le Conquete, Frangoise Maspero, Paris, 1972, pp.87-88.
23 See McCarthy, Mary, Social Change and the Growth o f British Power in the Gold Coast: The Fante States: 
1807-1874, University Press of America, Lanham, Maryland, 1983, pp.2-3.
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surplus which stimulated the formation of non-productive elites. While there was 
some diversity in both the sophistication and design of the resulting socio-political 
institutions, the dominant model was one of matrilineal paramount states supported 
by a council of chiefly officeholders and division heads in the Akan states. The Ga- 
Adangme system was similar although largely patrilineal.24
These differences between the two regions only serve to highlight the 
similarities of their slave systems. While it is evident that slavery was diverse across 
Africa,25 it is also clear that the institutions of slavery in the Gold Coast and Senegal 
shared certain characteristics. Amongst these traits was the dominance in both 
regions of a ‘domestic’ mode of production based upon the lineage and client 
systems over a slave mode of production. Ray Kea’s work suggests that production 
in the Gold Coast was centred upon peasants in agrarian hamlets, while some highly 
organised polities maintained a tributary mode of production based on labour 
contributions or rent in kind 26 In Senegal there is an absence of evidence for 
organised slave labour in sorghum and millet cultivation, despite investigation of the 
problem by Boubacar Barry and Martin Klein.27 In both regions this can explained to 
some extent by the dominance in slave-owning of aristocrats and chiefly 
officeholders prior to European intervention, to the exclusion of merchants and 
peasants.28 The undermining of these characteristics during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries forms one point of comparison of this dissertation.
Slavery in both regions was a function of the kinship form of organisation 
central to political and social institutions amongst their populations. In studying West 
African slavery, Claude Meillassoux and Paul Lovejoy identified this as a means of 
denying ‘aliens’ the benefits which accrued to kin.29 As a result, however, as slaves 
adopted their masters’ cultures over time they underwent a process of assimilation.
24 For local studies illuminating this see Kwamena-Poh, MA, Government and Politics in the Akuapem State 
1730-1850, Longman Group. London, 1973; Addo-Fening, Robert, Akyem Abuakwa 1700-1943, from Ofori 
Panin to Sir Ofori Atta, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, 1997; and Wilson,
Louis, The Krobo People o f Ghana to 1892, Ohio University Press, Athens, Ohio, 1991.
25 Manning, Patrick, Slavery and African Life: Occidental, Oriental, and African Slave Trades, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p.25.
26 Kea, Settlements, Trade and Polities, pp.5,18. See also Kaplow, S., “African Merchants of the 19th Century 
Gold Coast”, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Columbia, 1971, p.52 which shows that family labour dominated the 
production of palm oil.
7 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, pp.31-32. Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, p.12.
28 Searing, James F., West African Slavery and Atlantic Commerce: the Senegal River Valley, 1700-1860, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p.15. NAG ADM 11/975, Memorandum on the Vestiges o f  
Slaveiy in the Gold Coast, Assistant Secretary for Native Affairs Johnson, 1927.
29 Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery, p.2.; Meillassoux, Claude, The Anthropology o f  Slavery: The Womb of
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The Akan, for example, had a complex slave hierarchy, in which odonko, or persons 
purchased in the market, and domum, or war captives, were assimilated over time 
into domestic slaves who could in some cases marry, amass property, and even 
seek legal redress.30 Klein has identified a similar assimilative structure in Senegal, 
especially the Sereer states of Siin and Saalum.31 In both regions, however, 
assimilation was neither uniform nor guaranteed. These characteristics, too, would 
be transformed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
The transformations that subsequently took place would result from the 
impact of European intervention - first in the Atlantic slave trade and through the 
formation of coastal zones of interaction, later through colonisation and the 
attempted reform and extermination of some forms of slavery. It is here that Senegal 
and the Gold Coast can be shown to be unique cases for comparison. Both regions 
were integrated into the world economy earlier than their neighbours. Northern 
Senegal attracted Portuguese slave-seekers in the 1440s, and the Gold Coast 
attracted their gold-searchers in the 1470s. In the third decade of the seventeenth 
century, Dutch ascendancy at sea led them to establish two early African posts: 
Goree island off the coast of Senegal (1639) and El Mina on the Gold Coast 
seaboard (1637). 32 Subsequently, Senegal became the seat of French Empire in 
West Africa, and the Gold Coast was the site of the first major British investment in 
the region.
In the nineteenth century these parallels would continue. Groundnuts in 
Senegal and palm oil in the Gold Coast would help transform slavery and strengthen 
European involvement more rapidly than in many neighbouring locales. The extent 
of this involvement would, in turn, lead to the first strong European initiatives against 
indigenous slavery in West Africa -  the 1848 act of emancipation in colonial Senegal 
and the proclamation of emancipation in 1874 on the Gold Coast. These initiatives, 
based on nineteenth century perceptions and beliefs, share characteristics which 
contrast with the more prevalent twentieth century anti-slavery initiatives carried out 
in other parts of West Africa. Another product of the unique histories of these two 
regions, however, was the organisation of particular types of resistance. The long
Iron and Gold, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992, pp.11-35.
30 Rattray, R.S., Ashanti Law  and Constitution, Oxford University Press, London, 1929, pp.41-42. Admittedly 
Rattray was writing on Asante society, but the parallels appear valid.
31 Klein, Martin, “Slavery and Emancipation”, p. 173.
32 See chapter 2.
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history of European interaction had led to the establishment of strong Euro-African 
trading communities protective of their rights to own slaves, but the nineteenth 
century was also a period of resistance in which chiefly and Islamic indigenous elites 
resisted the expansion of Europeans. The opposition of these groups would have its 
own impact on attempts to reform slavery, leading to the implementation in both 
regions of forms of indirect rule which would be intrinsic contributors to post­
emancipation settlements.
The specific results of emancipation in Senegal and the Gold Coast were a 
result of both the variance and the similarities between the two regions. Likewise, 
this dissertation undertakes to analyse various differences in the outcome of 
attempts to reform or end slavery in divers sectors - urban and rural, coastal and 
interior, ethnically and historically diverse - within both regions. By carrying out 
these comparisons, this dissertation advances the scholarship on emancipation for 
several topics specifically. It presents a new understanding of how local factors - the 
attitudes of European administrators, intercontinental economics, and most 
importantly significant indigenous resistance - centralised Africans in the resolution 
of slave reforms - largely resulting in the failure of the implementation of reform. It 
contributes to our comprehension of in what circumstances this failure could be 
transformed, especially through the initiative of slaves. It investigates the 
mechanisms of slave desertion and emancipation. Finally, this dissertation expands 
our knowledge of the integrated slave routes which fed slaves into the coastal 
regions and the extent to which they were extinguished in the nineteenth century.
A note about orthography
One unfortunate legacy of the haphazard attitude towards African culture and 
society which characterised nineteenth century European intervention is a marked 
confusion over the spelling of indigenous personal and place names. Administrators 
and missionaries tended to impose their own preferred names for people and 
regions, and one place where this is most obvious is in the judicial record where, as I 
show, the interior origins of many slaves left magistrates baffled as to their identities.
In the post-colonial period, Africans have attempted to reclaim their own 
locales and histories, and I support that by trying, where possible, to use either the 
modern appellations designated by African governments or, failing that, the spellings 
preferred by African academics of note. As a result, I have largely adhered to the
16
orthography of the Senegalese historian Boubacar Barry and the Ghanaian scholars 
Robert Addo-Fening, Francis Agbodeka, and Akosua Perbi.
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CHAPTER 2:
The era of the Atlantic slave trade and its impact
Societies and states are in a constant state of evolution, and the West Africans 
who are the central characters in our nineteenth century narrative were heavily 
influenced by the social, political, and economic events and changes of the preceding 
eras. Amongst other transformations, the period leading up to the nineteenth century 
witnessed the integration of both Senegal and the Gold Coast into the intercontinental 
economy in general and the Atlantic slave trade specifically. The experiences of the 
slave trade - in Africa, the middle passage, and the Americas - have been the subject of 
numerous monographs and countless articles. In West African history, it is sometimes 
portrayed as the defining feature of the pre-colonial period, causing radical social and 
economic changes. This notion is highly politicised and must be qualified somewhat. 
While the Transatlantic slave trade was a catalyst which instigated socio-cultural change 
within small seaboard ‘frontier’ areas of Euro-African interaction, its effect became more 
diffuse the further one travelled from the coastal zone. The central objective of this 
chapter is the review of the academic discourse and introduction of new evidence 
evaluating the varying impact of these events on the socio-political institutions and 
dependency relationships in Senegal and the Gold Coast.
Origins of the slave trade: 1400-1700
The Atlantic slave trade was catalysed by a combination of the introduction of the 
labour-intensive sugar crop to Europe by crusaders and a concurrent decline in the 
number of labourers available to work the sugar fields as a result of the Black Death 
plague. Therefore when the King of Portugal granted Giovanni della Parma a license to 
begin growing sugar in the Algarve region, della Parma turned to slave labour recruited 
from the Canary Islands.1
Africans had already had a long history as slaves. As early as the tenth century, 
slaves from as far south as modern Tanzania and west to the Sahel were actively 
sought after by Arab, Turkish, and Egyptian masters. The Ottoman crown was a 
particularly consistent purchaser.2 West African slaves, particularly from the bend of the 
Niger River, had been acquired from Berber traders by Spaniards in Morocco. However, 
there is no evidence that this trans-Saharan slave route had a significant impact in
1 For a textbook narrative on this see Reader, John, Africa: A Biography of the Continent, Alfred A. Knopf, New  
York, 1998, pp.325-336.
2 Renault, Frangois, and Serge Daget, Les traites negrieres enAfrique, Editions Karthala, Parisl997, pp.17-38 and 
map p.29.
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Senegambia or the Gu!f of Guinea.3
This situation was transformed by the entry of the Portuguese, motivated by a 
combination of rising labour demands for sugar cultivation and enabled by new seafaring 
technology. From 1441 onwards, having run out of Canary Islanders4, the Portuguese 
turned to the African mainland for labourers. In 1445, a royal expedition established an 
outpost at Arguin, north of the Senegal River5, and from 1441-1446 an estimated 927 
slaves were shipped from the African mainland to Portugal.6 By the sixteenth century, 
Portuguese agents were exporting approximately 800-1000 slaves per year.7
The Portuguese also introduced the Gold Coast to the Atlantic world. In the 
1470s, Portuguese merchants began to invest in the long-running local coastal trade in 
slaves. Here the motivation was gold rather than labour. The Portuguese purchased 
slaves, mainly in the Bight of Benin, and bartered them for gold from mines in the 
Ankobra and Tano river basins of the Gold Coast.8 The Akan, who dominated these 
gold fields, joined the Atlantic system as slave importers, rather than exporters.
The sixteenth century was an era of Portuguese dominance, but by the first 
quarter of the seventeenth century, they were being expelled by the Dutch trading 
powers who were investing in the New World and Africa. The first two Dutch stations in 
Africa were Goree in Senegal, bought from Lebu rulers off the coast of the Cap Vert 
peninsula in 1639 and the Fante town of El Mina, acquired from the Portuguese in 
1637.9
The Dutch were the first of the northern European powers to become involved in 
the Atlantic trade - previously the sole prerogative of Catholic, southern European 
monarchs. Events were to unfold rapidly. French acquisition of Caribbean islands for 
the production of sugar led to the formation of the Compagnie des Indes Occidentales in 
1664, which almost immediately secured Senegalese slaves to work its plantations, 
building the post of St. Louis on an island in the Senegal River delta in 1659. In 1677, 
the French monarchy acquired Goree, which had meanwhile changed hands between
3 The Gold Coast is situated on the Gulf o f Guinea.
4 Thornton, John, Africa and Africans in the Making o f the Atlantic World, 1400-1800, University of Cambridge 
Press, Cambridge, 1992, p.34.
5 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p.36.
6 Azozara, G.E. The Chronicle o f the Discovery and Conquest o f Guinea, 1441-1448, translated by Beazley, C.R. and 
G.W.B. Huntingford, Cambridge Hakluyt Society, Cambridge, vol. 95 (1896), pp.90-91.
7 Barry, LeRoyaume de Waalo, p .117.
8 Reynolds, Edward, Trade and Economic Change on the Gold Coast 1807-1874, Longman Group, New York, 1974, 
P-7 -
9 The name El Mina, or Elmina, is Portuguese for ‘the mine’, which is indicative of the centrality of the local gold 
trade for Portuguese agents. Renault and Daget, Les trades negrieres en Afrique1 p.80.
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the Portuguese, Dutch, and British several times.10
British merchants also began to acquire African interests in the seventeenth 
century. Unlike the French in Senegambia, however, the British were initially interested 
in exploiting locally produced goods - including gold - rather than slaves. In 1672, the 
Royal African company was formed to trade to the Gold Coast, and consequently forts 
were built along the coast at “Dixcove, Secondee, Commendah, Anamaboe, Winnebah, 
and Accra, [as well as] Cape Coast Castle.”11 The Danish West India and Guinea 
Company was formed in 1697, and became the last important trading power to settle on 
the Gold Coast, with headquarters at Christiansborg fort, Accra.12
Rise and decline: the eighteenth century
The patterns of slave trading in Senegal and the Gold Coast are both similar and 
distinct from other West African regions. Not only were both regions involved in the 
slave trade very early, but also both experienced a cycle of slave trading in the 18th 
century which contrasted with the steady rise of the export trade from the Bight of Benin, 
Biafra, and the Congo.
The early 1700s marked a transformation in slave trading on the Gold Coast. By 
1705, gold, the product that brought European trade to the region, was no longer a 
primary export, that trade being superseded by the export of slaves. A Dutch officer of 
that period remarked:
Concerning the trade on [the Gold Coast], we notified your Honours already that 
it has completely changed into a Slave Coast, and that the natives nowadays no 
longer occupy themselves with the search for Gold, but rather make war on each 
other to furnish slaves.13
The export slave trade on the Gold Coast continued to expand until 1750. This 
expansion can be attributed both to an increased demand by planters in the New World 
and the rising ability of coastal states to supply slaves. The early 18th century was the 
era of Asante expansion, and the massive wars occasioned by the growth of that inland 
empire resulted in the creation of large numbers of slaves, who were traded to the coast 
through a network of Asante merchants and coastal middlemen.14 Asante expansion to
10 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p.47.
11 PRO, Colonial Office List, 1874, p.134.
12 N0rregard, Georg, Danish Settlements in West Africa: 1658-1850, Boston University Press, Boston, 1966, p.84.
13 Op. Cit in Reader, Africa, 1998, p.416.
14 Reynolds, Edward, Stand the Storm: A H istoiy o f the Atlantic Slave Trade, Allison and Busby, London, 1985, p.96. 
Reynolds, Trade and Economic Change, p.12.
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the northeast also meant a diversion of the gold trade towards the interior to North-Africa 
trade routes.15 During this period, the major slave buying powers on the Gold Coast 
were the British, French, Dutch, and North Americans, but by the 1780s Iberian and 
South American flagged carriers were taking over much of the trade.16
Regional slave exports peaked in the period 1750-5917, but declined for most of 
the remaining decades of the century. This period was characterised by a series of 
sharp declines occasioned by stability in Asante and on the coast during the reigns of 
Asantehene (King) Osei Kwadwo in the period 1764-1777 and European wars in the late 
18th century and early 19th century that deflected shipping away from West Africa.18 
Trade on the Gold Coast picked up again to about 74,000 captives exported per year in 
the 1790s19, concurrent with a general expansion of the Atlantic slave trade, driven by 
increased exports from the Bight of Benin, Biafra, and the Congo regions. However the 
relative importance of the Gold Coast continued to diminish; the region provided only 
approximately 7%-8% of African slave exports at the turn of the century.20
Senegal experienced a somewhat similar cycle. Following the French acquisition 
of Goree in 1679, slave exports stayed below an average of 3,000 a year for the entire 
Senegambia region, and many of these came from the British Gambia and Casamance 
regions21, outside of Senegal proper. French and British shipping data show that slave 
purchases largely declined after 1730, excepting brief flurries following regional 
upheavals, as in 1775 when approximately 8,000 were shipped from St. Louis.22 Most of 
the slaves initially came from the interior, either the Galaam region or deep into the 
Western Sudan.23 Consequently, Senegalese states tended to retain the best slaves,
15 Johnson, Marion, “The Ounce in Eighteenth Century West African Trade”, Journal ofAfrican History, 1966 (7) pp. 
197-214.
16 Eltis, David, Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1987, p.47.
17 Richardson, David, “Slave Exports from West and West-Central Africa, 1700-1810: New Estimates of Volume and 
Distribution”, Journal o f African History, 1989 (30), p.17.
18 Reynolds, Trade and Economic Change on the Gold Coasts p. 12.
19 Richardson, “Slave Exports from West and West-Central Africa”, p. 17.
20 Estimates differ. Richardson, synthesising sources from the W.E.B. DuBois Institute, approximates 7.3%. 
Richardson, “Slave Exports from West and West-Central Africa”, p. 18. However Stephen Behrendt, using 
Parliamentary and Treasury records, Caribbean gazettes, and Lloyd’s Registers o f Shipping and Lists, suggests a 
slightly higher number. Behrendt, Stephen, “The Annual Volume and Regional Distribution of the British Slave 
Trade, 1780-1807”, Journal of African History, 1997 (38), pp.187-212.
21 This takes into account the most liberal estimates available. Curtin, Philip, Economic Change in Precolonial 
Africa: Senegambia in the Era o f the Slave Trade, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1975. Lovejoy, 
Transformations in Slaveiy. Becker, Charles, “Les Effets Demographiques de la traite des Esclaves en Senegambie: 
Esquisse d’une Histoire des Peuplements de XVIIe a la fin du XIXe Siecle”, in Daget, Serge, D e la Traite a 
L ’esclavage, Bibliotheque D ’Histoire d’outre-mer, 1988.
22 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p.66.
23 Barry, Le Royaume de Waalo, p.117 Delcourt, Jean, Goree: Six Siecles d ’Histoire, Editions Clairafrique, Dakar,
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especially males, for their own purposes.24 By the time the Atlantic slave trade was 
outlawed by the British in 1807, followed by the Americans in 1808 and the French in 
181925, Senegal, like the Gold Coast had ceased to be a major supplier of slaves to the 
Atlantic market26, contributing only approximately 3% of slave exports around the turn of 
the century.27
Beyond the number’s game: war, depopulation, and stagnation 
In 1898, a British abolitionist contended that:
[Fjrom the middle of the seventeenth to near the end of the eighteenth century, 
statistics show that nearly 2 1/4 millions of negroes were deported from their 
own country by European adventurers to work in the British colonies in the West 
Indies.28
This early attempt to quantify the Atlantic slave trade initiated a debate that would 
occupy many pages of historical texts: exactly what was the impact of the Atlantic slave 
trade on Africa, and can it be expressed statistically? Understanding the number of 
slaves taken from Africa is only the first step to resolving this debate, but it is an 
important one for historians who place the blame for war, depopulation, and economic 
stagnation on the despoiling effects of this trade.
The debate surrounding slave exports from Senegambia, comprising Senegal, 
the Casamance, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau, is an excellent model of the dynamics of 
this quantitative debate. The seminal work on this topic is Philip Curtin’s Economic 
Change in Precoionial Africa. Curtin presents what even his critics admit is a highly 
detailed study on export numbers29, presenting a total export estimate of 304,330 slaves 
from 1681-1810.30 Paul Lovejoy, in his important 1983 work Transformations in Slavery 
largely accepted Curtin’s pre-1750 figures, adding only a statistically insignificant 3,200 
slaves.31
However, Curtin’s statistics have now come under an attack mounted mostly by
1984, p.74.
24 Delcourt, Goree, p.73.
25 Revolutionary France had abolished slavery in 1793, but it was never enforced and the edict was revoked by 
Napoleon in 1802. The abolition of the Atlantic slave trade will be discussed in greater depth in the next chapter.
26 Curtin, Philip, “The Abolition of the Slave Trade from Senegambia”, in Eltis, David, and James Walvin eds., The 
Abolition o f the Atlantic Slave Trade, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1981.
27 Richardson, “Slave Exports from West and West-Central Africa”, p. 17.
28 Macdonald, George, The Gold Coast: Past and Present, London, 1898, p.84.
29 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p.62.
30 Curtin, Economic Change in Precolonial Aftica, pp.162,164.
31 Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery, p.46, p.48.
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African scholars, and at the fore are Charles Becker and Boubacar Barry, Their 
challenge is significant not just in debating abstract figures, but for understanding the 
concrete significance of the slave trade to Africa. Curtin’s statistics had been used to 
support an argument that the importance of the Atlantic slave trade to Africa had been 
exaggerated.32 He imputed that the value of the slave trade to the region was less than 
that of the internal trade and that the resultant social changes were, to some extent, 
changes that would otherwise have occurred due to the integration of the region into the
go
Atlantic trading complex. In short, the effect of the Atlantic slave trade was limited. 
Supporters of this theory, including JD Fage, drew on Curtin’s statistics to support their 
arguments, suggesting that slaves were largely drawn from the most populous parts of 
Africa, thus mitigating the impact of the trade.34
Becker and Barry attack this attempt to “minimise the importance of the Trans- 
Atlantic slave trade”.35 Becker in a response published a year after Curtin’s work, and 
Barry as recently as 1998. They assert that Curtin omits important sources, including 
data on smugglers,36 and that he advances arbitrary figures without adjusting for missing 
data.37 Becker and Barry advance the theory that slavery was much more important as 
a transforming force in West Africa than Curtin allows, irreversibly retarding the 
development of West African states. “Contrary to Curtin,” Becker states, “we estimate 
that the evolution of Senegambia cannot be understood except in the precise context of 
the Atlantic trade.”38
All of these scholars agree that the importance of this quantitative data is not in 
determining an abstract numerical value, but in applying the data to the practical issues 
of social and economic transformation in the societies of origin. Clearly, deliberations 
must move beyond the attempts to quantify the impact of the slave trade in order to 
understand its effect on African societies and on indigenous forms of slavery.
32 Curtin, Economic Change in Precolonial Africa, p.xxii
33 Ibid, p. 146-157.
34 Fage, J.D., “Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Context of West African History”, Journal o f African History, 1969 
(10), pp. 393-404.
35 A  phrase used by both Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p.67; and Becker, Charles, "Le 
Senegambie a L’epoque de la traite des esclaves. A  propos d’un ouvrage recent de Philip D. Curtin: Economic change 
in Senegambia in the era of the slave trade.”, Revue franqaise d ’histoire d ’outre-mer, (64), 1977, p.214.
36 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p.62.
37 Ibid, p.63.
38 Becker,, “Le Senegambie a L’epoque de la traite des esclaves”, p.214.
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The political impact of the Atlantic slave trade
It can no longer be disputed that the Atlantic slave trade prompted some type of 
adjustment within many West African societies, Of the many arguments in favour of this 
‘transformation’ view, some are unproved, and some may be discounted, but the mass 
of evidence suggests that socio-economic, military, and possibly demographic changes 
occurred in the region between the mid-sixteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth 
centuries, and that the slave trade was a contributing factor behind some of these 
changes.
The Atlantic slave trade tended to induce the formation of three distinct types of 
societies: slave-producing, slave-supplying, and slave-selling.39 Much of the confusion 
about the impact of the Atlantic slave trade is a result of a failure to differentiate between 
these societies, each of which played a particular role in the mechanics of the slave 
trade. Slaves originated from slave-producing societies, often in the interior, which were 
the objects of slave raids or wars. The populations of slave-producing societies may 
thus be seen as the ‘commodity’ of the Atlantic slave trade.
There is no doubt that the era of the slave trade, and the 18th century specifically, 
was for Senegal and the Gold Coast an era of war. Regional histories describe massive 
conflict in the Senegalese regions of Waalo40, Kaajor, Baol,41 Siin, and Saalum42 
Similarly, this was the era of Asante expansion in the Gold Coast interior, and the 
various states of Akyem43, Akwamu,44 and Akuapem45 contested with Asante and each 
other for regional dominance. However it is unclear whether these wars were created by 
the Atlantic slave trade. Curtin suggests that these conflicts would have occurred 
without the impetus of the slave trade, as a natural expression of state-building; the 
acquisition of slaves was simply a bonus for the victors. This ‘political’ view of these 
conflicts is supported by evidence from the Asantehene (paramount chief) Osei Bonsu 
of the Asante, who told a trader, Joseph Dupuis, that wars were fought for political 
reasons, and not specifically to capture slaves.
39 van Dantzig, Albert, “Effects of the Atlantic Slave Trade on some West African Societies”, in Joseph Inikori, ed., 
Forced Migration, Hutchinson, London, 1982, p.189.
40 Barry, LeRoyaume de Waalo, p.109
41 Becker, Charles and Victor Martin, “Kayor and Baol: Senegalese Kingdoms and the Slave Trade in the Eighteenth 
Century”, in Joseph Inikori, ed., Forced Migrations, Hutchinson, London, 1982, p.118-125,
42 Klein, Islam and Imperialism in Senegal, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1968, p.29.
43 Addo-Fening, Akyem Abuakwa, p.24.
44 Perbi, Akosua, “Domestic Slavery in Asante, 1800-1920", Unpublished MA Dissertation, U. o f Ghana, Legon, 
1978, p.14-15.
45 Kwamena-Poh, MA, Government and Politics in the Akuapem State, 1730-1850, Longman Group, London, p.20.
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I cannot make war to catch slaves in a bush, like a thief... But if 1 fight a king, 
and kill him when he is insolent, then certainly... his gold, and his slaves, and the 
people are mine too.... I did not make war for slaves, but because Dinkera (the 
King) sent me an arrogant message and killed my people.46
It can, however, be convincingly argued that the Atlantic slave trade changed the 
nature of war from political to economic47, supporting Becker and Barry’s thesis. 
Observers on the Gold Coast testified before the British parliament that “the pretexts [for 
wars] are various; the real cause...the desire for plunder48” and that “slaves formed the 
principal part49” of that plunder as late as 1842. Furthermore, the growth in scale and 
ferocity of conflict amongst Akan states seems to have occurred in the 1700s concurrent 
with the expansion of the slave trade, and states such as Akwamu and Akyem Abuakwa 
had efficient mechanisms for sending slaves to coastal entrepots.50 Similarly, the 1730 
defeat of Akwamu by Akyem and the 1744-45 and 1746-7 Asante victories over Gonja 
and Gyaman directly coincide with periods of increased slave exports from the Gold 
Coast.51
There are explanations at to why the slave trade may have caused an expansion 
of warfare. Before this period, trade routes had been directed towards the interior. The 
availability of guns, which became desirable trade items in the seventeenth century,52 is 
argued to have revolutionised warfare. Elites, it is postulated, desired firearms for 
defence and conquest acquired slaves in order to buy the weapons, and then used the 
weapons to acquire more slaves. As one state or party established superiority with their 
firearms, their neighbours were also forced to arm, and a vicious cycle appeared. The 
gun-slave cycle was especially clear in Senegal, where existing tyeddo armies were 
perfectly adaptable to slave raiding - especially armed with firearms and equipped with 
horses.53 On the Gold Coast, the acquisition of large numbers of flintlock muskets in the 
1680s and 1690s54 closely followed the development of missile-armed levee armies in
46 Dupuis, Joseph, Journal o f a Residence in Ashantee, London, 1824, p.163-164.
47 This dicotomy was introduced by Curtin in Economic Change in Precolonial Africa, pp.153-168.
48 PP 1842 XII. 1, 551, Evidence of Maclean, p.83.
49 PP 1842 XII.l, 551, Evidence of Cruickshank, p.86. Cruickshank is admittedly are only slightly more creditable 
than Osei Bonsu.
SQ Kwamena-Poh, Government and Politics in the Akuapem State, pp. 19-20, Addo-Fening, Akyem Abuakwa, p.24.
51 The 91,400 slaves traded from the Gold Coast in the 1740s represents an apex for the 18lh century, falling to a 
recorded 66,300 in the 1750s. Numbers are from Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery, p.50.
52 Alpern, Stanley, “What Africans Got for their Slaves: A  Master List of European Trade Goods”, History in Aftica, 
1995 (22), pp. 4-53.
53Becker and Martin, “Kayor and Baol”, 1982, p. 118-125.
54 Kea, Settlements, Trade and Polities, p. 161.
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the interior states of Akwamu and Denkyira55, and directly precedes intense periods of 
expansion, including the annexation of Akuapem. These actions led to increased slave 
exports and in increase in the number of slaves being co-opted into the military retinues 
of aristocrats and kings. The demand for slaves on the coast prompted slave-selling 
coastal societies to promote conflict in the interior, an obvious method of increasing their 
supply of slaves.56 As the demand for imported goods, guns, and monies grew, rulers 
also began to raid their own people to sell into the intercontinental trade.
Nevertheless, this theory is not as compelling as it may initially appear. John 
Thornton has pointed out that many wars which appeared to be only slave raids actually 
had political motivations which are not transparent to us.57 Furthermore, he explains the 
acquisition of slaves as war spoils more in terms of continuity than disruption. Since 
slaves were the primary sources of wealth in African regions such as the Gold Coast and 
Senegal where land was not privately ‘owned’, the accumulation of slaves, rather than 
the acquisition of territory, had traditionally been the objective of wars.58 Although 
Thornton’s evidence is based largely on Benin and Kongo, this argument compels us to 
re-evaluate whether European intervention and the Atlantic Slave Trade were 
responsible for vastly elevated levels of warfare. Evidence for both the Gold Coast and 
Senegal, for example, suggests that European guns and horses were not as central as 
previously believed to the expansion of warfare in these regions, bringing the gun-slave 
cycle into question. The shift in warfare on the Gold Coast was largely brought about by 
socio-economic changes in the interior states of Akwamu and Denkyira59 rather than on 
the coast, and preceded the introduction of firearms. Horses, moreover, were useless in 
the forest zones of this region. Similarly, the horses which were so useful to the tyeddo 
of the Senegalese sahel largely came from Sudanese breeders, rather than European 
traders, and early models of the musket - incredibly difficult to utilise on horseback - 
were probably not as useful as has previously been thought.60
Nevertheless, the pillaging of peasant villages for human spoils did have a 
profound effect on some slave-providing societies. Waalo, for example, served not only 
as a raiding ground for Trarza Moors supplying slaves to the Portuguese and French 
after the sixteenth century,61 but was subject to the depredations of its own tyeddo.62
55 Ibid, p. 156.
56 Klein, Islam and Imperialism, p.29.
57 Thornton, Africa and Africans, p. 100.
58 Ibid, p.107.
59 Kea, Settlements, Trade and Polities, pp.161-164.
6(1 Law, Robin, “Horses, Firearms and Political Power in Pre-Colonial West Africa”, Past and Present, 1976 (72), 
pp.112-132.
61 Barry, Le Royaume de Waalo, p.109
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Thus by 1819 large parts of Waalo had been rendered “entirely sterile” despite the 
region’s productivity.63
There is also evidence that the economic realignment resulting from the Atlantic 
slave trade encouraged the instability of Senegalese states. The Jolof confederation 
broke apart as its coastal provinces gained power from their status as middlemen for the 
slave trade. Coastal Kaajor won its independence first but was soon followed by Waalo 
and Baol. The Jolof core in the interior was isolated from the Atlantic trade, and quickly 
lost its regional hegemony.64 Throughout the seventeenth century, land and 
ascendancy struggles between the succession states of Kaajor and Baoi continued to 
provide fresh slaves for export.65
Throughout Senegal, small armed states remained the dominant system of 
organisation, but older principles of state administration rooted in lineage relationships 
gave way to the dominance of war-lord aristocracies supported by slave armies.66 As a 
result, Barry and Becker argue that development stagnated, locking these states into 
subsistence economies 67 The Gold Coast shows similar signs of suffering long term 
economic injury from slave raiding.68 Ga-Adangme towns in the Accra region, for 
example, were destroyed by Akwamu attacks in 1677-1681 following which Ray Kea has 
suggested that much of the cultivated area of the coastal plain reverted temporarily to 
wilderness.69 The densely populated Nyanoase region of Akwamu similarly suffered 
from conflict in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth century, reflected in figures 
that show a decline in the number of men it could muster for operations from several 
thousand in 1695 to ‘a few hundred’ in 1735.70
Proponents of the theory that the Atlantic slave trade retarded economic 
development in West Africa point to evidence suggesting massive depopulation - both 
directly by exporting a large part of the population, and indirectly through warfare, 
migration, and famine - held Africa “below the critical density needed to force a 
breakthrough in agricultural development.” For example, sources from the 1820s 
indicate that French plantations in Waalo failed partly because of decreased populations
62 ANS K25, L ’esclavage enAOF, Deherme, 1906, cites Relations du Royaume d ’lssyny, 1714.
63 ANS 2B4 Governeur a Ministre, 5 Juin 1819, St. Louis
64 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p.44.
65 Ibid, p.86.
66 Ibid, p.80.
67 Ibid, p.31.
68 Macdonald, The Gold Coast, p.85.
69 Kea, Settlements, Trade and Polities, p.139.
70 Ibid, p. 140.
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leading to labour shortages.71 Barry argues that this proves direct depopulation due to 
the Atlantic slave trade72, although it appears that much of the depopulation was due to 
a more indirect factor: emigration to escape the slave raids of Trarza Moors.73
Depopulation certainly appears to be a logical result of the slave trade. 
Unfortunately, outside of a few coastal regions quantitative evidence has been difficult to 
produce. Patrick Manning attempted to overcome this in a 1985 study in which he 
extrapolated the effect of the slave trade from 1931 West African population censuses. 
His results appear to show that from the early 18th century onwards, population growth 
slowed significantly,74 a result he confirms in his 1990 work Slavery and African Life.75 
Manning, however, has based his argument on a controversial assumption. Gervase 
Clarence-Smith points out that “although we know a great deal about how slaves were 
exported from Africa... we have no idea what the [previous] population of Africa was.” 76 
Manning’s statistics for pre-slave trade populations are “estimated by backward 
projection from colonial-period population figures,”77 an undertaking made difficult since, 
as Manning admits, the slave trade had a “seriously negative and distorting impact” on 
the African population.78 Similarly, Manning is unable to show that West Africa, which 
bore the brunt of the effects of the slave trade, travelled a statistically different 
demographic path from regions of Africa unaffected by this trade.
David Eltis has suggested that the Atlantic slave trade was too diffuse over time 
and place to have a major effect on West African populations.79 Statistical analyses 
drawn from the integrated database of the W.E.B. DuBois Institute, containing records of 
slave voyages by European and American slavers from 1595-1845 suggest that certain 
regions may have experienced a demographic shift.80 Data for the Gold Coast indicate 
that about 90% of all slave departures took place from just three ports - Accra (British 
and Danish), Anomabu, and Cape Coast Castle,81 while trade in Senegal focused on
71 ANSOM Senegal 1/8, Ministre a Administrateur Roget, 9 Janvier 1822, Paris.
72 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Tt'ade, 1998, p .107.
73ANS 2B4, Administrateur Schmaltz a Ministre, 5 Juin 1819, St. Louis.
74 Manning, Patrick, “The Impact of Slave Trade Exports on the Population of the Western Coast of Africa, 1700- 
1850", in Serge Daget, ed., D e la Traite a L ’esclavage, Bibliotheque D ’Histoire d’outre-mere, 1988.
75 Manning, Patrick, Slave/y and African Life, pp.60-86.
76Clarence-Smith, WG, “Review of Patrick Manning Slavery and African Life: Occidental, Oriental, and African 
Slave Trades”, International Journal o f African Historical Studies, 1993,(26), pp.176-178.
77 Manning, Slavery and African Life, p.60.
78 Ibid, p.59.
79Eltis, Economic Growth, p.71.
80 Richardson, David and David Eltis, “The ‘Numbers Game’ and Routes to Slavery”, in Slavery and Abolition, 1997 
(18), pp.1-15.
81 Richardson, David and David Eltis, “West Africa and the Transatlantic Slave Trade: New Evidence of Long-run 
Trends,” in Slavery and Abolition, 1997 (18), p.23.
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Goree and St. Louis. Periodic population declines did occur in specific regions such as 
Great Accra and Waalo, but only following disruptive and infrequent events such as 
conquest or civil war. In general, however, there is little evidence of drastic population 
shifts. While we cannot exclude the possibility that these may have occurred, and while 
statistical data is increasingly available, mass depopulation amongst Gold Coast and 
Senegalese societies simply remains unproven.
The evolution of coastal society
The popular conception of the malignant impact of the slave trade on African 
society, while undoubtedly true, rests to some extent on the almost universally accepted 
depiction of Africans as wholly victims of European predation. Add to this the well 
chronicled suffering of the middle passage82 and the harsh treatment of slaves in 
America, and it is easy to ignore the fact that some Africans played an important role in 
the Atlantic slave trade83. Indeed, if Europeans had had to capture slaves in the interior 
of Africa themselves, the impact of the trade would undoubtedly have been greatly 
reduced. John Thornton has argued that the slave trade must be viewed as “not unlike 
international trade anywhere in the world of that period.”84 indigenous merchants and 
elites clearly participated in the export of slaves, and it is clear that generally “Europeans 
possessed no means, either economic or military, to compel African leaders to sell 
slaves.”85
If slave-supplying societies were clearly victims, then the slave producing- 
societies who raided them were active participants in the profitable slave trade. 
However those who benefited the most were the slave-selling societies of the coast. The 
states of Akwamu and Fante on the Gold Coast grew greatly in power by monopolising 
trade to the Dutch and some British coastal factories.86 The Elminans were especially 
active participants. Following the Asante victory over Akwamu in 1730, they encouraged 
the Asantehene to send them slaves, initiating a relationship that would continue into the 
nineteenth century.87 Likewise, we have seen how the coastal states of the Jolof
82 The historical record is more poignant on this subject than even the profusion of secondary sources. See especially 
CO 137/88 The Report o f the Assembly o f Jamaica on the Slave Trade, 20 October, 1789.
83 The position taken here is much criticised, but was pointed out by Stanley Engerman in his article Engerman, 
Stanley, “Some Implications of the Abolition of the Slave Trade”, in Eltis, David and James Walvin, eds., The 
Abolition o f the Atla?itic Slave Trade, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1981, p.4.
84 Thor nton, Africa and Africans, p.72.
85 Ibid, p.125.
86 van Dantzig, “Effects of the Atlantic Slave Trade”, p. 190.
87Irwin, Graham, “Precolonial African Diplomacy: The Example of Asante”, International Journal o f African 
Historical Studies, 1975 (8), p.86.
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Confederation used profits from the Atlantic trade to break away from the core state. 
Some of these states were able to halt the export of their own productive population, 
instead dealing in slaves from the interior and further profiting by selling provisions to the 
slave caravaneers.88 In these slave-supplying societies of both the Gold Coast and 
Senegal, it was the traditional elite of chiefs and kings who conducted much of the trade, 
utilising slave armies such as the tyeddo and ahenfo89 and sanctioning raids and wars 
for the acquisition of trade slaves.90
However it was the development of distinct Euro-African middlemen communities 
around European posts, rather than the involvement of traditional African polities, which 
led to the reconception of dependency relationships on new terms. By 1702, there were 
26 forts - British, Danish, and Dutch - on the Gold Coast, from Beyin by the Tano river to 
Pram pram near the Volta.91 European merchants, especially the factors of chartered 
trading companies, did conduct a floating trade along the entire coast, but only a few 
forts developed large settled middleman communities. Along with others which would 
fade in importance were the Dutch commercial establishment at Elmina, the British 
headquarters only kilometres away at Cape Coast Castle, and the Ga-Adangme polity of 
Accra which hosted Dutch, Danish, and British forts.92 Similarly, despite the construction 
of inland factories along the Senegal river, urbanised Euro-African communities in 
Senegal were largely confined to the island entrepots of St. Louis and Goree. Within 
these towns, the simple ‘floating trade’ in slaves and other commodities was replaced by 
a more complicated and centralised commercial system.93 For the slave vendors, this 
system represented a major advance as slaves could be securely ‘stored’ in the forts or 
in stronghouses until a trading ship arrived. However these entrepots were designed 
more for the convenience of the slave buyers, who profited greatly from the 
concentration of slaves, provisions, and ship repair facilities in the same location.
These municipalities were frontier zones, areas of interaction and fusion between 
African and European peoples. Goree and St. Louis were populated mostly by an 
African and Euro-African trading class known as habitants and their slaves, in addition to 
a smaller number of noires libres (free blacks) and European administrative and 
merchant personnel. Habitants were the middlemen of Senegalese commerce. The
88Searing, West African Slavery and Atlantic Commerce, p.29-30.
89 Kea, Settlements, Trade and Polities, p.163. Like chiefs’ retinues on the Gold Coast in general, the ahenfo were 
composed of slaves, pawns, and free retainers.
90Reynolds, Trade and Economic Change, p.13.
91Dickson, Kwamina, A Historical Geography o f Ghana, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969, p.116.
92 Others included Nassaw, Fort Kormantse, and Sao Jorge. Kea, Settlements, Trade and Polities, p.207.
93Austen, R.,Afiican Economic History, James Curry/Heinemann, London, 1987, pp.88-91.
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habitant community was quite exclusive; membership was limited to freeborn individuals 
of high social rank and a professional or trading occupation - the gum trade having the 
highest status.94 Most of the habitants were metis - the descendants of French 
merchants and their African wives and concubines who were known as signares. The 
signares maintained the prevailing Senegalese matrilineal traditions, but adopted 
European dress and took French or Portuguese names - amongst them were Laports, 
Franciers, Pecarres, and Baudins.95 It is not too bold to say that the habitants and 
signares were the bourgeoisie of Senegal. Certainly, they so perceived themselves. As 
a class, they struggled against the monopoly of the royally chartered commercial 
companies, such as the Compagnie commerciale d'Afrique who monopolised the 
Transatlantic leg of the slave and gum trades.96 In 1789, they expressed their perceived 
French bourgeois identity by sending cahiers de doieance to the Estates Generaies97 
demanding an end to the company’s monopoly. Habitant families were not only related 
to indigenous elites but made political and economic alliances with them through
Q Qmarriage and contract.
Similar merchant societies rose in the Gold Coast in the 17th and 18th centuries.99 
These polities were also highly mixed - indigenous Africans commingled with the 
descendants of company servants brought from other parts of Africa, Euro-African 
families with names such as Bannerman, Cleland, Hesse, Barnes, and Swanzy, and 
slaves. The resulting communities adopted many of the attributes of local cultures - the 
populations of Cape Coast and Elmina generally took on the abusua (matrilineal group) 
customs of the Fante,100 while divisions in dominantly Ga-Adangme Accra remained 
patrilineal in nature.101 While Euro-Africans tended to dominate middlemen positions 
between European merchants and African traders102, and adopted an identity somewhat 
removed from ‘tribal1 life103, the line between the two populations was highly permeable.
94Marcson, Michael, “European-African Interaction in the Precolonial Period: Saint Louis, Senegal 1758-1854", 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, Princeton U., Princeton, NJ, 1974, p.34. My use of the class structure in describing Franco- 
Senegalese society will be justified in later chapters
95ANS K9 and K 1 0 ,1849.
96 Delcourt, Goree, p.60.
97 Biondi, Jean-Piere, Saint-Louis du Senegal: memoires d ’un metissage, Editions Denoel, Paris, 1987, p.7, pp. 72-73.
98 ANS, 2B2, Schmaltz a Ministre, 19 June, 1919.
99 For a superb analysis of the economics of trade at these ports, as well as a number of biographies of important 
figures, see Kea, Settlements, Trade and Polities, p.206-247.
100Kaplow, “African Merchants of the 19th Century Gold Coast”, p. 19.
101See Parker, John, “Ga state and society in early colonial Accra, 1860s-1920s”, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University 
of London - School of Oriental and African Studies, 1995.
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Century”, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Boston University, 1969, p.122.
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Moreover, Euro-Africans carefully maintained important economic and consanguineal 
links with the indigenous community, and in practice often filled the important economic 
and political positions within these trading zones.
* * *
Within these societies, for the first time in West Africa, slavery moved from a 
largely cultural institution to a dominant mode of labour and economic organisation. The 
selling of slaves was the foundation of the process by which this occurred. These 
coastal forts and posts dealt, by the 1700s, with the majority of slaves being sold into the 
Atlantic trade.104 Many of the slave vendors were chiefly officeholders or merchants, but 
small traders selling one or two slaves are also present in the historical record.105 
Relatively swiftly, large numbers of slaves were diverted from the trade and retained for 
use within the community. The European powers each maintained slaves as workers 
and artisans, and even sent them as traders into the interior, in Elmina, there were 
about 184 company slaves in1645.100 British records show 367 slaves at Cape Coast 
serving as carpenters, gold takers, coopers, gunners, cooks, brickmakers, blacksmiths, 
chapel servants, canoemen, doctor’s servants, goldsmiths, armourers, and common 
servants.107 By the turn of the 19th century large numbers of slaves were in the hands of 
individual merchants - some of whom owned up to several hundred individuals. 
Evidence indicates they were used as porters, domestic servants, trading agents, and in 
cultivation.108
The rise in slave holding in these areas was directly linked to the development of 
merchant capital; as the concentration of wealth led to the accumulation of labour power 
as well as land and goods by wealthy merchants.109 Ray Kea has pointed out that in the 
Gold Coast slaves not only produced foodstuffs, but generated cash money for their 
masters through the sale of agricultural goods in town markets and through the 
production of gold.110 It is unclear how complete this transformation was and exactly 
when it took place. Certainly early in the seventeenth century the evidence indicate that
104Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p.49. Richardson, David and David Eltis, “West Africa and the 
Transatlantic Slave Trade”, p.23.
lli5The papers of Richard Miles provide excellent examples of these minor traders in the form of lists of purchases 
from Africans, op. cit. Metcalf, George, “A  microcosm of why Africans sold slaves: Akan consumption patterns in the 
1770s”, Journal o f African History, 1987 (28), pp.377-394.
106Feinberg, “Elmina, Ghana”, p.121.
107PRO, From First Schedule of the Act of 1752 (25 George II, cap.40).
108PRO CO 267/56, McCarthy to Bathurst, May 16,1822.
109 Kea, Settlements, Trade and Polities, p.56.
110 Ibid, p.200. Apropos the use of slaves for gold production.
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the goods sold in market towns and along the coast were more prevailingly “the surplus 
production of peasant family households rather than that of slave family households.”111 
However, there is some evidence from the 1630-1640s that wealthy indigenous 
merchants established farming villages near Cape Coast which may have been worked 
by slaves. Moreover, Kea suggests that in some regions at least, by the eighteenth 
century "slaves and bonded freemen... became the principal sources of subsistence for 
nonfarming urban dwellers and of social wealth for the dominant classes.”112
Urban Senegalese slavery evolved around French needs. The French 
government did not keep its own slaves. Instead, slaves were acquired by the habitant 
community and rented to the French government, resident merchants, and ship’s 
captains. Slaves were employed as laptots (canoemen), skilled workmen, millet 
grinders, cleaning women, laundry workers, and even musicians.113 The defence of the 
two islands was also dependent on slaves who were mobilised by their masters when 
conflict threatened.114 The relationship between slaves and masters that evolved here 
differed from that of traditional Wolof and Sereer society. Male slaves, especially laptots 
received a wage, consisting of a portion of the money paid to their master for their 
services, and could acquire considerable property.115 This fusion society thereby created 
a class of slaves whose role was entirely economic, supplementing the domestic and 
trade slaves in the community. These slaves even appear to have enjoyed a certain 
type of economic - if not social - mobility116; using their wages to purchase boats and 
hire their own labourers. However this mobility did not extend to enfranchisement - it 
was rare for slaves, however wealthy, to be able to purchase their own freedom.
In addition to the slave as labourer, habitant society recognised the slaves as 
status symbol. These captives, such as female parasol bearers, accompanied the 
signares on their promenades along the n’dar tout or around town as a signifier of elite
111 Ibid, p.16.
112 Ibid, pp.16,165.
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status.117
The expansion of slavery
In 1853, Brodie Cruickshank suggested that "there is reason to believe that, 
during some period of their history, the slave was protected by a more humane code of 
laws.”118 However he was forced to admit that indigenous slavery in the nineteenth 
century was not as benign an institution as depicted by colonial and company sources. 
Indeed, evidence suggests that over the preceding four hundred years the slave trade 
had acted as the catalyst for a transformation in both the numbers and the position of 
domestic slaves. The growth of slavery within Africa was most marked in the previously 
discussed coastal societies where the export trade was most important. The ratio of 
slaves to free people within the Gold Coast is posited to have risen to as high as 50% in 
some areas, while that in Siin, Saalum, Kaajor, and Waalo grew similarly.119 By the 
nineteenth century, the consensus amongst European visitors was that “here, [on the 
Gold Coast] domestic slavery is the root and foundation of the whole social system...”120 
Although it has been argued that this transformation to a slave mode of 
production was complete throughout West Africa, it was really quite limited before the 
nineteenth century, especially in the interior. Still, there is a great amount of evidence to 
suggest that the change, while gradual, was evident in both the Gold Coast and 
Senegal. As slaves became more valuable as trade commodities, slave owners 
developed new methods of acquisition, a phenomenon of which the growth of warfare is 
only one indication. Punishment was another method of procurement. Meredith noted 
that “during the slave trade, [the laws] all agreed in their ultimate tendency, that of 
slavery: for a trifling offence a man lost his liberty...”121 Enslavement also appears to 
have replaced fining as the most common punishment in the Sereer states.122. Other 
Europeans noted a growing trend towards slavery as the result of famine and 
insolvency. Parents unable to feed their children began to sell their children, or even 
themselves, into slavery to avoid starvation. It also became more difficult to achieve 
liberation. In Senegal, the manumission of children born to slave mothers and free 
fathers appears to have become virtually unknown,123 and Captain Maclean, long-time
117 Gueye, “Le fin de l ’esclavage", p.637.
118 Cruickshank, Brodie, Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast o f West Africa, 2 vols, London, 1853, p.240-243.
119 Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery, p.157, p.190.
120 PRO CO 96/25, Cruickshank to Smith, 26 August, 1851, Cape Coast Castle. Also in same file see Native Traders 
to Hill, 15 Dec 1851, CCC, and British Resident Merchants to Governor Jeremie, 24 March 1841, CCC.
121 Meredith, Henry, An Account o f the Gold Coast o f Africa, London, 1812, p.27.
122 Klein, Islam and Imperialism, p.29.
123 ANS K17, Rapport sur la Captivite, Administrateur Poulet, 1905.
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administrator of the Gold Coast, reported that by the nineteenth century slaves were 
“seldom manumitted by their masters.”124
It was not only methods of slave acquisition and retention that were affected by 
the adjustments wrought by the needs of the Atlantic slave trade. As intercontinental 
trade grew, slaves were to some extent sucked into the production of trade goods and 
foodstuffs. Much has been made of this ‘transformation of slavery’, proposed by Paul 
Lovejoy in his book of the same name:
The pull of the market had the effect of pushing indigenous forms of slavery 
further away from a social framework in which slavery was another form of 
dependency in societies based on kinship relationships to a system in which 
slaves played an increasing role in the economy.125
One of the cornerstones of Lovejoy’s hypothesis is the logical assumption that the slave 
trade must have stimulated the production and sale of foodstuffs to feed the 
unproductive trade slaves. It is clear that millions of slaves were moving from the interior 
to the coast, where they were housed, sometimes for long periods of time, until a slave 
ship appeared to carry them away. These slaves therefore needed to be fed at three 
stages - in caravans, in the barracooms, and on the ships themselves. Add to this the 
evidence that large numbers of slaves were being retained by coastal West African 
societies, and that urban populations who were not agriculturally productive were 
growing, and it seems likely that these slaves were employed in a slave mode of 
production. James Searing, Martin Klein, and other historians agree with Lovejoy that 
this must have occurred.
Unfortunately, the evidence for a rising slave mode of production during this era is 
unclear. Much is made of evidence that Cape Coast merchants employed slaves in 
‘plantations’ by 1822.126 But we know from the reports of explorers that the word 
‘plantation’ was often loosely applied to the cultivation of crops for local consumption. 
Still, it is not too far a stretch to believe that slaves belonging to merchants here may 
have been engaged in farming of crops for sale in the towns and forts; the chiefly office 
holders (caboceers), merchants, and resident Europeans of urban Gold Coast 
settlements fed themselves on produce from slave-worked farms.127 Certainly by the 
seventeenth century peasants in coastal societies were beginning to pay land ‘rent’ in
124 PP 1842 XII.l (551), Evidence of Captain Maclean, p.82.
125 Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery, p.19.
126 PRO CO 267/56, McCarthy to Bathurst, May 15,1822, no place.
127 Kea, Settlements, Trade and Polities, p.43.
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the form of gold, which they acquired by selling a portion of their goods at urban 
markets.128 However, this phenomenon appears to have been limited to the 
neighbourhood of urban coastal enclaves. States in the interior such as Akwamu and 
Akuapem seem to have turned more towards promoting commerce than agricultural 
production, and to have viewed slaves as products for export rather than the production 
of foodstuffs.129 The exception to this may have been the clearing of forests for 
agricultural production in forested regions of Adanse and Amanse, which Ivor Wilks 
argues became a task for unfree labour in the fifteenth and sixteenth century.130 Here 
too, the surge in slavery was related to the accumulation of merchant capital created by 
a rise in the mining and trade of gold in these regions - the profit from this industry being 
used by merchant families to purchase land and slaves.
In Senegal, the evidence for a slave mode of production is slightly more 
compelling. Slaves heading toward St. Louis were conveyed along a great distance, as 
many of them came from Gaajaga and Bambara territories. Searing has suggested that 
during this period slavery “was associated with both an extension in the size of 
agricultural units and intensification of the labour process.”131 Indeed, French sources 
indicate that many Wolof slaves worked their masters5 land for several days a week 
during this period.132 However, peasant subsistence production remained dominant.133 
French plantation administrators as late as the early 19th century in Waalo, for example, 
found that this region - neighbouring St. Louis - could still only provide free labour, and 
that slave labour for the purpose of cultivation was not readily available.134 It appears 
that while the transformation of slavery to a more obviously economic arrangement 
began to spread to African societies during the Atlantic trade, it was still an initial, rather 
than complete, transformation.
The transformation of pawning on the Gold Coast
The institution of pawning, on the other hand, was radically reinvented by the 
Atlantic slave trade. It appears probable that indigenous institutions of pawning, or debt 
bondage, originated as a method by which a husband’s abusua could acquire rights to
129Perbi, “Domestic Slavery in Asante”, p.14-15.
130 Wilks, Ivor, “Land, Labour, Capital, and the Forest Kingdom of Asante: A  Model of Early Change”, in J. 
Friedman and M.J. Rowlands, eds., The Evolution o f Social Systems, Duckworth, London, 1977, pp.508-512.
l31Searing, West African Slavery and Atlantic Commerce, p.48.
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133This was still true when groundnut farming became dominant in the 1850s.
134ANSOM Senegal II/2, Roger a Ministre, 12 Janvier 1820, St. Louis.
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his wife’s labour and children in a matrilineal society,135 In the era of the slave trade, 
however, pawning underwent a transition from a negotiated transfer of authority between 
lineage groups to a fundamentally commercial transaction. The demand for slaves led 
to the clandestine selling of contractually acquired pawns into slavery, often for export. 
By the nineteenth century, Gold Coast societies were allowing the sale of pawns outright 
to a purchaser, ignoring the traditional protections of pawn status.136 The line between 
pawns and slaves was thus blurred.
As pawns became vulnerable to the export trade, and as the demand for labour to 
replace individuals lost from slave-producing societies and to grow food for coastal 
communities continued to rise, elites developed strategies to enlarge their potential 
supply of pawns. Among the most significant methods by which they accomplished this 
appear to have been the development of punishment pawning and the growth in debt- 
producing customs. Throughout the eighteenth century, the size of fines given as 
punishment climbed precipitously. Indigenous chiefs levied increasingly enormous fines 
as punishment in cases of dispute. Evidence shows that not only those found guilty, but 
even occasionally the victors in litigation ran up such enormous fees that they became 
insolvent and were pawned to the very chiefs who heard their cases.137 Heavy damages 
were levied in cases such as adultery, which had not previously been punishable by 
financial penalty, and many imagined cases were brought before chiefs for the specific 
purpose of gaining pawns.138 Interest rates similarly surged. Before the Atlantic slave 
trade, there is no evidence that interest was laid on pawns,139 but during the eighteenth 
century interest of 50-100% became common both in pawning cases and for the 
borrowing of money in the coastal states.140 In both cases creditors began to seize 
members of the debtor’s abusua (matrilineage) and sell them as slaves. When this did 
not satiate their demands, it became common for creditors to kidnap and sell “any 
person or persons belonging to the said family, or even to the same country, state, or 
town, with the debtor.”141 This type of kidnapping, known as panyarring, was closely 
related to the increased demand for slaves and pawns created by the redirection of
I35The best analyses we have regarding pawning in Akan societies comes from Asante. Rattray, Ashanti Law and 
Constitution, p.48. For more on Akan pawning, see Austin, Gareth, “Human Pawning in Asante, 1800-1940: 
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unfree individuals into the Atlantic slave trade, The 1842 Parliamentary Select 
Committee, which generally accepted pawning as “voluntarily entered into” and “not 
abstractly unjust or unreasonable” nevertheless argued that by that date the spread of 
the practice of panyarring had made the institution of pawning “liable to much abuse, 
and much resembling slavery” and argued that thus “it should be the object of our policy 
to get rid of [pawning], even among the natives.”142 Evidence of panyarring became 
especially prevalent with the introduction of missionaries in the 1850s and 60s,143 but 
some sources make it clear that it occurred in the late eighteenth century and the early 
1800s as well.144 It seems evident that it was the voracious demand of the Atlantic 
slave trade that distorted the traditional custom of pawning. African elites took the 
initiative to find new supplies of people for export, and the institution of pawning was 
convenient for their needs. There is evidence that the panyarring of individuals found 
“on pathways, in forests, and on plantations” had become an accepted part of both inter­
state and inter-divisional conflicts, and that individuals captured in this manner were sold 
to slave-dealers on the coast.145
Not only was panyarring an efficient method of recruiting slaves for export, but 
due to the kinship-based roots of the institution, the children of female pawns (the 
majority of pawns were still female because of the nature of traditional pawning) 
belonged to creditors, lending them additional value as retained slaves. Given the new 
high interest rates, pawns were unlikely to be redeemed, and if they were, creditors still 
stood to make a great profit. The combination of high interest rates, panyarring, and the 
clandestine export of pawned individuals for export combined to make pawning an 
important tool for slave merchants.
In this environment changing cultural traditions contributed to the rise in pawning. 
Funeral and initiation rites reach a destructive level of extravagance in the eighteenth 
century as families put themselves in debt to pay for vastly inflated ceremonies and 
rituals.146 Records of colonial tribunals do not stretch back this far, but governmental 
reports speak of “ruinously expensive fetish ceremonies” and the economic 
embarrassment of “the expenses attending the celebration of all the principal events of
142 PP 1842, XI.1 (551), Report from the Select Committee on Slavery on the West Coast o f Africa, vi and vii.
l43See Chapter 4
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life”147 greatly expanding the practice of pawning. By the nineteenth century, the 
widespread institutions of panyarring and pawning bore little resemblance to the lineage- 
based model from which they developed.
The Atlantic slave trade and gender
Social transformation in the wake of the Atlantic slave trade was not confined to 
the institution of pawning. The role of gender in Senegalese and Gold Coast societies 
was distorted by the demands of the trade and, more importantly, the accompanying 
demands on labour by coastal societies servicing the slave trade. In order to 
understand this phenomenon, we have to briefly return to the statistics.
Women, we know, had traditionally formed a significant proportion of slaves in 
West Africa. Because of local cultural paradigms, women in both Senegambia and on 
the Gold Coast were important workers in agricultural and marketing contexts,148 tasks 
which became prevailingly the role of slaves in coastal societies during the era of the 
slave trade. Women were also valuable for their reproductive capacity. In bride-wealth 
societies, which characterised the populations of both the Gold Coast and Senegal, 
marrying a woman required a large outlay of resources.149 In addition, in the dominant 
matrilineal societies of both regions, women and their offspring still belonged to their 
matrilineage after marriage. Reproducing with slaves was a strategy that outflanked 
both of these constrictions, as masters avoided expensive bride-price payments and 
retained ownership of the offspring. Unions with female slaves were probably not 
preferable for first marriages, as they conferred no status, but certainly slaves were 
useful as additional wives and concubines, increasing as they did a man’s reproductive 
and production potential.150
Statistics indicate that the Atlantic slave trade reinforced this equation. Plantation 
owners in the new world paid preferable prices for slaves they perceived to be the best 
workers - young men,151 and these therefore formed the majority of the Atlantic trade. 
This phenomenon has been quantified by a series of historians. A survey of slaves 
imported into Jamaica from the Gold Coast for the period 1764-1788, for example,
147PRO CO 879/33, Fairfield Report, 1874.
148 Roberts and Miers, “The End of Slavery in Africa”, p.6-8.
149I thank Professor Robert Addo-Fening for information on marriage customs amongst the Akan. Similarly, French 
sources indicate that men made several ceremonial payments to matrilineages amongst the Sereer and Wolof. ANS 
K17, Rapport sur la Captivite, Administrateur Poulet, 1905, p.37.
150Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery, p.14.
151 Studies carried out in Jamaica, Virginia, and other slave destinations bear this out. See especially Galenson, David, 
Traders, Planters, and Slavers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p94-96, for British Carribean 
territories.
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included 11,176 women and 5,565 men.152 French shipping statistics from the 
Senegambia indicate a ratio of 175 women for every 100 men withdrawn from the 
coast,153 while another study suggests a statistics of 4:1 for the Senegal river region 
alone.154 Together, records of pre-abolition Atlantic slave traders indicate that their 
shipments included approximately 60% men and 40% women - leaving perhaps 
3,000,000 extra women in coastal markets towns and along the slave route.155
While these statistics show that consumers favoured male slaves, the explanation 
is not simply a question of demand. African slave vendors probably preferred to retain 
female slaves both for their own domestic needs and because they brought a higher 
price in the Saharan trade.156 The demand for men and women from slave-producing 
societies, therefore, was somewhat balanced, if serving several markets. Consequently, 
the rise of female slavery in coastal societies was largely a question of choice. Local 
slave owners preferred to retain female slaves and export a greater percentage of 
males. Coastal communities during this period tended to experience a marked rise in 
polygamy,157 and to exhibit a high proportion of females in slavery. Much of the 
evidence uncovered for this occurrence dates from slightly later than the Atlantic slave 
trade period, but is still illustrative in showing the effects of this transition. The slave 
population of French Senegal (the vast majority in Goree and St. Louis) in 1845, for 
example, was 4248 males and 5865 females.158 Similarly, the Methodist Missionary 
Society indicates a high proportion of slave wives amongst their congregants at Cape 
Coast in the 1830s,159 and Claire Robertson argues that nineteenth century Ga- 
Adangme slavery in Accra revolved around the owning of female slaves.160 As we will 
see in later chapters, British colonial records indicate similar trends after the inception of 
organised judicial records some 50 years after the end of the Atlantic slave trade. It is 
not too bold to argue from these various sources that by the nineteenth century women 
formed the majority of slaves in coastal regions, especially as traditionally female tasks
152Inikori, Forced Migration, p.23
153Geggus, David, "Sex Ratio, Age, and Ethnicity in the Atlantic Slave Trade: Data from French Shipping and 
Plantation Records”, Journal of African History, 1989 (30), pp.23-40.
154Klein, Martin, “Women in Slavery in the Western Sudan”, in Claire Robertson and Martin Klein,eds., Women and 
Slavery in Africa, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1983, pp.70-71.
155Inikori, Forced Migrations, p.25,
156Joseph Inikori estimates that from 1500-1890 4,590,000 women and 2,260,000 men were transported across the 
Sahara. Inikori, Forced Migrations, p.25.
157Manning, Patrick, “The Impact of Slave Trade Exports”, p.125.
l58ANSOM Senegal XIV/13, Tableaux Statistique, 1845.
159MMS West African Correspondence, G. Wrigley to Committee, 20 February 1837, Cape Coast, Box 258.
lfi0Robertson, Claire, “Post Proclamation Slavery in Accra: A  Female Affair?”, in Suzanne Miers and Richard 
Roberts, eds., The End o f Slavery in Africa, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1988, p.220-223.
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such as market vending and domestic work made up the majority of slave tasks in towns 
such as Cape Coast, Accra, Goree, and St. Louis.
Conclusions
West African society, in general, did not radically evolve within the era of the 
Atlantic slave trade. Instead, the effects of the Atlantic slave trade were just the 
beginning of a long period of transformation. The export trade was simply a catalyst that 
initiated a longer period of new economic development, integration into the Atlantic 
world, and transformation of indigenous social and political institutions. Much of this 
change occurred only after the ‘abolition’ of the export trade across the Atlantic in the 
nineteenth century. Still, for Senegal and the Gold Coast, the traces of the changes to 
come were becoming evident by 1800. African states were in disarray: large empires 
had broken up and economic development in the interior was stagnant, while Europe 
and its allies on the African coast were the beneficiaries of a realignment of trade routes 
and power towards the Atlantic ocean. These coastal communities incorporated African 
culture and combined it with European ideas such as mercantilism. It was here that 
social and economic paradigms shifted first, spreading slowly to neighbouring societies 
and then inland to the larger states of the interior. Slave modes of production did not 
become the norm, but slaves began to grow crops for sale in town markets and for 
provisioning the convoys of export slaves. The number and proportion of locally-held 
female slaves grew and larger numbers of slaves were retained by the trading powers 
and by individuals. On the Gold Coast, pawning underwent a systematic change, 
becoming harsher and losing its connection to the lineage system from which it 
developed. As Senegal and the Gold Coast entered the 19th century, they were 
societies in flux, having lost the strength of large states and strong traditional 
organisation without having gained much in return. At this critical juncture, European 
powers unilaterally decided to end the slave trade. In the resulting crisis of abolition 
merchants, administrators, slave-owners, and slaves would all struggle to impress their 
desires on the face of post-Atlantic trade slavery.
41
CHAPTER 3:
The crisis of abolition, legitimate trade, and the continuity of slavery
The criminalisation of the Atlantic slave trade did not induce a reversion to 
pre-contact traditions of slavery in West Africa. Rather, its termination induced a 
wider and sociologically more significant transformation of dominance 
relationships in less than half a century than had the slave trade. For slaves, 
slave-owners, and administrators abolition was a prototype crisis, a practice 
round for emancipation. Consequently, slave-owning elites developed the 
strategies of negotiation, evasion, and opposition which they were to put to 
effective use in subsequent periods. European administrators were forced to 
balance metropolitan demands for increased commercial productivity, the threats 
to the political and economic integrity of the colonies caused by African 
opposition to anti-slavery legislation, and the stringent demands of the 
abolitionist lobby. On a fundamental level, administrative structures were put 
into place in coastal enclaves which would form the models for later colonial 
states.
Slavery itself changed in response to the crisis of abolition. The role of 
slaves in the cultivation of trade goods and as labourers and soldiers expanded 
while fluctuating slave prices and increased demand for agricultural labour 
promoted slave owning outside traditional social groups. The trend towards a 
slave mode of production begun by the Atlantic slave trade was fed by the 
expanding production of legitimate goods during this period - an era in which the 
traffic in people was replaced by a trade in raw materials.
Abolition de jure
The abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade was a nineteenth century story. 
The first significant calls for the institution’s demise began in the 1780s, but it 
took more than two decades before the first of the major carrier states joined the 
movement towards abolition of the export of slaves from Africa to the new world.
Abolitionism caught hold first in Protestant northern Europe. On March
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16, 1792, Denmark became the first European power to forbid the slave trade to 
its citizens.1 Only a small number of slaves were carried annually on Danish- 
flagged ships, however, and the decree only took effect in 1803. Even after this 
date British and German plantation owners in the Danish Caribbean continued to 
utilise slave labour.
It was during this period that abolitionism firmly took hold in Britain. While 
there were distinct philosophical roots to abolitionism, “it was mainly religious 
conviction, insight and zeal which made it possible for anti-slavery feeling to be 
subsumed in a crusade against the slave trade and slavery.”2 In England, the 
Quaker anti-slavery discourse and evangelical and missionary ideals took hold 
amongst a class beginning to accumulate capital. Beginning in the 1780s, 
educated English and Scotsmen such as Sir Samuel Romilly, Thomas Clarkson, 
and Thomas Walker - men who had links to both capitalist institutions and the 
church - began to lead petition drives meant to influence Parliament. Due to the 
credentials of the movement’s leaders, these efforts quickly gained the support 
of “cities and towns, churches and vestries, and a wide range of private and 
public organisations.”3 By 1793, lower class radicals had emerged as a major 
force in the abolitionist movement, which was also driven by an environment of 
“intellectual and theological change”.4
The abolitionist movement was closely related to the mature state of 
capitalism within England. The mobilisation of a massive system for exporting 
slaves over the previous centuries, accompanied as it was by conflict, the 
plundering of agricultural villages, and reduction of production potential, 
interfered with the gathering and export of raw materials from Africa.5 The
1 N0rregard, Danish Settlements in West Africa, p.172.
2 Aiistey, Roger, “The Pattern of British abolitionism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries”, in Bolt, 
Christine and Seymour Drescher, eds., Anti-slavery, religion, and reform: essays in memory o f  Roger 
Anstey, W. Dawson, Folkestone ,1980, p.20.
3 Walvin, James, “The Public Campaign in England against Slavery, 1787-1834”, in David Eltis and James 
Walvin, eds., The Abolition o f the Atlantic Slave Trade, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1981,
p.65.
4 Anstey, Roger, “Religion and British Slave Emancipation”, in David Eltis and James Walvin, eds., The 
Abolition o f the Atlantic Slave Trade, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1981, pp.37.
5 Austen, Afi ican Economic History, p.45.
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industrial revolution’s demand for these materials6 drove the abolitionist process 
amongst mercantile interests. There is some debate which factor - ideological or 
commercial - was more significant in contributing to abolitionism in Britain, much 
of the evidence for ideological factors residing in the fact that many merchant 
abolitionists were acting against their own interests. However the involvement of 
merchants in the abolitionist movement7 was vital to its success, and contributed 
to the government’s decision to abolish the slave trade in 1807. The general 
consensus of historians is that “industrialisation created social classes and 
political groups which, lacking any strong vested interest in Atlantic slavery and 
jockeying for power with older mercantile forces which did, allied with those who 
opposed the dealings in human beings on theological and humanitarian 
grounds.”8 The subsequent Act of Parliament banning the export of slaves from 
Africa was no half measure, and the prescribed punishment included the 
forfeiture of any ship involved in the slave trade and a £100 pound fine for each 
slave confiscated - a substantial amount for the time.9 The law was further 
amended in 1811 to include punishment by transportation to a penal colony for 
the arrested officers of slave ships.10
The French embraced abolition somewhat less enthusiastically. Pre­
revolutionary French society did not develop the social and economic 
circumstances which created an environment in which abolitionism could 
flourish. The revolutionary government’s prohibition of slavery in 1794 was 
therefore something of a shock, and the decree was not enforced in either the 
Caribbean colonies or Africa 11 before being revoked by the premier consul 
Napoleon in 1802. Napoleon did issue an imperial decree forbidding the slave 
trade to French shipping during the 100 days’ rule of 1815, but the Restoration
6 Agbodeka, Francis, African Politics and British Policy in the Gold Coast 1868-1900, Northwestern Press, 
Evanston, 1971, p.18.
7 PRO CO 267/54, Committee to Bathurst, June 24,1814, Africa Office. PRO CO 267/54, Barnes to 
Bathurst, 23 April 1814, Africa Office. Meredith, An Account o f the Gold Coast, p.214.
H Austen, African Economic History, 1987, p.42.
9 PP 1806-7,1, (41,.45,.53), An Act for the Abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade.
10 pp ig io -11 ,1 , (275), An Act to render more effectual the Act for the Abolition of the Atlantic Slave 
Trade.
11 Roberts and Miers, “The End of Slavery in Africa”, p. 14.
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monarchy chose to ignore it.12 Subsequently, abolition was imposed upon 
France by the alliance formed against it (chiefly Britain) through the second 
Treaty of Paris in 1815. The abolition clause, perceived by the French populace 
as an attempt by maritime Britain to impose its ambition to control the seas, was 
also largely ignored. When, in January 1817 a royal ordinance reprised 
Napoleon’s 1815 decree forbidding the slave trade, and on April 15, 1818 it was 
finally promulgated, a cruiser squadron was almost immediately despatched to 
West Africa - not in hopes of catching slavers, but in order to challenge British 
supremacy over the region.13 As a result, French enforcement of laws intended 
to eradicate the export trade in slaves was extremely weak.
Enforcement and evasion: the illegal slave trade
The abolition of the export of slaves from Africa was decreed by the 
European metropoles, who intended that much of the responsibility for its 
enforcement would be held by officials dispatched from Europe - specifically the 
commanders of cruiser squadrons. In the event, however, officers of the 
Company of Merchants Trading to Africa and colonial officials based in coastal 
posts and towns played a large role in the struggle against the illegal trade. 
Simultaneously, African and Euro-African slave traders attempted to elude 
patrols and evade abolition laws. Contrary to European expectations, the 
campaign to end the slave trade was therefore largely a local affair.
The strong British naval presence off the Gold Coast caused an 
immediate decline in the scale of the export slave trade, from approximately 
8,000 slaves per year in 1800 to about a quarter of that in 1815.14 The Danish 
had already promulgated abolition, and the Dutch followed suit in 1813, although 
they continued to recognise the export of unfree ‘apprentices’. 15 British cruisers
12 27 March 1815. Daget, Serge, “Le Trafic Negrier Illegal Frangais de 1814 a 1850: Historiographe et 
Source”, Antiales de I’Universite d ‘Abidjan, 1975 (3), p.27.
13 Daget, Serge, “France, Suppression of the Illegal Trade, and England, 1817-1850", in David Eltis and 
James Walvin, The Abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1981, pp. 195- 
196.
14 Manning, Slaveiy and African Life, p.66.
15 van Dantzig, Albert, “Elmina, Asante, and the Abolitionists: Morality, Security, and Profits”, in Serge 
Daget, ed., D e la Traite d L'e.s'c/avagc^Bibliothcquc DTJistoirc d’outre-mer, 1988, pp.583-602.
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were given the right to search Dutch vessels through an 1819 treaty with the 
Netherlands, a condition subsequently extended to the Spanish, Portuguese, 
and other European and American vessels as well.16 As a result, the export slave 
trading from traditionally active ports such as Accra, Elmina, and Commenda 
declined quite drastically. The major drawback of such seaports for slave 
smugglers was their exposure to the ocean. More effective ports in Guinea and 
Nigeria were hidden behind mazes of creeks, but from Apollonia to the Volta 
River, the Gold Coast seaboard was more open. The effect of abolition on the 
commercial establishment of the Gold Coast was therefore almost immediate. 
Bowdich and other travellers of this period report evidence of abandoned slave- 
trading factories near the coast. Large slave markets such as Mansu were found 
in ruins.17 As late as 1821 Hutton visited Commenda, Apollonia, ‘Tatum5, and 
‘Succondee’, and noted that they had been abandoned by the servants and 
officials of the Company of Merchants due to lack of trade.18 The Dutch 
settlements were similarly crippled by abolition, especially after 1818.19 The 
British Company of Merchants was so impoverished that the Crown assumed 
possession of their assets in 1822.20
Concurrent with abolition, however, 1807 was also the year that the 
Asante state defeated an alliance of Akan states, taking enormous numbers of 
captives.21 With the collapse of the Atlantic trade -  Asante’s traditional market 
for war captives - the Asantehene cast about for other possible solutions. No 
doubt a portion could still be sold in coastal states, but this market was already 
glutted; prices in the littoral had declined from more than 9 ounces in 180322 to 
around 7 ounces in 180723. The Asantehene begged the British authorities to
16 PP 1819 ,1.-A, (119), (Netherlands). PP 1818,1, (314), (Spain). PP 1818,1, (333), (Portugal).
17 Reynolds, Trade and Economic Change, p.45.
18 Hutton, William, A Voyage to Afiica, Including a Narrative o f an Embassy to One o f the Internal 
Kingdoms, London, 1821, pp. 74-75.
19 Coomb, Douglas, The Gold Coast, Britain, and the Netherlands, 1850-1874L Oxford University Press, 
London, 1963, p .l.
20 PRO CO 267/54, An Act for Abolishing the African Company, 17 May, 1821.
21 La Torre, Joseph, “Wealth Surpasses Everything: An Economic History of Asante, 1750-1874", 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of California Berkeley, 1978, p.436.
22 La Torre, “Wealth Surpasses Everything”, p.426.
23 Hutton, A Voyage to Africa, p.53.
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reinstitute the trade at least until 182024, but following their refusal Asante 
merchants began increasingly to redirect trade east to the Volta River. The 
region around and beyond the Volta was not only outside British authority, but 
was characterised by convoluted creeks perfect for hiding both canoes and 
ocean-going vessels.25 It is not inconceivable that many Akan slaves were 
diverted down these routes and subsequently exported from Slave Coast ports. 
Much of this illegal trade was run by merchants from Accra, Ada, and other 
eastern communities with a significant European presence. Euro-Africans 
especially figure prominently. Sam Kanto Brew was an anglophone Mulatto who 
acted as a middleman in the illegal trade, acquiring the Asantehene's friendship 
and exchanging Spanish guns for Asante slaves.26 Euro-African traders from 
Dutch Accra were so deeply involved in the trade that the British resorted to 
bombarding the town in an effort to disrupt their activities.27 Despite the risks 
and British interference, the potential profits were more than lucrative enough to 
appeal to coastal merchants. In 1817, a Company officer wrote to his superiors 
in despair:
The people of the Coast are the brokers of those of the interior who 
supply the slaves...This trade is... beyond all comparison so indolent and 
lucrative, that even were there any appeal to their feelings, it would not 
influence it in competition with such inordinate gain.28
While strict British law deterred most British ship-owners from the trade, it 
could not limit the availability of slaves, and merchants of other European powers 
were eager to take the place of the British. From 1815 onwards, Spanish, 
Portuguese, and Brazilian vessels began to appear off the western Gold Coast, 
often crewed by Americans and Cubans and largely geared towards the 
voracious market for plantation labour in Brazil and Cuba.29 As the availability of 
slaves shifted eastward away from regions of effective British control, these
24 Dupuis, Joseph, Journal o f a Residence, pp. 162-164.
25 La Torre, “Wealth Surpasses Everything”, p.436.
26 PRO T 70/41, William Hutchinson to J.H. Smith, 11, October, 1817, no place.
27 PRO CO 267/54, Gordon to J.H. Smith, 5 November, 1817, Cape Coast Castle.
28 PRO T70/36, Smith and Officers to Committee, 15 March 1817, Cape Coast Castle.
29 PRO T 70/74, Committee to Castlereagh, 21 February 1817, London. PRO T 70/74, Committee to 
Castlereagh, 1 November 1816, Africa Office.
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slave ships did so as well. Quite early, records show that European slave vessels 
had ceased to appear along the sandy, well-populated coast between British 
Accra and Cape Coast Castle. As late as 1858, however, Spanish ships were 
being captured east of Accra.30 in 1860, slave marts were still supplying these 
vessels from Keta and along the Volta31. It was only in 1873 that an 
administrator, Governor Harley, was able to report that “no slaves have been 
exported from this settlement within the last three years.”32 The export trade, far 
from being easily abolished, had lingered for more than half a century,33 slave 
commerce simply being diverted to new areas. An alliance of flexible indigenous 
elites and mercenary European merchants had adapted the trade to exploit 
geographic holes in the enforcement of abolition.
' k ' k 'k
Senegal also experienced an appreciable initial decline in slave exports 
following the promulgation of abolition. 34 The British occupation of St. Louis 
and Goree at the beginning of the century and the blockading of continental 
Europe led to a temporary cessation of all export trade from Senegal, including 
slaves.35 However as slaves began to accumulate on both islands, the habitant 
community began to exert pressure to restart the trade, and when they failed to 
sway the British administration, they began to smuggle slaves through villages 
on the Waalo Coast.36 The returning French were faced with an established 
smuggling network upon their reacquisition of St. Louis in 1816. However, the 
illegal trade in Senegal was insignificant compared to that of the Gambia and 
Southern Rivers region, since the sandy beaches off northern Senegal were
30 PRO CO 96/41, Governor Pine, 19 September 1857, Sierra Leone. PRO CO 96/44, Acting Governor 
Bird to Sir Bulwer Lytton Bart, 20 December 1858, Cape Coast Castle.
31 PRO CO 96/47, Governor Andrews to Newcastle, 5 June 1860, Cape Coast Castle.
32 PRO CO 96/100, Governor Harley to Kimberley, 16 July 1873, Cape Coast Castle.
33 Export numbers were probably statistically insignificant after 1820, as evidenced by a marked decline in 
mention of slave ship sightings and captures after this year.
34 PRO CO 267/54, Barnes to Bathurst, 23 April 1814, Africa Office. Curtin, Philip, “The Abolition of the 
Slave Trade from Senegambia”, p.88.
35 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, pp.130-131.
36 PRO CO 267/82, Maxwell to Castlereagh, 15 January 1809, Goree
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easily patrolled.37 Still, slavers off the Senegalese coast openly flouted the 
abolition act, and French authorities were initially powerless to stop them. In 
June 1818, the brig La Dorado hove to at Goree, then at Saint Louis, and 
evaded attempts to board her before taking on a human cargo at Portudal. The 
disraught Commandant of St. Louis apologised “I cannot... discharge my 
responsibility with such feeble resources.”38
In June 1818, French warships were finally dispatched to West Africa. 
However the cruisers, manned by apathetic crews and initially directionless, did 
not capture their first slave ship for 20 months.39 In the absence of naval power, 
coastal authorities were forced to take up the slack, taking three ships in 1818 
alone.40 In 1819, the French crown finally dispatched an envoy, Baron Mackam, 
to investigate accusations made by the Governor of Sierra Leone of slave trading 
during Administrator Schmaltz’s term of office as Administrator of Senegal 41 
The Baron returned with a strongly worded report condemning both naval and 
civil authorities. However, the case went no further. Schmaltz’s hastily written 
explanations had been accepted by the Minister who demanded that these 
“odious imputations” ceased 42 Nor was there any serious official support for a 
more stringent approach. As late as 1826, the ordained punishment for slave 
trading was simply confiscation of ship and cargo, and for the ship’s captain an 
interdiction from the King’s vessels for life 43
This situation, however, was transformed over the next year. A 
groundswell of support for abolition had risen amongst influential businesspeople 
in the mid-20s, and in 1826, 300 ship owners petitioned against the trade.44 This 
lobby could not be ignored as previous abolitionists groups had been, and the 
Loi relative a la repression de la Tralte des Noirs was promulgated on the April
37 See Chapters 1 and 2.
38 ANSOM Senegal X lV /lbis, Commandant et Administrateur a Ministre, 30 June, 1818, Saint Louis.
39 Daget, Serge, “France, Suppression of the Illegal Trade, and England", p.196.
40 Reports from ANSOM Senegal XIV/1, 1818-1831.
41 ANSOM Senegal XIV/2, Note, Ministre, June 1818, St. Louis.
42 ANSOM Senegal XIV/2, Ministre a Schmaltz, 13 September 1819, Paris.
43 ANSOM Senegal X IV /1 ,1818-1832.
44 Daget, Serge, “France, Suppression of the Illegal Trade, and England", p.198.
25, 1827.45 The act increased punishment for slave traders, including 
banishment for Captains and up to 5 years imprisonment for the crews of 
slavers. Indicative of the complete reversal of French attitude towards slavery, 
application of the new law was swift, and the Captain of the Deux freres, 
captured in October 1827, was banished, his backers fined 17,080 francs.46 A 
portion of the fine went as prize money to the crew of the cruiser that captured 
the slave ship - as provided for by an 1825 ordinance 47 If the declining numbers 
of French slave ships sighted are any indication, the new laws were effective, 
and as French smugglers disappeared and prize money was offered the 
motivation of naval crews, now operating largely against Iberian and Brazilian 
flagged vessels grew conspicuously. By mid century, French patrols had proved 
reasonably effective, and smuggling from Senegal to the Americas ceased to be 
significant.
Slave owners and the crisis of abolition
The abolition of the overseas commerce in slaves represented a defining 
crisis for the numerically small but powerful community of Africans and Euro- 
Africans who participated in the trade, and those who supplied them both with 
slaves and with the provisions necessary to carry on the slave trade. We have 
already seen how the European presence on the Gold Coast was greatly 
reduced in the years following abolition 48 African slave merchants encountered 
similar difficulties. As the overseas slave market disappeared and no other 
commodity emerged to take its place, there was a marked decline in export 
earnings, leading to a decline in income for merchant elites.
For northern Senegal, the abolition of the export slave trade coincided 
with a decline in gum production 49 Despite the continuation of the overland slave 
trade into the region, the period directly following British abolition saw a decrease
45 ANS K4, Loi relative a la repression de la Traite des Noirs, 25 April 1827.
45 ANS 2B13, Governeur a Ministre, 9 October 1828, St. Louis
47 ANSOM Generalities ,172/1384, 2 August 1825.
48 PRO T70/35, Governor Torrane to Committee, 4 February, 1808, Cape Coast Castle. Meredith, An 
Account o f the Gold Coast, p.ii.
49 The gum trade would revive in 1830 following the failure of French attempts to develop a plantation
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in the island’s population for the first time in a century as the economic situation 
took a sharp downturn and habitants sold off their slaves and released their free 
servants.50 But abolition posed the greatest threat not to merchant elites but to 
the aristocracy. The overland slave trade in Senegal, as we have seen, was 
mainly the prerogative of traditional rulers and their tyeddo armies, who used the 
profits to secure their power in the form of guns and men, resources which gave 
them the ability to procure more slaves and conduct them safely to the coast. 
The end of the Atlantic slave trade threatened this monopoly, “depriving] the 
aristocrats of their main source of income and power.”51 The habitant community 
no longer demanded slaves, since local consumption needs were satisfied and 
export trade had declined,52and Wolof and Sereer aristocracies came under 
threat.
Africans in Senegal and the Gold Coast initially reacted to this crisis 
through the strategy of evasion. Asante traders sought to escape the effects of 
abolition by diverting their export in slaves to regions not controlled by the British, 
whereas habitants in Senegal and coastal merchants on the Gold Coast 
clandestinely supplied smugglers with humans. The drawback of this option was 
that it entailed a high margin of risk. In areas such as the Bight of Benin and 
southern Senegambia slave trade exports do not show a marked decrease, but 
Senegal and the Gold Coast did witness a massive decline in slave exports, 
indicating that smuggling was not the preferred option. 53 It soon became clear 
that the reduced demand for slaves could not meet the consistent supply, and 
large numbers of slaves had to be retained in coastal towns and around former 
slave-trading posts.54
Conceivably, slave-owners could have ceased to trade and own slaves 
entirely. However, we have seen that slaves were important assets for both
system in Waalo. Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p.140.
50 PRO CO 267/29, Lt. Col. Maxwell to H.M. Commissioner, undated 1810, Goree.
51 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p.308.
52 ANS 2B13, Governeur a Ministre, 1 April 1829, St. Louis.
53 Richardson, “Slave Exports from West and West-Central Africa”, p.17.
54 In Goree, British officers noted the existence of a “horde of slaves”. PRO CO 267/32, Maxwell to 
Castlereagh, 15 January 1809, Goree.
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Senegalese and Gold Coast elites, Administration reports from as late as the 
1830s and 1840s indicate that in neither area did slave imports to the coast 
decline. By 1836, around 10,000 slaves lived in St. Louis and Goree, and 
importation into the colony from as far away as for Galaam was still common.55 
Colonial Office sources for the Gold Coast were also reporting "a large body of 
persons held in slavery in the African forts”56 in 1841, as well as in the 
surrounding regions.
This rather pedantic exercise shows that slave-owning classes, both along 
the coast and in the interior, apparently opted for third alternative. Abolitionists 
had long argued that there had been a rising demand for non-slave African 
commodities in Europe. They postulated that the growth of this legitimate’ 
commerce was being retarded by the slave trade in petitions and in testimony 
before Parliament. The crisis of abolition therefore led some African and 
European merchants to attempt to tap into this potential trade and, consequently, 
to join in the production of ‘legitimate’ goods, as an alternative to the slave trade.
This new strategy necessitated a rather fundamental transformation of 
slavery in certain specific regions; namely the diversion of slaves into an internal 
servility in which slaves became labourers in the production of export goods. This 
alternative promised to both preserve their wealth and did not entail the risk of 
slave confiscation inherent to the export trade. To exploit this opportunity, 
however, these elites had to forge a union with the very European company and 
administrative officials who criminalised the export trade, and who were now 
casting around for ways to save their decaying presence on the coast.
The European plan to resolve the crisis of abolition
Abolition was an act of the metropole, imposed from above on 
administrators, company officials, and Africans alike. The wishes of the 
metropole, however, had remarkably little impact on the day to day running of the 
African possessions. Not only was it recognised that administrators in Africa had
55 ANSOM K7, Notes de l ’Ordonnatcur sur Paffranchissement des captifs, Commissaire Guillet, 29 January 
1836, St. Louis.
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more experience and knowledge than those in Europe, but quite simply the 
logistics of communication meant the responsibility for carrying out initiatives, 
and responding to challenges, resided in officials in Africa. In the absence of 
telegraphs and telephones, and depending on the availability of passing ships 
and the vagaries of wind, it often took several months for enquiries to reach the 
metropole, be acted upon, and for replies to return to administrators.57
Both the French government, which directly administered the Senegal 
colony and its dependencies58 and the Company of Merchants Trading to Africa, 
who exercised the Queen’s authority in the Gold Coast forts and up to a cannon 
shot away, were interested in promoting trade and cultivation. In 1822, the 
Ministre de la Marine et des Colonies wrote to Baron Roger, the first French 
Commandant et Administrateur de Senegal et Dependencies of “the firm 
intention of the government to encourage the development of cultivation... in 
Senegal.”59 Similarly, the Company of Merchants instructed Governor Torrane to 
instruct chiefs to “turn their thoughts to Agriculture and Commerce as the only 
means of obtaining [European Goods].”60 But however much the home offices 
were in favour of increased legitimate trading, and to whatever extent they felt 
they could provide ideas, resources, and motivation,61 the ball was obviously in 
the court of the administrators on the coast themselves.
On the Gold Coast, those responsible parties were officials of the 
Company of Merchants trading to Africa at least until its bankruptcy in 1821. For 
the large part, the company officials were merchants themselves, and had 
owned and dealt in slaves previous to the 1807 abolition and suffered in the 
decline following abolition.62 They therefore had a vested interest in 
reinvigorating trade, and based on common economic assumptions of the time
56 PRO CO 267/168, Minute by James Stephen, June 1841, Colonial Office.
57 This time lag is very visible in the French and British communique registers. PRO CO 343 and ANSOM 
Senegal I.
58 Saint-Martin, Yves-Jean, Le Senegal Sous le Second Empire, Editions Karthala, Paris, 1989, p. 105
59 ANS Senegal 1/8, Ministre a Administrateur Roger, 9 January, 1822, Paris.
60 PRO T 70/73, Committee to Governor Torrane, undated 1808, Africa Office.
61 “We are anxious to learn what progress has been made in Agriculture and Commerce...”, T 70/73, 
Committee to Governor, undated 1808, Africa Office.
52 PRO T 70/149, Committee Minutes, 2 March, 1807, London.
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the mechanism they chose for this regeneration was the plantation.
Most of the raw materials bound for England from the Americas came 
from plantations, but plantation cultivation had never really been successfully 
carried out on a large scale in Africa despite several experiments on the Gold 
Coast and elsewhere. In 1778, The Danish entrepreneur and scientist Dr Paul 
Isert had mobilised slave labour for an attempted coffee plantation on the Accra 
plains, but the plantation had failed after his death in 1789.63 The Danish made 
further attempts to cultivate sugar, cotton, and tobacco, but failed due to damage 
done by Asante invaders and the kidnapping of slave labourers from the 
plantations.64 Attempting to learn from the failure of these attempts, the officers 
of the Company of Merchants planned to promote coffee cultivation in mid-sized, 
independent plantations around each of the coastal forts, where they would be 
better protected. It was believed that the local populace would soon see the 
profitability of this venture. "Let the people dependant on our Forts employ their 
free time clearing small spots of Ground for Coffee Plantations, for their own sole 
emolument. The Free Natives will soon... follow the example,” argued the 
Company’s board of directors in London.65
During the same period, the French government was also searching for a 
marketable commodity to replace the slave trade as a money earner for the 
colony. The gum trade revived somewhat after abolition, to the delight of the 
habitants, but could not alone justify the continuing expense of the colony to the 
French government. Baron Roger, in his 1821 memoires, lamented that “during 
the abolition... gum has nearly exclusively... commanded the attention of 
commerce,”66 and recommended expansion into other areas. The minuscule 
French settlements - St. Louis, Goree, and a few small factories along various 
waterways - comprised very little arable land, but Roger believed that only cash- 
crop cultivation could save the Colony. Therefore at the begin of Roger’s term in 
1819, attempts were made to buy land from Waalo aristocrats, and a plan was
63 Kwamena-Poh, Government and Politics in the Akuapem State, p. 99. Kwamena-Poh bases his argument 
on Danish documents, J.F. Ripnasse to Copenhagen, 2 February 1789.
64 Reynolds, Trade and Economic Change, pp.64-65.
65 PRO T 70/73, Committee to Governor Torrane, undated 1808, Africa Office.
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accepted by the Ministre de la Marine calling for European-owned land outside of 
the colony, to be worked by wage-labourers.67 Thus the conclusion of both 
European administrations - French and British - was that cultivation by plantation 
was the key to economic success for their colonies.
Palm oil and slave labour on the Gold Coast
However the growth of agriculture on the Gold Coast did not occur in the 
way the Company of Merchants had conceived. For suppliers, production is 
driven by the demands of the market, and in this case it did not involve coffee or 
cash-crop plantations under the protection of British cannon. Instead, farmers in 
the interior quickly seized on a commodity in high demand in industrial Britain - 
the viscous fat produced by the oil palm.
Slave prices within the Gold Coast littoral had continued to fall after 1807; 
in some accounts purchasers were paying as little as 3 ounces for an adult slave 
- less than a third of the 1803 price.68 This phenomenon made slave owning 
affordable for the first time for farmers and traders outside of the urban merchant 
class and the chiefly elite, although still out of reach for most peasants. Prices 
stayed low for about a decade, before recovering around 1820, as internal 
demand grew.69 Although between these dates the production of agricultural 
exports did not increase significantly, unlike gold exports70, the recovery of slave 
prices was largely attributable to the expansion of palm oil production in the 
Akuapem and Krobo regions.
Palm oil had been imported from West Africa to England for decades. 
The orange pulp extracted from the seed of certain African palms was useful for 
soap and other household products. But the sudden increase in demand was 
attributable to another of its qualities. Palm oil was a superb machine lubricant, 
and in the nineteenth century industrial England was suddenly awash in
66 ANSOM Senegal II/2, Memoires, Baron Roger, 1821.
67 ANS 1B6, Rapport pour le Ministre de Plnterieur, enclosed in Ministre (de la Marine) a PAdministrateur, 
20 December 1819, Paris.
68 LaTorre, “Wealth Surpasses Everything”, p.426.
69 McSheffrey, Gerald, “Slavery, Indentured Servitude, Legitimate Trade”, p.366.
70 Reynolds, Trade and Economic Change, p.59.
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machines. In 1818, the first year in which export figures are clear, Great Britain 
imported 29,310 cwt of treated palm oil. By 1821, trade had reached the level of 
102,490 cwt.,71 and seemed destined to continue to rise. The regions which 
produced the most of the palm oil crop, Akuapem and Krobo72, were however 
located in an area of the interior which was especially susceptible to Asante 
attacks. Between 1821 and 1830, first British crown officials and later the 
‘Committee of Merchants’73 saw their fledgling recovery disappearing in the face 
of Asante attacks.74 In exasperation, in 1830 the committee installed a new 
Governor, Captain George Maclean, with a mandate to restore commerce by any 
means possible. Maclean offered the Asante a truce, promising to safeguard 
their merchants’ access to the Atlantic through the coastal states, thereby 
satisfying their most important demand.75 By acquiring the agreement of the 
rulers along the coast - especially the several Fante Kings, who after 1823 were 
firmly in the British camp - Maclean in 1831 ushered in an unprecedented peace.
In the previous chapter, we saw how the Atlantic slave trade had 
encouraged the growth of small-scale merchant-owned plantations around Accra 
and to some extent other coastal towns, producing crops for urban 
consumption.76 In the interior, however, this transformation had not taken place. 
Maclean’s peace changed all that by enabling extensive palm oil cultivation for 
export to develop in a secure environment. Palm oil production was labour 
intensive, especially as expressing and treatment of the oil had to take place 
prior to export.77 Because even extended families could not supply all the labour 
necessary, slaves became incorporated into the process. Despite the fact that 
slave purchase prices rose alongside demand in the 1820s and 1830s, slave
71 PP 1845, XXXIV, (187), 20 March, 1845.
72 Reynolds, Trade and Economic Change, 1974, p.69.
73 The Committee of Merchants took possession of the crown territories in 1828 Reindorf, C., The History 
of the Gold Coast and Asante, Basel Mission Book Depot, Basel, 1887, p.338.
74 The decline is documented in PRO CO 267/93, Abstract of the Amount of Exports from the 
Settlements...upon the Gold Coast, 1822-1827.
75 Metcalfe, G.E. Maclean o f the Gold Coast, Oxford University Press, London, 1962.
76 Kea, Ray, “Plantations and labour in the south-east Gold Coast from the late eighteenth to the mid 
nineteenth century”, in Robin Law, ed., From Slave Trade to Legitimate Commerce: The commercial 
transition in nineteenth centaiy West Africa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.135.
77 NAG ADM 5/3/7, Report of the Commission on Economic Agriculture in the Gold Coast, 1889.
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labour was still cheaper than wage labour in a region where land was largely 
available to free members of the community. Some historians have argued that
78palm oil cultivation “took place within the framework of traditional agriculture," 
but it is clear that slaves in fact began to play an important role in the production 
of this commodity. Cruikshank, for example, personally observed that slaves 
sold in Krobo and Akuapem by Asante traders were used by the palm oil 
industry,79 and more recently Inez Sutton has shown that there was an 
ownership connection between slaves in Akuapem and merchant owners in 
Accra.80 However it is from Basel Missionary sources in Krobo that the most 
compelling evidence comes.
Much of this information deals with Ologo Patu, the Konor, or paramount 
chief, of the Yilo Krobo state. In 1851, Patu was fined 1000 Kabes91 by a 
Magistrate, probably Bannerman, for not appearing in a court case. Patu was 
known to possess a massive number of slaves82, but his ability to produce palm 
oil in order to pay off the fine surprised the BMS, who noted that his wives 
processed palm all “ail year round” on a central farm. The oil was cultivated on 
an extensive series of oil palm plantations surrounding this central site, 
throughout which were spread crooms for his “slaves and children.”83
By the mid-1860s the evidence for slave labour on oil palm plantations is 
even more compelling. During the intervening period, Krobo merchants had 
developed a system of huzas84, rectangular strip oil palm plantations somewhat 
distant from the Krobo heartland. Slaves worked on these new farms to clear 
the bush, planting young oil palms alongside food crops. While these oil palms 
developed over a period of 3-5 years, foodstuffs grown between and in the 
shade of the palms not only fed the cultivators but also were transported into the 
towns and sold in markets. These young plantations were cleared and at least
78 Kaplow, African Merchants o f the 19th Century Gold Coast, p.52.
79 Cruickshank, Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast, pp.244-5.
80 Sutton, Inez, “Labour in Commercial Agriculture in Ghana in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries”, 
Journal of African History, 1983 (24), pp.461-483.
81 Probably heads of cowries.
82 BMS D-1.3, Stanger, 30 September 1851, Christiansborg.
83 BMS D-1.4a, Dieterle, 31 May 1852, Akropong.
84 Hill, Polly, The Gold Coast Cocoa Farmer, Oxford University Press, London, 1956.
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initially worked mainly by slaves who “produce[d] a rich harvest for themselves 
and their heads of family.”85 After the palms matured, their produce provided a 
further profit for the slaves’ masters. Missionary Roes noted that the slaves lived 
in meagre huts and worked “mostly naked” in the fields, and that free labourers 
worked amongst them.86 Joseph Mohr, in Akropong (Akuapem) also noted that 
by the mid-1850s families were “retaining their slaves in order to make a lot of 
palm oil.”87
Moreover, as both Krobo and Akuapem lacked the rivers which made 
transportation of palm oil in regions outside of the Gold Coast so cheap, and 
since pack animals were not available in the forest zone, human porterage was 
the only alternative for carrying treated oil and nuts to the coast - porters who 
probably included a large number of slaves. Ologo Patu had the capacity to send 
as many as 200 ‘people’ to the coast at a time.88
The internal sale of slaves, previously directed toward domestic and stool 
slavery, easily expanded to incorporate the dealing of slaves for agricultural use 
after 1807. Maclean’s peace of 1831 further facilitated the commercialisation of 
agriculture, to which unfree labour was directed.89 Abolition, rather than ending 
slavery on the Gold Coast, facilitated its replacement by an indigenous market 
that furthered the integration of servile labour into the capitalist production 
system. The next few decades would see the completion of this shift.
The failure of plantations in Senegal
Although the merchants and aristocrats of the Senegalese coastal regions 
experienced a similar crisis to those of the Gold Coast their response followed a 
somewhat different path, largely engineered by habitants for whom slaves 
continued to be a valued asset. There was, however, some similarity in the 
outcome. As on the Gold Coast, the agricultural anticipations of the French
85 BMS D-1.17, J ahresbericht, Roes, 17 January 1866, Odumase
86 BMS D-1.17, Jahresbericht, Roes, 17 January 1866, Odumase
87 BMS D-1.16, Mohr, 30 May, 1855, Akropong, op.cit. in Hanger, Slaves and Slave Holders.
88 BMS D-1.3, Stanger, 30 September 1851, Christiansborg.
89 PP 1842, XII.1, (551), Report from the Select Committe on Slavery on the West Coast o f Africa 
Evidence of Captain Maclean (Cape Coast), J. Topp (Accra), and B. Cruickshank (Anamoboe).
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metropole went largely unsatisfied, and an unsuccessful colonial administration 
found itself at least temporarily outmanoeuvred by an alliance of slave-owning 
groups. Meanwhile, in the interior, the resurgent commerce in gum further 
expanded the use of slaves for production. The combination of French attempts 
at plantation agriculture, the gum trade, and the supply of recaptives taken from 
slave ships led to the widespread use of indentured servitude in the form of the 
40-year long regime des engages a temps.
A A A
The habitant communities of St. Louis and Goree had used the confusion 
of the revolution and the Napoleonic wars to make significant inroads into the 
power of the French compagnies. Before 1789, trade from the Senegalese 
coast had been controlled by French companies who had received a royal 
mandate to trade in slaves and gum. The last of these was the aforementioned 
Compagnie commercial d ’Afrique, which was given an exclusive patent in 1774.90 
The habitants chafed under the company monopoly which kept them from freely 
selling their slaves, gum, and millet to transatlantic merchants. In 1789, as the 
Estates General were considering their cahier, the St. Louisian habitants 
terminated their contracts to provide slaves for the compagnie. Within the year, 
the Estates General had granted the community self-government with popular 
suffrage for all landowners,91 under the authority of a mayor (maire), who 
replaced the compagnie-appo\n\e6 magistrat municipal.
As habitant self-government, the office of maire came to assume an 
important administrative role, both in St. Louis and in Goree. By the end of the 
1820s, the maires were largely responsible for hygiene and petty justice. They 
were important intermediaries and spokesmen for the autochthonous population, 
and were given a monopoly on recruiting labour, interpreters, and clerks for the 
French authorities.92 In 1824, their power was expanded still further to include
90 Delcourt, Goree, p.60.
91 ANF C6/20, Ministre a Boucher, 7 September 1970, op. cit. in Marcson, “EuropearnAfrican Interaction 
in the Precolonial Period”, pp.72-75.
92 Delcourt, Goree, 1984, p.76-77.
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policing of the town and judicial authority over slaves and unpropertied Africans, 
and their position as middleman with neighbouring states was formalised.93 In 
1829, Governor Jubelu informed the minister that the maire had been charged 
with ensuring slaves were not illegally brought into St. Louis,94 a significant 
devolution of power. In 1819, Euro-African trader Michel Pellegrin represented 
France in peace negotiations with the Trarza Moors.95
It is no surprise, therefore, that Schmaltz, the Administrateur et 
Commandant in charge of making Senegal profitable again, should turn to the 
habitants for assistance in making their plantation plan work. The requirements 
for the plantations were cheap labour, available land, and easy transportation. 
The first area therefore considered was the vast expanse of Fuuta Tooro, where 
land would be rented by the administration and turned over to habitants and 
French entrepreneurs who would purchase labourers from local chiefs.96 
However the Muslim rulers of the Fuuta saw the plan as a cover for French 
expansion, and the plan fell through.97 Schmaltz therefore transferred his 
attention to Waalo, which was both proximate to St. Louis and relatively fertile, 
and asked the maire to negotiate a treaty with the Brak (King) of Waalo in 
1819.98 By the provisions of this treaty, the French agreed to pay an annual fee 
in return for land suitable for cultivation and the Brak’s aid in recruiting labour.
The Brak had agreed to the treaty largely because he saw the French as 
an ally against the Trarza Moors who had been raiding Waalo for slaves and 
booty.99 However, although the treaty stipulated that the chiefs of Waalo would 
provide labourers and replace runaways, the Brak felt no real need to enforce 
this stipulation,100 and the French were forced to turn for their labour needs to 
the habitants, most of whom also declined to contribute their valuable slaves to
93 ANSOM Senegal 1/8, Commandant et Administrateur Roger a Ministre, 10 April 1824, St. Louis.
94 ANS 2B13, Jubelu a Ministre, 1 April 1829, St. Louis.
95 Zuccarelli, Frangois, “Les maires de Saint-Louis et Goree de 1816 a 1872", Bulletin de Vlnstitut 
Fondamental dAfrique Noire, (35), 1973, p.553.
96 ANSOM 2B2 Schmaltz a Ministre, 8 July 1817, St. Louis.
97 Marcson, European-African Interaction in the Precolonial Period, p. 107.
98 ANSOM 2B4, Schmaltz a Ministre , 10 April 1819, St. Louis.
99 ANSOM 2B3, encl., Ministre a Schmaltz, 27 November 1818, Paris.
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101the low-paying cultivation work. The French needed labour, but the 
government could not own slaves, and nobody else would provide free labour.102 
Meanwhile captives freed from slave ships were beginning to accumulate in the 
two coastal cities. In 1818, a decision was made to solve both problems with a 
single solution
The catalyst for this decision was the seizure of the slave brig de Postillion 
in early 1818.103 The ship was carrying a number of slaves, of whom at least 26 
appear to have survived, and these were placed in the hands of the maire for 
employment “on works of public utility,”104 mostly in the St. Louis hospital. The 
subsequent labour shortage in Waalo led to the redeployment of these workers. 
By 1823, eight of them were working on the colony’s plantations at Richard-Tot 
and the habitation Roy ale.105
The act to formalise this forced labour of ostensibly freed recaptives was 
written by Governor Roger, who had replaced Schmaltz in 1822, and was 
prompted by the metropole’s growing concern for Senegal’s commercial future. 
The Ministre de la Marine had approved the use of freed slaves in January 1822, 
provided they were treated as free labourers and definitively manumitted after 14 
years of labour for the government.106 This system of indenture, in which the 
labourers were known as engages a temps, was sanctioned by an 1823 
ordinance. Engages were to be appropriated for the government’s use as 
labourers from amongst captives confiscated from slave ships or brought illegally 
into the colony. They were to be engaged for 14 years or until the age of 21 if a 
minor. However, this act contained a flaw with unforeseen consequences; article 
4 did not limit indenture to the government, but in some cases permitted its 
extension to private individuals.107
By 1825, 34 private plantations had been set up in Waalo. Many of
101 ANSOM 1B6, Ministre a Schmaltz, 20 December 1819, Paris.
102 ANSOM Senegal XIV/13, Annexe au Proces-Verbal, Commission des Affaires Coloniales, May 1842.
1(13 ANSOM Senegal X lV/lbis, Commandant et Administrateur a Ministre, 3 May 1818, St. Louis.
104 Ibid.
105 ANSOM Senegal XIV/20, Roger a Ministre, 7 January 1823, Senegal.
106 ANSOM Senegal 1/8, Ministre a Roger, 9 January 1822, Paris.
107 ANSOM Senegal XIV/18, Arrete concernant le regime des engages a temps, 28 September 1823, St. 
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the owners were French, but a considerable number appear to have been St. 
Louisian habitants.™3 With considerably more than 600 hectares under 
cultivation, these establishments were of significant size. The administration’s 
plantations added approximately 230 hectares. The number of engages working 
the private plantations is unknown, but approximations can be teased out from 
the records. In January 1823, the government had 36 engages working its four 
plantations,109 by the end of 1824, that number was up to 72.110 During the next 
4 years the total number of government engages hovered around 100, but it is 
uncertain how many of those worked in the fields.111 Similarly, between 1823 
and 1839, 213 individuals were engaged to private subjects in Goree,112 and in 
total throughout the colony there were 2,930 indentures between 1818 and 
1842.113 A proportion of these indentures made by the government were for 
purposes other than cultivation, and some engages acquired by private 
individuals were utilised as domestic servants, but clearly a large number of 
engages were directed towards labour in the fields. It is unfortunate that the 
names of purchasers are missing from the St. Louis records, as these could 
reveal a link between plantation owners and indentures. However, from the 
Goree documents it is clear that the family of Jean Pierre, who owned a 21 
hectare plantation at Lampsar, acquired 29 engages in 1835, the majority of 
whom were young males perfect for cultivation labour.114
Nevertheless, even the influx of labourers brought by the engage system 
was not enough for the success of the plantations, despite Roger’s 1826 claims 
of success.115 Roger’s successor, Gerbidon, reported that the plantations were a 
failure in 1827,116 and in 1831 the government’s plantations were abandoned.117
108 Statistics come from ANS Q16, Tableau des etablissements de culture, 1 May 1825.
109 ANSOM Senegal XIV/20, Rapport, Roger, 4 Janvier 1823.
110 ANSOM Senegal XIV/20, Etat Nominatif des Noires engages pendant 1824, Roger, 1825.
111 ANSOM Senegal XIV/12, Roger a Ministre, 18 July 1826, St. Louis; 1 January 1827, St. Louis.
ANSOM Senegal XIV/20, Roger a Ministre, 4 March 1828, St. Louis.
112 ANSOM Senegal XIV/21, Releve des Rachats suivis affranchissements, 1823-1829, Goree.
113 ANSOM Senegal XIV/21, Releve des nombre des Rachats suivis d’affranchissement conditionnel, 
Decarrett, 31 May, 1843, St. Louis.
114 ANSOM Senegal XIV/21, Releve des Rachats suivis affranchissements, 1823-1829, Goree.
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By 1837 the last private cultivators had given up as well.118
The failure of the plantation scheme was a result of an alliance of elites 
who opposed the plantations. As early as September 1819, the Trarzas had 
revoked their treaty with the French and begun raiding Waalo villages.119 In 
subsequent decade several peace agreements were signed, but were uniformly 
followed by a resurgence in raiding. In addition, the aristocracy of Waalo was 
not firmly behind the French. Part of the problem lay with mistranslations in the 
1819 treaty. The French believed they had purchased arable land. The Wolof 
understanding, however, was that the land was only leased, and several 
landowners disputed French claims so strongly that in 1827 a gunboat had to be 
placed on the Senegal River.120 In addition, the peasantry of Waalo was 
increasingly coming under the influence of Muslim leaders from the east and 
north. In 1830, the marabout Diile Faatim Tyam Kumba declared a holy war and 
invaded Waalo. The invasion was quickly defeated, but added greatly to the 
confusion in the region.121 Without habitant labourers and slave soldiers, the 
French could not hang on to the region, and the majority of the habitants were 
unwilling to help the French, and were openly antagonistic to the plantation plan. 
The unified habitants, under the maire, saw the plantations as threatening peace 
in the region and potentially as alienating the Trarza. This would have cut off the 
gum trade upon which they relied for their income.122 Gum was cultivated mainly 
by slaves, working in gangs of up to 50 in southern Mauritania123, significantly 
upriver from St. Louis, and a portion of the slave trade had been redirected to 
feeding the growing demand for labourers in these orchards.124 The habitants, 
following the crisis of abolition, depended on a flourishing gum trade. 
Accordingly, they refused en masse to assist the French, instead carefully
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tending their relationships with the Trarzas.125
The French were therefore forced to abandon plantations, but they did so 
relatively unscathed, Waalo, on the other hand, was left with a civil conflict 
involving aristocratic tyeddo, a rising Islamic force supported by peasants, and 
Trarza invaders. After 1840, and with the advent of groundnut cultivation, the 
effects of this destabilisation would become more pronounced, widespread, and 
significant.
A preview of emancipation: The regime des engages
The regime des engages was originally conceived as a system of 
employing captives seized from illegal slave traders in agricultural production for 
14 years before definitive manumission would occur. This institutionalised 
‘liberation’, while gradual, must have seemed almost honourable, even to 
abolitionists. However the 1823 ordinance allowed engages to fall into the hands 
of private individuals.126 This, together with the labour and military demands of 
colony and empire, were to expropriate the system over the next 20 years; 
transmuting the regime des engages into a form of institutional slavery open to 
abuses by both the administration and elites. Conversely, the regulations 
governing engagement also provided a loophole for some slaves to seek their 
freedom. This grand experiment presaged the struggles of the post­
emancipation period as the metropole’s intentions were subsumed by the 
practical needs of the administration, the manipulation of the habitants defending 
their dominant position, and the limited agency of slaves.
French abolitionism was at its height in the 1820s, and the regime des 
engages was apparently perceived as an acceptable alternative to slavery by 
abolitionists. French activists even went so far as to suggest that the system be 
adapted to replace domestic and agricultural slavery:
It seems to me... that the city of St. Louis, which is the seat of your
125 ANS 2B15, Quernal a Ministre, 25 August 1833, St. Louis.
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administration, would have a great interest in not employing or 
possessing slaves, and substituting engages for service with families, in 
small cultivation, and in commerce. 27
The commonly held sentiment that the regime des engages represented 
an “egalitarian, honourable, and useful” alternative to the slave trade lent a moral 
dimension to the plan and facilitated two major permutations.128 First, the idea 
that the habitants could be induced to replace slavery with engagement led to 
Article 4 of the 1823 Ordinance allowing private ownership of engages. Equally 
importantly, this concept facilitated a shift in the mode of acquisition of engages 
by the government from confiscation to purchase.
The French government appears to have purchased its first slave in April 
1818, when an 18-year-old male slave named Hametdour was acquired in an 
‘exchange’ with a slave owner in St. Louis.129 However the majority of engages 
continued to be acquired through confiscation130 until the system was opened to 
private owners in 1822 (see chart), following which alternative sources were 
explored. Between 1825 and 1829, the administration hired the compagnie de 
Gaiam to purchase at least 433 mostly Bambara131 slaves from the interior, 
representing 14% or more of all engages during this period.132 In the 1830s, the 
government also attempted to purchase outright privately owned slaves who 
performed well while under contract to the administration. There are several 
cases of slaves who were rented by the government to work in the hospital, for 
example, who were subsequently purchased from their masters in 1837 and 
1838 and converted into engages133
127 ANSOM Senegal X lV /lbis, M. Portalin(?) a Roger, 20 February 1821, Paris.
128 Ibid.
129 ANSOM Senegal XIV/20, Roger a Ministre, 7 January 1823, Senegal. Alternately spelled Hamer-doux. 
Probably AmadoUniversity
130 ANSOM Senegal XIV/20, Rapport, Roger, 4 January 1823.
131 It is not clear how many really were Bambara and how many were mislabelled simply because they came 
from the interior. However Bambaras were renowned amongst the French as superior soldiers.
132 ANSOM Semegal XIV/13, no title, 1 October, no year, no place.
133 ANS 3E12, Conseil d’Administration, Seances 20 October 1837, 4 November 1837, 8 December 1837, 
and 9 June 1838.
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TABLE 3.1
Engages registered in Senegal Colony
Year Type of Engagist Number of engages source
1818 Government (all) 25 a
1819 Government (all) none a
1820 Government (all) 1 a
1821 Government (all) 40 a
1822 All 145 a
1823 All 175 a
1824 All 170 a
1825 All 183 a
1826 All 219 a
1827 All 183 a
1828 All 207 a
1829 All 104 a
1830 All 105 a
1831 All 126 a
1832 All 48 a
1833 Ail 93 a
1834 All 151 a
1835 All 172 a
1836 All 145 a
1837 All 54 a
1838 all 99 a
1839 all 160 a
1840 all 98 a
1841 all 120 a
1842 all 107 a
1843 Government 44 b
1844 Goree (private) 27 c
1844 St. Louis (all) 185 d/e
1845-46 all 39 f
TOTAL 3225
a:ANSOM Senegal XIV/21, Releve des nombre des Rachats suivis 
d’affranchissement conditionnel, Decarrett, 31 May, 1843, St. Louis, 
b: ANSOM Senegal XIV/20, Bouet a Ministre, 23 February, 1843, St. Louis, 
c: ANSOM Senegal XIV/21, Matricule des engages a temps de Goree, 2 
January 1844.
d: ANSOM Senegal XIV/21, Affranchissements Conditionnels par le
Gouvernment pendant I'annee 1844, Decarret, St. Louis.
e: ANSOM Senegal XIV/21, Affranchissements Conditionnels Par diverse de
St. Louis pendant I'annee 1844, Decarret, St. Louis.
f: ANSOM Senegal XIV/21, Matricule des engages, I'annee 1846, St. Louis.
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Engages were utilised by the government not only on plantations, but 
also as boat workers, on construction, and especially in hospitals.134 By 1840, 
the regime des engages was so central to labour recruitment in Senegal that the 
administrative body of Senegal colony, the conseil d!'Administration, agreed 
unanimously that it could not be ended without threatening both the commerce 
and the defence of the colony.135
* * *
Defence was an important issue for the French administration, especially 
since European soldiers easily succumbed to African disease. Therefore in 
1819 Schmaltz suggested that liberated slaves be used, first as workers for 
engineer platoons,136 and then as enlisted soldiers.137 In order to induce recruits 
to join, a signing bonus was promised. Yet in practice, as the government failed 
to recruit free Africans, this money often simply represented the fee to masters 
who turned their slaves over to French authorities. The advantages of this 
practice helped ‘convince5 authorities in the metropole of the moral righteousness 
of this policy of rachats (repurchases).138 The result was the 1831-1832 
expansion in engage purchasing evident in Table 3.1.
In 1827 the policy of rachats was taken a step further. The abolition of 
slavery had led to a labour shortage throughout the French Empire 
Consequently, in April that year, the Minister ordered Governor Gerbidon to 
investigate the formation of a battalion of 600 men, not only for domestic service, 
but for use overseas in Madagascar and French Guyane. The mode of 
recruitment he left open to the Governor’s discretion.139 Gerbidon chose to 
purchase slaves for the usual indenture of 14 years, train them, and put them on 
ships without disclosing their destination.140 The parallels to the slave trade were
134 Senegal XIV/20, Jubelu a Ministre, 10 April 1829, St. Louis. Roger a Ministre, 7 January 1823, St.
Louis.
135 ANS 3E13, Conseil d’Administration, Seance 6 July 1840.
136 ANSOM Senegal XVI/3, 7 month unclear 1819, St. Louis.
137 ANS 2B4, Schmaltz a Ministre, 4 September 1819, St. Louis.
138 ANS 2B4, Ministre a Schmaltz, date unclear September 1819, St. Louis.
139 ANSOM Senegal XVI/3, Ministre a Gerbidon, 10 April 1827, Paris.
140 ANS 1B14, Gerbidon a Ministre, 31 July 1827, Paris.
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evident to contemporary abolitionists. In 1828, a letter was published in the 
liberal anti-slavery merchant paper Journal de Commerce which charged that the 
“slave trade is recommencing in Senegal... and the government itself is 
conducting this trade."141 The government’s response, in the royalist Messenger 
des Chambres, was to argue that the engagement, for a limited period, was a 
vast improvement for recruits who had formerly been slaves, and that the 
soldiers would help enforce the abolition of slavery in Madagascar.142
The blandishments of the abolitionist press had little effect on the 
recruiting system. Between 1828 and 1848, rachat remained the primary 
recruiting tool for French Senegal. In 1828, the blueprint for a military contingent 
called the compagnie des noirs was developed, and in 1832, King Louis-Phillipe 
approved 65,680.70 francs to pay for the enlistment, armament, and training of 
the company, although the unit did not become fully independent until 1836.143 
There were to be two types of recruits: volunteers enrolled for seven years, and 
slaves ‘ransomed’ by the government from the interior and indentured for 14 
years.144 In the event, no volunteers enrolled, and the 119 members of the unit 
in 1845 were all engages145 Furthermore, they had all been acquired under an 
exclusive contract in which the compagnie de Galam undertook to recruit 
Bambaras at Bakel.146 This forced movement of unfree individuals from the 
interior to St. Louis is strikingly similar to the forced migration, along the same 
path, which occurred during the Atlantic slave trade. In seeking to replace the 
system that provided labour during the Atlantic slave trade, the French response 
was essentially to emulate it.
The commercial elite of the Senegal colony, the habitants, also managed
141 ANS K4, Lettrc, A. Correard, Journal de Commerce, 11 November 18
142 ANS K4, Messenger des Chambres, 15 November 1828.. ANSOM Senegal XIV/2, Note pour le 
Messenger des Chambres, Ministre de la Marine, 1 November 1828, Paris.
143 ANSOM Senegal XVI/3, Ministre a Roi, 16 August, 1832, Paris.
144 ANSOM Senegal XVI/3, Pujol a Ministre, 30 May 1836, St. Louis.
145 ANSOM Senegal XVI/3, Extrait d’un Rapport de M. Rostolant, 1843.
146 ANS 1B41, Ministre a Thomas, 21 October 1844, Paris.
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to profit from the crisis that initially threatened to destroy their power. I have 
already described how the power of the Afro-European St. Louisian community 
grew in the period following abolition. Habitants were initially opposed to the 
engages, whom they feared would threaten the rental market for slave 
artisans.147 From 1820, however, they had begun to acquire engages for 
themselves. Post-1824 registers especially reveal a pattern of acquisition of 
individual engages by private Africans and Euro-Africans, while important 
habitant families and European companies such as Maurel & Prom often owned 
as many as forty.148 Although acquired legally as engages, these individuals 
were often treated as slaves. Unable to command their own labour or seek their 
freedom, engages were often reported as deceased and reintroduced into the 
slave market when prices rose.149 Most of the others were retained past their 
fourteen-year term. A comparison of the number of definitive manumissions 
after 14 years in Table 3.1, with the number of engages initially acquired in Table 
3.2 gives some idea of the disparity between the figures.
TABLE 3.1
Liberations after 14 years
Year Definitive Liberations
1831 50
1832 4
1833 2
1834 4
1835 8
1836 12
1837 4
1838 6
1839 4
1840 3
1841 5
TOTAL 103
ANSOM Senegal XIV/21, Releve des nombre des Rachats suivis d’affranchissement 
conditionnel, Decarrett, 31 May, 1843, St. Louis.
147 Zuccarelli, Frangois, “Le Regime des engages a temps au Senegal”, Cahiers d ’Etudes Africaines, 1962 
(7), pp.420-461.
14 ANSOM Senegal XIV/21, Releve des Rachats suivis affranchissements, Goree, 1823-1839.
149 ANS 2B18, Charmasson a Ministre, 4 October 1839, St. Louis.
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Although death and desertion undoubtedly claimed many engages, of the first 
eleven year-groups only 7% appear to have been definitively liberated 14 years 
later, a suspiciously low number. This abuse drew the notice of abolitionists and 
some administration officials, although condemnation was strongest in the 
metropole.150 In 1827, Roger introduced an ordinance requiring patrons to 
account for engages, instituting punishment for missing engages, and requiring 
that new engages be informed of their rights, but enforcement appears to have 
been lax.151
In response to pressure from the metropole to address this problem, 
Governor Bouet, overlooked his own opposition and that of the conseil 
dAdministration152 and reluctantly drafted an ordinance forbidding the 
introduction of engages into the colony as of the 1st of March, 1844, excepting 
only military recruits.153 The ordinance, like so many before it, was never 
properly implemented, and debate continued. Opponents argued that ending the 
regime would lead to a revival of slavery, despite the fact that it had never 
significantly decreased.154 This argument was nevertheless to ensure that the 
system continued until 1846, when a new law was passed to replace the 1844 
ordinance, and the regime des engages was finally ended.155
AAA'
i have argued that engages ended up being, in many ways, de facto 
slaves. Their situation was similar to slaves in that they had no control over their 
own labour and no freedom to leave employment, at least for 14 years. Thus 
they had few options. Engages could simply attempt to serve their 14 years, 
hoping for freedom, although we know that many never received that liberation. 
If they worked for the government they could attempt to gain an early release for
150 ANS K8, Rapport sur la Question des engages a temps, de Polignac, 22 January 1846, St. Louis.
151 ANS 1A14, Arrete Locale 18, Roger, 13 May 1827, St. Louis.
152 ANSOM Senegal XIV/18, Conseil d’Administration, Seance 16 January 1844.
153 ANSOM Senegal XIV/18, Arrete Locale 6, Bouet, 18 January 1844, St. Louis.
154 ANSOM Senegal 1/28, Les Memoires de Governeur Thomas, 9 November 1845, St. Louis.
155 ANS 1B49, Hoube a le President de la Cour d’appel, 23 August 1846, St. Louis.
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'good behaviour’, although examples of this parole are thinly spread in the 
historical record.156 Engages could, and did, run away - a common strategy for 
slaves as well. There is evidence of desertion as early as 1818, but exact 
numbers are not known.157 Certainly it was difficult for those recruited by the 
compagnie de Galam from the interior to return home through high risk areas 
where they were likely simply to be captured and re-enslaved.
What is even more interesting is that the system of engages provided an 
opportunity for slaves. Slaves and engages worked alongside one another, and 
just as masters converted engages into slaves, slaves often pretended to be 
engages and claimed their freedom from authorities.158 It is unclear exactly how 
this worked, but it appears that slaves would pretend to be an engage previously 
owned by their own masters, who had been sold, deserted, or had died. In the 
era before photography validated identity papers this subterfuge could have 
succeeded. By 1844, a significant number of cases such as this occurred, but 
administrators usually decided against the slave.159 The exact number cannot 
be determined, as there are no quantitative legal records for this period. 
Additionally, some cases where a master was attempting to fraudulently retain 
an engage by alleging they were slaves could have been perceived as cases of 
impersonation by the usually pro-habitant officials.
Conclusions
The impact of abolition was distributed unevenly in West Africa. For the 
inhabitants of coastal entrepots, especially St. Louis and Accra, the effect was 
quite pronounced, threatening their position as merchants and owners of the 
means of production. For the European companies who interacted with them, 
abolition threatened profitability, and the European presence on the coast was 
consequently initially reduced. Slave-owners and slaves in the interior were less 
affected, although slave traders faced a possible loss of revenue.
156 ANS 2B13, Jubelu a Ministre, 8 November 1828, St. Louis.
157 ANSOM Senegal XIV/20, Roger a Ministre, 7 January 1823, Senegal.
158 ANS 1B41, Ministre a Thomas, 4 October 1844, Paris.
159 ANS 1B41, Ministre a Thomas, 24 October 1844, Paris.
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The long-term response of merchants and trading communities was to 
replace the slave trade with a commerce in ‘legitimate’ goods, fortunately 
becoming feasible just as abolition was implemented. The British and French 
governments encouraged this activity. However, their schemes for putting into 
action these plans were invariably the encouragement of plantations of export 
crops near the coastal forts. In both the Gold Coast and Senegal administration 
officials reckoned without the needs and abilities of indigenous elites. Initially, 
chiefs and merchants organised an illegal slave trade and diverted slave 
caravans to areas where abolition was not enforced, but this was not an effective 
long-term strategy. Therefore on the Gold Coast, merchants moved to quickly 
exploit the British demand for palm oil by sponsoring organised production in 
Akuapem and Krobo. Similarly, Senegalese habitants sabotaged the Waalo 
plantations which threatened their expanding interests in the gum trade. As a 
result, the monopoly companies failed and the British and French governments 
had to become more involved in the colonies - the British by assuming control of 
the possessions on the Gold Coast from 1822-1828 and again in 1843 and the 
French by investing heavily in Waalo. Through these choices, the great powers 
were drawn towards expansive colonialism in both regions.
The crisis of abolition never actually threatened to end slavery within 
Africa. During abolition and the subsequent rise in legitimate commerce slavery, 
rather than replacing slavery with wage labour, was resilient enough to survive, 
and thrive, in several forms. In the Gold Coast interior, palm oil plantations were 
worked by slaves cheaply available after the export trade in people had 
diminished. Likewise, gum, the major crop of the early 1800s in Senegal, was 
worked by groups of slaves.
The colonial state also began to experience a labour and recruitment 
shortage. The French system of engages a temps was initially intended to 
replace slave labour with freed captives who were conditionally liberated under a 
14 year indenture. However, the manpower requirements of the French 
government and the active involvement of habitants led to its transformation into 
an enormous regime under which more than 3,000 individuals were placed in a
72
servile relationship, and only a small proportion eventually liberated. While some 
slaves exhibited agency in attempting to use the system to gain their liberation, 
the system of engages remained a dependency relationship that was slavery in 
all but name. This type of interaction between slaves, slave-owners, colonial 
officials, and the metropole, allowing the institution of slavery to stave off 
externally generated challenges will appear in later chapters.
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CHAPTER 4:
Rules and reality: ante-proclamation slavery and society on the Gold Coast
At first glance, it could be argued that following the abolition of the Atlantic 
Slave Trade (1807), the administration of the Gold Coast gradually prepared the way 
for emancipation (1874). In this teleological view, ante-proclamation policies 
represented a deliberate attempt to reduce the central role of slavery within society in 
preparation for the introduction of capitalism and wage labour.
However the path to emancipation was neither methodical nor planned, and 
the mid-nineteenth century did not witness a gradual transition toward emancipation. 
Instead, policy towards slavery in the ante-proclamation period was marked by series 
of experiments which - despite a series of external edicts and the interference of an 
enlarged missionary community - left dependency relationships largely unaffected for 
the majority of slaves.
This argument is not intended to imply that the period preceding emancipation 
was marginal to that process. During these crucial years, the various modes of 
liberation were explored by members of servile classes. Organisations of traditional 
and educated elites coalesced which would be crucial in organising post­
proclamation resistance, and the attitudes and strategies which would be applied by 
government and missionary agents in the post-proclamation period were formulated 
and discussed. At a fundamental level, during this period British power increased at 
the expense of other European powers, leaving Britain alone as a colonial power 
facing another powerful external adversary - the rising Asante1 nation to the north. 
However while important social and economic factors were developing, slavery was 
not really any closer to being ended in 1873 than it was in 1807.2 It took the shock of 
the 1873 Asante War, and the attention it focused on the region, to cause the radical 
departure from previous policy that ushered in emancipation.
1 Asante’s history during this period has been extensively discussed. See McCaskie, T.C., State and Society in 
pre-Colonial Asante, Cambridge University Press,, Cambridge, 1995. Wilks, Ivor, Asante in the Nineteenth 
Century: The structure and evolution o f a political order, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975,
2 In 1873, the Chief Justice of the Colony, Marshall, argued that it was necessary to “recognfize]... the rights of 
masters as wall as... of the servants” in defending his judicial decisions to return slaves to their masters. PRO CO 
879/33, Marshall to Wolseley, 24 December 1873, Cape Coast, enclosed in W olseley to Kimberley, 26 December 
1873, Cape Coast.
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Restricting slave owning in the wake of the 1834 emancipation
Slavery lost its legal recognition in most parts of the British Empire through the 
Act for the abolition of slavery throughout the British Colonies in 18333, in which 
provision for the abolition of slavery (by August 1, 1834) was introduced. All slaves in 
regions under British suzerainty henceforth became ‘apprentices’ and were 
“absolutely and forever manumitted.”4 In the confusion surrounding the promulgation 
of this act, Governor Maclean, acting for the Committee of Merchants, wrote to the 
Colonial Office asking how the 1833 act applied to the Gold Coast.5 The response, 
embodied by a Royal Order in Council, was that it did not. That great philanthropic 
act applied only to crown colonies - Antigua, Bermuda, Bahamas, St. Christopher, 
Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Mauritius, and the Cape Colony.6 The Gold 
Coast administrations of Maclean and his successors by this decision retained great 
leeway in dealing with slavery. As a result, other than requiring the chiefs signatory 
to the 1831 treaty to restrict panyarring7, Maclean declined to interfere with slave- 
owning amongst the settlements’ allies and neighbours.
The 1807 Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade had already forbidden slave 
owning within the British Isles8, but did not constrain slave holding in the colonies. 
On the Gold Coast, even Company officers continued to hold slaves, often within the 
forts.9 After the Committee, responding to abolitionist pressure, forced this practice 
underground in the 1830s, officers simply purchased debt contracts from African 
merchants and became the ‘patrons’, and de facto masters, of large numbers of 
pawns.10 Although Maclean’s administration was largely absolved of responsibility 
for this state of affairs by the Parliamentary Committee on West Africa in 184211, 
such abuses were one reason the Colonial Office, sensitive to the abolitionist lobby, 
brought the possessions back under Crown control in 1843.12
3 PP 1833, IV, (209) B ill fo r the abolition o f slavery, for Promoting the Industry o f Manumitting Slaves, and 
Compensating the Persons hitherto entitled to the Service o f such Slaves.. As amended PP 1833, IV, (233).
4 Ibid.
5 Metcalfe, Maclean o f  the Gold Coast, p.262.
6 PP 1834-5, XLI, (1137), King’s Order in Council, 31 July 1835.
7 PP 1842, XI. 1 (551), R eport from the Select Committe on Slavery on the West Coast o f Africa, Evidence of J.G. 
Nicholls, p.7. While domestic slavery was considered generally benign, panyarring was viewed as barbaric and 
unnatural.
8 PP 1806-7 ,1, A n A ct for the Abolition o f  the Slave Trade, 41,.45,.53.
9 PRO CO 267/168, Minute by James Stephen, June 1841, Colonial Office.
1(1 WMMS West African Correspondence Box 258, G. Wrigley to Committee, 20 February 1837, Cape Coast.
11 Metcalfe, Maclean o f the Gold Coast, p,280-283.
12 PRO CO 267/168, Minute by James Stephen, June 1841, Colonial Office. PRO CO 96/2, Maclean to Stanley,
13 September 1843, Cape Coast.
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The Act for the More Effectual Suppression of the Slave Trade in 1843 was 
similarly a response to the state of affairs both in the Gold Coast and other West 
African possessions. The Act ‘extend[ed] and appl[ied] to British subjects 
wheresoever residing” provisions of previous acts including slave dealing, importing 
slaves, and the holding of slaves and pawns.13 Although the act applied only to 
Europeans, Maclean’s successor Governor Hill (RN)14 was immediately faced with a 
number of Fante and Ga-Adangme chiefs who were labouring under the impression 
that their slaves were to be confiscated.15 The apprehensive Hill quickly reassured 
them that their slave-owning rights had never been at issue. He further informed 
them that “the slave-trade was all that we prohibited”16, a patent untruth.
The administration did not again attempt to extend the prohibition against 
slave-owning until 1851, when another Governor (Major Stephen) Hill issued a 
proclamation on the advice of his Executive Committee withdrawing legal recognition 
of the slaves of “educated natives” of Cape Coast, Accra, and Anomabu. This act 
had an economic, rather than moral, motivation. The British merchants represented 
by this committee simply felt these Euro-African and African traders held an unfair 
advantage over their European competitors through their access to unfree labour.
But both Hill and the committee members were stunned by the indigenous 
response to the act. The paramount chief of Cape Coast immediately recalled 
labourers he had undertaken to provide for civil construction projects, and the 
proclamation was ripped from town walls.17 More significantly, a coalition of urban 
leaders opposed to the act quickly emerged, led by such important traders as Joseph 
Smith, William de Graft, and James Thompson. These activists pursued several 
strategies - defending ‘domestic servitude’ as essentially benign; disputing the legality 
of the law; and demanding compensation for their potential losses.18 This proved too 
much for Governor. Recognising that his position was legally tenuous and that the 
support of the Euro-African elite was politically essential, Hill declined to enforce the
13 NAG ADM 4/1/1, ‘Act for the More Effectual Suppression of the Slave Trade”, 6&7 Victoria, 24 August 1843,
14The first Crown-appointed Governor following the 1842 transfer of authority.
15 Grace, Domestic Slavery in West Africa, p.29.
16 PRO CO 96/4, Hill to Stanley, 6 March 1844, Cape Coast.
17 PRO CO 96/25, Hill to Colonial Office, 12 December 1851, Cape Coast.
18 PRO CO 96/25, Native Traders to Hill, 15 December 1851, Cape Coast.
19 PRO CO 96/25, Hill to Colonial Office, 12 December 1851, Cape Coast.
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Political and economic realities in the aftermath of abolition
If the administration had no mandate and no will to end slave owning amongst 
the urban elite who professed loyalty to the Crown, it is perhaps no wonder that the 
British had even less interest in moderating slave-owning outside of this group. 
British authority outside of the coastal ‘possessions’ was extremely limited. The 
informal influence of the Committee of Merchants had reached no farther than the 
towns abutting their forts until the end of the 1830s when some authority was 
reasserted by Maclean,20 on the basis of his personal reputation and the 1831 treaty 
establishing peaceful relations between the coastal powers and the Asantehene.21 
While this treaty guaranteed the role of Asante as a major power in the region, it also 
extended the administration’s commitment as guarantor for the coastal states. 
Following the reassertion of British authority, the Colonial Office and its appointees
Opwere largely content to maintain this status quo.
It is also clear from the incident that concludes the preceding section that it 
was politically and economically expedient for administrators to support or overlook 
institutions of slavery. The production of legitimate goods suddenly expanded during 
this period, in the wake of the 1831 treaty which made long-distance trade safe for 
the first time in decades.23 Palm oil export values climbed from £16,750 to £42,745 
in 1841 accompanied by a similar growth in guinea grains and to a lesser extent 
coffee24, and internal trade increased commensurately. European administrators 
attempted to direct commerce toward specific crops, and in this they were assisted 
by Basel Missionaries who had been invited into the region by the Danish 
administrator of Accra in 1828.25 The Basel Mission Society began to cultivate coffee 
at a model farm in Domonasi in 1840, and supported British attempt to promote 
coffee and fruit cultivation amongst indigenous planters.26 This operation took on a 
distinctly evangelical air under the influence of the BMS. At Domonasi, 
autochthonous leaders were invited to observe the entire coffee preparation
20 PP 1842, XI. 1, (551), Report from the Select Committee on the West Coast o f Africa, 1842.
21 PP 1842, XI.1, (551), R eport from the Select Committee on the West Coast o f Africa, 1842, evidence of J.G. 
Nicholls.
22 PRO CO 96/14, Winniett to Grey, 31 January 1849, Cape Coast Castle. Governor Winniett makes clear the 
distinction even between Cape Coast Castle and Cape Coast Town.
23 Reynolds, Trade and Economic Change, p.78.
24 PP 1842, XII, Report from the Select Committee on the West Coast o f Africa, Appendix.
25 Kwamena-Poh, Government and Politics in theAkaapem State, pp.112-113.
26 NAG EC 6/ Basel Mission Periodicals, Mission Magazine, 1847.
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operation27, and were encouraged to take seeds, equipment, and knowledge back to 
their communities, Coffee cultivation became something of an obsession with 
administrators as well, who turned to it to repair the commercial damage wrought by 
abolition.28 But ironically coffee plantations, strenuously promoted along the littoral by 
the European establishment, utilised the very unfree labour that abolition was 
intended to abolish. The largest plantations, owned by such Euro-African merchants 
as Swanzy, Lutterodt and others, were mainly worked by slaves.29 The economic 
hopes of the administration therefore rested completely on the backs of slaves, and 
although high international tariffs kept coffee cultivation from attaining the necessary 
critical mass30, the interests of administrators were now firmly intertwined with that of 
slave owners. Thus throughout the 1840s and 1850s slavery remained integral to the 
economic success of the region through the cultivation and transportation of both 
palm oil and coffee.31
Political concerns also contributed to making emancipation an unattractive 
option for the administration. As we have seen, the colonial administration’s reliance 
on indigenous urban slave owners enabled them to successfully resist challenges to 
their slave owning rights in 1844 and 1851. British colonial policy was also bound by 
consideration of the Asante to the North. A renewal of conflict with Asante would 
have threatened the economic development of the region, and the administration 
therefore carefully avoided alienating Asante authority. This was a policy made more 
difficult by the 1843 Act for the More Effectual Suppression of the Slave Trade 
promulgated from the metropole, which prohibited British officers from assisting in the 
“carrying away of slaves to be dealt with as slaves.” 32 Committee of Merchant’s 
authorities had habitually returned slaves who sought refuge in their posts during the 
previous decade, a policy which allowed Asante traders the freedom to use slave 
carriers to transport goods to the coast. The 1843 Act threatened this informal 
convention, and the British administration reacted by ignoring this clause for as long
27 Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Reverend Robert Brooking, 1846 Report, p.81-2.
28 PRO CO 96/11, Governor Winniett’s Report on the Blue Book, 31 December 1847, Cape Coast.
29 1842.XI.1, (551), Report from the Select Committee on the West Coast o f  Africa, 1842, report of Dr. R. 
Madden. Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Extracts from Stanger’s Diary, No. 17, 29-30 March 1848, Accra.
30 Reynolds, Trade and Economic Change, 1974, p.65.
31 Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Stranger’s Quartel Bericht, August 1854. The use of slaves in palm oil cultivation is 
discussed in chapter 3.
32 NAG ADM  4/1/1, An Act for the M ore Effectual Suppression o f the Slave Trade, 6+7 Viet., 24 August 1843.
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33as possible. When attention was finally drawn to their inactivity by the abolitionist 
press in 1855, Acting Governor Henry Connor suggested, not that further resources 
be given to aid enforcement of the act, but that a royal dispensation be given to 
exclude the Gold Coast from these provisions, since the colony could not survive an 
Asante onslaught.34 Realpolitik continued to triumph into 1858, when Governor Bird 
not only continued to choose not to enforce the 1843 runaway slave provisions, but 
threatened to fine or imprison any British subjects harbouring or protecting runaway 
Asante slaves.35 Throughout this entire period, British magistrates continued to return 
runaways, “well knowing that if sent back, [many] would be beheaded instantly on 
their return.”36 In hindsight, the British were correct in considering this issue an 
important keystone in their relationship with the Asante; a fact made evident by the 
Asantehene’s decision in 1863 to launch an invasion of the coast in the wake of a 
British decision not to deliver up runaway slaves.37
Nor were slaves themselves active in promoting emancipation. When, in the 
1840s, Dr. Madden, who had been charged by Parliament to report on slavery in 
West Africa, instructed a number of slaves that they were free, they refused to take 
up their liberations unless “the Queen intended to give them something to eat, 
[otherwise] they would prefer to serve their masters who supplied their wants.”38
If Governors could not, until 1863, even bring themselves to accept the letter 
of a law restricting the return of slaves to an outside power, and could not count on 
significant slave agency, they were even more reluctant to promote emancipation. 
The mass liberation of slaves would have endangered their own economic projects 
and threatened to alienate the powerful urban merchants and chiefly office holder 
lobbies within the Gold Coast. Colonial officials had to operate in the face of these 
realities while at the same time responding to abolitionists in the metropole. The 
result was the development of colonial propaganda which insisted that slavery on the 
Gold Coast was relatively benign. Perhaps Governor Benjamin Pine best explained 
the view exhibited by his contemporaries:
33 PRO CO 96/33, Connor to Herbert, April 7 ,1855 , Cape Coast.
34 PRO CO 96/33, Connor to Herbert, April 7, 1855, Cape Coast.
35 PRO CO 96/43, Proclamation by Bird, 18 May 1858, Cape Coast.
36 PRO CO 96/43, Bird to Bulwer Lytton, 11 August 1858, Cape Coast.
37 PRO CO 96/57, Chief Justice’s Remarks on the Emancipation and Slave Trade Suppression Acts, encl. in 
Andrews to Newcastle, 10 April 1862, Cape Coast. Governor Pine refers directly to a case of two slaves who had 
been granted refuge in a British post, to the direct anger of the Asantehene. PRO CO 96/60, Pine to Newcastle, 13 
February 1863, Cape Coast.
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The universal prevalence of Domestic Slavery throughout the Gold Coast is 
admitted by the stereotyped phrase of its apologists that it is ‘interwoven into 
the whole framework of society there’... it has been represented as a mild 
form of slavery scarcely deserving of the name, but rather to be regarded as 
a patriarchal system of government whereby the mass of the people is kept 
in subjugation and provided for. It has been compared to the rule exercised 
by Chiefs over their clansmen or to the authority of Lords over their Vassals.
This notion was an effective tool for justifying the administration’s complicit 
recognition of domestic slavery, and it was soon put to use. Starting in the 1850s, 
officials were forced to defend their stance on slavery in the face of pressure not so 
much from distant metropolitan concerns, but generated by a new non-governmental 
group within the region: the missionaries.
Slavery, missionaries, and policy 1833-1870
The Committee of Merchants, who administered the British possessions from 
1828 to 1843, had no real policy towards slavery beyond ensuring that nothing 
interfered with the increasing production of and commerce in legitimate goods. The 
Committee, a purely commercial venture, was even more vulnerable to economic 
considerations than a colonial government, and therefore while their agents 
undertook various schemes to promote agriculture, they exhibited little interest in 
indigenous slavery beyond attempting to use it for their own ends.
Governor Maclean, however, was the exception to this rule, and was 
responsible not only for ending war with Asante and reopening trade routes, but for 
the first experiments with a domestic servitude policy attempted by a European 
administration on the Gold Coast. Maclean was not tempted to emancipate domestic 
slaves or end pawning. He regarded pawning as generally no worse than the English 
apprenticeship system, and argued that in England and the colonies “to relieve a 
debtor of his obligations and to accept his services in lieu of the debt, is not
39uncommon.” In defending his role in allowing pawning to continue, Maclean argued 
that he “could not release [pawns] from their pecuniary engagements,” but that he 
had guaranteed that their labour should not be coerced.40 To this end, the Governor 
did force several merchants to allow their pawns to work off the principal of their debt,
38 Cruickshank, Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast, p.236.
39 op. cit. Metcalfe, Maclean o f  the Gold Coast, p.220.
40 PRO CO 96/2, Maclean to Stanley, 13 September 1843, Cape Coast.
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but only in a small number of cases. 41 Similarly, Maclean allowed the gradual 
manumission of some long-standing slaves when their masters died, “classpng] them 
as debtors to the estate... on condition of their serving [either the estate or individuals 
who lent them money to pay of the debt] at low wages until they should come ask to 
repay the money advanced.”42 Maclean also freed a small number of domestic 
slaves who could prove abuse, but otherwise did not interfere with the institution 43
Maclean’s successors, the Governors of the Settlements on the Gold Coast 
following the reversion to Crown rule in 1843, did not diverge from his policies other 
than the manumission of slaves who were abused or could disprove the validity of 
their enslavement.44 Like their predecessors on the Committee of Merchants, these 
colonial administrators had no real policy regarding domestic slavery. It was only 
with the appointment of Benjamin Pine in 1857 that this changed. While Pine 
acknowledged that the actions of the colonial government in exercising jurisdiction 
over much of the coast implied official recognition of domestic slavery, he realised 
that mass emancipation could not be effected with colonial resources45 
Furthermore, Pine felt that as the British influence protected the people of the coast 
from the threat of invasion, human sacrifices, and the oppression of chiefs, “although 
our jurisdiction necessarily involves some recognition of slavery, yet this is scarcely to 
be regarded as an evil, since it enables us to prevent its abuses...”.46 As a 
compromise measure, he therefore issued a memorandum that in many ways 
presaged the methods of emancipation 13 years later. By Pine’s command, no 
magistrate would compel a slave or pawn to return to his/her master, although only in 
cases of abuse or ownership by a British subject were magistrates ordered to 
emancipate the slave, non-intervention otherwise being the watchword. Pawns who 
were seized because of a debt owed by a relative or countrymen were also to be 
freed by officers.47
The result was more a whimper than a bang. Pine was replaced by Governor
41 Reynolds, Trade and Economic Change, p. 159.
42 PP 1842, XI. 1, (551), R eport from the Select Committee on the West Coast o f  Africa, 1842, report o f Dr. R. 
Madden, encl, Maclean to Russell, 13 April 1841.
43 PRO CO 96/2, Maclean to Stanley, 13 September 1843, Cape Coast.
44 Cruickshank, Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast, pp.228-229. There is no other evidence that this took place, 
and Cruickshank was not the most objective observer.
45 PRO CO 96/41, Pine to Labouchere, 20 October 1857, Sierra Leone.
46 PRO CO 96/41, Pine to Labouchere, 20 October 1857, Sierra Leone.
47 PRO CO 96/41, Memorandum for the Guidance of the Courts as to cases involving Slavery and Pawning, 
Governor B. Pine, 30 October 1857, Cape Coast Castle.
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Bird less than a year later, and courts largely persisted in actively returning slaves to 
masters. Few ‘illegally’ panyarred pawns appear to have come forward, partly 
because there was little advertisement of the proclamation.48 Still, by introducing into 
Gold Coast law the idea of non-recognition of slave relationships, rather than active 
emancipation, Pine pioneered a model strategy in mediating between British 
abolitionism and Gold Coast political realism.
Other schemes were to emerge from another source - the activities of 
Protestant missionaries. Missionaries had been inconsistently active on the Gold 
Coast since 1482. Portuguese Augustinians were the first, followed by French 
Capuchins at Assini in the 1630s, the English Society for the Propagation of the 
Gospel at Cape Coast in the later part of the seventeenth century, and the Dutch 
Moravians at the beginning of the eighteenth.49 However these missionaries had 
largely been interested in the spiritual wellbeing of the European community, and 
generally confined their activities to the larger coastal trading posts. The nineteenth 
century missionaries were different. The Basel Mission Society settled the first 
missionary ‘communities’ on the Gold Coast in 1828 in the Danish zone of influence50 
- not only Accra but for the first time in the interior regions of Akuapem and Krobo. 
The European missionaries were assisted by a group of Jamaican families who were 
brought over to form the hub of the BMS congregations. The Basel Missionaries 
dispersed into the interior, teaching the catechism and preaching the gospel. Along 
the coast, they and opened mission schools for training teachers, clerks, skilled 
labourers, and catechists.51
The BMS was joined by the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society in 1836. 
The WMMS was equally evangelical, but although the congregation sent agents as 
far as Asante52, most of its effort was initially focused on the Cape Coast area.
Both of these societies reviled the institution of slavery, Wesley himself having 
had much to say on the subject53, and both could have played a central role in 
promoting abolitionism in the Gold Coast at least by acting as a watchdog over the 
administration. Nevertheless, pragmatism often intrudes upon idealism, and the
48 NAG SCT 2/4, Accra Judicial Assessor’s and Divisional Court, I860-; SCT 5/4, Cape Coast Judicial 
Assessor’s Court, 1866-.
49 Wilson, The Krobo People, p.135.
50 Reynolds, Trade and Economic Change, p.75.
51 Wilson, The K robo People, pp.136-137.
52 WMMS, Box 258/31, West African Correspondence, Journal o f T.B. Freeman, 1839.
53 Much of it contained in WMMS Box 662, Anti-Slavery Papers.
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realities of operating in an African environment were not long in making themselves 
clear to the missions’ officers. Missionary personnel were despatched to remote 
locales and charged with building churches, chapels, schools, and houses for 
themselves. Free labour was not readily available, especially where indigenous 
regimes were unsympathetic, and missionaries often had to employ pawns and 
slaves. The Wesleyans tried to palliate this operation by purchasing the contracts of 
pawns and deducting a portion of their wages until the purchase sum was cleared.54 
In the late 1850s through to the early 1870s the BMS similarly instituted a policy of 
purchasing slaves and allowing them to work off their ‘debt’ to the mission, similar to 
the French policy of rachats.55 However, they were also often forced to rely on the 
hired labour of slaves.56 There was a thin division between liberating slaves by 
purchase and purchasing slaves for labour and the missionary groups were clearly 
sometimes forced to operate on the ‘wrong’ side. This situation was somewhat 
embarrassing for the missions, and colonial officials used such practices to deflect 
criticism of administration policy emanating especially from WMMS sources, at one 
point intimating that a leading Methodist, the Reverend Freeman, was one of the 
largest purchasers of pawn contracts in the entire region 57
The congregations themselves initially attracted alienated or peripheral 
members of the community, such as slaves58, but Euro-African merchants, eager to 
associate themselves with their European identities, formed the most influential 
faction within the Wesleyan community.59 Both the slave and slave-owning 
constituencies had their own ideas on the role of dependency relationships in society, 
and these further complicated the role of missionaries on this important subject, as 
clergy could not freely agitate against an institution supported by important members 
of their flock. The WMMS consequently decided not to directly agitate against 
slavery, but rather to promote a capitalist mode of labour in order to “assist in 
creating a market-force economy to free slaves.”60 Based on the theory that cash
54 Metcalfe, Maclean o f the Gold Coast, p.311.
55 BMS D-1.19b, Zimmerman, 11 January 1868, Odumase. Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Suss to Basel, 24 April 1856, 
Akropong; Baum to Basel, 14 July 1857, Akim.
56 BMS D-1.21b, Zimmerman, 16 August 1869, Odumase. BMS D - l . l l ,  Zimmerman, 30 Janauary 1861, 
Odumase.
57 PRO CO 96/2, Maclean to Stanley, 12 September 1843, Cape Coast.
58 BMS D - l . l l ,  Zimmerman, 30 January 1861, Odumase, BMS D-1.10, Zimmerman and Aldinger, 25 January 
1860.
59 WMMS Box 258, West African Correspondence, Wrigley to Committee, 20 February 1837, Cape Coast.
60 WMMS Box 662, Anti-Slavery Papers, Printed letter regarding cultivation of cotton in Africa, 24 December
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cropping would stimulate wage labour they carried out several schemes to promote 
the growth of cotton and other goods from a model farm at ‘Domonassi’, aided by a 
grant from the Society for the Extinction of the Slave Trade.61 The farm failed, but 
the missionaries clamoured for further resources for a second attempt.62 The 
Wesleyans even at one point attempted to recruit American ex-siaves63 to return and 
lead the project, but this effort was once again unsuccessful. These experiments in 
using capital to promote wage over unfree labour proved only that the Gold Coast 
was not ready for the wage labour revolution.
The Basel Missionary Society’s experiment with emancipation was even more 
interesting, and in the event was almost adopted as colonial policy. The BMS, 
operating largely in the interior, and drawing less of its support from urban elites, 
ironically had a more free hand to pursue anti-slavery policies. Slavery had been an 
issue discussed by missionaries in the field for some time, and in the early 1860s the 
debate came to a head, culminating in a debate between the missionary leadership 
in Basel and a number of lay missionaries in Africa. The Committee, supported by 
Eisenschmid in Kyebi and several other field agents, argued that slavery was not only 
evil in and of itself, but also the root of many other social and economic problems in 
indigenous society.64 In the end, the strict abolitionists emerged victorious, and in 
1863 the BMS banned slave-holding among its members. Rather than alienating or 
expelling their slave-owning congregates, however, the BMS forged a compromise 
whereby the slaves were declared debtors for a sum equivalent to their purchase 
price. The slaves were thereafter paid a monthly wage for their labours, a portion of 
which was refunded to repay their masters. A significant number of these slaves also 
received the right to work a piece of land for themselves.65 Alongside this policy, the 
Basel Missionaries also began to reject important potential converts who were not 
willing to liberate their slaves.66
I860.
61 WMMS Box 258, West African Correspondence, Instructions to Rev. Freeman and other missionaries of the 
Society on the Gold Coast, and in Ashantee, undated 1835.
62 WMMS Box 266, West African Correspondence, MMS Synod Minutes, 23-25 May 1842.
63 WMMS Box 662, Anti-Slavery Papers, African Aid Society Paper for intending Settlers in Africa, undated 
1860. This strategy was possibly influenced by the ongoing attempts to settle freed American slaves in places 
such as Liberia.
64 Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Eisenschmid’s letter, 5 May 1862, Akim.
65 PP 1865, V, (412), R eport from the Committee on the West Coast o f Africa, Evidence o f Rev. Elias Shrenk, 
1865.
66 A  number of “heads of families” were rejected for baptism because they refused to put aside their slaves and 
their wives - monogamy being the other major hurdle to conversion for wealthy individuals. BMS D-1.16,
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While this gradual liberation scheme drew inspiration from Maclean’s efforts 
30 years earlier, its scope was somewhat greater as the BMS congregation had 
several thousand members67; and its effect was heightened when in 1865 the plan 
was presented in parliament and its results evaluated, bringing the matter to the 
attention of the Crown.68 Although the action was limited to Methodist congregations, 
the idea of transforming slaves into bonded workers was a precedent when, 10 years 
later, administrators had to decide what form emancipation would take.
Slaves to the state?: colonial recruiting
Before the 1870s, British policy on the Gold Coast was generally anti­
expansionist69, a reflection of prevailing attitudes and lack of colonial fervour amongst 
the British population. The result was the policy of limiting British jurisdiction 
discussed above, with the coastal forts and settlements administered by a small 
European staff in an effort to control costs.70
Both for budgetary reasons and because European soldiers were susceptible 
to tropical disease, the colonial administration quickly turned to African troops to 
enforce what authority they had.71 The idea of using Africans as soldiers was not a 
novel one. In earlier chapters, we saw how European merchant companies had 
often relied on town militias (asafo) as auxiliaries. In other parts of West Africa, the 
recruitment of Africans had a long history. The British had begun recruiting 
indigenous troops in Goree, Senegal in 1808, soon after capturing the island.72 
There they had encountered a wall of apathy in attempting to enlist volunteers, and 
turned to slaves, whom they felt “would be happy to change their state” and could be 
purchased “for the consideration of about eighty to a hundred dollars each”.73 The 
British administration in Senegal also incorporated slaves confiscated under the 1807 
anti-slave trading act into their military forces.74
The officer in charge of this effort, Administrator Maxwell, was raised several
Zimmerman, 28 September 1864, Odumase; D-1.19b, Zimmerman, 16 February 1867, Odumase; D -1.22a, 
Zimmerman, 30 March 1870, Odumase.
67 The Akropong congregation alone had 956 members. PP 1865, V, (412), Report from  the Committee on the 
West Coast o f Africa, Evidence of Rev. Elias Shrenk, 1865.
68 pp 2 8 6 5 j 412, Report from the Committee on the West Coast o f Africa, 1865.
69 Agbodeka, African Politics and British Policy in the G old Coast, 1971, pp.34-35.
70 PRO CO 96/18, Fitzpatrick to Grey, 10 March 1850, Cape Coast.
71 PRO CO 96/4 Hill to Stanley, 2 March 1844, Cape Coast.
72 PRO CO 267/32, Maxwell to Castlereagh, 14 September 1808, Goree.
73 PRO CO 267/32, Maxwell to Castlereagh, 15 January 1809, Goree.
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years later to the position of Governor of Sierra Leone (and thus the senior 
Government official in West Africa). In that role he promoted the recruitment of 
Africans to serve in British forts throughout the region, and communicated with the 
Committee of Merchants on the Gold Coast the possibility of inducing Fantes to join 
such a force.75 The Committee of Merchants, unsure that they could find voluntary 
recruits, turned to slaves ‘emancipated’ by the British cruiser squadron, requesting 
the conscription of about 200 men to serve at Gold Coast forts.76
The number of ex-slaves recruited in this manner is unclear, but could never 
have been very large as the Committee of Merchants did not maintain a significant 
military force. The crown administration inherited from the Committee of Merchants 
only 191 soldiers of the Gold Coast Corps and the militia77, who were then 
augmented by the 1st West Indian Regiment brought over to form the garrisons of the 
major forts.78 Governor Hill, sensing the need for a larger force and unable to form a 
large body of volunteers, filled out the militia by ‘borrowing’ slaves from local slave 
owners. Membership in the militia carried a monthly wage, and Hill found it quite 
simple to pay a portion of that wage to the slaves’ masters, continuing a long tradition 
of administrator’s ‘winkpng] at’ such arrangements.79
Indeed, slaves continued to form the bulk of the Gold Coast Corps throughout 
the 1840s and 1850s. A majority of voluntary recruits were runaway slaves, as many 
as 90% according to one colonial source.80 Military officers tended to accept these 
runaways out of a desperate need for recruits, but the complaints of aristocrats and 
slave-owners led to a restructuring of the recruiting process in 1858 to a method 
whereby chiefs were required to produce a quota of free recruits each year.81
While the administration faced opposition from slave-owners to their policy of 
recruiting runaway slaves, the purchase and indenture of slaves was also soon 
forbidden by an 1852 decision by Secretary of State for the Colonies Newcastle that 
“the plan of purchasing men... even if in reality likely to tend to their ultimate 
freedom... could scarcely be understood in Africa except as implying a recognition by
74 PRO CO 267/32, Maxwell to Castlereagh, 15 January 1809, Goree.
75 PRO CO 267/54, Barnes to Bathurst, 25 November 1813, Africa Office.
76 PRO CO 267/54, Committee to Arbuthnot, 24 September 1819, Africa Office.
77 PRO CO 96/4, Hill to Stanley, 2 March 1844, Cape Coast.
78 PRO CO 96/4, Hill to Stanley, 2 March 1844, Cape Coast.
19 Cruickshank, Eighteen Years on the G old Coast, p.234.
80 PRO CO 96/43, Pine to Labouchere, 10 February 1858, Cape Coast.
81 PRO CO 96/43, Pine to Labouchere, 2 February 1858, Accra; CO 96/43, Pine to Labouchere, 10 February
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her Majesty’s Government of the principle of Slavery.”82 The subsequent decline in 
the muster of the Gold Coast Corps and the West Indian Regiment (which was being 
reinforced with local recruits) continued until 1862, whereupon the threat of war with 
Asante forced the military commander of the region, Major Cochrane, to review 
policy. Cochrane, desperate for troops, concluded that Governor Pine’s 1857 order 
that administration officials should not “compel or order a slave or pawn to return to 
his master”83 implied that “every British officer... might refuse to view any person as a 
[slave orj pawn” and thus allow for their enlistment as a free individual, a policy he 
ordered military recruiters to adopt.84 When Governor Pine reported this strategy to 
the Colonial Office, Secretary of State Newcastle firmly reiterated to Governor Pine 
that “the enlistment of Slaves or Pawns to serve in Her Majesty’s Forces is not to be 
practiced.”85 Following this order and complaints from several slave-owners86, Pine 
thereafter instructed the military establishment to cease recruiting slaves and pawns 
in no uncertain terms.87 Despite appeals, the Colonial Office upheld the decision 
ending the recruitment of unfree individuals and runaway slaves in December 1863.88
The upshot was the continuation of recruiting problems for the military, 
which sought any potential solution that would raise the number of enlisted 
personnel. The first possibility, raised in the wake of the 1863 War, was to authorise 
a paid Native Levy in times of conflict89, but the limitations of this untrained force 
were clear - it was simply no substitute for regular units. As the demand for police 
and garrison troops90 increased following the annexation of the Dutch forts in 187191, 
a decision was taken to recruit troops outside of the region at Lagos, a significant 
departure from previous policy. The success of this experiment would have serious 
ramifications on labour opportunities for liberated slaves and freemen alike in the
Q Onext quarter century.
1858, Cape Coast.
82 NAG ADM 1/1/10, Parkington to Hill, 18 December 1852, London.
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87 PRO CO 96/62, Pine to Newcastle, 7 November 1863, Cape Coast.
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89 PRO CO 97/1, Ordinance 1 of 1864, Governor R. Pine, 22 feburary 1864.
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The waxing of indigenous elites: 1861-1873
The colonial administration, supported by meagre resources from the 
metropole and unable to recruit significant African auxiliaries, found itself unable to 
exercise much authority in the regions protected by the 1831 treaty. British authority 
east of Cape Coast went into decline and failed to recover even following the 1850 
acquisition of the Danish territories in the east - the forts of Accra, Prampram, Ningo, 
Keta, Ada, and treaty authority over the rich regions of Krobo and Akuapem.93 The 
administration attempted to rectify this situation by ordering a direct poll tax in the 
protected territories to raise revenue for infrastructure projects and personnel in 
185294, but the tax was extremely unpopular, and by 1854 a revolt was spreading 
from the former Danish regions west into Fanteland 95 Opposition crystallised around 
the theme that the money was being misspent96 as the British administration failed to 
improve the infrastructure or place significant garrisons. By 1857, Governor Pine 
was recommending a retreat from protectorate responsibilities.97 The 1863 Asante 
raids further aggravated the situation, and the disgruntled Colonial Office refused to 
release funds to deal with the resulting turmoil in districts recently vacated by Asante 
forces.98
The environment of resistance engendered by the Poll Tax Revolts99 carried 
over to the late 1860s, as coalitions of aristocrats and educated merchants coalesced 
to control their own political destinies.100 Among the Fante, this spirit of 
empowerment found its expression in resistance to a proposed exchange of territory 
between the British and the Dutch. The exchange, intended to normalise the 
European powers respective coastlines, would have transferred authority over roads 
leading to Fante from Wassaw and Chama to the Dutch, traditional allies of the
93 PRO CO 96/18, Winniett to Early Grey, 30 March 1850, Cape Coast.
94 Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century, p.207.
95 PRO CO 96/30, Hill to Newcastle, 29 January 1854, Cape Coast.
96 PRO CO 96/52, Andrews to Newcastle, 25 April 1861, Christiansborg.
97 PRO CO 96/41, Pine to Labouchere, 10 October 1857, Cape Coast.
98 Parker, “Ga state and society in early colonial Accra”, pp.114-115.
99 Opposition to this, the first attempt to levy a direct tax on Gold Coast inhabitants, was perhaps the first shot in 
a long history of Ghanaian (and African) resistance to colonial taxation. Similar examples outside the Gold Coast 
include the Hut Tax War in Sierra Leone and the revolts over hut and dog taxes in South-West Africa. Extensive 
commentary on the Poll Tax Revolts can be found in the Cape Coast - Central Region Archives.
100 pj^Q c o  96/77, Kennedy to Colonial Office, 7 November 1868, Cape Coast; CO 96/85, Ussher to Kennedy, 
11 July 1870, Cape Coast.
Asante.101 The Kings and Chiefs of Fante refused to allow Dutch power over their 
neighbours, who also rejected Dutch authority, instead maintaining “their resolution... 
whether accepted or not to maintain their true allegiance to the British flag under all 
circumstances and adversities.”102 As a result, the Fante nobility rejected Dutch 
authority. Their principal complaint appears to have been the proposed exchange, 
however the recent imposition of the poll tax and British failure to pay promised 
stipends led the combined chiefly office holders to choose to form an independent 
Confederation.103 The resulting convention proceeded to swiftly create a national 
militia, and began to collect taxes.104
Although the move towards Confederation was initiated by kings and chiefs105, 
the bureaucracy was soon necessarily transferred into the hands of missionary- and 
colony-educated Euro-African merchant families, who began to exercise executive 
control.106 As chiefly officeholders became disaffected by their declining power over 
the situation, they turned back to the British, and in 1872 important chiefs began to 
disavow the Confederation, seeing in British jurisdiction a way of regaining their 
authority.107 As a result, not only did the Confederation fail, but a significant wedge 
was driven between the British officials and chiefs on the one hand and the merchant 
elite on the other which was to prove important to future events.108
The decline of British authority led to an inability on the part of the 
administration to influence indigenous slavery in any manner. The only remaining 
method by which the British could influence slave-owning was through the courts, but 
aristocrats had begun to withdraw their support for colonial courts in the late 
1860s.109 Furthermore, Benjamin Pine’s order to magistrates not to interfere with 
slavery left the few slaves who chose to assert their freedom in the hands of their
101 NAG-CC #72, Aborigine Rights Protection Society, Granville to Cardwell, 13 September 1869, Cape Coast.
102 PRO CO 96/79, Simpson to Kennedy, 2 March 1869, Akwamu.
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masters. 110 On the other hand, magistrates did effect the release of individuals, 
especially children, placed in bondage for debts contracted by persons other than 
themselves or their parents,.111 While relatives of pawns did sometimes use the 
courts in this manner, the general paucity of cases during this period reflects both the 
reluctance of Africans to use British courts and the limited extent of British 
authority.112
Conclusion
On the 6th of April 1873, the King of Holland gave up his forts on the Gold 
Coast to the British in what would prove to be a watershed event for the Gold Coast 
region.113 The succeeding two years would see Asante power on the coast broken, 
British hegemony established, and slavery banned.
On the eve of the exchange, however, none of this could have been foreseen. 
Most specifically, there was no established plan and no impetus for ending slavery. 
The preceding half-century had been an era, at best, of experimentation with various 
small-scale schemes of ending servile relationships, the most significant of which 
were not even initiated by the administration. Lacking the resources to effect such 
policies even if they had been found desirable, Governors largely allowed Africans to 
decide the fate of slaves, a strategy that culminated in Benjamin Pine’s non­
interference strategy. At no point during this period was the 1834 Emancipation Act 
promulgated in any part of the Gold Coast, outside of the few physical structures that 
comprised the British forts, and even there runaway slaves were generally returned 
until 1863, after which they were still not encouraged to seek refuge.
Nevertheless, the experiments of the ante-proclamation period were crucial to 
defining the post-proclamation settlement. The failure of military officials to obtain 
sanction for slave-recruiting policies would have significant ramifications for ex-slave 
labour and enlistment. Pine’s non-interference strategy would form the basis of the 
adoption of the ‘Indian Model’ of Emancipation. The alienation of educated urban 
elites from the administration in the wake of poll tax resistance and Confederation
110 Slaves could bring civil cases to court charging their masters with “wrongly claiming [defendant] as 
slaves/pawns” if they could prove they were illegally sold or captured, eg NAG SCT 17/4/1, Accra JA Court 
Gold, Brown v. Adjuah, 13 April 1874. NAG ADM 1/10/2, Bentil to Ussher, 2 February 1870, Mumford.
111 NAG SCT 2/4/9, Accra Divisional Court, Accra Divisional Court, 2 August 1871.
112 23 cases involving slaves and pawns in the Accra and Cape Coast Judicial Assessor and Accra Divisional 
Courts between April 1867 and November 1874, NAG SCT 2/4/6-2/4/11 and 5/4/15.
113 PP 1873, XLIX, (266), No.33, Received 6 May 1873.
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would have great effect on their power to resist the ordinances of emancipation, while 
the reconciliation of many chiefs would lend them authority to negotiate their own 
solutions. Lastly, the firm establishment of missionaries would push the development 
of wage labour and the rehabilitation of slaves further in the next quarter-century.
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CHAPTER 5:
The grand experiment - emancipation in Senegal Colony, 1832-1854
If slavery in Senegal and the Gold Coast prior to the sixteenth century was in 
varying degrees related to the lineage system, largely social and political in nature, and 
only one of a complex set of organising principles, then the periods of the Atlantic slave 
trade and abolition introduced important innovations in slave-holding and dealing within 
these societies. European initiatives - highly-organised commerce of the Atlantic slave 
trade and its subsequent abolition, the demand for ‘legitimate’ goods - had led to the 
commercialisation of captivity and later a slave mode of production in some sectors of 
local culture. However, these plans, European in conception, had largely been hijacked 
by indigenous merchants and chiefly officeholders.
On the Gold Coast, experiments with expanding opportunities for manumission 
were similarly defeated or deflected by local elites, while the French regime des engages 
was simply appropriated by habitants to serve their own needs. Indeed, the free 
inhabitants of St. Louis and Goree were largely satisfied with prevailing conditions and 
locally posted officials saw little reason to rock the boat. Thus, as in the Gold Coast, 
there was little reason to expect a drastic change in the state of affairs. Events in the 
metropole were to change all this. The principles behind thel 848 revolution in France 
were to be expressed in a drastic reversal of policy and a revival of humanitarianism and 
abolitionism, culminating in an emancipation decree promulgated throughout the empire. 
The administration’s view of slavery in the fledgling colonies had always been linked to 
politics in the metropole, and the impact of this decree in the Senegal colony would 
influence the fate of the colony’s 6000 slaves. Moreover, it would serve as a prototype 
for a pattern in policy and action that would continue until the end of the century.
These events have been discussed to some extent by Martin Klein, who 
devotes half of a chapter to emancipation and its immediate impact, and another half to 
more long-term effects which manifested themselves during and after Faidherbe’s 
expansion in the 1854-1865 (discussed in chapter 6 of this dissertation).1 However 
while Klein’s treatment of the subject does form a framework for understanding the
1 Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, pp.19-27 and pp.28-36 respectively.
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events surrounding emancipation, this chapter is an attempt to provide a deeper 
narrative by approaching several topics outside of Klein’s scope. The first section 
covers the debates on and attempted reform of slavery prior to 1848. These events 
illuminate the motivations and strategies of administrators in the metropole and in 
Senegal as well as slave owning elites, and assist us in understanding the crisis of the 
sudden shift to emancipation. Much of this chapter is also concerned with the days 
surrounding the episode of emancipation, in which we can see at play the specific social 
and economic characteristics of slavery in St. Louis and Goree which lead to a unique 
outcome for emancipation. Using this information, I am able in the last sections to 
engage with Klein, Mohamed Mbodj and other historians including Louis Faidherbe 
himself to discuss the de facto impact of emancipation.
Formulating emancipation?: manumissions and debates 1832-1848
Following the economic failures of the Waalo plantations in 1827, the French 
monarchy turned its attention to domestic concerns and Senegal was somewhat 
neglected. A series of inexperienced governors was imposed upon St. Louis, one for 
each of the 21 years between Roger’s disgrace in 1827 and emancipation in 1848.2 
None of these administrators lasted long enough to formulate and carry out their own 
policies, and the Ministry of the Navy directly imposed most of the period’s procedural 
regulations.3 The various Governors were solely responsible for the implementation of 
these regulations and the running of day-to-day affairs during their brief tenures.
The policy on official manumission policy was a case in point. The administration 
had a policy of affranchisements definitives for engages who managed to survive their 
fourteen-year indenture. However when the French government began to come under 
increased pressure from abolitionists following the July 1830 revolution, the Ministry of 
the Navy began to investigate the possibility of allowing slaves to purchase their own 
freedom. Consequently, they solicited the opinions of the various colonial Governors.4
In Senegal, it was Governor Saint-Germain (1831-1833) who was reluctantly 
forced to confront this issue. The constant changeover of administrators had vested the
2 ANSOM Senegal 1/12 to 1/33, Correspondence Generate.
3 The Ministre de la Marine was responsible for administering overseas colonies.
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habitant community with an inordinate amount of power, and Saint-Germain was aware 
that they would not support any proposed system of rachats. Furthermore, whereas in 
the Caribbean colonies there were relatively few slaves who could afford to purchase 
their freedom, many of the slaves of the islands of St. Louis and Goree, endowed with a 
share of their own wages, could conceivably have purchased their freedom en-masse.5 
Saint-Germain therefore brought three objections before the Ministre de la Marine.
First and foremost, Saint-Germain appealed to the Ministry’s inherent thriftiness 
and predilection for public order, suggesting that the introduction of rachats would 
exacerbate slaves’ inclinations to flee their masters, becoming vagabonds and thus 
drains on the public purse. He furthermore suggested that any policy incorporating 
rachats would alienate slave-owners whose support the administration relied upon.
Saint-Germain realised both of these issues were insufficient justifications for 
opposing an extension of self-liberations. Instead he argued that the habitant class, 
relying as they did completely on their slaves for income, would be irreparably ruined by 
the loss of their skilled slaves; and reminded the Ministre that habitants and their slave 
labourers were the basis of the region’s economy. Saint-Germain suggested as a 
solution that if rachats must be allowed, slaves in Senegal should be required to 
purchase their freedom by “replace[ing themselves] with another slave of the same 
value.”6
This suggestion ran directly counter to the Ministry’s main objective of pacifying 
abolitionist critics, and was largely ignored. Instead, in 1832, a royal ordinance was 
passed allowing slaves to purchase their freedom. The act required slaves to submit 
“through the mediation of either their master or the procureur du roi, a demand to be 
definitively recognised as free” after a six month waiting period.7 The act made clear 
that these manumissions could occur only with the agreement of the slaves’ owners, to 
whom the slaves were presumably required to pay a certain amount.
The 1832 ordinance deliberately left unclear the mechanisms under which these
4 ANSOM Senegal XIV/1, Saint-Germain a Ministre, 5 April 1832, St. Louis. Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, p.19.
5 ANS K6, Notes de l ’Ordonnateur sur l ’affranchissement des Captifs, Commissaire Guillet, 29 January 1836, St. 
Louis.
6 ANSOM Senegal XIV/1, Saint-Germain a Ministre, 5 April 1832, St. Louis.
7 Ordonnance Royale, 12 July 1832, in Duvergier, J.B., Collection Complete des Lois, Decrets, Ordonnances, 
Reglemens etA vis du Conseil d ’Etat, Tome 37, Pommeret et Guenot, Paris, 1838.
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rachats would occur, which perhaps explains why it has been ignored by many 
historians of emancipation even though available records do indicate a small number of 
slave manumissions prior to 1848.8 Analysis of the documents is made even more 
difficult by the unfortunate blending of rachat records with those of other forms of 
manumission, including the definitive emancipations of engages. However that specific 
cases are rachats can be concluded from marginalia and details in tables. A scrawled 
notation in one notebook, for example, indicates that the freedom of a four year old girl 
named Fara was purchased by Tiaye M’Baye, a carpenter, for 500 francs9, and similar 
records of what appear to have been re-purchase prices in other documents seem to 
similarly indicate occurrences of rachat™
Alongside the records of rachats there is evidence of a small number of 
individuals freed by the administration. Amongst these, the singular record of Aminata 
stands out. Aminata was a young female slave freed by the magistrates of St. Louis due 
to abuse at the hands of her master.11 This appears to have been a unique occurrence, 
as was the case of an unregistered engage named Foutoura, freed by the courts 
because she had been introduced into the colony illegally, although it is not clear how or 
why.12 However like all slaves manumitted by these executive judgements, by the 
mechanism of rachats, or after 14 years of service as engages, Aminata and Foutoura 
became freedwomen but did not acquire the rights of citizens of the colony until three 
years after their manumission or, if minors, until three years after they had reached their 
majorite.13
It is unclear how many slaves purchased or were granted their freedom between 
1832 and 1848. Records held in the French archives in Provence and in Dakar do not 
agree on this issue, and it is often unclear whether the individuals discussed in the 
documents in either location were freed engages or manumitted slaves.14 Records from 
Dakar tell us that only 261 slaves purchased their freedom between the years 1830 and
8 ANS K6, Actes d’affranchissement, 1834-1841.
9 ANS K6, Actes d’affranchissement, 1834-1841, No. 122, 18 December 1836.
10 ANS 3E20, Proces-Verbal, Seance de Conseil d’administration, 5 February 1848, St. Louis.
11 ANS K6, Actes d’affranchissement, No. 124,10 December 1836.
12 ANS K6, Actes d’affranchissement, No. 20, 18 May 1841.
13 ANS 1B23, Ministre au Pujol, 4 September 1835.
14 i.e. ANS M3, Rapport sur la Service Judiciare, Greffe de File de St. Louis and Greffe de Goree, various dates.
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1841, about twelve a year, and this suggests that rachats were periodic occurrences 
rather than a major manifestation.15 For the Ministre, the ‘failure’ of the rachats policy 
was an embarrassment. The blame for this must be placed firmly on the administration 
which either by oversight caused by the excessive gubernatorial turnover rate or by 
design failed even to pass an ordinance officially confirming the royal act until 1840.16
The administration’s reluctant compliance with the regime des rachats was 
symptomatic of if its self-acknowledged inadequacy. The colony was so diminutive - 
French sovereignty still encompassing only the two principal islands and a small number 
of posts along the river- that anti-slavery laws should have been eminently 
enforceable.17 But with no effectual leadership within the Colony, and with France more 
than a month away by ship, no real policy against slavery was formulated.
Yet while attitudes and policy remained essentially stagnant in Senegal, attitudes 
were beginning to change in the metropole. The prospect of emancipation was first 
seriously broached within the government in the 1830s, as the newly reinforced 
abolitionists began to flex their muscle in France. Senegalese colonial officials, 
however, continued to dismiss the idea. While accepting that the metropole controlled 
both budgets and means of persona! advancement, administrators had to deal with the 
realities of their situation in Senegal. As a result they became increasingly defensive of 
the compromises they were forced to make with local elites. In their despatches to their 
superiors they attempted to deflect the increasing abolitionist pressure by suggesting 
that emancipation would carry its own humanitarian dangers. They suggested that the 
welfare of slaves - especially the aged or infirm - would suffer if masters were released 
from their responsibilities, and that emancipation would turn slaves into vagrants and 
create a class of the voluntarily unemployed. Artfully, they also appealed on the political 
and budgetary grounds likely to concern ministerial officials: that neighbouring peoples 
would withdraw from their commerce with the colony, that it would become necessary to 
mount expensive police operations in the interior of the region, and that local customary 
law would break down and foment anarchy.18 Despite the breadth of their arguments,
15 ANS 4E1, Proces-Verbal, Seance de Conseil Generate, 14 November 1842, St. Louis
16 ANS 2B18, Charmasson a Ministre, 6 October 1839, St. Louis.
17 ANS K17, Rapport sur la Captivite, Administrates Poulet, 1905.
18 ANS K6, Notes de I’Ordonnateur sur l ’affranchissement des Captifs, Guillet, 29 January 1836, St. Louis.
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the solutions proposed by officials in Senegal reveal that their primary concern was to 
avoid alienating the habitants, upon whom the weak Governors relied for stability. 
Governor Guillet, for example, proposed that if emancipation were necessary, slaves 
should be indentured to their masters for 14 years, at the end of which an indemnity 
would be given, thus both softening the blow and compensating local slave owners.19
Although unable to effect the local enforcement of anti-slavery policies, the 
Ministre de la Marine continued to feel pressure from abolitionist sources, and in 1840 
the emancipation debate reached a new level culminating in the appointment of a 
special commission to study the question of slavery in the colonies. This committee 
identified three potential modes of emancipation:
1. Emancipation of children as they are born; the adult generation of slaves to 
remain with their masters.
2. The purchase of all slaves from private owners by the state, which would 
then collect a portion of the slave’s wages until the purchase price were fully 
paid.
3. Conversion of slaves into apprentices for a period of time, following which 
they were to be definitively emancipated.20
All of these suggestions proposed a gradual transition from domestic slavery to 
emancipation, the central variance being the role the state would play. Remarkably, 
these suggestions were rejected not by abolitionists, but by the Commandant of Goree. 
The Commandant dismissed the idea of state regulation of gradual liberations, correctly 
perceiving that the administration in place could not competently regulate the work of 
slaves. Oh the other hand, he recognised that Senegalese slaves, generally richer and 
more skilled than their Caribbean counterparts, would not accept apprenticeship. "It is 
necessary”, he wrote, “for their liberation to be both instantaneous and definitive.”21 
Under such a formula slaves, he believed, would stay at their jobs and would cause a 
minimal disruption to commerce and society. However, the Commandant further 
argued, if this were to occur an indemnity must be simultaneously paid to habitant slave­
owners. These arguments do not really reflect a surprising reversal of opinion, instead
19 Idem
20 My paraphrasing. ANS 'K25>L >esclavage enAOF, Deherme, 1906, pp.15-17.
21 ANS 2E2, Proces-Verbal, Seance d’arrondissement de Goree, 4 September 1842,
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displaying a continuing pragmatism. Faced with the increasing possibility that French 
abolitionists would force through some sort of emancipation deal, the Commandant 
simply chose to channel his resources into getting the best possible deal for habitants 
and other slave owners.
The early 1840s were a period of intense debate on the question of the abolition 
of domestic slavery. In May 1842 a colonial commission was appointed in Paris by the 
Naval Ministry which invited comments from all the colonies on the possible 
consequences of emancipation and on the best mode of liberation to adopt.22 In the 
event, the contentions of Senegalese officials, supported by evidence assembled from 
hearings in St. Louis and Goree, were effective. The opinions of the various classes 
were unsurprising. The noires libres and Europeans were divided on the subject of 
emancipation, but both signares and habitants declared themselves opposed to any 
such plan, despite the offer of a cash indemnity. Nor was there any division amongst 
the ranks of the slaves, who unanimously supported emancipation although suggesting 
that they would probably be happy to remain in residence with their owners.23
Nevertheless they could not hope to compete with their owners. The statements 
of the habitants were very convincing. Carefully phrased and eloquently stated, in direct 
contrast to the evidence of their uneducated slaves, the habitants’ statements 
recognised the moral appeal of emancipation. However, they argued, slaves in the 
colony were not only more secure and had a higher standard-of-living than many noires 
iibres but were also instrumental in conducting commerce and in feeding the colony.24 
As a result, the Paris commission recognised the differences between Senegalese and 
Caribbean slavery. They agreed not only that there were differences between the two in 
the roles slaves played in the economy, but also that in Senegal, unlike the Caribbean, 
most masters were non-European and both they and the slaves were Muslims. The 
commissioners also recognised the significance of the colony’s position, surrounded as 
it was by slave-owning societies.25 Thus the Paris commission yielded to pressure from 
an alliance of habitants and the colonial administration, declining to apply to Senegal the
22 ANSOM Senegal XIV/13, Rapport a la question de Paffranchissement des Captifs au Senegal, 16 April 1847, Paris.
23 Summarised in ANSOM Senegal XIV/13, Rapport a la question de l ’affranchissement des Captifs au Senegal, 16 
April 1847, Paris.
24 ANSOM Senegal XIV/13, Proces-Verbal de Commission d’Inquete, November 1848, Saint Louis.
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law of 18 July 1845 which established conditions for gradual emancipation in the 
Caribbean colonies.26
The limited compromise of 1848 did not satisfy the abolitionist community. On 
April 24, 1847, a petition was presented to the Assemblee Nationale containing 11,000 
signatures, comprising amongst them “3 bishops, 19 vicaires generaux, 858 priests... 7 
members of the institute, 151 elected counsellors, 213 magistrates...” and more than 
9000 property-owners and merchants.27 Amongst other issues the abolitionists 
remonstrated the lack of any emancipation plan for Senegal.
In response, the Naval Ministry prepared a draft of a gradual emancipation 
ordinance for the colony in 1847. The act was to have set up a system enabling slaves 
to request their emancipation, each case to have been considered by the Governor on 
an individual basis. The administration was to have been given the power to force 
masters to accept a ‘reasonable’ rachat price28 This further attempt to reach a 
compromise between metropolitan abolitionist pressure and colonial concerns implied 
that full emancipation would still be a long time in coming.
Emancipation
In the event, the 1847 royal ordinance was never passed, and in 1848 everything 
changed. In February of that year Parisians took to the streets and ministers on the left 
seized power, ejecting the royal family and proclaiming a Republic in early May. The 
Republican leaders were reformers and had close ties to the abolitionist movement, and 
it took only four days for the new government to name a commission, led by abolitionist 
Victor Schoelcher29, charged with “preparing an immediate act of emancipation in all the 
colonies of the Republic.”30
The decree ultimately adopted was no compromise, but an intellectual heir to the 
declaration des droits de I’homme. The young optimistic Republican government did not
25 ANSOM Senegal XIV/13, Commission des affaires coloniales, Annexe au Proces-Verbal, Seance du Mai 1842.
26 ANSOM Senegal XIV/13, Rapport, le Conseiller d’etat, 31 July 1847, Paris.
27 Gaston-Martin, histoire de VEsclavage dans les Colonies Franqaises, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1948, 
p.291.
28 ‘Reasonable’ as defined by the administration. ANSOM Senegal XIV/13, Projet d’ordonnance royale sur les 
affranchissements, 1847.
29 Schoelcher was to be instrumental in the 1880 initiative for the eradication of slavery as well.
30 ANS K25, L ’esclavage en AOF, Deherme, 1906.
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feel bound by local considerations of politics and economics. For Schoelcher and his 
colleagues, emancipation was about “human dignity” and slavery was castigated for 
“destroying the liberty of man” and “suppressing the natural principle of rights and 
needs”.31 As a result, the operative clauses of the decree were powerful and 
straightforward. Slavery was “entirely abolished”, as was the regime des engages. 
Furthermore, it became illegal for any French citizen to “possess, own, buy, or sell 
slaves” anywhere in the world. Since the inhabitants of Senegal had been granted 
representation in the Assembles Nationale by Article 6 of the decree, this interdiction 
was extended to Senegalese habitants and signares. For contravention of this decree, 
the provisional government decreed the worst imaginable sanction - the loss of French 
citizenship.32
These provisions of the 1848 decree provided the framework for an envisioned 
post-emancipation settlement - a definitive end to domestic slavery in a society tightly 
integrated with France, peopled by citizens for whom the threat of losing citizenship was 
enough to ensure compliance. The provisional government’s single concession to the 
slave-owners was the promise of an indemnity to mitigate the loss of the income 
provided by the rental of their slaves.
The most controversial clause in the document was Article 7, which declared that 
“[t]he principle that ‘the soil of France emancipates the slave who touches it’ is applied to 
all colonies and possessions of the Republic.”33 This principle that touching French soil 
immediately conveys freedom, or sol affranchis, was a threat to the economic and 
political ties with neighbouring slave-owning societies. For thirty years, French policy 
had been engineered specifically to avoid conflict over this issue, which, it was 
anticipated, would alienate indigenous rulers and merchants. The clauses of the 1848 
decree, so different from those suggested by the 1847 draft of the royal ordinance, 
threatened to crash into the unprepared colony like a cue ball, sending habitants, slaves, 
colons, and neighbouring Wolof and Sereer chiefs into their corners and then provoking 
a collision of interests.
31ANSOM Senegal XIV/15, Decree portant l ’abolition de l ’esclavage dans les Colonies, le Gouvernement provisoire, 
27 April 1848.
32 Ibid.
33 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15, Decree portant l'abolition de l ’esclavage dans les Colonies, le Gouvernement provisoire,
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Nevertheless, the provisional government made it clear to Governor Baudin that
this time, at least, there was to be no exemption from any part of the decree for Senegal.
On May 7th, the newly appointed Naval Minister Arago sent a letter to ensure that the
instructions contained in the decree were clear. Anticipating that resistance from the
administration in Senegal would center on Article 7, Arago wrote:
According to Article 7, the establishments on the west coast of Africa all become 
French territory...therefore all slaves who touch the soil receive the right of 
freedom. The situation of these establishments, in close proximity of countries 
where slavery exists, without doubt gives to this measure... a particular 
[difficulty]. But this cannot be sufficient reason to place Senegal outside this 
essential national principle...34
Arago’s instructions on this and other matters clearly stated that the law must 
implemented in Senegal with only a two month warning before execution35 and without 
exception. However, in addition to the indemnity (which, to Baudin’s relief, Arago 
continued to promise) the government made one concession to prudence. While in 
principle forbidding engages, Arago agreed that the government could keep under 
indenture soldiers who garrisoned the inhospitable interior trading posts,36 effectively 
creating a loophole in an otherwise solid decree - an exception which would be 
instrumental in facilitating the conquest of indigenous states in the following decade. On 
June 23rd, 1848, Acting Governor37 Du Chateau promulgated the royal decree for 
Senegal colony, setting a definitive emancipation date of August 23rd.38
The execution of emancipation: July and August 1848
In the months leading up to August 23rd, 1848, St. Louis and Goree seethed like a 
pair of anthills opened to the sun by the rocks of playful children. The slaves of the
27 April 1848, Article 7.
34 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15, Ministre a Baudin, 7 May 1848, Paris.
35 ANS K8, Ministre a Baudin, 7 May 1848, Paris.
36 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15, Ministre a Baudin, 7 May 1848, Paris
37 The official title for French colonial Governors during this period was commissaire, but I have chosen to use the 
term Governor since the duties appear to have remained the same and within a few years the title Governor had 
returned.
3R ANS K8, Arrete Local, Commissaire Du Chateau, 23 June 1848, St. Louis. Gueye, M’Baye, “Le fin de 
resclavage", p.641.
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colony, comprising as they did skilled craftsmen and entrepreneurs as well as wage- 
earning laptots and pileuses39, were a politicised and somewhat mobile class. As a 
group, they felt secure that in the event of emancipation demand for their services would 
remain high following liberation. As a result, they were overjoyed by the promulgation of 
the emancipation decree and in St. Louis there were instances reported of slaves 
prematurely refusing to obey their masters.40 Similarly, the commandant of Goree 
reported in July that a number of slaves had expressed the intention of leaving their 
masters as soon as possible 41 Searching for support for a policy he expected to be 
unpopular amongst the habitants, Governor Du Chateau even sponsored ‘Emancipation 
Clubs’, which organised approximately 500 slaves to oppose anti-emancipation agitation 
by masters 42
Slave owners, led by influential habitant families such as the Franciers (who 
amongst them owned 30 slaves) and the Pecarres (69), and by signares in Goree and 
the influential maire of St. Louis, actively opposed the proposed emancipation. Before 
1848, threats by habitants to leave the colony in order to conserve their slaves had been 
instrumental in keeping anti-slavery legislation at bay, but these were shown to be a 
bluff.43 After the April decree, slave-owners were forced to accept de jure emancipation, 
and began to pursue a new set of strategies. The slave-owners’ position was no longer 
based on ideological arguments that domestic slavery was benign or benevolent - 
arguments which they correctly perceived would have been ineffective in the abolitionist 
environment created by the provisional government. Instead they turned away from 
ideological arguments and attempted to salvage their economic positions from potential 
ruin.
The provisional government expected that the promised indemnity would 
convince the habitant and signare community to collaborate with emancipation. 
However, the amount of the indemnity was the subject of great debate in the Assemblee 
Nationale44, and neither Baudin nor Du Chateau received instructions on the subject
39 See Chapter 2
40 Gueye, “Le fin de 1’esclavage", p.642.
41 ANS 4B15, Commandant Gachot a Du Chateau, 1 July 1848, Goree.
42 Marcson, “European-African Interaction in the Precolonial Period”, p.229.
43 ANSOM Senegal XIV/13, Du Chateau a Ministre, 18 September 1847, St. Louis.
44 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15, Ministre a Baudin, 7 May 1848, Paris.
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during the pre-promuigation period. This vague promise did little to reassure slave­
owners. As a result, some habitants tried to limit their losses. As early as April, some of 
the older signares, anxious about the possibility of losing such an enormous portion of 
their wealth in their old age, moved their slaves to the up-river trading entrepots, les 
escales, prepared to sell them to the Trarza and Wolof markets if the indemnity proved 
too low. As emancipation jitters grew, other slave owners began to move slaves to 
villages in Kaajor and Waalo. Many of these slaves were smuggled out of the city even 
after the implementation of the August 23 emancipation, and then sold.45 Since 
habitants had strong links with the local communities, and often owned mainland 
plantations which provisioned the colony, many also converted their urban slaves into 
farm labourers, but this was a strategy of last resort as masters who did so lost most of 
the income of their skilled wage-earning slaves 46
The majority of masters did hang onto their slaves until emancipation, at which 
time they were given a further promise of an indemnity. In September, soon after 
emancipation, they were promised 219.90 francs per slave47, but the indemnity was not 
actually delivered until June 1852.48 In the intervening period, while signares in Goree 
begged the government for payment of compensation to replace their “sole means of 
existence”49, many others were forced to sell their indemnities to speculators such as the 
Maurel and Prom company for a small percentage of their face value.50 In the end, the 
indemnity was reset to 330.15 francs per slave, and the speculators walked off with 
enormous profits.51
While some habitants and signares sold their slaves or hid them outside the 
colony, the vast majority grudgingly accepted the government’s offer of an indemnity in 
exchange for acceptance of emancipation. To a certain extent, this was because some 
slaves resisted attempts to deprive them of their liberation. The emancipation clubs
45 ANS 3B64, Ardo-Labaytre, Chef des Peules de Ouadabe a Baudin, 3 October 1848, Kaajor. ANSOM Senegal XIV 
15a (several files).
46 Mbodj, Mohamed, “The Abolition of Slavery in Senegal 1820-1890: Crisis or the Rise of a New Entrepreneurial 
Class”, in Martin Klein, ed., Breaking the Chains: Slavery, Bondage and Emancipation in Modern Africa and Asia, 
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1993.
47 ANS 1B49, Ministre a Baudin, 4 September 1848, Paris.
48 ANS 2B31, Protet a Ministre, 8 June 1852, St. Louis.
49 ANS 4B15, Notables de Goree a Commandant, 16 March 1849, Goree.
50 Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, p.25.
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organised by Du Chateau kept slaves informed and organised to great effect. Their 
power climaxed in the weeks leading up to the August 23rd date of emancipation. 
During this already tense period, a habitant was arrested in St. Louis for beating a slave. 
The ensuing trial brought about a protest by a group of slave-owners opposed to the 
conviction of the slave owner. The protesters to their surprise found themselves 
confronting approximately 400 slaves, members of the emancipation clubs, who forced 
their masters to stand down.52 For the first time in the history of Senegal Colony, slave­
owners did not confront solely the administration over slavery-related issues, but were 
forced to cope with the opposition of their own slaves, and this factor made all the 
difference. The politicised slaves had much more at stake in the emancipation process 
than the administration, and refused to compromise. Their owners appeared defeated.
The impact of emancipation: masters and slaves
Much of the historical commentary on the 1848 emancipation has concluded that 
this event signalled the beginning of the demise of the habitant slave-owning class. 
Francophone historians such as Gueye53 and Pasquier have concluded that habitants 
“were... the victims of that apparent egaiite.’54 Pasquier in 1967 calculated that the level 
of the indemnity could never have equalled the income masters had previously 
generated from their slaves, in addition to which many impoverished slave-owners were 
forced to sell their indemnities for a fraction of their value to European merchant houses. 
Even James Searing agrees that emancipation “undermined [the] social power” of the 
habitant class.55
The events of Emancipation Day, August 23, 1848, seem to bear out this opinion 
to some extent. In St. Louis, the Governor posted the emancipation order at 8:00 in the 
morning. By eleven, “a vast quantity of men rehabilitated by France reformed in the 
place... [with] flags and signs of joy and liberty floating above the sea of human
51 ANS 2B31, Protet a Ministre, 8 June 1852, St. Louis.
52 ANSOM Senegal VII/49, Du CMteau a Ministre, 19 August 1848, St. Louis.
53 Gueye, “Le fin de l ’esclavage".
54 Pasquier, Roger, “Apropos de l ’emancipation des esclaves au Senegal en 1848", Revue frangais d ’Histoire 
d ’Outre-Mer”, 1967 (54), pp.188-208.
55 Searing, West African Slavery and Atlantic Commerce, p.175.
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heads.”56 The joyful crowd, having cleansed themselves of the dirt of bondage with the 
waters of the Atlantic ocean, cried “a thousand times” vive fa France, vive la liberte and 
banged on drums, exulting in their freedom. Goree was the sight of somewhat less 
exuberant celebrations.57
But after the demonstrations died down, and despite the free status of the former 
slaves, the basic fact of the 1848 emancipation is that for slaves of colonial inhabitants 
little had really changed. In Goree, the administration had desperately prepared to 
temporarily house and feed slaves who left their masters.58 In the event, the newly freed 
men and women chose to remain with their masters almost unanimously, and there 
were initially no requests for housing and food aid from former slaves.59 Even in St. 
Louis, only 200 former slaves from a population of several thousand chose to seek 
shelter in the tents erected by the Governor on the pointe du nord.60
Why did slaves choose to remain with their masters? Governor Faidherbe, who 
was appointed to lead the colony in 1854, noted that some signares had been so 
impoverished by the 1848 emancipation that their former slaves voluntarily continued to 
share their wages with them.61 Faidherbe’s view was somewhat facile. What was really 
happening was not a case of rich ex-slaves pitying their former masters. In fact, as 
Mohamed Mbodj suggested in his 1993 criticism of Pasquier and Gueye, the habitants 
and signares continued to dominate their former slaves by controlling the supply of 
labour and housing.62 St. Louis and Goree were both islands, and both had a limited 
availability of land. However, both were also the exclusive centres of wage employment 
in their regions. Former slaves were thus unable to leave and use their wage-earning 
skills on the mainland. As Klein points out, they were also unable to purchase any of the 
expensive and largely unavailable land in the two towns.63 Freed slaves therefore found 
themselves with no option but to remain with their former masters. As a result in both 
Goree and in St. Louis a situation arose whereby former slaves, rather than paying a
56 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15, Du Chateau a Ministre, 23 August 1848, St. Louis.
57 ANS 4B15, Commandant Roche a Citoyen Commissaire, 26 August 1848, Goree,
58 ANS 4B15, Commandant Gachot a Gouverneur, 1 July 1848, Goree.
59 ANS 4B15, Commandant Roche a Citoyen Commissaire, 26 August 1848, Goree.
60 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15, Du Chateau a Ministre, 23 August 1848, St. Louis.
61 Faidherbe, G. Louis, Le Senegal, la France dans I’Aftique Occidental, Paris, Hachette and Co., 1882, pp.115-116.
62 Mbodj, “The Abolition of Slavery in Senegal”, p.198.
63 Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, p.26.
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share of their wage to their masters, paid a rental fee to their former owners. The 
habitants retained power not only through their control of residences, but by their 
ownership of the majority of the colony’s boats and construction equipment, and by their 
position as providers of wage employment. As a result, relatively little social change 
occurred, In view of which historians are perhaps justified in declaring that 
“emancipation did not change anything great in the social order.” 64
Article 7: The predictable reaction of indigenous states
Despite the grand experiment of emancipation and the particularities of slave- 
master relations within the colony, Senegal’s administrators faced a remarkably similar 
political and economic situation to their British counterparts on the Gold Coast. Senegal 
Colony was surrounded by independent Wolof, Tukolor, and Sereer states, all to some 
extent Islamicised and all led by autocratic traditional aristocracies.65 French influence 
with these states was uneven, and even the few armed posts along the Senegal River 
were feebly implanted.66 In all of these societies slavery was a highly integrated social 
and economic institution.
The economic changes of the nineteenth century acted to preserve this 
situation. In 1829, the first recorded shipments of peanuts from the British Gambia were 
reported67, and during the same period French merchants became interested in these 
‘oily nuts’. In December 1828, a group of merchants urged Governor Jubelu to purchase 
a peanut oil press for the Colony, although there was still little interest amongst peasant 
cultivators.68 The level of interest rose, however, throughout the 1830s as habitants 
searched for a replacement for the gum trade which was again in decline in the years 
leading up to emancipation, and by 1840 the administration had begun to grant 
groundnut concessions to habitants 69 This expansion was matched by a growing
64 Hardy, G.,La Mise en valeur du Senegal de 1817 a 1854, Paris, 1921.
65 Although some of those aristocracies were by this time besieged by Islamic revolutionaries.
66 Renault, Francois, “L’abolition de l ’esclavage au Senegal: L’attitude de Padministration frangaise”, Revue 
frangaise d ’histoire d ’outre-mer, 1971, (58), p.20.
67 Brooks, George E., “Peanuts and Colonialism: Consequences of the Commercialization of Peanuts in West Africa, 
1830-1870", Journal o f African Histoiy, 1975, (16), p.32.
68 ANSOM 2B13, Jubelu a Ministre, 20 February 1829, St. Louis.
69 ANSOM 1B48, Extrait d’un Memoire de M. Herice relatif a quelque ameliorations a porter a la Colonie de 
Senegal, 18 February 1848, Paris. ANSOM 2B18, Baudin a Ministre, 30 October 1840, St. Louis.
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acceptance of peanut oil in French commerce and industry, and Parisian commercants 
demanded a reduction of the peanut oil tariff in 1843.70 By this time, the British had 
made their decision to concentrate on palm oil for their industrial needs and the French, 
with their access to predominantly drier regions, consequently chose to concentrate on 
peanut oil.71 As a result, cultivation of the groundnut soared in Senegal. In 1849, 3 
million kilograms of peanuts were shipped from Kaajor, the center of cultivation, and 
large amounts also originated from along the Saalum and Senegal Rivers.72 The 
demand for peanuts could not entirely be met by the peasant populations of these 
regions, however, and peanut farm owners turned to slaves to assist in production.73 
The shortage of labour in Senegal also led to suggestions that freed slaves from Goree 
be conscripted as cultivators on the Cap-Vert peninsula.74
It was these economic and political realities that convinced the Governors of the 
1830s and ‘40s that emancipation was unrealistic, and even in 1848 it was recognised 
that the real challenge to emancipation came not from the habitants, whose reliance on 
French commerce hamstrung their opposition to the plan, but from the governments of 
neighbouring states.
Because the 1848 decree only emancipated slaves in the Colony it was hoped 
that the rulers of Senegalese states would not object. However, the principle that “the 
soil of France frees the slave who touches it” threatened to alienate the Colony’s 
neighbours. The habitants, recognising that their personal fortunes were tied into 
commerce with the interior, tried to convince the metropolitan government of this in a 
petition of 15 February 1849, calling for the revocation of the ‘soil liberates’ policy.75
As anticipated, in the period following emancipation a number of slaves from 
Waalo, Kaajor, and the Sereer states fled to Goree and St. Louis. Governor Baudin was 
sympathetic to the plight of indigenous slave owners, but told the Chief of Wolof/Lebu 
Dakar that his actions were constrained by orders from the metropole, and he could only
70 ANSOM 1B35, Prefet de la Seine a Ministre de Commerce, 2 March 1843, Paris.
71 Brooks, “Peanuts and Colonialism", p.42.
72 Ibid, pp.43-45.
73 Bowman, Joy, Ominous Transition: Commerce and colonial expansion in the Senegambia and Guinea, 1857-1919, 
Avebur, Aldershot, 1996, pp.20-21.
74 ANS 2E2, Proces-Verbal, Seance de Conseil d’arrondisement de Goree, 3 January 1846, Goree.
75 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15, Petition, 15 February 1849, St. Louis.
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advise that masters living in the vicinity of the colony guard their slaves carefully/6
While many of the slaves who sought refuge were actually the very slaves whom 
habitants had sold to the mainland in order to escape the effects of emancipation77, 
many more were slaves who transported the trade and food products from the interior 
upon which the colony relied.78 As a result, indigenous traders began to refuse to bring 
their goods into Goree and St. Louis79, although they relied on commerce with the 
colony as much as the habitants relied on commerce with them. The traders exerted 
political pressure upon their own rulers. 80 In February 1849, the situation came to a 
head with an argument over the slave of a Waalo trader who had sought refuge in St. 
Louis. When Baudin refused to return the individual, the Brak withheld cattle destined 
for the colony and the Darnel of Kaajor embargoed shipments of peanuts81, and as the 
conflict widened the Trarzas closed the gum trade.82 The fears of administrators and 
habitants had been confirmed, and indigenous responses to emancipation threatened 
the existence of the Senegal colony.
Two steps back: expulsion of runaways and conseils de tutelles
The 1848 emancipation decree was definitively worded and clearly supported by 
colonial officials in France. There could be no confusion as to its purpose. But within a 
year of its execution authorities in France relinquished their abolitionist role and allowed 
the emasculation of two of the decree’s most important clauses.
Article 7, which stated that 'soil liberated’ was the first to go. On the very day that 
saw the commencement of the joint embargo of goods to the colony, February 12th 
1849, Governor Baudin wrote to Minister Arago:
I agree that the principle which declares all slaves who touch French soil are 
free is just, but in certain local conditions and needs, like those found in place in 
Senegal, the rigorous application is difficult and appears contrary to human
76 ANS 3B61, Baudin au Chef du Dakar, 20 January 1849, Senegal.
77 ANS 2B27, Baudin a Ministre, 3 February 1849, St. Louis.
78 ANS 2B27, Du Chateau a Ministre, 22 August 1848, St. Louis.
79 Richards and Miers, “The End of Slavery in Africa”, p.14.
80 ANS 3B64, Darnel a Baudin, 26 August 1848, Kaajor.
81 ANS 2B27 and Senegal 1/35, Baudin a Ministre, 12 February 1849, St. Louis.
82 Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, p.27.
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rights.83
Baudin pleaded for a face-saving solution to his quandary. He argued that the 
colony would starve without food grown on the mainland, and painted a picture of 
thousands of refugee slaves overrunning the two islands. He was aware, however, that 
metropolitan officials had to satisfy their own abolitionist constituencies and could not 
backtrack on their actions.
The solution to the problem was provided by the maire of St. Louis, who 
suggested to Baudin that refugee slaves be expelled through the operation of an 1835 
civil ordinance that gave him the power to eject ‘vagabonds’84 who threatened public 
health and safety. By arguing that unemployed refugee slaves threatened the safety of 
the colony, Baudin could authorise civil authorities to return runaway slaves. Minister 
Arago consequently found himself confronted by a situation engineered entirely by 
Africans. On the one hand, indigenous powers threatened the economic future and 
provisioning of the colony. At the same time, the relatively high number of slaves fleeing 
to the two towns was overwhelming their resources.85 Arago, aware that he would be 
unable to convince his colleagues to rescind Article 7, seized on the compromise. On 
April 18th he wrote to Baudin agreeing to the plan, which had already been effectively 
implemented without his sanction. “In proclaiming the principle of liberation by [French] 
soil,” Arago explained, “the Government of the Republic... never thought to do damage 
to the safety which is a right of French citizens living in our overseas possessions.”86
The habitants and their allies had won a signal victory, and showed that their 
power was undiminished. Not only had they still retained the services and some of the 
income of their former slaves, they had also achieved the de facto repeal of Article 7. 
The administration soon gave into a further concession. Unable to care for emancipated 
child slaves, Baudin acceded to suggestions from local leaders and allowed patrons 
(guardians) to take the children on as apprentices, to be compensated for housing and 
food costs by the child’s labour.87 In the event, the patrons were generally the children’s
83 ANS 2B27 and Senegal 1/35, Baudin a Ministre, 12 February 1849, St. Louis.
84 ANS 2B27 and Senegal 1/35, Baudin a Ministre, 12 February 1849, St. Louis.
85 ANS K17, Rapport sur la Captivite, Administrator Poulet, 1905.
86 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15, Ministre a Baudin, 18 April 1849, Paris.
87 ANS M3, Arrete Locale de 13 April 1849, Governeur Baudin.
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former masters, and the system was essentially a return to slavery, but the so-named 
conseils des tutelles were nevertheless approved by the Ministry on November 13th of 
the same year.88 Between 1849 and 1847, 213 children were subjected to the authority 
of the conseils. Many were child slaves returned to their masters in 1849. Others were 
simply orphans from the colony, from the posts along the Senegal River or Petite Cote, 
or even from Gabon. Most of the patrons were habitants, although some were French 
officials or in very rare cases relatives of the children. Even notorious slave-owners 
such as Marie Laboure were allowed to act as patrons. Such a state of affairs appeared 
reasonable to the decision-making conseils, which were generally composed of several 
influential and formerly slave-owning habitants and an approximately equal number of 
French commercants and administrators.89 Governor Faidherbe did attempt to reform 
the system in 1857 by ensuring that all minors were freed upon reaching the age of 
eighteen90, but children continued to be bound into this condition of near-slavery until 
1862.91
Conclusion
Like every previous metropolitan policy aimed at limiting the institution of slavery, 
the emancipation of 1848 did not go as planned. Admittedly, the provisional government 
was successful in some respects; most importantly, around 6,000 slaves in St. Louis and 
Goree received their de facto freedom. However, many former slaves simply continued 
to be dependants, clients, and tenants of their former masters. Since they had enjoyed 
certain advantages - including wages - prior to emancipation, their position was relatively 
unimproved even in terms of mobility. Certainly they could now leave their masters if 
they wished, but only to find another similar patron within the colony or to brave the 
dangerous paths of Waalo and Kaajor, attempting to evade the slave-traders long 
enough to reach home. In the event, most chose to stay with their masters. After 1854, 
the army also became an option, although not a desirable one.
The slaves of the colony of Senegal were liberated’ in 1848, except for those
88 Ministre a Baudin, 13 November 1849, Paris.
89 M3, Registre les deliberations, les Proces-Verbaux des Seances et les transaction du Conseil du Tutelle des 
Enfants... a St. Louis, 20 April 1849 - 18 February 1857, St. Louis.
90 Arrete Locale, 5 December 1857, Governeur Faidherbe.
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under 18 who were returned to their masters as apprentices under essentially the same 
conditions they had previously endured. However, after February 1849 slaves seeking 
refuge in the colony were ejected from the islands as ‘vagabonds’ and dumped on the 
shores of the mainland where their masters clustered to pick them up and re-enslave 
them. The golden glow of France’s paternalism was already tarnished by these events 
when, in 1854, a new Governor took up his post in St. Louis and began plotting to 
expand French influence into the previously independent states of Senegal and beyond.
91 ANS K17, Rapport sur la Captivite, Administrator Poulet, 1905.
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CHAPTER 6:
Pragmatic policies in periods of expansion, 1854-1880
By the middle of the nineteenth century, slavery had become integral to the 
economies and societies of both the Senegal and Gold Coast regions. The effects of 
four centuries of the Atlantic slave trade and the rise in legitimate trade far outweighed 
forty years of half-hearted European policies aimed at controlling the use and transport 
of slaves and mitigating their social circumstances. The 1848 emancipation in Senegal 
Colony had been limited both in scope - two diminutive island towns - and in effect. 
Similarly, the British had implemented few procedures affecting slavery outside of 
restricting European possession of slaves in the few forts and settlements they 
controlled.
The mid-nineteenth century, however, witnessed the beginning of an unheralded 
increase in European involvement in both these regions which led to significant changes 
in colonial policy toward slavery. During the preceding periods, the extent of both 
French and British sovereignty had been limited to coastal entrepots and ‘factories’ or 
‘posts’ along major trading routes. In the Gold Coast, de facto authority had been 
temporarily extended by Maclean in the 1830s, but colonial sovereignty was still limited 
to a small number of coastal positions. In Senegal, French authority beyond the two 
islands of St. Louis and Goree was limited to the posts of Merinaghen in Waalo and 
Dagana, Bakel, and Senou-debon on the Senegal River.1
The subsequent expansion of European authority provided the basis for a 
potential watershed for the institutions of slavery in both these regions, as European 
ideals of abolition were brought into play for greatly enlarged geographic regions and 
populations. This chapter introduces the framework of official policy within which the 
effect of European hegemony, the resistance of slave-owners, and the agency of slaves 
will be discussed in the following chapters.
Harnessing slavery to expansion: Senegal
French power was surprisingly limited in Senegal, considering several decades of 
commercial experiments and political interference in neighbouring indigenous states. 
The failure of plantations in Waalo had limited French influence as well as further
1 The French, additionally held a few positions in the Gambia and Casamance which are outside the geographic area 
of this dissertation. Renault, “L’abolition de l ’esclavage au Senegal”, p.6 .
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weakening a state already disrupted by the depredations of the slave trade.2 The 
fyeddo-supported aristocracy had lost its primary source of income with the abolition of 
the Atlantic slave trade and was reduced to bickering over the rents paid by the French 
for plantation land.3 Their authority was further reduced by the increasing Islamisization 
of the peasant population inspired by the jihad of Shayk Umar upriver in Gaajaga and 
Fuuta Tooro.4 The internal turmoil in Waalo also provoked the Trarza Moors to attempt 
to assert their power over the region in another attempt to control the trade in gum 
arabic.5 The French were alerted to the threat of Moorish hegemony by their own 
merchant companies who continuously called for a military solution to the problem.6 
Governors and officials in Senegal were easily won over to their side by persuasive 
economic and political arguments. “The time has come”, Governor Pujol wrote the naval 
ministry as early as 1834, “when Waalo must pass under the domination of the French 
or that of the Maures...”.7 Successive governors were, however, unable to take the 
initiative to bring Waalo firmly under French influence.
At this crucial juncture, however, there came into this situation an individual who, 
much like Maclean in the Gold Coast, transformed the entire situation. Captain Louis 
Faidherbe had initially been appointed to organise the colony’s defences, but in 1854 he 
was placed in the position of Governor. In France, the bureaucrats of the Second 
Empire (which had replaced the Deuxieme Republique in July 1852s) were not as 
convinced of the need to interfere in Waalo as the local administration. Faidherbe was 
instructed by the Ministre de ia Marine only to “assist peaceful development of 
commercial interests” and was warned quite clearly, “your nomination is neither the 
beginning nor the continuation of a belligerent era.”9
But Faidherbe, like Maclean, was not one to be limited by such instructions. He 
understood that the profitable exploitation of commercial agriculture in Senegal was the 
main concern of his superiors10, and he was further convinced by the local French
commercants that French control of the peanut-growing areas was the means to achieve
2 See chapters 3 and 5.
3 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 177.
4 For an excellent account of this important figure in Senagelese and Soudanic history, see Barry, Senegambia and the 
Atlantic Slave Trade, 1998.
5 ANS 3B52, Governeur a M. Caille, 16 March 1843, St. Louis,
6 ANS 2B30, Protet a Ministre, 14 April 1852, Saint Louis.
7 ANS 2B16, Pujol a Ministre, 7 March 1834, St. Louis.
8 ANP A1191-1218, Lois du Deuxieme Republique.
9 Barrows, Leland, “General Faidherbe, the Maurel and Prom Company, and French expansion in Senegal”, 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, UCLA, 1974, p.231. Barrows is especially detailed on the invasion of Waalo.
10 France had both lowered import duties on peanuts and funded scientific expeditions to analyse potential peanut 
growing sites. See Marcson, “European-African Interaction in the Precolonial Period”, p. 199.
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this goal. Halfway through the century, more than 1 million kilograms of groundnuts were 
leaving St. Louis on an annual basis11, and the French commercial companies operating 
in the Colony were looking to the peanut trade to assist them in breaking the habitants' 
domination of commerce and to reduce the power of the Trarzas in Waalo. The 
temporary detachment of Goree from the Senegal Colony in 185412 was in part intended 
to allow the Governor of Senegal in St. Louis to concentrate on issues in Waalo and the 
Governor of Goree on the production of peanuts in the Siin-Saalum basin, Gambia, and 
the Casamance. Thus in the early 1850s, the French merchant houses induced 
Faidherbe to place forts on the river at Dagana and Podor in Waalo in order to protect 
their investments.13 Following this action, Faidherbe convinced the Minister to support 
his initiatives and in January 1855 he was authorised to “render the states left [south] of 
the river independent of the Maures.”14
Faidherbe was obviously not reticent to proceed, and it was scarcely a month 
before he was at the head of a column marching into the interior of Waalo. In February 
1855 he launched a combined land and river assault against the Trarzas at Nder on the 
Ferlo River.15 To his great surprise, however, the majority of the Wolof aristocracy, 
including the nominal Queen N’Dette-Yallo, chose to support the Trarzas.16 
Nevertheless, Faidherbe’s superior column of French regulars, colonial recruits, and a 
small force of auxiliary tyeddo won several victories and he proceeded to install a pro- 
French Brak on the throne of Waalo.17 The puppet-king failed, however, to generate the 
necessary support18, and on December 30, 1855, Faidherbe replaced him with a more 
direct system of administration. The state was divided into four cercles, to be 
administered by pro-French chiefs, at the same time as forts such as Dagana, Podor, 
and Richard-Toll were placed under direct colonial control.19
However, Faidherbe did not stop at the borders of Waalo. French policy in 
Senegal continued to be dominated by economic issues, and Faidherbe, the “master 
architect”20 who initiated French hegemony, convinced his superiors that expansion into 
the interior would secure the profitability of the colony. In 1858 he wrote to the Ministre
11 ANS 2B31, Protet a Ministre 21 August 1852, St. Louis.
12 ANS 2E3, Conseil d5 administration de Goree, Proces Verbal du Seance, 29 January 1855.
13 Barry, Le Royaume de Waalo, p.301.
14 ANSOM Senegal I/41B, Ministre a Faidherbe, 19 January 1855, Paris.
15 Barrows, “General Faidherbe, the Maurel and Prom Company”, p.270.
16 ANSOM Senegal I/41B, Faidherbe a Ministre, 11 March 1855.
17 Barry, Le Royaume de Waalo, p.307.
18 ANSOM Senegal I/41B, Faidherbe a Ministre, 3 April 1855, St. Louis.
19 ANSOM Senegal I/41B, Faidherbe a Ministre, 6  June 1856, St. Louis.
20 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 190.
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de la Marine tha t:
The political line we have adopted in Senegal... generally consists of protecting 
the sedentary black cultivators against the Moor nomads... and in particular... 
against the brigandage of the [ityeddo].21
Operating on a pretext that was both so convincingly humanitarian and so 
amenable to the metropole’s economic goals, Faidherbe invaded Kaajor in 1856, hardly 
giving his troops a rest from their first campaign. To his allies amongst the indigenous 
elite, Faidherbe maintained that Kaajor had given refuge to France’s defeated 
opponents from Waalo, but it was clear that he intended to opportunistically exploit a 
civil war between rival aristocratic factions within Kaajor.22 Faidherbe’s campaign was 
approved by the Ministre as it would have the effect of bringing the Kaajor peanut crop 
under French control and allow the French government to effectively tax that commodity. 
23 After an extended campaign, the French acquired the right to fix tariffs on groundnuts 
leaving Kajoor for French-controlled ports such as Dakar and Rufisque as well as 
gaining the right to appoint members of the Darnel’s Council of Electors 24 Faidherbe 
then briefly went to France for consultations, returning to command a newly reunited 
Senegal Colony once again incorporating Goree.25 He subsequently proceeded to 
launch yet another campaign aimed at securing the peanut-growing Siin-Saalum delta26, 
in which he succeeded after limited resistance and the burning of Fatick. As a result, 
both kingdoms, while remaining nominally independent, were drawn into the French 
sphere of influence. Furthermore Faidherbe acquired the Petite Cote as a protectorate, 
further increasing French control of the peanut-trading coast.27 The conquest of the 
satellite states of Dimar and Toro on Waalo’s flank in 1859-60 completed this period of 
French expansion in Senegal.28
Faidherbe’s conquest was made possibly by the officially sanctioned exploitation 
of the indigenous system of slavery. His administration continued and expanded
21 ANSOM Senegal IV/46, Faidherbe a Ministre, 13 March 1858, St. Louis.
22 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 191.
23 Barrows, “General Faidherbe, the Maurel and Prom Company”, p.651.
24 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 191.
25 ANS K17, rapport Sur la Captivite, Administrateur Poulet, 1905.
26 ANSOM Senegal I/46B, Ministre a Faidherbe, 1 September 1859, Paris.
27 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 193.
28 Renault, “L’abolition de l ’esclavage au Senegal”, p .l l .
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previous administrators’ policies of rachat in which slaves, under conditions similar to the 
engagement of the pre-emancipation period, were purchased for use as soldiers. 
Directly following the decision to emancipate the colony’s slaves in 1848, the provisional 
government had agreed to Commissaire Baudin’s requests that engages in military 
service could be retained in their positions in order to assure the security of the colony.29 
The only proviso, in keeping with the republican ethos, was that the administration was 
required to treat such soldiers exactly the same as their white colleagues in terms of 
food, dress, and training.
However, while pragmatic considerations necessitated the retention of the military 
engage system, the emancipation act prohibited any new engagements and forbade the 
policy of rachats30 After 1849, colonial officers were thus forced to attempt to recruit 
volunteers from within the Colony, but military duty was apparently unpopular amongst 
the urban St. Louisian and Goreean populations. Commanders saw the muster of their 
units decline rapidly as engages completed their terms.31 In the three years following 
emancipation, a grand total of three African volunteers appear to have joined local 
compagnies32 In 1851 a local commission appointed to deal with this issue advised 
Governor Protet that the only conceivable solution was to reinstitute the policy of 
rachats, but the Republican government was unwilling to accept such a move.33 It was 
only following the Restoration of 1852 that this situation changed. The bureaucrats of 
the Second Empire, like their predecessors who ruled prior to 1848, managed to 
convince themselves that the policy of rachats was not only necessary but also actually 
humanitarian. They praised the policy for liberating captives at the ‘small price’, to those 
so released, of a few years military service.34 Furthermore, they suggested that such 
soldiers would be perfect for service in the New World, sparing French troops for 
European duty.35 The Ministre de la Marine consequently re-authorised the regime des 
rachats on November 30, 1854, instructing Governor Protet to form two compagnies 
indigenes36 Protet designed the compagnies to intermingle free and indentured recruits
29 ANSOM Senegal XVI/3, Ministre a Citoyen Commissaire Baudin, 27 May 1848, Paris.
30 As indicated by subsequent sources, this suppresion of military engagement ( under Article 2) was in fact put into 
effect. See ANSOM Senegal XIV/18, Ministre a Protet, 15 April 1852, Paris.
31 ANS 2B27, Baudin a Ministre, 14 January 1849, St. Louis.
32 Echenberg, Myron Colonial Conscripts, the Tirrailleurs Senegalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960, Heinemann 
Books, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 1991, p.9. Echenberg’s monograph focuses largely on the twentieth century.
33 ANSOM Senegal XIV/18, Ministre a Protet, 15 April 1852, Paris.
34 ANSOM Senegal XIV/18, Ministre a Protet, 15 April 1852, Paris
35 ANSOM Senegal XVI/4, Le Chef de Division pour des Cotes Occidentales d’Afrique a Ministre, 23 November 
1853, Goree.
35 ANS K25, L ’esclavage enAOF, Deherme, 1906.
116
and planned to recruit 450 individuals.37 As a sop to the nagging abolitionists in the 
metropole, he suggested that the engages should serve for a shorter term than 
previously - only 7 years instead of 14.
However, the invasion of Waalo, carried out partly by indigenous troops, 
convinced Faidherbe that the available compagnies indigenes were insufficiently trained, 
unmotivated, and of too small a size to carry out his grand plan of conquest. In 1857 he 
therefore convinced the Ministre de ia Marine that a more highly paid and trained fighting 
force should be constructed with repurchased former slaves. The name he proposed 
was the Tirailleurs Senegalais.38
A small minority of the tirailleurs subsequently recruited were mercenaries, often 
former tyeddo, from outside French jurisdiction. There were also some recruits to the 
force from amongst the disenchanted of the lower classes and special castes of Wolof 
society - especially blacksmiths and griots39 However, by far the majority of those 
enlisted were slaves purchased from traders. When recruitment dropped, the 
administration simply contrived to raise the ‘bonus’, in fact a fee paid directly to slave 
dealers and owners.40 The number of Tirailleurs doubled to 1,000 by 186741 and 
continued to stay above that mark throughout the period of expansion42, increasing 
again in the early 1880s.
There is no doubt that the tirailleurs played a major role in the French conquests 
of the 1850s and ‘60s. Tirailleurs were the largest contingent of trained troops in 
Faidherbe’s and his successors’ campaigns on the Senegal River and in Siin-Saaium 
and Kaajor.43 Without the policy of rachats, even the Ministre admitted that the 
pacification of the peanut region would have been much more difficult and would have 
utilised huge amounts of French resources 44
Not only were the French willing and even eager to purchase slaves for the 
military conquest of peanut-growing areas, but most of the infrastructure that supported 
the export of peanuts was also built by slaves. The ports of Dakar and Rufisque, where 
slavery was still legally recognised, were purpose-built for the export of the Kaajor and
37 ANS 13G23, Protet a Ministre, December 1854, St. Louis.
38 ANS 2B32, Faidherbe a Ministre, 16 December 1857, St. Louis.
39 ANS 2B67, Thomas a Ministre, 6  June 1890, St. Louis.
40 Klein, “Slavery and Emancipation in French West Africa”, p. 176.
41 Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts, p.7.
42 Although Echenberg notes a decline in conscripts to 625 in 1872, my evidence suggests that the number of 
tirailleurs stayed quite high even during the French withdrawal of the 1870s. ANSOM Senegal II/5, Memoire, 
Governeur Serval, November 1871 - lists 1065 tirailleurs.
43 ANSOM Senegal IV/45 Fleuve 1854-1879, IV/46, Cayor 1855-1860; and Senegal IV/50 Sine et Saloum 1859- 
1877.
44 ANSOM Senegal 1/54, Ministre a Pinet-Laprade, February 1868, Paris.
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Siin-Saalum groundnut crops. Local slave holders may have been reluctant to provide 
slaves to Goree and St. Louis due to the high risk that slaves would claim their freedom 
on French soil, but the ports of Dakar and Rufisque were outside of French territory and 
as a result the administration freely contracted for the labour of slave manoeuvres45 
Meanwhile, hundreds of skilled artisans, many of them former slaves living in Goree, 
were mobilised to supervise the construction of railway stations, forts, chapels, schools, 
and telegraph systems in the 1860s.46
The French administration was careful to ensure that neither the policy of rachats 
nor the unfree contract labour used in the construction of Dakar and Rufisque could 
technically implicate them in re-introducing slavery into the colony. Rachats continued to 
be portrayed and to some extent accepted in the metropole as a humanitarian means of 
liberating slaves. Construction in Dakar and Rufisque lay outside the colony where, 
although the administration clearly knew of the use of slaves and paid their masters for 
their labour, such an operation was technically if not morally acceptable. 47 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the administration was willing to subvert the spirit of the 
emancipation laws in support of the commercial needs of the colony and consequently 
their perceived success as administrators. Furthermore, this was only one manifestation 
of the erosion of the 1848 emancipation policy, as political and economic realities 
prodded Faidherbe and his successors to dismantle that progressive act step by step.
French expansion and the dismantling of the 1848 emancipation
Immediately following the 1848 act of emancipation, indigenous regimes in 
Waalo, Kaajor, and the Petite Cote had forced the colonial administration to refrain from 
enforcement of Article 7, which had been intended to liberate any slaves setting foot 
within French-administered territory.48 The extension of French authority after 1853 only 
increased the complications surrounding emancipation. As the colony expanded, new 
regions were brought under the de jure rule of abolition. The peanut-growing regions, 
which the Ministre de la Marine depended upon to make the colony profitable, had been 
specific targets of the expansion. Cotton cultivation experiments carried out in Waalo in 
the 1860s, had failed to take hold due to difficulties with irrigation.49 Peanut production,
45 This argument is effectively made by Mohamed Mbodj. Mbodj, “The Abolition of Slavery in Senegal”. The subject 
is directly mentioned in ANS K ll ,  Faidherbe a Commandant Goree, 22 February 1865, St. Louis. The hiring of 
slaves is also indirectly mentioned in Valiere a Commandant du Goree, 24 March 1874, St. Louis.
46 ANS PI, Petition des Notables de Goree a Commandant, 1 December 1869, Goree.
47 Mbodj, “The Abolition of Slavery in Senegal 1820-1890”, p.205.
48 See Chapter 5.
49 ANSOM Senegal 1/51, Pinet-Laprade a Ministre, 25 May 1866, St. Louis. Senegal 1/46, Faidherbe a Ministre, 12 
June 1860, St. Louis.
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on the other hand, had continued to increase and spread, thriving in the dry climate of 
the Wolof states.50 Thus Faidherbe’s successor as Governor, Jaureguiberry, was 
cautioned to concentrate his efforts on cultivation with similar instructions to those given 
to his predecessor. The colonial military, he was instructed, should be directed towards 
protecting the cultivating peasant population from brigands - whether Moors or tyeddo 51 
Peanuts and slavery were by this time inextricably linked in West Senegal. The 
short June-November growing period of the peanut necessitated intensive labour for 
short periods.52 Thus, while free peasants profited from and were empowered by their 
production of a saleable cash crop53, there arose “a heavy dependence on slave labour 
in the Peanut Basin”54 during the growing season. Furthermore, while St. Louisian 
laptots had been liberated, most of the other labourers involved in transporting the 
peanut crop were slaves.55 With the new ports of Dakar and Rufisque opening, 
merchants were able to use slaves to transport peanuts to the major peanut-trading 
ports without ever entering French territory.
But the same policy of expansion that was intended to protect the peanut fields 
threatened this arrangement. The 1848 act forbade habitants and residents of French 
posts from owning slaves, threatening to exclude these owners of capital from the 
peanut trade. Worse, the French occupation of the Cap Vert peninsula and acquisition 
of the Petite Cote from Siin in 1861 threatened the groundnut delivery network by 
technically expanding the ‘soil liberates’ policy to these regions.
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As the cultivation of peanuts enriched and empowered Sereer and Wolof 
peasants, they increasingly turned to Islam to liberate them from the aristocrats and 
tyeddo who continually preyed upon them. Many in Waalo and Kaajor were especially 
impressed by a scholar and leader who was rising in Fuuta Tooro. El Hajj Shayk Umar, 
head of the Tijaniyya brotherhood, had taken his first tour of the Wolof States in 1846. 
Operating along the upper river, and attracting Manding, Wolof, and Fulbe followers, 
Shayk Umar was by 1854 the ruler of a large territory bordering the French up to the
50 See Chapter 5 for the origins and early years of peanut production in northern Senegal. ANSOM Senegal I/43E, 
Journal du Havre, enclosed in Faidherbe a Ministre, 13 June 1857, St. Louis. Senegal 1/51, Pinet-Laprade a Ministre, 
25 May 1866, St. Louis.
51 ANSOM Senegal 1/48, Ministre a Jaureguiberry, 17 December 1861, Paris.
52 Moitt, Bernard, “Slavery and Emancipation in Senegal’s Peanut Basin”, International Journal o f African Historical 
Studies, 1989, (22), pp.27-50.
53 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p.178. This phenomenon is well-documented.
54 Moitt, “Slavery and Emancipation in Senegal’s Peanut Basin”, p.27.
55 Renault, “L’abolition de l’esclavage au Senegal”, p.19.
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post of Bakel.56 Even more threatening to French commercants was Maba Jaakhu. To 
the French a notorious bandit, Maba was a Tijaniyya leader from the Gambia basin who 
is well-beloved in Senegalese popular memory. Maba clashed with the French in 
Saalum and later occupied Jolof, fighting to a draw with Governor Pinet-Laprade in 
Saalum in 1865. Maba’s marabouts fought several wars both with the French and 
secular rulers57 until his death in battle in 1867 by the Bur of Siin.58
Noting the hostility of secular-political rulers such as the Bur towards popular 
Islamic leaders, the French quickly realised the usefulness of the divide and conquer 
policy. Faidherbe and his immediate successors supported aristocrats against Muslim 
revolutionaries, aided pro-French parties within states, and installed puppet rulers 
wherever possible But because of their reliance on elements of indigenous elites, the 
French had to be careful not to alienate any possible allies. The extension of the 
emancipation policy, unpopular amongst even those elite families of northern Senegal 
and the Siin-Saalum delta who were French allies, was perceived by Faidherbe as 
potentially disastrous. Indeed, apologies by French officials presenting the official 
version of emancipation in Senegal in the early 20th century blame the military-political 
situation for the lack of progress on emancipation during the 1850s and ‘60s. “This 
[period]”, administrator Poulet argued in 1905, “was certainly not the moment to 
impose... this grand measure of emancipation.”59 Deherme similarly implored his 
readers to realise the great difficulties which ‘forced’ Faidherbe to neglect emancipation :
It [was] war throughout [Senegal]. Oualo, allied with the trarzas, had been 
invaded. The river was becoming more and more dangerous, and trade was 
halted up to Podor. it [was] the hour of El Hajj [Shayk U]mar and the situation 
was critical...60
indeed, the mutual incompatibility of Faidherbe’s expansionist policies and 
colonial anti-slavery laws had become evident with his first forays into the interior. The 
forts, which he constructed in 1854 at the behest of the French merchant community 
were by law French territory, and subject to the articles of the 1848 emancipation. 
Faidherbe had previously approved stratagems in place to expel as Vagrants’ slaves
56 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, pp.152-187.
57 Klein covers Maba’s campaigns quite extensively in his history of the Siin-Saalum region. Klein, Islam and 
Imperialism, pp.63-93.
58 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, pp.195-199.
59ANS K17, Rapport sur le Captivite, administrateur Poulet, 1905.
60 ANS K25, L ’esclavage enAOF, Deherme, 1906.
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seeking refuge in these forts61; but technically the inhabitants of the villages surrounding 
the posts were French subjects, and Faidherbe was legally obligated to liberate their 
slaves. Faced with this dilemma, Faidherbe turned to his advisors for ideas. In a 
meeting on April 27, 1854, he told them of his “intention to declare as French..., all the 
villages which [exist] on the river within cannon shot of our forts.” However, he admitted 
that the question of slaves made this position politically difficult.62
The Chief Justice, obviously briefed beforehand, was ready with a solution for the 
Governor. Opening with the by-now familiar arguments that Senegalese slavery was 
benign, and furthermore the practical consideration that enforcing emancipation would 
only strengthen the hand of the colony’s enemies, he suggested that the inhabitants of 
the new territories were subjects, rather than citizens, of France. As such they were 
entitled to retain their slaves. The Administrative Council, agreeable to a solution that 
met both their personal commercial needs and the colony’s political interests, 
unanimously assented.63 Ministre Hamelin condoned this arrangement whereby 
individuals living “under [the French] flag” could “keep their slaves.”64 The Minister’s 
approval had been the sole obstacle to Faidherbe’s plan, and on the 18th of October he 
issued a decree stating that for “the populations established under our posts, other than 
St. Louis... the decree of emancipation is not applicable...”.65
The invasion and conquest of Waalo, however, brought to light a number of new 
problems for Faidherbe. As his forces captured towns, villages, and swathes of land, 
members of the resident slave population began to claim their freedom under French 
law.66 Although the number of refugees seems to have been small at first, Faidherbe 
had to face the fact, based on experiences in St. Louis and Goree in 1848, that a mass 
influx could occur at any time. He recognised that this could alienate his allies, but also 
saw the usefulness of refugee slaves for induction into the tirailleurs. Thus in 1857 he 
moved to solve this dilemma, acting to reassure the slave-owners in conquered 
territories that their slaves would not be taken from them, or even allowed to leave them. 
Eschewing the very public path of issuing an ordinance, Faidherbe instead sent out a 
closed policy circular to his Chief Justice, the Imperial Procurator, and the Director of
61 See Chapter 5.
62Using the formula of claiming land ‘within camion shot’ seems to have been common amongst Europeans on the 
west coast of Africa. ANS 3E26, Proces-Verbal du Seance, Conseil d’Administration, 10 April 1855.
63 ANS 3E26, Proces-Verbal du Seance, Conseil d’Administration, 10 April 1855.
64 Considering that Faidherbe wrote to him on the 25th of April, and that boats took from 3-5 weeks for a one-way 
voyage to France, his reply on the 21st of June seems quite swift. ANSOM Senegal XIV/15B, Ministre a Faidherbe, 
21 June 1855, Paris.
65 ANS K ll ,  Arrete, Faidherbe, 18 October 1855.
66 Renault, “L’abolition de l ’esclavage au Senegal”, 1971, p .l l .
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Native Affairs.67 The instructions contained within the circular limited emancipation to 
the localities that had constituted the colony prior to June 27, 1848 and reaffirmed the 
policy of allowing French subjects, as opposed to citizens, to retain their slaves. 
Furthermore, Faidherbe resorted to a pragmatic ploy to both satisfy his allies and 
increase his forces:
If it has been officially declared that we are at war with a state... a decision of the 
governor can make it known if the fugitive slaves from that state... will be 
received in our establishments or given their liberty...if the slaves [seeking 
refuge] come from states at peace with us, we will expel them as vagabonds 
dangerous to public order and peace, for the reclamation of their masters who 
are free to reclaim them outside the forts.68
The absolute pragmatism of this decision was completely acceptable to
Faidherbe, who unlike his predecessors, did not even deign to justify this policy on 
humanitarian grounds. Nor was he averse to completing the abandonment of the sol 
affranchis act. He not only confirmed the actions taken by Baudin to expel runaway 
slaves but extended the policy to exclude from liberation the slave attendants of
“gentlemen or chiefs” visiting St. Louis for “political affairs”. Once again the metropole
was forced, after the fact, to affirm an action carried out entirely by a local agent. In this 
case, Ministre L’Amiral seemed somewhat pained by the action, pointing out that 
Faidherbe’s policy compromised a central principle of French humanitarianism, but 
reluctantly agreed that this policy was “gravely inconvenient” in Senegal and approved 
the action.69 In 1862, just in case there were any questions, Faidherbe reprinted the 
1857 circular restricting emancipation to St. Louis and its suburbs of Guet N’dar, Bouet- 
Ville, and N’dar Tout; to Goree; to Sedhiou and Carabane in the Casamance; and to the 
“ancient military posts of the colony of Senegal.”70
Faidherbe’s policy of expansion proved an economic success for the Colony. 
Admittedly, the production of peanuts initially dropped due to the conflict of expansion 
and counterattacks by Islamic leaders such as Maba.71 But by 1867 Governor Pinet-
57 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15, Circulaire Confidentielle, Faidherbe au Chef de la Justice, Procureur Imperial, Directeur 
des Affaires Indigenes, 14 November 1857, St. Louis.
68 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15, Circulaire Confidentielle, Faidherbe au Chef de la Justice, Procureur Imperial, Directeur 
des Affaires Indigenes, 14 November 1857, St. Louis.
69 ANS K ll ,  Ministre a Faidherbe, 5 February 1858, Paris.
70 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15, Circulaire Confidentielle, Faidherbe a les offiders, 15 November 1862, St. Louis.
71 ANS 13G23, Pinet-Laprade a Ministre, 18 June 1863, St. Louis.
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Laprade was able to report exports of 2.5 million kilograms of groundnuts from the 
Senegal River region, 4.5 million kilograms from Rufisque/Dakar, and 450,000 kilograms 
from the smaller ports at Portudal and Joal on the Petite Cote.72 French administration 
throughout the region had at this time evolved along much the same path as in Waalo. 
The 1er Arrondisement, based on St. Louis, included the annexed region of Waalo, while 
the 2eme based around Goree encompassed the indirect administration of much of 
Kaajor and Siin and parts of Saalum. The 3eme was composed of those regions of 
Dimar, Toro, and Fuuta-Tooro based around the riverbank forts of Bake!, Medine, Salde, 
and Matam which were accessible to French patrols. Only in Waalo was there an 
effective French administration. Kaajor and the 2eme Arrondisement were largely 
controlled by chiefs dependant upon French aid, while Siin and Saalum had maintained 
their nominal independence at the price of the Petite-Cote.73
1869, however, was a temporary high water mark for French influence. The high 
cost of Faidherbe’s wars of conquest had emptied colonial coffers, and in December of 
that year an inspector sent by the Ministre de la Marine proposed abandoning some of 
the more distant posts including Kaolack and Portudal, while concentrating resources on 
Cap Vert and the 1er Arrondisement.74 Governor Vaiiere further reduced expenditures by 
coming to an agreement with Lat Joor renouncing French claims to the interior of Kaajor, 
but preserving a safe passage for the planned Paris-Dakar railroad.75 Later in 1870, the 
disasters of the Franco-Prussian war solidified the French retreat, sapping resources 
from the administration and, after the fall of Paris, casting it adrift. Faidherbe, who had 
returned home from Senegal some years earlier, figured quite significantly in actions to 
relieve Paris; but in the colony the lack of resources severely restricted the successive 
governor’s ability to manoeuvre.
Saint-Martin, in his 1989 monograph Le Senegal Sous le Second Empire argued 
that “the incompatibility of fitting France with the indigenous system of slavery played a 
large part in the origins of de-annexation in 1871 .”76 The difficulties encountered by 
Faidherbe would certainly make it convenient to believe Saint-Martin’s assertion, but 
Faidherbe and his successors seem by the 1870s to have effectively dealt with the 
concerns of indigenous slave-owners by abandoning the principles of the 1848 
emancipation The local administration seems by and large to have accepted the role of 
slavery in the regions under their jurisdiction, to the satisfaction of local elites. After
72 ANSOM Senegal 1/54, Pinet-Laprade a Ministre, 28 October 1867, St. Louis.
73 B iondi, Saint-Louis du Senegal* p. 124.
74 ANSOM Senegal I/56d, General Reboul a Ministre, 15 December 1869, Dakar,
75 ANSOM Senegal I/56b, Vaiiere a Ministre, 6  January 1870, St. Louis.
76 Saint-Martin, Le Senegal Sous le Second Empire, p.605.
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1880, abolitionist pressure would again build in the metropole and the colony. For now, 
however, it appears that the de-annexation of Kaajor and the dismantling of Faidherbe’s 
empire was largely a symptom of the disastrous French war against Prussia, and, more 
significantly, effective resistance by local elites - something which will be discussed 
further in later sections.
Dutch withdrawal, the Asante war, and British hegemony on the Gold Coast
Unlike Faidherbe’s expansion in Senegal, the creation of the British Gold Coast 
Protectorate was not only unanticipated but also unlooked-for. The first step towards the 
creation of British hegemony was the withdrawal of Holland, the only European 
competitor remaining on the coast. But the Dutch flight of April 1873 was not the result 
of British pressure. 77 Instead, it resulted from the resistance of the inhabitants of 
Dixcove and nearby Fante towns which had been placed under Dutch authority by the 
territorial exchange agreement of 1867. 78 The major cause of indigenous opposition 
was Holland’s alliance with Asante, a state that had territorial designs for a coastal 
outlet.79 The relationship centred around Dutch recognition of Asante’s claim to the 
town of Elmina, which led to the siege of that town by the nascent Fante Confederation 
in 1868, a conflict which continued until 1870 and brought Asante forces into the region 
in support of Elmina.80 In May 1870, a Dutch fleet was forced into a prolonged 
bombardment of Dixcove.81 As expenses continued to mount and trade suffered, the 
Dutch Parliament decided to cut their losses and agreed to a handover of territory to the 
British in 1873, who seized upon this opportunity to monopolise Gold Coast trade.
While the interior states of Akyem Abuakwa and Akuapem and the coastal 
powers accepted at least nominal British hegemony, the administration’s refusal to 
honour the Asante ‘note’ to Elmina and Britain’s obvious bias towards the Fante 
infuriated the Asante.82 It was this issue that seems to have caused Asantehene Kofi 
Kakari to order an invasion of the British-protected provinces83. Kofi Kakari is alleged to 
have stated that “Elmina is transferred but not in the heart.”84
77 See Chapter 3.
78 PRO CO 96/77, Kennedy to Colonial Office, 7 November 1868, Cape Coast.
79 NAG-Cape Coast #72, Aboriginal Rights Protection Society, Granville to Cardwell, 13 September 1879, Cape 
Coast.
80 See PRO CO 96/80 and CO 96/81 for accounts of this conflict. For more on Asante-Dutch relations, see Yarak, 
Larry, “The Elmina Note: Myth and Reality in Asante-Dutch Relations”, Histoiy in Africa, 1986, (13), pp.363-382.
81 PRO CO 96/85, Horton to Granville, 2 May 1870, Cape Coast.
82 Yarak, “The Elmina Note: Myth and Reality in Asante-Dutch Relations”, 1986.
83 PRO CO 96/98, Marginalia by Kimberley in Harley to Minister, 14 April 1873, Cape Coast.
84 PRO CO 96/98, Harley to Minister, 14 April 1873, Cape Coast.
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There was some justification for the Asantehene's anger. Not only had the British 
refused to recognise Asante’s claim to sovereignty over Elmina which payments of the 
rental ‘note’ would have acknowledged, but since the early 1860s they had given refuge 
to fugitives fleeing the Asantehene’s justice.85 It was also the result of politics within 
Asante. Kofi Kakari’s ascent to the stool had brought to power the “war party” within 
Kumasi, which authorised the 1873 invasion of the protected territories.
The subsequent campaign, involving on the British side the intervention of and 
considerable casualties among both indigenous and European soldiers, considerable 
cost to the British taxpayer, and the eventual destruction of Kumasi, ended in a 
conclusive British and Fante victory over Asante in 1874. It was this military conquest, 
rather than the withdrawal of Holland, that enabled British hegemony over the Gold 
Coast and subsequent emancipation. The defeat of Asante initiated a flurry of 
secessions from amongst its provinces; Juaben, Bekwae, Adansi, and others withdrew 
their support from Kumasi and raised the standards of rebellion, crippling Asante power 
and leaving the colonial administration the solitary remaining major power on the 
coast.86
The bewildered British thus found themselves the leaders of a victorious coalition 
of states, exercising hegemony and committed to establishing some sort of colonial 
administration, whereas they had fought only to repel an invasion that threatened their 
economic interests. Furthermore the war had focused the attention of the British 
metropole on the region, including that of the abolitionist lobby who forced popular 
debate into Parliament and called for emancipation in the territory. Raymond Dumett, in 
his article on the origins of the 1874 ordinances “Pressure groups, Bureaucracy, and the 
Decision-Making Process” picks out political, economic, and humanitarian concerns at 
work in this process.87 To some extent, the movement for increased imperial 
responsibility in this region was a result of pressure from newspapers and 
parliamentarians who perceived both military and economic gains from greater 
responsibility. However emancipation was forced into this process by humanitarian 
groups especially the Aborigines Protection Society and British and Foreign anti-Slavery 
Societies, which conducted a campaign of letter-writing and publications and were 
supported by reports from the field by reporters confronted with the realities of slavery in 
the Gold Coast.88
85 Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century, pp.220-222„
86 Ramseyer, F and J Kuhn, Four Years in Ashantee, James Nisbet and Co., London, 1875, p.296.
87 Dumett, Raymond, “Pressure groups, Bureaucracy, and the Decision-Making Process", pp.193-211.
88 Ibid, p.206.
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As a result, and despite their own opposition, colonial officials were forced to 
confront the fact that the expansion of British control meant the extension of British law, 
which technically forbade the institution of slavery. The subsequent proclamation of the 
Protectorate called not only for civil and commercial jurisdiction, administration, and 
taxation but also the “Abolition of Slave dealing” and “[mjeasures with regard to 
domestic slavery and pawning.”89
Secretary of State for the Colonies Carnarvon was thus faced with a similar 
conundrum to that which faced Faidherbe, in that stringent anti-slavery laws were clearly 
as incompatible with British expansion as they had been with French. As a politician he 
was forced to respond to the British public’s calls for a more stringent anti-slavery policy 
in the newly formalised Protectorate. Personally, also, he was opposed to what he 
considered the ‘worst excesses’ of slavery. To his mind this was represented by the 
importation and sale of slaves within the Protectorate, a practice he called “an outrage 
and a crime [to be] punished as such wheresoever the authority of the British Crown can 
avail to bring it to justice.”90 Carnarvon was thus disposed towards taking action against 
the slave trade. Conversely, he recognised that both long-standing export goods such 
as gold and palm products and the potentially profitable crops of gum-copal and coffee, 
which had recently been introduced into the interior, relied to some extent upon slave 
labour for production and transportation.91 He had clearly been informed of the 
prevalence of domestic slavery both in agriculture and gold production and in domestic 
service to established chiefs and trading/land owning elites.92
Even more importantly, the cost and difficulty of implementing a fully staffed 
colonial administration complete with military, judicial, and executive officers had been 
made clear by the expense of the Asante War, and the Colonial Office was eager to 
secure the support of chiefs in order to limit the size and cost of colonial administration. 
They were forced to acknowledge, however, that the authority of these chiefly 
officeholders was based on their control of land and labour, much of which was unfree, a 
situation which was to remain true throughout the remainder of the century. “It seems 
doubtful”, an administrator wrote as late as 1927”, whether the system [of chief’s rule] 
can be long maintained in this country... but for what remains of the domestic slave
89 Agbodeka, African Politics and British Policy, pp.55-56.
90 PP 1875, LII, (c.1139), Carnarvon to the Officer Administering the Government of the Gold Coast, August 21, 
1874.
91 Addo-Fening, Akyem Abuakwa, p.26.
92 PP 1875, LII, (c.1139), Carnarvon to the Officer Administering the Government of the Gold Coast, August 21, 
1874.
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system.” 93 Therefore, while Carnarvon perceived that actions taken to enforce anti­
trading ordinances would appeal to abolitionists in the metropole but threaten the 
livelihoods only of a relatively small number of full-time slave traders, he was 
nevertheless wary of undertaking the difficult task of enforcing emancipation for the bulk
of the Protectorate’s slaves.
The Colonial Office was therefore interested in achieving the dual goals of
appeasing abolitionists at home while maintaining the support of the slave-owning elite
of the Protectorate. This effort resulted in three proposals, which Carnarvon
subsequently put before the Gold Coast administration. The first proposal, by which the
government would purchase the slaves by payment of £8 per slave and then make use
of them for a number of years on a policy basically identical to the regime des
engages94, was quickly rejected. What was acceptable to French society in the 1840s
was not acceptable to Britain in the 1870s. Similarly, the Sixes Model, based on the
Basel Missionary Society’s actions of the 1860s95, was rejected by Governor Strahan.
This programme, through which a slave was to have been immediately awarded one
free day to work for his/herself and purchase the other days from his/her master over a
period of years, appealed to the Colonial Office because of its intrinsically gradual
approach. But it was that very attribute which also threatened to make it unacceptable
to the British public, as Strahan noted when he wrote to Carnarvon “only very slowly
would this method operate (if ever it sufficed) to wipe out the reproach of slavery in the
Protectorate”.96 Strahan also argued that the logistics of implementing such a proposal
amongst numerous slaves without a strong commitment by the understaffed
administration to keeping records and policing the scheme would lead to its failure.97
Carnarvon therefore put his weight behind a third proposed system of 
emancipation, the Indian Model, which required the administration to immediately end 
the legal status of slavery but forced the slaves themselves to take legal action in order 
to win their emancipation. The Indian Model had the dual advantages of immediately
93 NAG ADM 11/975, Memorandum on the Vestiges of Slavery in the Gold Coast, Assistant Secretary for Native 
Affairs Johnson, 1927.
94 PP 1875, LII, (c.1139), Carnarvon to the Officer Administering the Government of the Gold Coast, August 21,
1874.
95 See Chapter 4.
95 PP 1875, LII, (c.1139), Strahan to Carnarvon, September 19,1874, Cape Coast
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granting slaves the right to seek their emancipation while making it somewhat difficult to 
achieve, thus limiting the chance of a mass exodus of slaves from the entourages of 
their masters and their positions in transportation, agriculture, and mining. The Indian 
Model was also accepted by the local merchants and administrators who made up the 
Colony’s Legislative Council98; and in September 1874 Governor Strahan adopted drafts 
of two ordinances based on this plan to be enacted on December 17.
However, while the administration clearly had the power to implement this act in 
the Colony which was “nothing but the forts and lands immediately around them or 
actually acquired by the Government”99, the case was not as apparent for the bulk of the 
Protectorate. Carnarvon, however, stated in no uncertain terms that if Britain were to 
accept increased defense and administrative responsibility for these districts, they would 
have to be allowed to exercise certain rights of control. He therefore informed the local 
administrators that he was willing to “incur some risk for the sake of removing the 
dishonour and moral taint which is incurred by a toleration of slavery”.100 He argued that 
the states of the Protectorate owed this favour to his government which:
...as their deliverer [in the 1873-4 Asante War], is entitled to require of them a 
greater degree of deference and conformity. ... Their conformity is required in 
pursuit of... the immediate abolition of slave dealing and the importation of slaves, 
to be followed by such regulation of the relations between master and slave as 
shall, ultimately, and in the long course of time, effect the extinction of slavery 
itself.101
With this argument, Carnarvon not only rationalised the extension of British 
jurisdiction, but also stressed that the extinction of the slave trade, rather than the 
suppression of domestic slavery, was Britain’s priority. This prioritisation was again 
reflected in Strahan’s two ordinances on December 27, 1874, which were accepted by 
the Legislative Council in Cape Coast with little debate.102
The first part of his carefully coordinated scheme was the Gold Coast Slave
97 PP 1875, LII, (c.1139), Strahan to Carnarvon, September 19,1874, Cape Coast.
98 PRO CO 98/2, Legislative Council Minutes, 17 December 1874.
99 NAG ADM 12/3/2, Griffith to Knutsford, 14 June 1888, Accra.
i°o pp ig 7 5 ? Lffi (c.1139), Carnarvon to the Officer Administering the Government of the Gold Coast, August 21, 
1874.
101 Ibid.
102 PRO CO 98/2, Legislative Council Minutes, 17 December 1874.
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Dealing Abolition Act which dealt with the crimes of slave dealing and the importation of 
slaves. The charge of slave dealing was to be applied to anyone who “shall... deal or 
trade in, sell, barter, transfer or take any slave.... or any person in order so that such 
person should be held or treated as a slave.”103 The same charge was also, confusingly, 
applied to individuals placing or receiving a pawn.104 Further, slave dealing applied to 
both the exportation of slaves from and importation of slaves into the Protectorate. For 
all these activities, the administration decreed punishment of up to five years 
imprisonment and a fine.105
The second ordinance, the Gold Coast Emancipation Ordinance, implemented 
the more passive Indian Model. The Emancipation Ordinance was intended both to 
demonstrate the administration’s commitment to allowing slave liberations and its 
support for the status quo in slave-master relationships. The operative clauses of the 
ordinance simply ordered:
...all courts to ‘refuse, disallow, discharge, and dismiss’ any claims held by one 
person over another... providing always that this enactment shall not be construed 
to include or apply to such rights as under the ordinary rules of English law 
applicable to the Gold Coast Colony may arise under and by virtue of contracts of 
service between freemen.106
While the ordinance did not, as Strahan had originally intended, go so far as to 
recognise “tribal [dependency] relations according to the customary law of the Protected 
Territories”107, it went some way towards reassuring slave-owners that their slaves would 
not be encouraged to seek liberation. The punishment for “compelling the service of 
any... free person” was set at five years’ imprisonment.108
Strahan informed Carnarvon that this ordinance satisfied the government’s 
intention not to actively encouraging slave liberations. “I do not anticipate”, he wrote,
103 PP 1874, LII, (c.1139), Strahan to Carnarvon, 28 December 1874, enclosure 1, Gold Coast Slave Dealing 
Abolition Act, Article 4.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid, Article 7. Carnarvon and the Acting Colonial Secretary on the Gold Coast both argued for a heavier 
sentence. PP 1874, LII, (c.1139), Carnarvon to Strahan, October 29,1874, London. PRO CO 98/2, Legislative 
Council Minutes, 17 December 1874.
106 PP 1874, LII, (c.1139), Strahan to Carnarvon, 28 December 1874, enclosure 2, The Gold Coast Emancipation 
Ordinance, Article 4..
107 PP 1874, LII, (c.1139), Strahan to Carnarvon, 19 September 1874, enclosure 3.
los pp j 8 7 4 ) LII, (c.1139), Strahan to Carnarvon, 28 December 1874, enclosure 2, The Gold Coast Emancipation
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“that the slaves will immediately in any large numbers leave their masters.”109
The immediate impact of the emancipation ordinance in the Gold Coast
Strahan was only the first in a long line of administrators and then historians to try 
to define the impact of emancipation, for the issue has been the subject of rigorous 
debate by the colonial and academic communities. Assistant Secretary for Native 
Affairs Johnson, in his 1927 Memorandum on the Vestiges of Slavery in the Gold Coast, 
tells his readers that “there [had been] no general eagerness for manumission”110. This 
was the official position presented in government documents, supported by Strahan’s 
letters to Carnarvon which suggested that there was little disturbance caused by the 
emancipation ordinances.111 This ‘continuity5 theory was largely accepted by the colonial 
establishment, but historians such as Paul Lovejoy began to ask serious questions 
about abolition and emancipation in Africa at the end of the 1970s, suggesting that 
emancipation was in some regions the cause of massive social and political shifts. 
These ‘transformational5 ideas were best represented in the historiography of the Gold 
Coast by Gerald McSheffrey’s 1983 article “Slavery, Indentured Servitude, Legitimate 
Trade, and the Impact of Abolition in the Gold Coast 1874-1910: A Reappraisal.”112 
McSheffrey utilised recently translated excerpts from the Basel Missionary Archives 
which suggested that there were mass self-liberations by slaves, especially in the interior 
of the Protectorate, to argue that emancipation caused a major dislocation in slave- 
owning on the Gold Coast. His evidence was mainly letters which claimed that in Ada 
“From almost every master some slaves have gone”113, in Akyem Abuakwa’s capital of 
Kyebi “about 100 slaves have left their masters”114, and in Akuapem “about 200 slaves 
have run away...”.115 McSheffrey’s article especially focused on Akyem Abuakwa which 
was both a minor producer of palm oil and was well monitored by BMS missionaries.
Ordinance. Article 5.
109 pp -[8 7 4  ^L j j  (c<i i 3 9 )5 Strahan to Carnarvon, 19 September 1874, Cape Coast.
110 NAG ADM 11/975, Memorandum on the Vestiges of Slavery in the Gold Coast, Asstistant Secretary for Native 
Affairs Johnson, 1927.
m  p r o  CO 96/115, Strahan to Carnarvon, 26 March 1875, Cape Coast.
112 McSheffrey, “Slavery, Indentured Servitude, Legitimate Trade”, pp.349-368.
113 Jenkins BMS Abstracts, J. Binder to Mader, Basel Missionary Factory Ada, 3 July 1875.
114 Jenkins BMS Abstracts, Asante, Mohr and Werner to the Basel Mission Slave Emancipation Committee, 26 June 
1875, Kyebi.
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However McSheffrey has himself come under significant criticism for overlooking 
BMS documents which suggested that relatively few slaves actually left their masters in 
Akuapem, Krobo, and other internal regions.116 Furthermore, the Akyem mission’s 
reports on which he relies have since been brought into question as the chief 
missionaries were concurrently embroiled in a conflict with the local government based 
largely on the confrontational tactics of indigenous missionary David Asante, a cousin 
and rival of the Okyenhene.u7
The case against McSheffrey’s transformation thesis has been put forward by 
Raymond Dumett and Marion Johnson, who argued that the administration held a 
“gradualist, noncoercive policy with respect to slaveholding and pawning” and its efforts 
were “meliorative and eroding rather than abolitionist in effect.”118 Although something of 
a return to the official colonial theory of “continuance”, Dumett and Johnson’s article was 
well supported by a variety of administrative and missionary sources.
However, the “continuance” theory has again been questioned recently, not least 
by John Parker, who in his study of the urban history of Accra argued that “the available 
evidence points neither to the historiographical polarities of ‘continuity or ‘rupture’, but 
rather to a whole range of responses often involving negotiations between masters and 
slaves...”.119 Kwabena Opare-Akurang also muddies the waters by suggesting that there 
was a division between the Colony, where British enforcement was strong and there was 
a large slave response, and the Protectorate, where enforcement and consequently 
response was weak.120
While Opare-Akurang’s arguments are made somewhat suspect by his apparent 
failure to accept the nineteenth century definition of the Colony as only the few forts and 
settlements of the coast and not their surrounding districts121, Parker has to a large
115 Jenkins BMS Abstracts, Mader’s cover letter to Basel, 25 August 1875, Akropong.
116 Jenkins BMS Abstracts, Dieterle to Basel, 22 June 1875, Aburi. Eisenschmid to Basel, 25 June 1875 Akropong. 
Schonefeld to Mader, 8 July 1875, Odumase.
117 This will be discussed in depth in Chapter 7. See Addo-Fening, Akyem Abuakwa, pp.57-71.
118 Dumett and Johnson, “Britain and the Suppression of Slavery”, pp.106-108,
119 Parker, John, “Ga state and society”, p.144.
120 Opare-Akurang, Kwabena, “The Administration of the Abolition Laws, African Response and Post- Proclamation 
Slavery in the Gold Coast 1874-1940”, Slavery and Abolition, 1998, (19), pp. 149-166. Opare-Akurang, Kwabena, 
“Slavery and Abolition in the Gold Coast: Colonial Modes of Emancipation and African Initiatives”, Ghana Studies, 
1998 (1), pp.11-34.
121 For my response to Opare-Akurang’s assertions see my article “The Case for Africans: The Role of Slaves and
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extent pointed the way to a new direction for understanding emancipation. The 
evidence for the Gold Coast in general matches that Parker has found for Accra. The 
1874 emancipation, while not immediately revolutionary for most slaves and slave­
owners, did result in a long-term transformation and in a wide variety of negotiated 
outcomes for slaves and their masters.122
In the short-term, however, the colonial administration largely succeeded in 
providing a route for emancipation without encouraging a rupture in the local economy or 
society. While McSheffrey, and to some extent Opare-Akurang, claim that there is 
“ample testimony that serious disruptions had indeed occurred”123, their evidence rests 
unevenly on a very few unquantified statements in letters emanating largely from the 
BMS, aside from one purely anecdotal reference by Strahan.124 Much of the evidence 
for this is only now emerging from the SCT colonial magistracy files in the National 
Archives of Ghana, which both McSheffrey and Opare-Akurang ignored but which 
contain valuable quantitative and qualitative information.
It is clear from these sources that it was British rather than indigenous courts 
which dealt with slave-related crimes during the post-proclamation period (and up to the 
end of British rule on the Gold Coast). The 1853 Supreme Court Ordinance had been 
an attempt to marginalise indigenous jurisprudence in the towns contiguous with British 
settlements and forts125; and the extension of the Protectorate in 1874 favoured the 
promulgation of this policy throughout the newly ‘protected’ districts. However the 
scarcity of healthy European administrators meant that Africans, and more frequently 
Euro-Africans, continued to play a significant role in judicial and civil administrations.126 
Important Africans, including known former (and possibly current) slave owners were in 
rare instances even appointed to senior judicial posts. One of the most important of 
these figures was George Cleland. A notable slave owner, relative of the Alato Mantse 
and one-time acting holder of that Jamestown stool, Cleland had led a militia of his
Masters in Emancipation on the Gold Coast, 1874-2000”, Slavery and Abolition, 2000 (21), page numbers 
forthcoming.
122 See Chapter 7.
123 Opare-Akurang, “Slavery and Abolition in the Gold Coast”, pp. 17.
124 PP 1875,LII (c.1343), Strahan to Carnarvon, March 6, 1875, Cape Coast.
125 Gocking, Roger, “British Justice and the Native Tribunals of the Southern Gold Coast Colony”, Journal o f African 
History, 1993 (34), pp.94-96,
126 Opare-Akurang, “The Administration of the Abolition Laws”, p.152.
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slaves in support of the British in 1873, and after having headed an indigenous tribunal 
for several years, was appointed as a Justice of the Peace by Strahan in 1874.127 
Cleland, who had been indicted for purchasing a slave in 1868, was nevertheless given 
jurisdiction over British subjects within the Colony for an indeterminate period, although 
not without some controversy.128
While the appointment of Africans and Euro-Africans to such major posts was 
uncommon, even during the transition period of 1874-5, educated locals continued to 
serve as clerks, translators, and of course in the police. In addition, both the Judicial 
Assessor’s court, which initially dealt with slave-related crimes, and the Divisional Court 
in Accra which replaced it in 1878 allowed participation by local notables in the judicial 
process.129 Defendants at the Divisional Court could request trial by a jury of their peers, 
who to the frustration of the administration frequently chose to acquit individuals whom 
the administration believed to be guilty.130 Even when defendants did not insist on jury 
trial, the Chief Justice of the Divisional Court was usually assisted by both European and 
non-European assessors.131 Although the presiding Justice could legally disregard the 
opinions of assessors, their advice was generally accepted.
District Courts did not deal with slave-related crimes during this period, and 
slaves who wished to follow the only path to legal emancipation available to them under 
the Indian Model - the courts - had to travel to Cape Coast or Accra to receive their 
emancipation.132 This was probably a greater hindrance to emancipation than the 
frequently cited argument that slaves were ignorant of the proclamation.133 It is 
therefore indicative of the agency of some individual slaves that they trickled in from the 
Akuapem hills, Akyem Abuakwa, and further to receive their certificates of liberation.134
127 My thanks to John Parker for this biographical information.
128 NAG ADM 1/12/3, Chief Magistrate Marshall to Lt. Colonel Johston, April 9, 1874, Accra. Cleland was indicted 
in NAG SCT 2/4/4, Regina v. Sarah Smith, Accra Supreme/Divisional Court, 20 May 1868.
129 The court sat in Cape Coast until 1876 and later in Accra. NAG SCT 5/4/14-5/4/19 and 17/4/1
130 PRO CO 96/203, Hodgson to Knutsford, 8 July, 1889, Accra.
131 NAG SCT 2/5/1 (1879) - 2/5/13 (1899)
132 The Accra District Court was the first to hear slave dealing cases in 1882. See Chapter 7.
133 Jenkins BMS Abstracts J. Binder to Mader - Basel Misisonary Factory Ada, 3 January 1875 claimed slaves in Ada 
did not know of emancipation. Ignorance of the proclamation was also used as a defence by some defendants. See 
NAG SCT 5/4/15 Regina v. Quacoe Bart, Cape Coast Judicial Assessors Court, 9 March 1875; Regina v. Ashun and 
Kofi Dontoh, Cape Coast Judicial Court, 1 March 1875.
134 Jenkins BMS Abstracts, Dieterle to Basel, 22 June 1875,( Aburi). SCT 5/4/19 Regina v. Acquassie Mirriwa, Cape 
Coast JA Court, 1 December 1876 (Mampong); SCT 5/4/19 Regina v. Kofi Tando, Cape Coast JA Court, 2 December
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Nevertheless, initially the numbers of slaves seeking their liberation was not 
proportionally significant. Certainly there were few who chose to use the legal 
intervention of the courts. SCT records indicate only approximately 20 cases of slaves 
or their families using the legal system to effect their liberation before 1880in the Judicial 
Assessors’ and District courts combined, and most of these individuals were recently 
introduced slaves rather than long-time servitors. 135 At the same time, Dumett and 
Johnson rightly point out that even the most dramatic (and questionable) mass self­
liberations suggested by the Basel Missionary archival evidence number only 100-200 
slaves, while in many areas even BMS sources indicate few liberations indeed.136
The agency of slaves is the topic of the next chapter, but it is interesting to note 
that there is no evidence at all during the period of initial emancipation (1874-1880) of 
judicial authorities commissioning proactive investigations into slave holding or even 
slave dealing. Of the 48 cases involving slavery or pawning heard by these courts, 28 
apparently resulted either from police acting on the advice of a witness, slave-owners 
belatedly hearing of the emancipation acts and throwing themselves upon the mercy of 
the court (which was usually given), or a police constable happening upon a crime being 
committed.137 However while there are no cases during this period of magistrates 
commissioning investigations, when the abolitionist press got hold of a story such as the 
sale in Little Popo of two Gold Coast girls, the administration was willing to go to great 
lengths to reclaim or repurchase those individuals.138
'k'fc'fc
The expansion of British authority after 1873 necessitated an increasing 
commitment in terms of military power. The failure of Major Cochrane and his 
successors in the Gold Coast Corps to recruit coastal peoples into British units or to 
receive permission from the Colonial Office to recruit slaves had resulted, at the
1876 (Domassie in Akyem).
135 Most cases do not make it clear the exact mechanism by which slaves brought into British jurisdiction were 
identified.
136 Dumett and Johnson, “Britain and the Suppression of Slavery”, p.91.
137 This information is all drawn from NAG SCT 5/4/15-18; SCT 17/4/1; SCT 2/5/1; and SCT 2/4/11.
138 NAG ADM 1/9/1, Freeling to Rottman and Cole, 3 September 1877, Accra.
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beginning of the Asante War, in a divided constabulary.139 Most of the coastal forts were 
manned by small contingents of the 171-man “Fantee Armed Police”, but the largest 
force was the “Houssa Armed Police”, recruited mostly by missions to Lagos and the 
upper Volta, whose 211 members largely formed the garrisons of Cape Coast and 
Elmina.140 These small forces were totally insufficient in the face of the Asante invasion, 
however, and despite augmentation by both British regulars and West Indian units, the 
campaign commander General Wolseley initiated a levy of coastal peoples, who often 
willingly volunteered for duty against Asante, either individually or in asafo companies. 
By 4 November 1873, Wolseley had more than 3200 indigenous auxiliary combatants.141 
The number of associated carriers is unknown but must have been even larger.
In the face of the Asante military threat, however, at least one of Wolseley’s 
officers decided to reconsider the inclusion of slave recruits in their forces. Captain 
Glover, the former Governor of Lagos, actively recruited slaves in late 1873 for a column 
aimed at striking through the bush for Kumasi. Glover’s recruiting agents directed their 
efforts at “slaves of persons residing at Cape Coast and other places on the Gold Coast” 
and a number of slaves clearly saw a opening and seized the opportunity to enlist.142 
Luckily we have details of the origins of some of the recruits, although only for 
September 1873 whereas we know recruitment continued into November. The inducted 
slaves and ex-slaves were almost entirely northerners, and according to the registrars 
mostly Muslim, and were officially enlisted in the Houssa Armed Police.143
139 See Chapter 4
140 NAG ADM 1/10/2, Monthly State of the Fantee Armed Police and the Gold Coast Houssa Armed Police Force, 24 
June 1873.
141 PRO CO 96/103, Wolseley to Kimberley, 4 November 1873, Cape Coast.
142 NAG ADM 1/10/20, Sworn declaration, HAPF Recruits, 12 August 1873.
143 NAG ADM 1/10/2, Nominal Roll with Particulars of Recruits medically examined for Houssa Armed Police, 
September 1873.
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TABLE 6.1 
Recruits to the Houssa Armed Police, 
September 1873__________________
Status Numlvi l ’ C Ik. Cl it
Current slave in Colony 26 47%
Current slave outside Colony 8 15%
Former slave, purchased freedom 2 4%
Former slave, manumitted 1 2%
Former slave, freed by Governor Hill 1 2%
Former slave, refugee from Asante 6 11%
Former slave, freed by death of master 5 9%
Former slave, runaway from master 4 7%
Free individual, no slave history 2 4%
Total 55
NAG ADM  1/10/2, Nominal Roll with Particulars, September 1873
A plurality of recruits was individuals, who, until joining the force, were slaves 
within the Gold Coast Colony, while many others were from allied states abutting 
colonial towns. It is clear from correspondence surrounding this recruitment effort that 
their masters were strongly opposed to their induction, and at one point at least this led 
to a street riot in which several enlisted slaves and masters were injured.144 Other 
inductees were slaves who had either bought their freedom or been given their liberty 
upon the deaths of their masters, or in some cases slaves who had fled their owners 
several years previously. These former slaves were probably convinced to join up by the 
promise of a recruitment bonus and wages inflated by the war. At least one recruit had 
been freed by Governor Hill over thirty years earlier! Only two enlistees were free 
individuals who claimed to have had no slave background.
However, unlike the French Ministre's approval of the tirailleurs senegalaises, the 
Colonial Office balked when Captain Glover suggested that recruitment efforts could be 
aided if masters were paid a £5 bounty for allowing their slaves to join up.145 Glover had 
authorised this policy, but not without alerting General Wolseley, and Wolseley 
communicated the proposition to Secretary of State for the Colonies Kimberley. 
Kimberley deemed the issue important enough to consult with Gladstone himself, and
144 PRO CO 96/103, Captain Glover to Wolseley, 6 November 1873, Accra.
145 PRO CO 96/103, Captain Glover to Wolseley, 6 November 1873, Accra.
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the Prime Minister did not approve.146 On the 17th of December, 1873, Kimberley 
consequently instructed Wolseley to forbid Glover from recruiting on this basis. While 
“mak[ing] full allowance for the difficulty in which Captain Glover has found himself 
placed in recruiting for the Houssa Force”, Kimberley stated that:
As his actions, although beneficial to the slaves in procuring their emancipation 
and enabling them to engage in a well paid and honourable service, may be 
misconstrued and might lay her Majesty’s government open to the charge of 
encouraging the traffic in slaves, i think it desirable that he should discontinue 
the practice of making payments to masters on account of the enlistment of their 
slaves, and I request you to so instruct him.
There are several reasons why the British rejected a policy which the French in 
Senegal embraced. The most obvious is the greater pressure of abolitionism both in 
Britain and at this later date. Second, there was the precedent of Newcastle’s order 
against such recruiting methods in 1862.147 More practically, the Colonial Office was 
wary of offending the very chiefly officeholders upon whom they depended for the bulk 
of their auxiliaries, an important contingent of the British forces, by accepting their slaves 
into service. But perhaps most importantly, British commanders on the Gold Coast were 
simply not facing the same recruiting problems as Faidherbe. Whereas Faidherbe’s 
conquests had been largely unpopular with Senegal’s neighbours, Wolseley, fighting a 
defensive action alongside the coastal powers rather than a war of expansion, was 
strongly supported by the militias of neighbouring states. He simply did not need to 
resort to the same measures as Faidherbe. A cynic might suggest that even abolitionist 
England might have allowed the recruitment of slaves if it had been strictly necessary 
from a military point of view, but in this case it was not.
After 1874 the issue of the recruitment of slaves seemed a moot point as slavery 
had lost its legal status, and slaves did not technically exist in the Protectorate or 
Colony. However, the administration continued to be starved of recruits to both 
constabulary forces. The militia for coastal peoples - the “Fantee” constabulary, was cut 
down to 200 troops due to a lack of volunteers, while the “Houssa” force was given a 
larger share of responsibility for the Protectorate at 900 individuals. There is evidence
146 PRO CO 96/103, Holland to Kimberley, Telegramme, 16 December 1873, London.
147 See Chapter 4.
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that some slaves who left their masters in 1874 and 1875 joined the “Houssa” 
constabulary, at least from the coastal areas, but clearly not en masse, since 
commanders continued to recruit from outside the Protectorate in order to fill their units. 
148 in 1875, Captain Barrows led a successful recruiting drive along the Niger River149, 
but in 1879, another mission had to be carried out in the same region and in Salaga 
north of the Protectorate.150 Within the year, Ussher was forced to request permission 
to send yet another recruiter to the area.151 At one point, the desperate administration 
was even considering enlisting from Manding communities in the Gambia.152 Unlike in 
Senegal, the recruitment of slaves and former slaves in the Gold Coast was cleariy not a 
success.
AXA
While there were obvious differences between European attitudes towards 
slavery in the Gold Coast and Senegal during their respective periods of expansion, the 
general goal of both administrations was to ensure the profitability and the security of the 
colonies. As in Faidherbe’s Senegal, the immediate post-proclamation period on the 
Gold Coast witnessed the introduction of administrative attempts to control labour 
supplies for profitable cash products. Governor Freeling, for example, introduced rules 
governing apprenticeship in 1877, which allowed for court-sanctioned apprentice 
positions for individuals between the ages of 9 and 16 not only in the trades but also for 
domestic servitude.153 Thus the administration could place youths, especially orphans, in 
positions which had been previously generally, although not exclusively, filled by slaves. 
On the other hand, Governor Freeling crafted the ordinance with a view to preventing 
apprentices from becoming slaves by setting up a mandatory certification process and 
forbidding the removal of apprentices from the Protectorate. Unfortunately, I have found 
little further evidence on this subject, but the system does not appear to have been
148 Jenkins BMS Abstract, J. Binder to Mader, Basel Missionary Factory Ada, 3 July 1875. Again, this topic will be 
discussed in Chapter 7.
149 PRO CO 96/131, Ussher to Colonial Office, 10 November 1875, Cape Coast.
150 NAG ADM 1/1/48, Hicks Beach to Ussher, 3 July 1879, London.
151 PRO CO 96/131, Ussher to Kimberley, 13 September 1880, Accra.
152 PRO CO 96/115, Strahan to Carnarvon, 22 June 1875, Cape Coast.
153 PRO CO 97/2, Ordinance 16 of 1877, “Masters and Servants”, 23 July 1877, Governor Freeling.
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extended to agricultural work. This fact can be interpreted as indicating that there was 
no labour shortage in agriculture, and thus no major exodus of slaves from this field, 
although the connection is tenuous.
Still, Carnarvon’s and Strahan’s plan to implement an emancipation policy that 
would not strip workers and domestics from their positions appears to have succeeded. 
Between 1875 and 1876 production of palm oil grew from 2.68 million gallons to 3.87 
million gallons, and palm kernels exports climbed from 4,677 tons to 7,655 tons, while 
gold exports increased to 17,280 ounces from 11,801 ounces.154
At the same time, the administration largely avoided censure by the abolitionist 
missionary communities throughout the Colony. While in 1874 the Methodists were 
attracting 10,400 attendants to public worship in 23 chapels in coastal towns and had a 
combined membership of 2513, their only response to emancipation was to welcome its 
implementation in 1875.155 In the next five years there is no evidence that they issued 
any complaints as to the pursuit of slave policy by the government. The Basel 
Missionary Society was somewhat more active, requesting police presence in Kyebi to 
monitor slavery in 1875 and accusing the Okyenhene of slave holding in 1879, but 
otherwise appears to have largely accepted the implementation and enforcement of the 
Indian Model.156 Colonial governors encouraged this acquiescence through the 
judicious use of propaganda. The annexation of Keta in 1879 was largely aimed at 
claiming the mouth of the Volta before any other colonial power and stopping the 
smuggling of legitimate goods in order to avoid British tariffs157, but it was also useful 
propaganda since the region continually hosted major slave trading markets.158 In the 
face of such evidence it is difficult to express British attitudes towards slavery between 
1874 and 1880 better than Dumett and Johnson, who wrote that:
[our] impression gained is that of a government which hoped by mere 
expressions of disapproval to reduce the harsher aspects of indigenous slavery 
gradually - but which preferred the status quo and looked paternalisticaily on 
slaves remaining close to former masters as the most effective means of social
154 Dumett, and Johnson, “Britain and the Suppression of Slavery”, p.81.
155 WMMS Reports XIX, Tabular View of the Gold Coast District, 1874.
156 WMMS Reports XIX, Gold Coast District, 1875.
157 PRO CO 96/28, Ussher to Hicks-Beach, 9 December 1879, Keta.
158 See Chapters 4 and 9.
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co n tro l.159
The reinforcement of pragmatic policies during the French retreat. 1870-1880
Colonial regimes in both Senegal and the Gold Coast approached the question of 
slavery and emancipation with the dual goals of satisfying abolitionist pressure while 
maintaining the socio-economic status quo. While the Gold Coast administration 
specifically engineered the Indian Model so as to minimise the impact of emancipation, 
the French in Senegal had to work around a much more stringent document which 
called for the active liberation of slaves.
As we have seen, Baudin, Du Chateau, and Faidherbe used subterfuge to 
mitigate the implications of the 1848 emancipation so as to assure the colony’s 
profitability and security. For these actions, they were continually able to secure the 
sanction of their superiors in the metropole, their respective Ministers of the Navy. 
Unfortunately for them, however, the implication of the 1848 extension of citizenship to 
inhabitants of St. Louis and Goree also placed the Colony’s justice system under the 
Minister de ia Justice. Both justices and prosecutors were appointed by and reported to 
the Ministry of Justice160, and their actions were likely to be shaped by metropolitan 
pressure rather than (or as well as) pragmatic colonial concerns.
Fortunately for the executive officers of the colony, the only punishment for slave 
dealing dictated by the 1848 emancipation laws was the loss of citizenship for the 
perpetrator.161 The implication of this law was that only citizens could be punished for 
slave trading or owning offences, which meant, to Faidherbe’s relief, that subjects of 
Waalo, Kaajor, and other areas brought under French control were immune from judicial 
sanction.162
The tribunals of Goree and St. Louis in the 1840s and early 1850s were 
completely ineffective in dealing with slavery. 163 These tribunals had not been 
fundamentally altered by the 1848 emancipation, and there is no evidence that a single
159 Dumett and Johnson, “Britain and the Suppression of Slavery”, p.86.
160 Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, p.60.
161 See Chapter 5.
162 Their slaves could still, according to the 1848 law, seek their liberation on French soil (which they were 
nevertheless unlikely to receive). However the masters were immune to prosecution for owning these slaves.
163 ANS M3 Rapport sur le Service Judiciaire, 20 March 1842, St. Louis.
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case of slave dealing was brought before them164. However the reunification of Senegal 
and Goree in 1854 resulted in an imperial decree by Louis Napoleon codifying justice in 
Senegal. The supreme court which emerged, the cour d’assises, sat at St. Louis and 
heard all major cases in the colony, including those involving slave dealing. In a nod to 
the power of both the habitants and the local administration, the 1854 decree put much 
of the court’s power for determining guilt or innocence not in the hands of the French 
president de ia cour imperial but in those of four assessors “taken from among the 
notables...composed of [officers], former officers, and the principal landowners and 
merchants of St. Louis and Goree”.165 The responsibility for justice was thus placed in 
the hands of the prime proponents of a pragmatic slave policy.
Conversely, the 1854 imperial decree guaranteed the independence of the 
colonial prosecution, and prosecutors were the individuals charged with bringing cases 
to court. Within months of the decree public prosecutors charged three Moors with 
having brought two female slaves and a young boy into the colony - allegedly for sale. 
Aware of the limitations of the 1848 proclamation, they chose to pursue this case under 
an 1831 law intended to punish maritime slave traders exporting slaves to the New 
World, but which could be construed to include traders importing slaves into the Colony 
by land.166 The two cases were so open-and-shut that even the tilted cour d’assises 
handed down 20 and 15 year penalties to the traders. However, the decision was 
reversed on appeal on the basis that the “accused were strangers and that the crimes 
were committed in foreign countries.”167 When Minister Ducos was faced with the fait 
accompii of the reversal of the conviction he argued that the crimes had in fact been 
carried over to French territory. Nevertheless he agreed that the subject status of the 
accused was enough to guarantee that they should be found innocent. There is no 
record that the newly-appointed Governor Faidherbe personally took a hand in the 
appeal, but certainly the case became a precedent for guaranteeing immunity for French 
subjects just in time for Faidherbe’s expansion and the introduction of large numbers of 
individuals as subjects.
164 There is a total absence of slave dealing cases in ANS M3, ANS K ll ,  and Senegal XIV before the 1850s.
165 ANS M3, Decret Imperial portant Organisation Judiciaire, 9 August 1854.
166 See Chapter 3.
167 ANS K ll ,  Ministre a Faidherbe, 28 December 1854, Paris.
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The appeals court’s decision dealt something of a blow to proponents of a 
vigorous prosecution of slave-related laws, and there is no record of further slave- 
dealing cases for a full 20 years, other than the rather straight-forward prosecution of the 
Commandant of Bakel for the sale of slaves captured in battle, for which crime he 
received only one month’s imprisonment.168 Consequently, the arrival in 1874 of Prosper 
Darrigrand, a lawyer and abolitionist who had practised in the West Indies, was 
something of a local disaster for the administration’s pragmatic approach to slavery.169
Darrigrand had been appointed by the Ministre de la Justice to the post of 
president de la cour d’assises, from which position he launched his attack on slave 
dealing. His first strike came in 1875 when he charged two habitants, Gasconi Diop and 
Goza Jean Cartier, with having sold and bought a slave girl respectively. Darrigrand 
considered the case watertight, and so apparently did the defendants who “contested 
neither the reality nor the gravity of the charges.” Nevertheless, the assessors - French 
officers and fellow habitants - acquitted the defendants, arguing incorrectly that the 1831 
law applied only to “slave vessels.” 170
The disgruntled Darrigrand refused to be so easily defeated by the ‘old boy 
network’ of colonial officials and habitants that conspired to limit the impact of 
emancipation. In 1878 he managed to bring to court four more individuals accused of 
slave dealing. Three of them were clearly subjects and not citizens, as they lived in the 
village of N’Diago.171 However the fourth, N’Diaye N’Diaye, was an habitant and owned 
property in St. Louis as well as farms and 15 slaves in Waalo.172 Therefore Darrigrand 
pursued him despite the resistance of Acting Governor Leguay, who in the absence of 
Governor Briere de I’lsle wrote to the Minister for assistance.173 Leguay’s frantic calls for 
assistance brought Briere de I’lsie thundering back to confront Darrigrand. The 
Governor feared the alienation of both the Waalo aristocracy and that of the pro-French 
Muslim cleric Bou-el-Mogdad, at whose residence the sale had taken place.174 In the
168 ANS K ll ,  Faidherbe a Ministre, 15 December 1857, St. Louis.
169 Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, p.60.
170 ANSOM Senegal XIV/16, Darrigrand a Valiere, 28 May 1875, St. Louis.
171 ANS K ll ,  Leguay a Ministre, 1 August 1878, St. Louis.
172 ANS K ll ,  Briere de l’Isle a Ministre, 8 December 1878, St. Louis.
173 ANS K ll ,  Leguay a Ministre, 18 August 1878, St, Louis.
174 Klein, Slaveiy and Colonial Rule, p.61.
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end, N’Diaye was found guilty and sentenced by Darrigrand to six months 
imprisonment.175
But Darrigrand’s victory was short-lived. By the time he was able to bring another 
slave dealing case before the cour d’assises, former Governor Jaureguiberry had been 
appointed Ministre de la Marine and in support of Briere de Plsle he convinced the
17fiMinistry of Justice to pull Darrigrand off the case. The judicial challenge to the 
administration’s slave policy had been defeated, and pragmatic politics had won again.
AA A
In the 1870s, while the French were detaching themselves from responsibility for 
large areas of the interior due to lack of resources, the metropole became increasingly 
aware that the balance of the peanut trade had shifted to Siin-Saalum and Kaajor and 
therefore to the entrepots of Cap Vert. Thus while French colonialism was on the retreat 
elsewhere, Governor Valiere noted in 1874 that Dakar and Rufisque were becoming 
increasingly valuable ports and indeed massively profitable for France, and moved to 
formally annex the two settlements. The decision prompted a debate in the colonial 
administration over whether or not the 1848 proclamation should be extended to these 
regions. In fact, the issue had been discussed before. In 1865, when the importance of 
Dakar became apparent, Governor Pinet-Laprade had suggested extending 
emancipation to Dakar and indeed the entire Cap Vert peninsula.177 Although Pinet- 
Laprade had ordered the Commandant of Goree to warn the Dakarois of the imminent 
extension of French law to their town178, and received the support of the Minister179, the 
move was never implemented.
In 1874, therefore, the Commandant of Goree, Canard, rightly pointed out again 
that annexation of the two ports, while securing their status as French possessions, 
would necessitate the previously unrealised emancipation of the many slaves who lived
175 ANS K ll ,  Briere de l ’lsle a Ministre, 8 December 1878, St. Louis.
176 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15d, Briere de l ’lsle a Ministre, 17 February 1879, St. Louis.
177 ANS K ll ,  Pinet-Laprade a Ministre, 20 February[?] 1865, St. Louis.
178 ANS K ll ,  Pinet-Laprade a Commandant de Goree, 22 February 1865, St. Louis.
179 ANS K ll ,  Ministre a Pinet-Laprade, 30 April 1865, Paris.
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and worked there.180 Valiere agreed that Canard was correct, and feared that move 
would alienate the Lebu slave-owners of the towns. Valiere recognised that the 
inhabitants of Dakar and Rufisque would need some time to move their slaves to 
villages and farms along the coast or make other arrangements. He therefore ordered 
Canard to warn the chiefs of the two towns of the imminent decision, but added that “it 
seems to me in all justice [we must] give the habitants a reasonable delay” so that they 
may not suffer ’’too much” at the loss of their slaves.181
In the event that ‘reasonable delay’ became 3 and 5 years in Dakar and Rufisque 
respectively. Despite continual statements by Valiere that “the moment ha[d] come” to 
apply emancipation to Dakar and Rufisque182, and a further warning to the slave-owners 
of Dakar by Canard in July 1875, it was only on July 27th, 1877 that the legality of slave- 
owning was removed from the locality of Dakar.183 Emancipation took two years longer 
in Rufisque, and was applied only on June 20th, 1879.184
The extension of emancipation to Dakar and Rufisque was a complete 
compromise. Slave-owners within the towns had been given a period of years to move 
their slaves outside the fairly small area of enforcement, which they had used to great 
effect.185 Likewise, Canard, who as Commandant of Goree had direct control over 
enforcement, refused to follow a policy of vigorously enforcing emancipation in case it 
might “produce very serious political complications.”186 In a large part this came about 
because of the administration’s obsession with the development of the towns187, in 
which important projects for the improvement of transport and port facilities were being 
carried out by an industry constantly in need of workers.188 The slave owners of 
Rufisque fought to “keep their slaves” right up to the date of emancipation189, but despite
administrative fears of heavy opposition to emancipation in Rufisque190, these never
180 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15c, Canard a Valiere, 23 January 1874, Goree.
181 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15c, Valiere a Canard, 4 February 1874, St, Louis.
182 As he wrote again in a letter to Goree, ANS K ll ,  Valiere a Commandant de Goree, 24 March 1874, St. Louis.
183 ANS K ll ,  Comandant de Goree a Briere de FIsle, 1 December 1877, Goree.
184 ANS K ll ,  Telegramme, Commandant de Goree a Briere de ITsle, 20 June 1879, Dakar.
185 ANS 4B64, Commandant de Goree a Briere de l ’lsle, 1 July 1879, Dakar.
186 ANS 4B64, Commandant de Goree a Briere de l ’lsle, 1 December 1877, Dakar..
187 ANS 4B64, Commandant de Goree a Briere de ITsle, 1 January 1878, Dakar.
188 ANS 4B64, Commandant de Goree a Briere de ITsle, 1 December 1877 and 1 July 1878, Dakar.
189 ANS 4B64, Commandant de Goree a Briere de l ’lsle, IMay 1879, Dakar.
190 ANS 4B64, Commandant de Goree a Briere de ITsle, 1 December 1877, Dakar.
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materialised. Nor were there inordinate increases in the number of slaves seeking 
documents of liberation in either year, despite the fact that slaves remaining in these two 
towns were legally allowed to receive such documents.191
The argument that emancipation was neither effective nor disruptive seems to be 
supported by Commandant Canard’s refusal to extend emancipation throughout Cap 
Vert in 1880, in which he confirmed that slaves had been removed to villages “not far 
from [the] towns... of Dakar and Rufisque” but that if all Diander [Cap Vert] were 
liberated the situation would become untenable for Lebu slave owners.192 Thus the 
administration, while forced to extend emancipation to the two ports, believed that it had 
succeeded in its stated intention of giving slave-owners every opportunity to conserve 
their slaves.
Conclusion
I have argued that the policies of administrators on the Gold Coast and Senegal 
towards emancipation in the mid-nineteenth century were pragmatic. In the face of 
increased responsibility, and with little physical assistance from the metropole, 
administrators formulated and carried out policy themselves and only applied afterwards 
for support from their superiors. However, if their policies were ‘pragmatic’, it was a 
pragmatism born out of the realities of a situation in which the socio-economic and 
political state of the colony, and potentially their own chances of advancement, relied 
largely on the co-operation of slave owners and the complacency of slaves, neither of 
which were simple to ensure. If it seems that I have implied in this chapter that 
administrative policy was more central to emancipation’s outcome than indigenous 
agency, it is only because in the next two chapters I intend to show how Africans and 
Euro-Africans were major players in limiting the de facto effectiveness of emancipation 
and slave-policy.
191 Moniteur du Senegal, 1868-1888, from Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, p.72.
192 ANS K25, L ’Esclavage en AOF, Deherme, 1906.
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CHAPTER 7:
Slaves and masters in the post-proclamation Gold Coast
The emancipation policy that the British administration carried out on the Gold 
Coast was removed from its abolitionist origins not once, but twice. In the last chapter 
we saw how the administration and the Colonial Office cast the anti-slavery ordinances 
in a mould shaped in part by their recognition of their partnership with slave-owners and 
in part by their fear of the economic and political chaos threatened by a mass slave 
exodus.
The larger deviation, however, came not in the production of a policy informed by 
the administration’s concerns but in its execution. Under the Indian Model, the 
administration abdicated its central role in the emancipation process to these two 
groups. Thus, while anti-slavery policy was created by the metropole and carried out by 
the local administration, in the event the most important actors would be slaves and their 
masters. The primacy of slave choice is generally recognised by historians, Dumett and 
Johnson having argued in their 1988 article that “[tjhe most formidable roadblock against 
wholesale emancipation... was the reluctance of slaves themselves to come forward...”.1 
The evidence I present here largely supports their view of how slave agency affected the 
course of emancipation. However relatively little attention has been given to the views 
and actions of slave owners beyond the peripheral subject of monetary compensation, 
which in the event Her Majesty’s Exchequer declined to approve.2 However, slave­
owners were in fact central participants in the process; devising mechanisms to avert, 
evade, and mitigate the potentially ruinous transformations resulting from the 
emancipation ordinances.
The major contribution of the administration was in providing a catalyst for and 
recognition of a slave’s free status. This emancipation potential, although largely not 
taken up, enabled a re-evaluation of slaves’ relationships with their masters in which 
those two groups negotiated individual solutions largely without the interference of 
Europeans. In the words of Igor Kopytoff, “the existence of the option of emancipation 
could usually play in the ‘slave’s’ favour as long as the option was not exercised.”3
1 Dumett and Johnson, “Britain and the Suppression of Slavery”, p,85.
2 For more on this see Opare-Akurang, “Slavery and Abolition in the Gold Coast”, 1998, pp.27-32.
3 Kopytoff, “The Cultural Context of African Abolition”, p.499.
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Slave owners: resistance
In order to understand the roles played by masters in affecting the course of 
emancipation, it is necessary to take a step back and look at who owned slaves in the 
Gold Coast Protectorate of the 1870s. It is perhaps inaccurate to argue that there was a 
slave owning ‘class’ or ‘classes’, but certainly the ownership of slaves was intricately 
connected to wealth, status, and power. In earlier centuries, slaves had been the 
dominant “form of private, revenue producing property1'4 in a region where land tenure 
was generally vested communally - in the family or stool - rather than privately.5 The 
increasing British hegemony had only served to formalise this situation as administrators 
tried to impose a normative set of laws for a region in which there had previously been 
some variety.6 Indeed, Basel Missionary agents complained about the resulting refusal 
on the part of the administration to turn stool land over to private individuals, especially 
ex-slaves.7 Thus when emancipation was promulgated a large proportion of slaves, 
especially in the rural setting, were still tied to chiefly officeholders and were used for 
agrarian, artisanal, military, and status purposes.8 BMS agents identified the slaves of 
important chiefs as particularly poorly-treated9, but their conflicts with local leaders who 
were often hostile to slavery may have contributed to this view.10
In any event, the evidence suggests that a greater percentage of slaves was held 
not by stooi-holders but by families of lesser status. The Basel Missionary agent 
Zimmerman specifically identified the majority of slave owners as being not 
aristocratic.11 Similarly Assistant Secretary for Native Affairs Johnson as late as 1927 
noted that “there is no family of any note in the whole country which does not have 
amongst its members one or more domestic servants... over [which]... heads of families
4 Thornton, Africa and Africans, p.75. Also see my arguments in chapter 1.
5 Although the use of title deeds was becoming more prevalent in the late eighteenth Century along the coast and in 
the nineteenth Century made limited headway in gold-bearing regions of the interior. See NAG ADM 12/5/184, 
Brandford Griffith to G.E. Eminsang, 13 September 1890, Accra. Nevertheless the vast majority of land appears to 
have remained vested in the stool or abusua. See NAG ADM 5/3/7, Report o f the Commission oti Economic 
Agriculture in the Gold Coast, 1889.
6 NAG-CC #55 Hayes-Redwar, HW, Comments on Some Ordinances o f the Gold Coast Colony, 1909. NAG ADM  
5/3/7, Report of the Commission on Economic Agriculture in the Gold Coast, 1889.
7 Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Zimmerman, unaddressed, 26 July 1875, Abokobi; Eisenschmid to Basel, 25 June 1875, 
Akropong.
8 1 have already shown how colonial sources linked slavery inextricably to the authority and wealth of chiefly 
officeholders.
9 Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Zimmerman, unaddressed, 26 July 1875, Abokobi; Asante, Mohr, and Werner to the BMS 
Slave Emancipation Committee, 26 June 1875, Kyebi.
10 See below.
11 Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Zimmerman, unaddressed, 26 July 1875, Abokobi.
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in the past... exercise[d] unlimited authority” and pointed out that “not... every slave- 
owning family possessed a stool.”12 Slavery had became more prevalent during the era 
of the Atlantic Slave Trade, as an increased number of slaves moved through the region 
for export and some were retained for domestic use.13 Clearly, also, a number of 
‘slaves5 so identified may have been pawns in debt bondage, an institution which had 
also become increasingly prevalent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or even 
apprentices or members of an inferior branch of the abusua. Such slaves, pawns, and 
other dependants participated in family production of subsistence and market crops, as 
well as performing domestic functions.
The third slave owning group were the merchants of coastal settlements, some of 
whom held chiefly office as well. Zimmerman argued that these “educated slave 
owners” and “merchants of the coast” were especially harsh masters.14 Whether this is 
true or not is unclear, but certainly the role of their slaves was largely linked to the 
production of commodities and had been formed by the growth in legitimate trade of the 
nineteenth century.15 Such slaves, and often pawns since merchants were prominent 
money-lenders, worked in fields to provide food to the coastal settlements, provided 
domestic service, and carried trade goods to and from the interior. Others ran market 
stalls selling goods produced on their masters5 rural farms both in coastal cities and 
regional market hubs.16 The purely economic role of many of these unfree workers may 
have distanced them from the traditional relationship of ‘benign slavery5 which Gold 
Coast administrators alleged had prevailed in the region.
The leadership of the slave owners rested in the hands of the chiefly officeholders 
and coastal merchants. It was these two groups who could potentially lead resistance to 
the emancipation of their slaves. However, the capacity of the coastal elite to oppose 
the colonial administration, forged largely through their common experiences in such 
institutions as the Fante Confederation, was to some extent weakened both by their 
reliance on Britain as trading partners and by their cooperation in the Asante War. 
Likewise, while the administration was progressively driven by its financial and personnel 
problems to rely upon the cooperation of chiefly officeholders, the chiefs themselves 
depended on British military power to defend them from a potentially resurgent Asante 
threat and to shore up their finances and authority. Few wanted to end up like the King
12 NAG ADM 11/975, Memorandum on the Vestiges o f Slavery in the Gold Coast, Assistant Secretary for Native 
Affairs Johnson, 1927.
13 See Chapter 3.
14 Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Zimmerman, unaddressed, 26 July 1875, Abokobi
15 See Chapter 4.
16 BMS D-1.60, Ga-Adangme Distriktconferenz, 3 December 1894 - 6 December 1894, Christiansborg,
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of Denkyira who by 1890 was forced to lease stool land17, and fewer still like the rulers of 
Akyem Abuakwa and Wassaw who, as we will see, were exiled by the British. In the 
wake of the Asante war, British power, while incomplete, was evidently strong enough to 
reprimand or remove individual rulers and to assist others.
Thus it is understandable that there was little forcible opposition by elites to the 
promulgation of the 1874 Slave Dealing Abolition and Emancipation ordinances. 
Indeed, Governor Strahan famously informed Carnarvon five months after the 
ordinances were promulgated that:
Public tranquillity has not been disturbed; on the contrary, I am confident that at 
no time in the history of the Protectorate has there been greater regard for 
established authority or more ready obedience to the laws than at present.18
Since the fortunes of both chiefs and merchants were now inextricably tied to the 
administration, forcible opposition on their part was unlikely. Instead, indigenous leaders 
dutifully appeared at meetings called by Strahan on November 3, 1874 in Cape Coast 
for the western chiefs19 and November 5 in Accra for chiefs in the eastern districts20 to 
explain the two anti-slavery ordinances. Strahan reported that his presentations were 
well received, and the kings and chiefs generally accepted the interdiction against 
buying and selling slaves. However, at the meeting in Cape Coast a murmur of 
opposition was raised against the liberation of 'old pawns’ and ‘those who live with us’.21
In fact, a number of Fante chiefs appear to have laboured under the 
misunderstanding that Strahan had implied that slaves could not leave their masters 
without proving abuse, as had been the case previously. Thus when, in December 1874 
and January 1875, the first few slaves began to claim their liberation, a number of chiefs 
formally asked Strahan to restore the conditions in place prior to emancipation.22 The 
one thing Strahan could not do was to officially re-recognise slavery, and he declined 
their request. Several days later, however, a petition in the same handwriting was 
presented to Strahan with 86 signatures from the “Kings, Chiefs, Headmen, Captains, 
and other principal men” of the western districts complaining that the act “leaves the 
slave-holding population impoverished” and warning that “[t]he slaves themselves have 
no landed property; they have no village or croom to which they can claim a right” and
17 NAG ADM 12/5/184, Brandford Griffith to G.E. Eminsang 13 September 1890, Accra.
18 PRO CO 96/115, Strahan to Carnarvon, 26 March 1875, Cape Coast.
19 PP LII, 1875, (c.1139), Strahan to Carnarvon, received 24 November 1874, from Cape Coast.
20 PP LII, 1875, (c.1139), Strahan to Carnarvon, 5 November 1874, Accra.
21 PP LII, 1875, (c.1139), Strahan to Carnarvon, 3 November 1874, Cape Coast.
22 PP LII, 1875, (c.1159), Strahan to Carnarvon, 3 January, 1875, Cape Coast.
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again imploring Strahan to rescind the act of Emancipation.23 A petition “from the iadies 
of the Gold Coast Protectorate”24 soon followed, asking either for the annulment of the 
ordinances or compensation.
Although it seems clear that there was some participation in this petition by chiefly 
officeholders and kings, Strahan immediately suspected that the guiding hands were 
those of the same educated merchants whom the Colonial Office believed responsible 
for conceiving the Fante Confederation. He noted that the petition from the ‘ladies1 had 
"2 signatures and 17 marks apparently by the same hand” and that the handwriting on 
two of the petitions was the same, and indeed the content was very similar to the other 
petitions.25 Carnarvon concurred, commenting that:
I did not fail at once to observe that the composition and language of the 
petition, which are drawn with a great command of English, are in remarkable 
contrast to those which the persons purporting to be the petitioners are 
themselves in the habit of using... I cannot doubt that you are right in attributing 
this document to some one or more of the educated Fantis who have on 
previous occasion advocated their views on colonial and other subjects in similar 
manners26
When Strahan mentioned the petitions in a second letter to Carnarvon, the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies sniffed that “I have already... put you in pull possession of the 
views of Her Majesty’s Government”27, and instructed Strahan to henceforth ignore the 
documents. The petitioners, those whose signatures were on the petitions and those 
who may have guided their hands, were forced to acquiesce to the emancipation 
decision.
Despite the fact that strategies of open resistance and direct political action were 
both now unavailable to slave owning elites, they refused to give in entirely. Knowing 
that the British administrators tacitly supported the status quo, chiefs in the interior felt 
free to carry out a campaign of passive non-cooperation, in at least one case allegedly 
neglecting to carry out a public reading of the proclamation.28 More importantly, they did 
not feel compelled to actively liberate their slaves, and many continued to take new
23 pp 1875, (c.1159), Strahan to Carnarvon, 8 January, 1875, Cape Coast.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 NAG ADM 1/1/39, Carnarvon to Strahan, 19 February 1875, London.
27 NAG ADM 1/1/39, Carnarvon to Strahan, 23 March 1875, London.
28 If the BMS agents in Kyebi are to be believed. Jenkins, BMS Extracts, Eisenschmid to Basel, 25 June 1875,
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ones. The King of Akomfi29, the King of Gomoah30, the Chief of Adomsine31, and other 
chiefly officeholders were charged and often fined for slave dealing following 
emancipation. Joining them were numerous anglophone urban merchants such as Kate 
Payne32 and John33 and Ellen Quartey34 who persisted in purchasing or brokering 
slaves. As late as 1890, a Chief in Keta “possessing the confidence of this government” 
and so loyal that “it has been the custom of the [DC] to communicate through him with 
other native chiefs and people” was actively buying slaves.35 Traders who judging from 
their dress were probably merchants from the coast were actively participating in 
importing slaves into the Protectorate.36 There appears to have been no geographic 
region where the merchant and chiefly elites did not try to retain their slaves, and it is 
therefore hardly surprising that non-aristocratic inhabitants of the Protectorate also 
tended to retain and trade in slaves long after the emancipation edict. Firminger, 
travelling to Salaga through the eastern interior districts “learned... that a very large 
number of slaves were still held in the [Protectorate” and that “there were large numbers 
of Hausa, Fulah, Moshi, and especially Grunshi slaves held by the Aquamoos, Krepis, 
and Kroboes.”37 The fact that 54 cases of slave dealing were prosecuted in 1888 in 
Accra, Cape Coast, East Akyem, Winneba, Saltpond, and Dixcove Districts alone is 
indicative of the prevalence of slave owning in the Protectorate throughout the 
nineteenth century.38
A'AA'
When citizens of the Protectorate or Colony were caught with slaves, they carried 
their resistance into the judicial arena. Since the victims of the internal slave trade were
now largely young females form north of the Protectorate who were deemed less likely
Akropong.
29 NAG SCT 5/4/16, King Tando and King Akimmy v. Owooh Cudjoe and Offlay, Cape Coast JA Court, 8 May 
1875.
30 NAG SCT 5/4/18, Queen v. Abbom and Abrobah, Cape Coast JA Court, 4 August 1876.
31 NAG SCT 2/5/12, Queen v. Chief Ahinkorah, Accra Supreme/Divisional Court, 4 September 1895.
32 PRO CO 96/208 DC Peregrine to Assistant Colonial Secretary, 29 July 1889.
33 NAG SCT 17/5/2, Achampong v. John Quartey, Accra District Court, 27 July 1882.
34 NAG SCT 17/5/9, Regina v. Ellen Quartey, Accra District Court, 20 June 1890.
35 NAG ADM 1/9/4, Griffith to DC Kwitta, 1 October 1890, Christiansborg (Accra).
36 Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Hall’s Report on the Journey to Anum, 25 February 1887.
37 NAG ADM 1/1/88, Firminger to Colonial Office, 30 April 1889, West Kensington.
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to escape or seek their liberation than male adults, a common ploy was to claim that 
girls had been purchased ‘in the traditional way’ to be a wife. In the colonial courts, this 
was an effective defence. Magistrates were quite ready to believe that "the Fanti39 
purchases his wife - for conceal it how one might; it is a purchase and held to be 
[so]...”.40 However, in retrospect we know that this argument was often false. 
‘Brideprice’ as such as not standard across the Gold Coast, and many southern Akan 
peoples especially made only customary payments, more symbolic than tangible41 
Some slaves were themselves aware of the distinction. A Grunshi woman named 
Mansah, bringing a suit against her master, Torro, and in conjunction with another wife, 
Korkor, stated that she “ha[d] not been married to jTorro] by native laws or customs.”42 
In this case, despite the support of another co-wife, Ammah, for Torro, the District 
Commissioner found him guilty and sentenced him to two months with hard labour. Still, 
the ’wife defence’ figures at least 12 times in the very incomplete SCT records. A 
number of similar cases also occurred in which masters claimed to have bought children 
to be their ‘sons' and/or ‘daughters'. Indicted slave owners from the interior also 
sometimes argued that they were unaware of the edicts of emancipation43, and the verity 
of their defences is hard to gauge although the Chief Justice accepted them in principle, 
despite conceding that “a generally correct understanding of its scope and purport has 
spread rapidly and widely”.44
At the same time, some defences were probably somewhat more valid. Slaves 
and pawns, as traditional items of wealth, had been used as barter commodities for 
centuries, and a significant portion of slave dealing cases in 1875 and 1876 occurred 
because coastal merchants trading outside the Protectorate, especially in Asante, had 
been paid for their goods in slaves which they were forced to accept or face financial
38 The year for which we have the most records, although also a year of increased enforcement - see Chapter 9
39 The name ‘Fanti’ or ‘Fante’, and their supposed customs, were also commonly applied to larger parts of the 
Protectorate which had not joined the Confederacy.
40 NAG ADM 1/12/5, Sanitary Report on the Station of Elmina, 1883, Elmina.
41 Interview with Professor Robert Addo-Fening, 27 November, 1998. I am indebted to Professor Addo-Fening for 
his assistance.
42 eg NAG SCT 17/5/12, Regina v. Tarro, Accra District Court, 30 September, 1891. For more on the Mossi people 
see chapter 9.
43 NAG SCT 5/4/15, Regina v. Quacoe Bart, Cape Coast Judicial Assessors Court, 9 March 1875; 17/4/1, Regina v. 
Adjuah Sharry, Esserifi, and Agreman, 8 March 1877, Accra Judicial Assessors Court.
44 PP1875, LII, (c.1343), Srahan to Carnarvon, 6 March, 1875, Cape Coast, enclosure 1 ‘Chalmers Report’. NAG
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ruin. While gold, cowries, and woven cloth were also accepted currencies, traders were 
sometimes forced to accept what Asante merchants, themselves impoverished following 
the razing of Kumasi, could offer. Bossum Akinnee, for example, was supposed to be 
paid for goods sold to Kofi Karikari himself in ‘country cloth, but was instead forced to 
accept payment partly in cloth and partly in two children to keep “as pawns... until he 
should be able to pay the account.” 45
Pawning especially was too inextricably linked with the lineage system for many 
magistrates to understand. Some accusations of pawning were really custody battles 
brought by mmusua against sons-in-law, by husbands against wives for custody of 
children, and by nephews against their uncles for whom they were forced to work 46 
Mixed in with these were valid cases brought by pawns and their families. The 
magistrates must have found it difficult to sort the wheat from the chaff.
Masters who were brought before the courts were often aided by the indigenous 
‘notable’ officers. Prior to the formal establishment of the Gold Coast Protectorate, 
missionaries had bemoaned the fact that important slave owners were largely 
responsible for enforcing administrative policy 47 To a large extent this continued to be 
the case after 1874, especially as locally-recruited juries and assessors played a central 
role in colonial jurisprudence. Governor Hodgson expressed his disappointment with an 
1889 jury decision to acquit a slave owner “although no defence was raised by Counsel 
on his behalf, on any point of law, or on the merits” and despite the fact that three 
children had testified that he had kept them as slaves.48 In a similar situation, the four 
appointed assessors cleared a defendant on the grounds that the alleged slave was the 
defendant’s wife, despite the fact that the defendant had made no such argument49
While there was therefore a level of passive resistance amongst slave owners, 
both within and outside of the courts, there appears to have been very little active
SCT 5/4/15, Regina v. Kofi Dontoh and Ashun, Cape Coast JA Court, 1 March 1875.
45 e.g. NAG SCT 5/4/18 Regina v. Bossun Akinnee, Cape Coast JA Court, 6 April 1876. See also 5/4/18, Regina v. 
King Enimil Quow, Cape Coast JA Court, 28 February 1876;
46 NAG SCT 2/5/1, Regina v. Sarah Brown, Accra Divisional Court, 5 February 1883; 17/5/8, Ashong v. Tontoo and 
Harshani, Accra District Court, 14 September 1888; 17/5/9, Regina v. Acossadah, Accra District Court, 22 March
1890.
47 BMS D-1.21b, Zimmerman, 24 August 1869, Odumase.
48 NAG ADM 12/13/3, Hodgson to Knutsford, 8 July 1889, Accra. PRO CO 96/203, Hodgson to Knutsford, 8 July 
1889, Accra, enclosure 1, Chief Justice to Colonial Secretary.
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opposition to the anti-slave ordinances either on the coast or in the interior. Slave­
owners were to some degree hamstrung by the new political-economic situation in which 
the balance of military and executive power was shifting to the British. Thus there were 
few instances of violent resistance to the imposition of British law, although some 
exceptions did occur. Agbodeka has identified two such incidents in Akuapem. In 
November 1886, District Commissioner Williams was assaulted while attempting to 
serve a summons. Members of the Gold Coast Constabulary sent to arrest his assailant 
were subsequently attacked at Adakrom and their prisoner released. Likewise, in early 
1887 the Akuapemhene refused to assist members of the Constabulary sent to arrest 
the mob's leaders.50 Despite such occurrences, violent resistance did not figure 
significantly in slave-owners’ responses to emancipation.
Chiefs: between collaboration and resistance
I have already argued that chiefly officeholders generally attempted to appear 
supportive of the colonial administration, mostly to secure support from the 
administration, and because of their reliance on British military power. However it is clear 
that the cooperation of chiefs was primarily self-interested in nature. Chiefs who 
collaborated in such activities as road building, military and police actions, and other 
projects expected some reward or did so when it suited them.51 In the same respect 
they acted in support of the anti-slavery rules only when it served their own interests and 
the interests of their subjects, and often combined collaborative policies with the passive 
resistance strategies discussed above. For example, the Osu Mantse, a senior 
Christiansborg chief, assisted police by turning suspects over to them52, as did the 
Paramount Chief of Akuapem when served with a direct request in 1883.53 The most 
cooperative chiefs often had the most obvious ulterior motives. The King of Juaben, 
who had fled from Asante to Akyem, and later to Cape Coast for his role in the 1873 
alliance victory, and many of whose subjects had become war captives in the process,
49 NAG SCT 2/5/1, Regina v. Tuitalaboo, Accra District Court, 5 October 1881.
50 Agbodeka, African Politics and British Policy in the Gold Coast, pp. 104-108.
51 PRO CO 96/156, Rowe to Derby, 18 March 1884, Accra.
52 NAG SCT 17/5/9, Regina v. Mamah, Accra District Court, 3 October 1890.
53 Although three years later his relationship with the administration had broken down enough for the incidents 
described above to take place. NAG ADM 1/9/3, Turton to King Quamin Fori, 20 July 1883, Christiansborg.
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informed on anyone he found owning slaves of Juaben origins,54 Similarly, there are 
records of other chiefs attempting to stop pawning in instances which involved their own 
constituents being seized.55 A ruler who protected his own people not only protected his 
power base but gained legitimacy in the eyes of his subjects.
It is no wonder that the chiefs of the Protectorate felt trapped between their dual 
reliance upon slaves and the administration for both money and status. They were 
further confused by the Indian Model and what consequently appeared to them to be a 
lack of enforcement of the emancipation edicts, which convinced them they could safely 
own slaves. Conversely, the administration continued to prosecute individuals for slave 
dealing and even pawning, which further blurred the line between what was acceptable 
and what was not. Thus chiefs who owned slaves were walking a very thin line, 
something they could not always do successfully. The prosecution of two important 
chiefs for slave dealing highlights this situation very clearly.
* * *
Colonial sources mention little about Enimil Quow, the paramount chief of East 
Wassaw, prior to his prosecution in 1876. He appears to have been a supporter of the 
administration and British officials had some hand in his accession to the stool.56 
Similarly, although he had plenty of opponents ready to move in after his fall he seems 
to have been quite popular with his subjects.57 Therefore, when he appeared at the 
Cape Coast Judicial Assessor’s court in 1876 in response to Acting Judicial Assessor 
Melton’s summons, he had every reason to believe he would get off lightly, and he 
admitted his guilt. He had bought as many as seven slaves from a relative in Asante 
ostensibly to assist the relative in paying a debt but also probably because adult male 
slaves were now difficult to acquire within the Protectorate.
While admitting the charge, Quow protested his loyalty to the government, “I am
54 NAG SCT 5/4/18, Regina v. Quabina Keamie, Cape Coast JA Court, 29 May 1876.
55 NAG SCT 5/4/18, Regina v. Awhabon, Cape Coast JA Court, 19 February 1876.
56 NAG SCT 5/4/18, Regina v. Enimil Quow, Cape Coast Judicial Assessors Court, 23 February 1876.
57 PRO CO 96/121, Freeling to Carnarvon, 5 April 1877, Accra.
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your Honor’s Captain... 1 have not offended before,”58 he implored the magistrate. Quow 
saw no contradiction between his allegiance to the Crown and his evasion of the law. 
He was therefore unpleasantly surprised to be fined 100 ounces of gold, exiled to Lagos 
for three years, and forced to abdicate his stool.
Enimil Quow had tried to have his cake and eat it too, believing that he could own 
slaves and still maintain his position with the administration. Unfortunately, he had 
crossed a line he did not know existed. His crime was not owning slaves, but importing 
them from outside the Protectorate. The commission of a crime which Carnarvon and 
Strahan had promised to extinguish, and by such a prominent figure whose actions 
could so easily come to the attention of missionaries and abolitionists, led to a sentence 
“such as to mark most strongly and emphatically the intolerance with which the law 
regards all offences of the nature committed by him.”59
Much more is known about Okyenhene Amoako Atta I, the paramount chief of 
Akyem Abuakwa who also strayed beyond the pale of tolerated slave owning. Atta had 
been an ally during the Asante war, and for that reason the administration initially sided 
with him in conflicts which arose between BMS agents and his officeholders.60 The 
disagreement initially centred on the conversion of state officials to Christianity, which 
threatened the Okyenhene’s authority.61 However, the conflict expanded over issues 
surrounding the promulgation of emancipation, during which period the Kyebi 
missionaries took a strict stance, publicising the new laws and offering slaves 
employment if they left their masters.62 Furthermore, Atta’s cousin David Asante led his 
compatriots in what can only be called a persecution of the Akyem royal family. Asante 
unsuccessfully prosecuted highly placed officials including members of the Okyenhene’s 
family for allegedly assaulting the wife of Reverend Dale, but it was the Okyenhene who 
was his particular target.63 In 1877, Asante brought a case against the King for insulting
58 NAG SCT 5/4/18, Regina v. King Enimil Quow, Cape Coast JA Court, 23 February 1876. As noted previously, the 
‘stool’ is the Akan equivalent of the European ‘crown’ or ‘throne’.
59 PRO CO 96/118, Strahan to Carnarvon, 4 March 1876, Cape Coast, encl. 1, Chalmers to Strahan, 1 March 1876.
60 See Chapter 6. Jenkins, BMS Extracts, Asante, Mohr, and Warner to Slave Emancipation Committee, 26 June 1875, 
Kyebi.
61 Agbodeka, African Politics and British Policy, p.60.
62 Rathbone, Richard, Murder and Politics in Colonial Ghana, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1993, pp.22-24. 
Agbodeka, African Politics and British Policy, pp.64-65.
63 NAG SCT 2/4/12, Asante v. Crown Prince of Kyebi and Others, Accra Divisional Court, 17 December 1877.
156
and attempting to exile him, but the magistrate found that Asante had “tried to lure away 
[the Okyenhene’s] people, interfered in litigation, and made a general nuisance of 
himself.”64 Asante was subsequently transferred to Akuapem.
Perhaps Amoako Atta I could be excused for feeling that he was vindicated by the 
1877 decision. He clearly believed that he had been given a free hand in Akyem 
Abuakwa, and subsequently increased his attacks on the Basel Missionary community.65 
This harassment, however, was the factor that turned the administration against him. 
The Okyenhene was not conscious that the Governor’s support had ebbed away, partly 
due to unreduced pressure from the BMS, and was therefore surprised when, in May 
1880, he was brought to Accra on charges of slave dealing.66 He had been accused not 
only of pawning, but also of “direct importation and purchase of slaves from countries 
outside of the Protectorate.”67 This conscious participation in slave dealing had further 
transformed the administration’s attitude from one of pragmatic support to opposition, as 
was made clear from Governor Ussher’s anger following the two slave dealing cases in 
which Amoako Atta prevailed, despite the administration’s views, as the witnesses 
against him failed to appear or to prove their cases.68 The jury, requested by Atta, was 
made up of chiefly officeholders and local merchants, and they found him resoundingly 
not guilty, to Ussher’s disgust.69 Nevertheless, Atta had crossed a line and Chief Justice 
Marshall subsequently managed to get him convicted of the lesser charge of malicious 
arson, which resulted in a five year exile in Lagos before returning in 1885 to the acclaim 
of many of his subjects.70
These two cases of leading slave-owners reinforce several theories that I have 
posited. First, it is clear that the administration’s reliance on slave-owning elites led 
them to largely ignore the prevalence of domestic slavery. However they were forced by 
political and, to be fair, moral imperatives to act on allegations of slave dealing and the 
importation of slaves into the Protectorate. Paramount Chiefs Amoako Atta I and Enimil
64 NAG SCT 2/4/12, Asante v. King Attah of Kyebi, Accra Divisional Court, 18 December 1877.
65 Rathbone, Murder and Politics, pp.22-24.
66 PRO CO 96/130, Ussher to Minister, 12 February 1880, Accra.
67 PRO CO 96/130, Ussher to Minister, 25 March 1880, Accra.
68 NAG SCT 2/5/1, Regina v. Atta (two cases), Accra Divisional Court, 4 May 1880.
69 PRO CO 96/131, Ussher to Minister, 25 May 1880, Elmina.
70 PRO CO 96/165, Griffith to Minister, 12 May 1885, Accra. Some, however, were opposed to his re-elevation.
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Quow crossed that line. It is evident that neither of these leaders was aware that they 
had made a move that would put them in disfavour. The position of slave-owners was a 
difficult one, walking a thin line between their reliance upon slaves and their need for 
support from the administration, and if pro-British chiefs like these could so easily get 
into trouble, the position of their slave-owning subjects was even more confusing.
* * *
I have shown above how slave-owners collaborated with or resisted the 
1874 ordinances. Yet however much they evaded or organised resistance to 
emancipation, it appears that they were forced to make some changes. The subjects 
and strategies of the internal slave trade, for example, were drastically transformed to 
evade prosecution and more importantly to limit the proportion of runaways.71 As we will 
see in later sections, even the owners of domestic slaves had to make concessions to 
their dependants in order to ensure they would remain. However some historians have 
also suggested that masters turned away from slave owning towards pawning, and that 
the post-proclamation period witnessed a surge in pawning cases.72 The evidence for 
an expansion in pawning points towards an increase in debt-producing practices such as 
expensive funeral customs and high interest rates, and the seizing of individuals for the 
debts of relatives.73 However there is simply not enough evidence to show this, and it is 
possible to argue that this intensification of pawning not occur. All of the evidence 
named above in fact reflects processes introduced during the last period of the Atlantic 
slave trade in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: a rise in interest rates74, the 
panyarring of lineage-group and polity members for the debts of their fellows75, and the 
growth of debt through litigation or expenses associated with expensive rituals.76 The 
horrified reports of increased pawning in the 1880s may merely have been a reflection of 
an increased awareness of pawning. This in turn was brought about by the increasing
71 See Chapter 10.
72 Dumett and Johnson, “Britain and the Suppression of Slavery”, p.94.
73 Gold Coast Chronicle, Vol. Ill, No. 93, 12 September 1892. NAG ADM 5/3/7, Report o f  the Commission on 
Economic Agriculture in the Gold Coast, 1889.
74 Cruickshank, Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast, London, 1853, p.322. PRO CO 879/33, Fairfield Report, 1874.
75 PP 1842, XI.1, (551), Report fi'om the Select Committee on Slavery on the West Coast o f Africa, Evidence of J.G. 
Nicholls. The information refers specifically to the period before 1831.
76 Meredith, Henry, An Account o f the Gold Coast, p.30. PRO CO 879/33, Fairfield Report, 1874.
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prevalence of administrators and missionaries in the interior and rural areas especially, 
informed by a growing number of Christian converts, and not an actual increase in the 
practices of pawning or panyarring. This may have been exacerbated by the fact that 
Christian congregations continued to attract a large proportion of low-status individuals 
such as pawns throughout the last decades of the century, and these converts were the 
missionaries’ primary informants.77
The unaffected slaves
Before we consider those slaves whose position was changed by the potentiality 
of emancipation, either drastically or marginally, we need to look at those who were 
unaffected by the proclamations, if such a group existed. The truly unaffected are in 
many cases difficult to distinguish from those slaves who were only marginally affected. 
Admittedly their existence can be posited from affidavits given by missionaries and 
administrators. Still, I would like to suggest that those slaves whose existence was 
unchanged by the proclamation were minority groups within larger environments for 
whom specific factors counteracted the alternatives offered by the newly legalised 
modes of liberation.
The first arguments as to why these slaves remained with their masters rested 
upon the supposed benign nature of Gold Coast slavery. This argument, which had 
survived the abolition of the slave trade and other nineteenth century challenges, was an 
intrinsic argument behind the Indian Model. The major colonial reports on slavery in the 
Gold Coast, most importantly the Fairfield Report commissioned by Parliament in 1874, 
continued to stress that “economically, the condition of a slave is an advantageous one 
as compared with that of a free labourer” and still argued that “slavery is an emanation 
of parental and family authority.”78 Nor did this attitude fade after emancipation. More 
than half a century after the two proclamations J.C. de Graft Johnson, an African 
administrator of Euro-Fante descent, would write that:
the slave is invariably well treated and regarded rather as a member of the
family... and not infrequently succeeds in accumulating a considerable amount
77 BMS D-1.70, Kolle, 12 February 1990, Odumase.
78 PRO CO 879/33, Fairfield Report, 1874.
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of personal property...79
Many Basel missionaries signed on to this theory. An agent in Christiansborg 
wrote that “the majority [of slaves in Accra] have remained with their masters [partly] 
because they are well-handled and are part of the family...”.80 However, BMS agents 
carefully distinguished between this form of domestic slavery and what they saw as 
harsher slavery under “educated slave-owners, the merchants of the coast, mulattos, 
and the great princes among the [T]wis.”81 Such theories did help shape colonial 
policy. Some magistrates, for example, tended to withhold punishment for slave-owners 
if they could prove that they treated their slaves well, in direct opposition to the 1874 
ordinances!82
Thus for a minority of slaves, remaining with their masters may have been as 
much an example of ‘free’ choice as deserting. Basel Mission agent Tabitha Schonefeld 
reported the narrative of one such Ewe slave, who was purchased along with her aunt 
by an apparently Christian family in Krobo in 1873. After emancipation, her father sent 
for her to return home, but she chose to stay. In the intervening period, her aunt had 
married into her master’s family, and she was expected to do so shortly as well. She 
had also been receiving training from the Basel Missionary. It is unclear if her father had 
initially sold or pawned her voluntarily, but in such a situation, she clearly preferred to 
stay in Krobo.83
However, simply arguing that slavery was relatively benign does not sufficiently 
explain why some slaves remained with their masters. While domestic slavery as it 
existed in the Protectorate largely did entail certain protections for slaves, many of these 
had been worn away by the transformative impact of the Atlantic slave trade. 
Furthermore, however assimilative domestic slavery may have been, slaves were still 
slaves - that is they still had no social status within the lineage group, no land ownership 
rights, no legal profile within Akan law, and their movements were restricted.
79 NAG ADM 11/1/975, Memorandum on the Vestiges of Slavery in the Gold Coast, Assistant Secretary for Native 
Affairs Johnson, 1927.
80 Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Fritz to Basel, 28 July 1875, Christiansborg.
81 Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Zimmerman, unaddressed, 26 July 1875, Abokobi.
82 NAG SCT 2/5/1, Regina v. Oduku and David, Accra Divisional Court, 9 June 1880; Regina v. Timbuctoo, Accra 
Divisional Court, 5 October 1881.
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Why then would they allow themselves to remain in such situations? There are 
several convincing arguments why some slaves were unable or unwilling to exploit their 
new opportunities. Dumett and Johnson, for example, suggested that some slave 
agency was blocked by “the strong dependency/welfare element inherent in Akan 
traditional servitude, plus powerful group pressures with the threat of ostracism or worse 
if a slave testified against his master.”84 These social factors were certainly 
considerable for slaves who originated within the southern Akan region or who wished to 
remain within their community after leaving, and furthermore restricted a slave’s ability to 
recruit the assistance from potential witnesses for use in the courts. Even indigenous 
officials such as interpreters were “roundly abused” by local people for "bringing down 
the white man” in such cases.85
These cultural constructions were central to court cases in which a number of 
slaves, both men and women, actually resisted their liberation in court cases brought on 
their behalf, choosing instead to remain with their owners.86 Furthermore, as late as 
1889 some slaves who initially approached the constabulary requesting judicial liberation 
recanted under peer and community pressure.87 The officers dealing with these cases 
appear to have remained oblivious to the cause of their retractions.
In the face of such societal obstructions, and knowing the potential earned 
advantages assimilation could bring a slave, Dumett and Johnson were consequently 
unsurprised when their research showed that “most slaves did not seem anxious to give 
up this paternalistic system of subordination.” However, these two historians also 
recognised other equally substantial hurdles to slave liberations. “Many [slaves]”, they 
argued, “knew no other home than that of their masters, or could not return to their place 
of origin because of distance or continual slave-raiding.”88 Clearly if slaves could 
overcome social pressure to remain with their masters, and definitively liberate
83 BMS D-1.27, Tabitha Schonefeld, 1875, Odumase.
84 Dumett and Johnson, “Britain and the Suppression of Slavery”, p.85.
85 PRO CO 96/120, Freeling to Carnarvon, 30 January 1877, Cape Coast; enclosure Brown to Acting Colonial 
Secretary, 19 January 1877, Accra.
86 NAG SCT 2/5/1, Regina v. Oduka and David, Accra Divisional Court, 9 June 1880; 22/4/51, Regina v. Antamo 
Cudjoe, Dixcove District Court, 11 February 1880; 17/5/12, Regina v. Kuasie Abbe, Accra District Court, 21 October
1891.
87 NAG SCT 2/5/4, Regina v. Aijaba Yarba, Accra Divisional Court, 9 September 1889.
88 Dumett and Johnson, “Britain and the Suppression of Slavery”, p.78.
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themselves, they would have to leave the communities in which they lived. The risks in 
leaving were daunting. Assistant Secretary for Native Affairs Johnson listed the 
challenges such slaves would have faced:
Many could hardly find their own people again even if they were able to trace the 
native villages from which they or their parents were originally abducted. Some 
may have no relations left in their own country. A large number can no longer 
speak their mother tongue. Very few indeed could adapt themselves easily to 
new surroundings and almost everyone would be very sadly disappointed to find 
in the end that he or she had only exchanged one kind of servitude for another.89
Basel Missionary agents and contemporary administrators similarly noted that many 
slaves who initially celebrated emancipation and left their masters soon “gave it up and 
voluntarily returned to their original work”90, obviously daunted by the difficulties 
associated with their independence. Others simply had themselves "declared free, and 
then returned to their masters” and the safety of the known, having achieved a symbolic 
victory and perhaps negotiated some change in status.91
Some groups of slaves faced special difficulty in returning to their former homes. 
Slaves with northern origins who chose to liberate themselves had to travel through 
regions where slavery was still practised, through wars and disruptions created by the 
break-up of greater Asante, to families perhaps little remembered. If they had been 
captured as children, they might not even be able to locate families, or their kin-groups 
might not exist in the same location. Some slaves may have even forgotten their 
childhood languages. Others saw no advantage in returning to kin-groups that may 
have voluntarily sold them into slavery. The assimilative nature of Gold Coast slavery 
meant that for older slaves retention of their assimilated status was preferable to the 
risks of the road.
Claire Robertson has argued that women slaves especially were unable to leave 
their masters. In addition to the difficulties faced by other slaves, women found it much 
more difficult to start up trading businesses or find wage labour on their own. Even more
89 NAG ADM, Memorandum on the Vestiges of Slavery in the Gold Coast, Assistant Secretary for Native Affairs 
Johnson, 1927.
90 PRO CO 96/208, DC Riby to Colonial Secretary, 30 January 1890, Aburi.
91 Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Fritz to Basel, 28 July 1875, Christiansborg.
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importantly, female slaves feared the loss of the children they had borne to their owners. 
Magistrates did tend to confirm the rights of masters to such children, and in at least one 
case conferred upon a female master the children of a female and a male slave, both of 
whom belonged to her, when the children asked to remain with her.92 Women slaves 
also tended to be assimilated more quickly, especially if they were the mothers of their 
masters’ children, and had much more to risk. At the same time, Robertson argues, 
British magistrates - perhaps reflecting Victorian values - were unsympathetic to those 
women who did seek their liberation and often returned them to their owners as 
apprentices.93 These factors probably did play a part in limiting the range of choices 
available to female slaves and in inducing them to remain with their masters, but neither 
Robertson nor I have found sufficient evidence to prove this.
A last obstacle to liberation that must be mentioned is ignorance of the specifics 
of emancipation. We know that a number of individuals accused of slave dealing and 
pawning used ignorance of the 1874 proclamations as a defence. Some of these 
defendants in the initial post-proclamation period such as ‘Oweaguow’ who turned 
himself in to the authorities in 1875 after he learned of the ordinances, are quite 
convincing.94 However Kwamina Ansa and Baidu Amta, caught during a period of 
increased vigilance in 1897, more than twenty years after emancipation and in Cape 
Coast District rather than any outlying region, are less believable.95 Administrators have 
suggested, and I am inclined to believe, that in the bulk of the Protectorate the 
emancipation laws were widely disseminated at least by the late 1870s.96 We also know 
that some chiefs acted immediately to inform their subjects of the new laws.97
Still, as late as 1890 there were “parts of [the Protectorate] which have seldom, if 
ever, been visited by a Government Officer” according to Acting Governor Hodgson.98 
The prevalence of slave owning in districts that were peripheral to the Protectorate
92 eg NAG SCT 17/5/9, Eccusah Ajishe and Neepow Kwah v. Garmamir, Accra District Court, 20 November 1889.
93 Robertson, Claire, "Post Proclaimation Slavery in Accra”, pp.227-230.
94 NAG SCT 5/4/16, Regina v. Oweaguow, Cape Coast Judicial Assessors Court, 14 December 1875.
95 NAG SCT 23/5/4, Regina v. Kwamina Ansa, Cape Coast District Court, 24 September 1897; 23/5/4 Regina v. 
Baidu Amta, Cape Coast District Court, 24 September 1897.
96 See Chapter 6. Also PRO CO 96/208, Hodgson to Knutsford, 17 February 1890, Accra. PP 1875, LII, (c.1343), 
Strahan to Carnarvon, March 6, 1875, enclosure 1, Chalmers Report.
97 NAG SCT 5/4/15, Regina v. Kofi Dontoh and Ashun, Cape Coast JA Court, 1 March 1875.
98 PRO CO 96/208, Hodgson to Knutsford, 17 February 1890, Accra.
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seems to have remained much more obvious than in the central coastal districts." 
Border districts such as Keta and Axim especially retained large numbers of slaves in 
their original state.100
At the risk of foreshadowing some of my conclusions, I must state here a problem 
with sources and with historians who have argued that slaves did not leave. Many of 
them, it seems, saw only two alternatives for slaves - liberation of some form or another 
or the rejection of emancipation for the security of their current position. Later in this 
chapter, I will be suggesting that many slaves who are identified as remaining unaffected 
by the 1874 ordinances were in fact participants in a gradual transformation which 
remained largely invisible to administrative and missionary sources. Very few slaves 
indeed were completely unaffected by the promulgation of emancipation.
Modes of liberation
While it can be argued that the position of some slaves remained constant 
despite the 1874 emancipation, and while I will argue that the majority of ‘former’ slaves 
remained local and affiliated to their masters, it must be acknowledged that some slaves 
chose to completely liberate themselves from their dependant relationships. This group 
has been the subject of a widespread but somewhat shallow historical debate on 
emancipation. The main argument of McSheffrey’s 1873 article, for example, was that 
“the demand for emancipation seems to have been both immediate and widespread 
[and] was not just confined to the servile populations of the towns... but was equally 
evident in the traditional communities of the interior."101 However McSheffrey relied 
largely on generally anecdotal Basel Missionary sources and vague statements by 
Acting Chief Magistrate Chalmers. Dumett and Johnson, partly in rebuttal to 
McSheffrey, posited that “only a tiny number of slaves took advantage of the colonial 
courts” and that the number who deserted was “relatively small.”102 However, they found 
it equally difficult to quantify slave liberations.
Perhaps this reluctance on the part of historians to propose numerical solutions to
99 NAG ADM 1/1/88, Firminger to Colonial Office, 30 April 1889, West Kensington.
100 PRO CO 96/311, Hodgson to Chamberlain, 29 January 1898, Accra. PRO CO 96/208, Heron to Colonial 
Secretary, 2 August 1889, Accra.
101 McSheffrey, “Slavery, Indentured Servitude, Legitimate Trade”, p.354.
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the question of ‘how many slaves’ was in fact a responsible choice. Opare-Akurang, by 
contrast, has stirred together figures suggested for slave cases during diverse periods of 
time and within a region which is not clearly defined, and proposes the figure of 632 for 
the number of slaves liberating themselves by judicial means for the period between 
1874 and 1918 in the Colony alone.103 He uses this information to support his thesis that 
the demand and support for emancipation within the Colony was greater than that in the 
Protectorate. Because this research does not reflect information from a number of 
primary sources, Opare-Akurang has made a number of errors in producing this figure. 
First, he accepted all cases dealing with slavery as instances of self-liberation, whereas 
many were brought by witnesses or family or discovered by the constabulary. 
Additionally, Opare-Akurang fails to recognise that many of these cases refer to crimes 
that took place outside of the minuscule Colony, but were brought to courts in Accra or 
Cape Coast because, initially, those were the only criminal courts in the Protectorate 
and because the legal mandate of magistrates based in Accra and Cape Coast covered 
large portions of territory which were not part of the Colony.104 The dangers of 
quantifying the unquantifiable are obvious from this.
While I therefore decline to produce numbers, there is a large body of qualitative 
evidence available that can be used to reveal new information about modes of liberation. 
There appear to have been two major types of liberations: those which were carried out 
by slaves themselves and those which were organised by their families.105 The Chief 
Magistrate of the time, Chalmers, noted that “nine-tenths” of cases related to slaves 
brought before the judicial bodies immediately following the emancipation ordinances 
were brought by kin106, and this statistic has unfortunately been accepted by some 
historians.107
An actual investigation of cases brought before colonial courts unfortunately pulls 
out all the supports from under this theory. Of those cases heard by the Cape Coast 
Judicial Assessor’s Court and the Accra Divisional Court in 1874-5, a minority appear to
102 Dumett and Johnson, “Britain and the Suppression of Slavery”, pp.88-89..
103 Opare-Akurang, “The Administration of the Abolition Laws”,p. 157.
104 See Chapter 6.
105 There were also a limited number of liberations organised by the administration for various reasons.
106 PP 1875, LII, (c.1343), Strahan to Carnarvon, 6 March 1875, Cape Coast, enclosure 1, Chalmers Report..
107 Opare-Akurang, “The Administration of the Abolition Laws”, 1998,p. 156.
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have been brought by kin - usually fathers or uncles - on behalf of their slave 
relations.108 Slaves themselves figure at least equally often, and ‘witnesses’ and police 
constables appear to have been the most significant informants.
What does this signify for kin liberation? It is obvious from the judicial record that 
some families were indeed operative in freeing their relatives. Such cases initially 
formed a significant proportion (although nowhere near nine-tenths) of slave-dealing 
cases, to some degree tailing off after 1877 but not disappearing by the end of the 
nineteenth century. In an article appearing in Ghana Studies Journal, Opare-Akurang 
has suggested that these kin liberations occurred largely amongst slaves who were 
originally pawns who “had not been redeemed, and hence had fallen into perpetual 
bondage.” 109 Opare-Akurang is correct in identifying pawns as the main subjects of kin 
liberation within the courts. Families found the courts a convenient way to reclaim 
pawned individuals, especially for recently contracted debts.110 Most of these individuals 
were also obviously living close to their families.111 But I have been able to identify only 
two instances of slaves, rather than pawns, being redeemed by kin, and one of these 
was as a result of the influx of slaves followed by a migration of families caused by the 
Asante-Juaben war.112 Clearly, kin liberation was largely the province of pawns and 
their families.
Self-liberation was an entirely different affair. As we saw in the previous section, 
it took serious agency on the part of slaves to leave a secure, if dependant, position and 
face the risks of an unsecured, but free future. It might be logical to deduce from this 
that slaves of long-standing service, with ties to local families, and having acquired some 
status and wealth would be more likely to have the agency and resources to seize their 
freedom and leave. However, as Dumett and Johnson pointed out such slaves were 
more likely to feel a strong sense of dependency and even loyalty to their masters.113 
Furthermore, slaves who had been assimilated were less likely to risk their gains in
108 NAG SCT 5/4/15-17 and 2/4/11.
109 Opare-Akurang, “Slavery and Abolition in the Gold Coast”, 1998, p.24.
110 eg NAG SCT 5/4/15, Cudjoe Amooar v. Benfoo, Cape Coast Judicial Assessors Court, 10 February 1875; NAG 
SCT 5/4/16, Regina v. Quacoe Appeah, Cape Coast Judicial Assessors Court, 1 May 1875.
m eg NAG SCT 5/4/16, Regina v. Quacoe Appeah, Cape Coast Judicial Assessors Court, 1 May 1875 (Aquapem); 
17/4/1, Regina v. Quacoe Teah, Accra Judicial Assessors Court, 8 March 1877 (Krepi).
112 NAG SCT 5/4/19, Regina v. Acquassie Mirriwah, Cape Coast Judicial Assessors Court, 1 December 1876.
113 Dumett and Johnson, “Britain and the Suppression of Slavery”, 1988,p.85.
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status and economics for an uncertain future. Most significantly I am not convinced that 
a large body of slaves, rather than pawns, actually lived locally to a free kin group - 
especially since we know that most slaves were acquired through warfare and, less 
frequently, by kidnapping.114 Indeed, even those sources that suggest that local slaves 
ran away tend to refer to slaves originating from a neighbouring or nearby state rather 
than their owner’s polity.115
Instead, there is a large body of anecdotal evidence pointing to higher 
frequencies of self-liberation amongst newly acquired slaves brought into the region 
from the north. Chalmers, for example, noted that “considerable number of [imported 
slaves] have availed themselves of their freedom, and left their masters.”116 Governor 
Griffith noted the regularity with which newly (and illegally) imported slaves ran away 17 
years later.117 John Parker reports similar evidence for war captives in Accra.118
While it is difficult to get beyond hearsay evidence to prove that newly-acquired 
northern war captives fled from their masters in larger numbers than longer-serving 
slaves from within the Protectorate, primary evidence for self-liberation amongst this 
group is more convincing in so far as use of the courts is concerned. The vast majority of 
slaves (excluding pawns) who brought cases against their masters in the 1870s had 
been recently acquired from Asante, Juaben, or further north.119 This trend did not end 
in the 1880s even though the slave trade from the interior turned to female and young 
slaves brought down from markets in Wa, Asante, and Salaga.120 Chalmers’ argument 
that the majority of “imported slaves” who liberated themselves “scarcely at all appeared 
before the courts...”, but instead simply returned to their homes seems to indicate similar 
statistics for desertions.121
Slaves from the north exhibited a wide variety of other liberation strategies as 
well. There is evidence of recently-imported slaves seeking assistance from their fellow
114 Opare-Akurang argues that a large population of slaves of indigenous extraction existed in the Protectorate. 
Opare-Akurang, “Slavery and Abolition in the Gold Coast”, p.24.
115 For example Ewe slaves in Akuapem. Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Bieterle to Basel, 22 June 1875, Aburi.
116 PP 1875, III, (c.1343), Strahan to Carnarvon, March 6 1875, Cape Coast, enclosure 1.
117 PRO CO 96/222, Griffith to Knutsford, 27 February 1892, Accra.
118 Parker, “Ga state and society in early colonial Accra”, p.145.
119 NAG SCT 5/4/15-5/4/19, 2/5/11
120 See Chapter 9.
121 pp Ln, (c.1343), Strahan to Carnarvon, 6 March 1875, Cape Coast, enclosure 1, Chalmers Report.
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countrymen in Hausa Constabulary camps in Accra and Cape Coast122 and transferring 
their loyalty to new and presumably less harsh masters.123 Imported slaves often did not 
leave their masters until they were beaten or maltreated124, but because they had only 
recently been torn from their homes and had not been assimilated to any degree into 
their new positions, self-liberation remained more open and more attractive to them.
It is clear that the primary criterion inducing slaves to leave their masters was the 
likelihood that they had a safe, secure home to which to return. Nevertheless, it has 
been suggested that slaves’ occupations, geographical locations, and the demands of 
their owners may have influenced their decision. Zimmerman, as we have already seen, 
argued that slavery was harsher amongst “educated slave owners, the merchants of the 
coast” who did not observe the ‘traditional rights’ of Akan and Ga-Adangme slavery, and 
that self-liberation was higher amongst their slaves.125 Nevertheless, even McSheffrey 
agrees that there is no evidence outside of the BMS sources indicating increased self­
liberation amongst the slaves of coastal merchants.126 Nor do any other sources 
corroborate Zimmerman’s claims that the slaves of “great princes among the |T]wis”, 
especially in Akyem, tended to liberate themselves.127
Nevertheless some slaves who could not easily return to their places of birth still 
liberated themselves, and these individuals must be considered. Such incidents were 
largely a question of economic opportunity. Slaves who wished to claim their freedom 
would only do so if they believed they had options superior to remaining with their 
owners, and these opportunities were functions of location, learned skills, and job or 
land availability, as we will see in the following section.
Means of post-liberation existence
Other than the few captives who could return to homes generally outside of the 
Protectorate, dissatisfied slaves had a limited selection of viable economic alternatives
122 NAG SCT 17/5/9, Regina v. Afeli, Accra District Court, 25 March 1890.
123 NAG SCT 5/4/19, Regina v. Quacoe Agay, Cape Coast JA Court, 6 December 1876.
124 Ibid; also 17/5/2 Karfor v. Coffeee Assally, Accra District Court, 20 October 1882; 2/5/1, Regina v. Awah, Accra 
Supreme/Divisional Court, 12 January 1884.
125 Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Zimmerman, unadressed, 26 July 1875, Abokobi.
126 McSheffrey, “Slavery, Indentured Servitude, Legitimate Trade”, p.354.
127 Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Zimmerman, unadressed, 26 July 1875, Abokobi
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to their dependant means of existence. Their preferred option would have been the 
acquisition of a plot of land large enough for food subsistence and the sale of surplus, a 
goal which would have been closest to achievable in coastal areas and in regions 
bordering trade routes. These areas had a high demand for foodstuffs128, were already 
populated by pre-existing and largely accepted immigrant communities, and were more 
strongly under the influence of British law than was generally the rule. Missionary 
sources, for example, indicate that “several” freed slaves with northern origins moved 
into the Kyebi region, which was a growing market for foodstuffs both because of the 
mission school and as a trading crossroads.129 While these former slaves were granted 
plots of land130, in more densely populated coastal regions of the Gold Coast there was 
little land unattached to either stool or family.131 British rule in these regions had led to a 
formalisation of land tenure rules and by 1874 only a small portion of arable ground was 
privately held in the Protectorate, despite the emerging land market leading to 
privatisation in select urban areas, and stool land could not legally be alienated.132 Ex­
slaves who wished to cultivate plots commonly had to pay a ‘tribute or royalty’ in kind 
and thus became dependants of the landowners.133 While this remained an option for 
slaves in especially abusive positions, for most dependants it was not necessarily 
superior to pre-existing arrangements and assimilated status with a former master.
Urban areas, however, continued to attract former slaves, although few became 
wage labourers as had been predicted. Paid employment was not widely available 
during this period134, and slaves appear to have been reluctant or unable to take on 
wage labour. While there is some evidence that hired labour became more difficult 
and expensive to obtain after emancipation as skilled slaves left their masters, this was
128 NAG ADM 5/3/7, Report o f  the Commission on Economic Agriculture on the Gold Coast, 1889.
129 Addo-Fening, Akyem Abuakwa, pp.223-224,
130 Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Mohr to Basel, 7 January 1880, Kyebi; Muller to Basel, 4 March 1893.
131 NAG-CC #55 Hayes-Redwar, HW, Comments on Some Ordinances o f the Gold Coast Colony, 1909. Stool land 
was not yet generally being alienated to migrant farmers.
132 NAG ADM 5/3/7, Report of the Commission on Economic Agriculture in the Gold Coast, 1889.
133 NAG ADM 5/3/9, Report upon the Customs Relating to the Tenure of Land on the Gold Coast 1895, reports of 
HK Vroom (DC Tarkwa), Inspector General Scott (GC Constabulary), AW Thompson (DC Prampram). NAG ADM  
11/975, Memorandum on the Vestiges of Slavery in the Gold Coast, Assistant Secretary for Native Affairs Johnson, 
1927.
134 Dumett and Johnson, “Britain and the Suppression of Slavery”, p.92,
135 ADM 11/975, Memorandum on the Vestiges of Slavery in the Gold Coast, Assistant Secretary for Native Affairs 
Johnson, 1927. Excluding a few carrier positions along major trade routes. Addo-Fening, Akyem Abuakwa, p.233.
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only amongst highly skilled artisans - a category that excluded most slaves, especially 
those from the interior.136
Even if wage labour was not in high demand in the colonial towns and missions, 
such areas potentially provided other opportunities. Some BMS stations, for example, 
accepted self-liberated slaves as congregational members and workers.137 Such 
arrangements appear to have been commonly initiated by the slaves.138 However it was 
the administration which provided the greatest opportunity for slaves. Officials continued 
to view northerners - whom they still lumped together as ‘Hausas5 and ‘Muslims5 - as 
superior recruits for both the military and law enforcement for the Protectorate. The 
‘Fante Constabulary’ and later the Police Constabulary remained an unpopular 
profession for coastal peoples139 and those who joined had a high rate of desertion.140 
Thus while Governor Hodgson raised pay in 1894 in an effort to attract recruits141, other 
administrators argued that local recruits were inferior to the northerners and were not 
worth the effort.142 As a result the administration continued its policy of recruiting on the 
Niger and at Salaga, often recruiting escaped or manumitted slaves from these 
regions143. In this environment, slaves with northern origins were also happily accepted 
by the administration.144 Muslim slaves in the far interior of the Protectorate who had 
previously been unable to leave their masters often joined recruiting missions on their 
way to Salaga and were happily accepted by the recruiting officers anxious to reach their 
quota.145
Still, the pull of a military career on former slaves should not be over-estimated. 
The Constabulary was never very large.146 While we are unable to firmly quantify the
136 PP 1878, LV, (c.2148), Report... on the Effects o f the Steps Taken by the Colonial Government, Chalmers. PRO 
CO 96/185, White to Minister, 5 November 1887, Accra.
137 Addo-Fening, Akyem Abuakwa, p. 194.
138 BMS D-1.30, Weiss, 4 September 1878, Odumase.
139 PRO CO 96/272, Commissioner Kitson to Maxwell, 2 April 1896, Accra.
ho pj^Q £Q 9 6 / i 9 i s Half-Yearly Report on the Gold Coast Constabulary, 20 February 1888, Elmina.
141 NAG ADM 12/3/3, Hodgson to Minister, 9 February 1894, Accra.
142 NAG ADM 12/3/3, Brandford Griffith to Minister, 3 December 1892, Accra. PRO CO 96/294, Maxwell to 
Colonial Office, Telegramme, 30 June 1897.
143 PRO CO 96/183, Acting Queen’s Advocate to White, September 24, 1887, Accra. PRO CO 96/263, Maxwell to 
Minister, 5 March 1896, Accra.
144 ADM 11/975, Memorandum on the Vestiges of Slavery in the Gold Coast, Assistant Secretary for Native Affairs 
Johnson, 1927.
145 NAG ADM 1/1/88, Firminger to Colonial Office, 30 April 1889, West Kensington.
146 PRO CO 96/115, Strahan to Carnarvon, 22 June, 1875, Cape Coast Castle. NAG ADM 5/1/72; Departmental
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number of slaves who joined, average total recruitment - including free volunteers, ex­
slaves, and foreigners recruited outside the Protectorate - rarely exceeded 100-150 per 
year, except in 1896 when soldiers were needed for garrisons in Asante.147
While some former slaves were willing and accepted as soldiers, they could rarely 
be found in other positions with the colonial state. Few could be induced to take up 
menial labour jobs available with the administration, despite a general shortage of labour 
for infrastructure projects. Furthermore, there was a strong view amongst British 
administrators that Akan and Ga-Adangme workers were “not gifted with a strong desire 
for work”148, but certainly former slaves would have been accepted by the labour-starved 
administration, which was forced to import ‘Kru’ workers to finish the most important 
projects.149 For most slaves, such hard labour jobs generally offered less security and 
inferior working conditions to those they experienced with their masters, and there is no 
record of former slaves leaving their positions on farms and in domestic situations to 
become gang-labourers for the colonial government.
Still, while we can see that the increase in European intervention in the region did 
not initially offer many new and viable alternatives to the slave means of existence, it 
could be postulated that the accelerated production of legitimate goods during this 
period opened up new opportunities in mining and agriculture. Recently freed slaves 
potentially could have taken advantage of these new industries to provide a living.
The increase in commercial mining after 1878150 created some employment 
opportunities in the interior as companies formed by Europeans151 and indigenous 
coastal merchants152 purchased concessions, especially in Tarkwa District (Eastern 
Wassaw). However these companies preferred to hire free ‘Fantis’ or even more 
frequently Kru labourers.153 Furthermore, a new and exhaustive study by Raymond
Reports, 1895; etc.
147 NAG ADM 5/1/73, Departmental Reports, 1896.
148 NAG ADM 5/1/72, Departmental Reports, 1895.
149 NAG ADM 5/1/72, Departmental Reports, 1895.
150 NAG-CC #217, Gold Coast Times, Vol 1,10, June 16,1881.
151 NAG ADM 1/12/4, Report on the Tarquah District, Commander Ramsay, 9 August 1882, Accra.
152 NAG-CC #217, Gold Coast Times, Vol 1,40, April 22,1882.
153 NAG ADM 13/1, Gold Coast Chronicle, Vol 111,118, March 11 1893.
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Dumett has shown that the gold rush of the post-proclamation period was largely based 
on a rise in small-scale pre-capitalist traditional mining carried out by mobilised family 
labour.154 Finally, while the increase in gold extraction may have provided opportunities 
for a small number of former slaves, it only began to do so in 1878, and did not figure in 
the initial calculations of slaves following 1874.
Similarly, the demand for cash crops, especially cocoa and coffee, did not exist 
on any scale in the 1870s and 1880s and did not provide opportunities for Protectorate 
slaves. The BMS coffee plantations in Akuapem which had been destroyed in the 1869 
Asante invasion had only been replanted in 1881155, and it wasn’t until early 1890 that 
small-scale coffee cultivation took off in the eastern districts.156
TABLE 7.1
Value of Coffee Exports from the 
Gold Coast157
Year Value in C Source
1882 0 ADM 5/3/7
1883 11/10/00 ADM 5/3/7
1884 8/11/06 ADM 5/3/7
1885 63/9/4 ADM 5/3/7
1886 75/3/6 ADM 5/3/7
1887 85/9/0 ADM 5/3/7
1888 115/14/3 ADM 5/3/7
1889 49/18/9 ADM 5/2/1
1890 247/6/0 ADM 5/2/1
1891 473/6/3 ADM 5/2/1
1893 630 ADM 5/1/74
1894 1265 ADM 5/1/74
1895 1753 ADM 5/1/74
1896 4065 ADM 5/1/74
1897 3068 ADM 5/1/74
TABLE 7.2
Value of Cocoa Exports from the 
Gold Coast
V cai \  ahn. in ' Source
1893 93 ADM 5/1/74
1894 546 ADM 5/1/74
1895 470 ADM 5/1/74
1896 2275 ADM 5/1/74
1897 3196 ADM 5/1/74
1898 6420 ADM 5/1/74
1899 6447 ADM 5/1/74
154 Dumett, Raymond, El Dorado in West Africa: The Gold Coast Mining Frontier, African Labour, and Colonial 
capitalism in the Gold Coast 1873-1900i  James Currey, Oxford, 1998, pp.267-268.
155 It is unclear how these plantations were destroyed, as the invasion of 1869 mostly took place in Peki. However the 
Commissioniers did interview locals and are very clear on this point. NAG ADM 5/3/7, Report of the Commission on 
Economic Agriculture on the Gold Coast, 1889.
156 pRQ Q-) 96/219, Hodgson to Minister, 9 November 1891, Aburi.
157 NAG ADM 5/3/7, Report o f the Commission on Economic Agriculture on the Gold Coast, 1889. ADM 5/1/74,
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Similarly the cocoa industry, despite the support of Basel missionaries and the 
administration, was largely ignored by indigenous producers until 1890158, probably 
because of the high investment and low initial returns necessitated by the five-year 
maturation period of the cocoa tree.159 Cocoa production thus only took off as demand 
and prices rose in the early 1890s and increased production came online around 1893 
(see chart) and it was not until 1897 that the Department of Agriculture reported 
“hundreds” of small-scale plantations in Akuapem, aided by nurseries set up by the 
administration at Aburi.160 Cocoa production was also geographically confined at least 
initially to the climatically, geographically, and politically suitable eastern provinces, 
whose more advanced infrastructure and proximity to the Volta river and well-developed 
trade pathways also facilitated delivery to the coast. Thus while cocoa provided 
opportunities for wage labour after 1900 and may have attracted recently liberated 
Asante slaves, it was not a major factor in ex-slave opportunity in the late nineteenth 
Century Protectorate.161
As a last resort, former slaves could have enlisted with one of the European 
companies recruiting labourers for overseas labour. French companies were active in 
the early 1890s, recruiting small numbers of Elminan labourers for French colonies162 
such as Grand Bassam and the French Congo, as was the Royal Niger Company. 163 
However overseas labour was an unpopular proposition for indigenous workers. John 
Parker has argued that most of the Accras who worked overseas, for example, were 
really slaves and followers of important ‘bigmen5 who were coerced into serving 
overseas, their patron retaining the recruitment commission.164 Because of such 
abuses, recruitment by overseas companies was legally limited by the Masters and 
Servants and Foreign Employment Ordinance of 1893.165 In any case, former slaves 
had such an aversion to working overseas that those few who deserted without any
Departmental Reports, 1993. ADM 5/2/1, Report on the Census of the Gold Coast Colony, 1891.
158 PRO CO 96/193, Brandford Griffith to Knutsford, 24 August 1888, enclosure 2, Customs to Colonial Secretary, 
Accra.
159 NAG ADM 5/3/7, Report of the Commission on Economic Agriculture on the Gold Coast, 1889.
160 Hill, The Gold Coast Cocoa Fanner, p. 103.
161 Sutton, “Labour in Commercial Agriculture in Ghana”, pp.461-483.
162 NAG ADM 13/1/6, Executive Council Minutes, 19 January 1894.
163 PRO CO 98/7, Executive Council Minutes, 25 June 1889.
164 Parker, John, “Ga state and society in early colonial Accra”, p.148.
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prospects or skills generally preferred vagrancy to the unknown of a foreign land.166
Negotiated Outcomes
So far in this chapter, I have argued that, on the one hand, the majority of slaves 
were in some manner affected by the emancipation ordinances. On the other hand, I 
have shown that few slaves chose to use the courts to liberate themselves, nor does it 
appear was there a great deal of available opportunity for private acquisition of land use 
rights, for wage labour, or for service in mines or cultivating cash crops. However, until 
now I have not presented any evidence as to what the majority of slaves actually did do.
Gold Coast slave-owners could not entirely control access to the means of 
existence - missionary sources show that a limited number of ex-slaves were able to 
arrange for tenancy rights to land in the interior and certainly some few slaves enlisted 
for service overseas, with the administration, or managed to gain employment with the 
Basel Missionaries. Some may, as Dumett and Johnson have suggested, have become 
casual workers, odd-job men, or petty traders.167 However the communal structure of 
land ownership and the assimilative nature of Gold Coast slavery, combined with the 
paucity of waged and cash-cropping opportunities during this period, meant that few 
slaves other than recently captured northerners and some pawns perceived any 
situation preferable to remaining with their masters.
Nevertheless, while the majority of slaves chose not to liberate themselves, 
slaves were to varying degrees able to mitigate their social and economic status within 
their dependant relationship, and this is what I believe took place on a regional scale. 
The majority of slaves were neither unaffected by emancipation nor did they liberate 
themselves. Instead the prospect of emancipation prompted slaves and masters to 
renegotiate their relationships, usually to the benefit of the slaves. The process by 
which slaves attempted to exploit the opportunity of newly legalised paths to 
emancipation and masters accommodated certain of their slaves’ demands in an effort 
to limit their losses was probably a complex and gradual process.
155 NAG ADM 4/1/17, Ordinance 8 of 1893, Masters and Servants and Foreign Employment Ordinance.
166 NAG ADM 11/975, Memorandum on the Vestiges of Slavery in the Gold Coast, Assistant Secretary for Native 
Affairs Johnson, 1927.
lfi7 Dumett and Johnson, “Britain and the Suppression of Slavery”, pp. 92-93.
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It is impossible, with the sources available to us, to mark geographic or cultural 
differences between the manner in which negotiations were carried out and settlements 
agreed upon in different regions or under different types of masters. Dumett and 
Johnson settled for identifying two general types of negotiated outcomes. In the first, 
slaves cleared new farms which were within the locality of their masters but which their 
masters did not occupy, and which were somewhat removed from their masters’ lands. 
In the other, somewhat closer relationship, Dumett and Johnson argue that slaves 
continued to work their master’s land but in a sharecropping arrangement.168 Opare- 
Akurang has recently studied the matter in greater depth, relying on the somewhat 
questionable evidence gleaned from a relatively small number of interviews he carried 
out in a limited area of the Gold Coast the 1990s. His argument stresses that such 
agreements were in fact “not based on usufruct use of land” but involved either “slaves 
rent[ing] land from their former holders” or “sharecropping”. Further, he insists that such 
arrangements occurred “especially in the burgeoning export commodity and staple crops 
producing areas of the Birim-Censu-Pra basin of the Eastern Province.”169
Incidents of negotiation were, in fact, widespread. Such shifts in status were 
noted by a District Commissioner in Saltpond170 as well as by Basel Missionaries in 
Akuapem.171 Slave-master relationships also clearly shifted in urban settings172, in the 
western districts173, and in the plantations of the Accra plains where slaves reportedly 
“neither pay[ed their masters] part of their produce nor work[ed] for [them] three days in 
the week as was the case before.”174 However BMS sources regarding the land and 
produce-rich eastern interior do seem to indicate that slaves there were able to negotiate 
from an extraordinarily strong position, “farming the land given them by their masters as 
free men.”175 These sources date from mid-1875 before a full picture could have 
possibly become clear, but it is entirely possible that slaves in Akuapem and Krobo may
168 Dumett and Johnson, “Britain and the Suppression of Slavery”, pp. 88-89.
169 Opare-Akurang, “Slavery and Abolition in the Gold Coast”, pp.19-21.
170 NAG ADM 5/3/9, Report upon the Customs Relating to the Tenure o f Land on the Gold Coast, 1895, H. 
Cummings, DC Saltpond.
171 Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Dieterle to Basel, 22 June 1875, Aburi.
172 NAG SCT 17/5/1, Regina v. George Napoleon, Accra District Court, 22 March 1897.
173 NAG ADM 5/3/9, Report upon the Customs Relating to the Tenure o f Land on the Gold Coast, 1895, H. 
Cummings, DC Peregrine.
174 Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Zimmerman, unadressed, 26 July 1875, Abokobi.
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have been able to negotiate from a position of relative strength due not only to the high 
levels of agricultural production in these regions, but to the influence of Basel 
Missionaries.
As early as 1863, Basel Missionaries had required their congregants to liberate 
slaves using the Sixths model, converting these individuals to wage labourers - 
especially bricklayers, carpenters, and wheelwrights - or more rarely assisting them in 
gaining possession of a piece of their former masters’ lands.176 The basis for a waged 
mode of existence for former slaves who nevertheless remained under the purview of 
their former masters was thus developed quite early in the Volta District, including 
Krobo, at least within the Christian community. The experiences of this group appear to 
have served as an example motivating slaves ‘liberated’ in 1874. Thus Volta District 
administration sources noted that slaves who negotiated their status in this district “in the 
generality of cases ha [ve] [their] own piece of land to farm, and if an artisan ha[ve] all 
the wages [they] earn...”.177 Evidence from the early twentieth century indicates that 
former slaves in this region continued to be associated with their former masters’ 
children, including joining Christian congregations together.178
However, most evidence regarding negotiation strategies throughout the 
Protectorate and Colony suggests that agricultural slaves largely remained upon their 
master’s land, but occupied their own fields and paid ‘rent’ in service rather than cash or 
kind.179 Administrators such as DC Cummings of Saltpond and DC Riby of Volta are 
very clear on that point.180 Similarly, Assistant Secretary for Native Affairs Johnson 
wrote (albeit in 1927) that:181
175 Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Dieterle to Basel, 22 June 1875, Aburi.
176 PP 1865,V, (412), Report from Committee on Africa (West Coast), Evidence of Reverend Elias Schrenk, of the 
Basel Mission, Q. 3334-3341.
177 PRO CO 96/208, Former DC Rigby to Colonial Secretary, Aburi 30 January, 1890.
178 BMS D-1.98, Josenhans, 25 January 1912, Odumase.
179 Admittedly, this is contradicted by at least one source. BMS D-10.3, Binder, 3 July 1875, op. Cit. In Hainger, 
Slaves and Slave Holders on the Gold Coast, p.126.
180 NAG ADM 5/3/9, Report upon the Customs Relating to the Tenure o f Land on the Gold Coast, 1895, H. 
Cummings, DC Saltpond. PRO CO 96/208, Hodgson to Knutsford, 17 February 1890, Accra; encl. 14, DC Riby to 
Colonial Secretary, 30 January 1890, Aburi.
181 NAG ADM 11/975, Memorandum on the Vestiges of Slavery in the Gold Coast, Assistant Secretary for Native 
Affairs Johnson, 1927.
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The [former slaves] have portions of the family or community lands assigned to 
them to make farms, the produce of which is their own property and without 
paying any portion thereof as tribute. They certainly help their masters also to 
make their farms, and those who stay in the same house perform such 
household duties as hired servants in European countries do. In return they are 
fed and clothed and are given all the privileges of children... Otherwise they are 
only required occasionally to perform such duties as selling, going on errands, 
etc. They make occasional presents to their masters, who never fail to give 
return presents.182
There is no opposing evidence to suggest that sharecropping was a preferred 
negotiating outcome for either slaves or masters. The system of abusa, by which the 
labourer receives one third of produce and the land-owner two thirds, and which has 
figured so largely in cocoa production in the twentieth century183, appears not to have 
entered the Protectorate until after the First World War.184
Aside from suggesting that slaves largely paid for their land tenancy by giving 
service, Johnson’s arguments reveal the social dependency that remained with most 
slaves despite their augmented status. By giving ritual presents slaves acknowledged 
their dependency, and while slaves exerted some economic rights they still acted as 
servants and clients of their former masters. In Accra, Cape Coast, and other urban 
settings, masters appear to have allowed slaves to remain in houses they owned185, but 
maintained these slaves as part of the domestic servant population, a group which as 
late as 1891 made up approximately 12% of the populations of both Cape Coast and 
Accra.186 These and other dependants who had renegotiated their positions were still 
social inferiors, and libel cases reveal that they were frequently reminded of their 
dependent status and slave origins. Wherever possible, these individuals sought to 
assert a higher status by reworking their family trees187 or suing their antagonists, who
182 NAG ADM 11/975, Memorandum on the Vestiges of Slavery in the Gold Coast, Assistant Secretary for Native 
Affairs Johnson, 1927.
183 See Robertson, A.F, The Dynamics o f Productive Relationships: African Sharer Contracts in Comparative 
Perspective, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984; and Austin, Gareth, “The Emergence of Capitalist 
Relations in south Asante Cocoa-Farming, c.1916-1933", Journal o f African History, 1987 (28), pp.259-279.
184 Hill, The Gold Coast Cocoa Farmer, p.12.
185 NAG SCT 17/5/5, Regina v. George Napoleon, Accra District Court, 22 March 1897.
186 This total probably included both former slaves, pawns, and free dependants.. NAG ADM 5/2/1, Report o f the 
Census o f Gold Coast Colony for the year 1891 .
187 Gaps appear in the family trees of many coastal Ghanaian families during this period..
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were usually their former masters or their relatives, with whom they were economically 
forced to remain in contact.188
Opare-Akurang has also suggested that female slaves whose masters desired to 
retain their services were able to renegotiate their position through the institution of 
marriage.189 Such negotiations would probably have been carried out by the slaves’ 
families. Remarriage as a free woman would have benefited the former slave by 
completing her integration into her husband’s family with the status of a fully free 
individual, while benefiting her family by reattaching her to her own matrilineage. At the 
same time, such an arrangement preserved the labour of the woman and her children 
for the former master. Unfortunately, the sole evidence for these remarriages comes 
from David Chalmers - the Chief Justice following emancipation. In an 1878 report, 
Chalmers reported that “the sentiments attaching to free marriage [were] so much 
appreciated that persons who had been married as slaves... have subsequently 
[married] a second time as free persons” and noted that marriages were “more 
frequently than formerly contracted through the interposition of the blood relations of the 
woman.”190
To place this theory within the debate over whether emancipation represented a 
“continuation” or a “dislocation” of socio-economic and cultural institutions on the Gold 
Coast, it seems clear that, despite McSheffrey’s hypothesis, there was no mass exodus 
of slaves from masters anywhere within the Protectorate. Slaves neither used the courts 
nor chose to flee en-masse unless they had highly marketable skills or could return to 
their families - either because of proximity or because they had only recently been 
captured. Nevertheless, relatively few slaves remained unaffected by emancipation in 
the long term. Emancipation did not cause them to liberate themselves. However it was 
a catalyst which gave them the leverage to renegotiate their economic position within the 
authority of their masters, who saw such negotiations as their own best response to the 
possibility of losing the power, economic stability, and status for which they needed their 
slave clients. The role of the administration was only, and could only be, to prepare an
188 e.g. NAG SCT 17/5/6, Owoo v. Quartay Hupah, Accra District Court, 1 September 1887; 23/4/131, Abba Ackireh 
vs. Lana Akebua, Anamaboe District Court, 25 January 1895. 23/5/2, Araba Qukraku vs. Assuwai, Cape Coast 
District Court, 1 March 1895.
189 Opare-Akurang, “Slavery and Abolition in the Gold Coast”, pp.26-27.
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environment in which change could take place. It was slaves and their masters who, 
influenced by cultural, economic, and social imperatives, created the compromises that 
characterised the post-proclamation settlement.
190 PP LV, 1878, (c.2148), Report... on the Effects o f the Steps Taken by the Colonial Government, Chalmers.
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CHAPTER 8;
Slaves and masters in French-Administered Senegal
In the post-proclamation Gold Coast, as in Senegal Colony after 1848 and Goree 
and Rufisque in the late 1870s, reluctant enforcement of abolition laws by colonial 
administrations empowered slaves and forced masters to react, resulting in the creation 
of new relationships and economic arrangements. In the bulk of ‘protected5 Senegal, 
however, enforcement of emancipation was non-existent in the two decades of 
expansion following the 1848 emancipation. Nor did this change in the 1870s, as the 
French withdrawal allowed indigenous leaders to firmly reclaim authority over most of 
the states of Senegal.
As a result, there is relatively little historical evidence of a growth in slave 
resistance or a transformation of dependant relationships. Consequently there has been 
little scholarly interest in this period as compared to either the 1848 Senegal Colony 
emancipation or the 1874 anti-slave ordinances on the Gold Coast. Frangois Renault 
did investigate late nineteenth century slave policy in both his 1971 article on 
emancipation in Senegal and in the subsequent volume published in 1976.1 But 
Renault, however talented, was a member of the clergy and not a trained historian; 
these works while excellent surveys on colonial policy generally ignore social and 
cultural issues and the agency of Africans - especially slaves. Besides Renault, the 
course of slavery in post-1850s Senegal outside of the colony was generally only 
discussed as a peripheral issue in articles and volumes2 until Martin Klein’s well 
researched Slavery and Colonial Rule in French West Africa. 3 Klein’s work is 
exceedingly useful for historians studying this period. While lacking in narrative and 
somewhat disjointed in presentation, Slavery and Colonial Rule introduces massive 
amounts of quantitative information and points to previously untapped sources.
Klein’s research does not, however, indicate that there were any major changes 
in dependant relations in the regions surrounding the Colony in the 1860s and 1870s. 
During this period French authority was simply too remote and too thin to offer 
reasonable alternatives for all but the most determined of slaves. On the other hand, 
data collected by Klein and myself does suggest that pressure from the metropole to 
implement emancipation measures after 1878 may have had some impact on the 
Senegalese states again falling under the authority of French administration. This is
1 Renault, “L’abolition de l ’esclavage au Senegal”; Renault, LiberationD ’esclaves.
2 Although I must commend the treatment of this subject by H. Olu Idowu. Idowu “The Establishment of Protectorate 
Administration in Senegal".
3 Klein, Slaveiy and Colonial Rule.
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especially true as that administration grew in size and became more intent on 
implementing policy during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. As a result, it 
was during this period that some change occurred.
Public pressure to reform anti-slavery policy, 1879 -1882
Faidherbe’s restriction of emancipation to the small entrepots and posts occupied 
by France prior to 1848 remained unchanged until slavery was abolished in Dakar in 
1877 and Rufisque two years later.4 Substantive French authority outside of these areas 
was confined largely to Waalo and the Petite Cote, while limited de facto control was 
exercised over Dimar from the posts of Dagana and Podor.
As late as 1878, there seemed little motivation for a revision of this status quo. In 
that year, the Ministre de la Marine, Pothnau, wrote to Governor Briere de L’lsle that he 
continued to believe that while the administration “must enforce... our ideals of justice 
and civilisation”, care must be taken “not... to put at risk our good relationships with... the 
indigenous protectorates.”5 The Ministry had no reason to challenge that policy, and 
Briere was merely another in a long line of military men who, since Faidherbe, had 
refused to drop their opposition to what they perceived as a dangerously unsound policy 
of emancipation.
However, in the event, 1879 was a year of unexpected change in the metropole’s 
attitude towards this pragmatic approach to slave policy. It was two nineteenth century 
bastions of abolitionism, the Protestant clergy and the press, which initiated this change. 
French public opinion by this time was recognisably abolitionist, and the report from 
Senegal of a French Pastor named Villeger indicting the administration for their policy of 
expelling slaves seeking refuge in the Colony in the expectation that they would be 
reclaimed by their masters caused an immediate sensation.6 The republican papers La 
France, Le Marseillaise, Petit Parisien, and Lanterne indicted not only the administration 
but also former Minister Jaureguiberry for failing to suppress slavery within the colony.7 
An editorial in La France declared that “slavery exists in France, if it exists in Senegal” 
and attacked the administration for expelling refugee slaves and allowing their sale 
within the coastal towns. Such accusations rested largely on evidence provided by
4 See Chapter 5.
5 ANS K25, Ministre a Briere de L’lsle, 13 December 1878, Paris.
6 ANS K ll ,  Genouilly a Pinet-Laprade, 11 June 1866, no place. Renault, “L’abolition de l ’esclavage au Senegal”, 
1971, pp.31-32.
7 Petit Parisien, 12 January 1880. Lanterne, 10 and 12 January 1880. Le Marseillaise, 5 October 1879. La France, 3 
October 1879.
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Villeger and church publications.8
Although the radical Lanterne also attacked the Ministry and administration for 
withholding emancipation from most of the peoples under their authority, the major issue 
of the scandal revolved around lax enforcement of emancipation within the Colony, and 
it was to this that Pothnau responded. Pothnau did not bother to deny the charges, 
instead claiming that the incident to which Villeger referred was “a regrettable error.”9 
The Minister quite clearly understood the need for this subterfuge and was aware that 
the incident was not a mistake but an unwritten administrative policy. In a letter to 
Governor Briere de Lisle he accepted the rationale that the Colony was “surrounded by 
populations possessing slaves which serve to transport their produce to our factories...” 
and supported the policy of expelling slaves who were, he argued, largely vagabonds in 
any case. In no way did he suggest that the administration should change their 
procedures.10
Pothnau, however, had underestimated public interest in the issue and the 
abilities of his opposition. The scandal reached the French Senate on the March 1, 
1880, when Victor Schoelcher11 charged the administration with three crimes. First, he 
indicted them for allowing slave-owners to reclaim their slaves up to 3 months after they 
had sought refuge within the Colony. Second, he claimed that slaves were “freely 
bought and sold” in Dakar. In addition, Schoelcher deplored the “free crossing of French 
territories” by slave caravans.12 In a thundering speech, he decried the authorities’ 
betrayal of the “right to asylum that is our greatest heritage.”13 Briere de L’lsle clearly 
saw which way the wind was blowing and decided to at least make noises in the right 
direction. Following his advice, the merchants and officers of Senegal’s conseil general 
quickly passed a resolution “demanding strict application of the 1848 decree.”14 Real 
change was slower, however, as one of Pothnau’s successors, Minister Rouvier, noted 
in 1882.15 Administrators continued especially to turn a blind eye slave-owners seeking 
to recover slaves claiming refuge in the Colony
8 “L’esclavage eii France”, La France, 3 October 1879.
9 Renault, “L’abolition de l ’esclavage au Senegal”, 1971, p.32.
10 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15d, Ministre a Briere de L’lsle
11 The famous Republican abolitionist and former head of the commission which authored the 1848 emancipation act.
12 It is not clear whether Schoelcher realised the contemporary limits of French authority. France still technically held 
Protectorates over several interior and coastal states, but had not exercised them for a full decade.
13 ANS K25, L ’Esclavage enAOF, Deherine, 1906. Journal Officiel de la Republique Franqaise, 2 March 1880.
14 q.v. Idowu, “The Establishment of Protectorate Administration in Senegal", pp.253.
15 ANS K12, Ministre a Canard, 31 January 1882, Paris.
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The Waalo and Dimar exodus
However an era of pragmatic military administrators came to an end in December 
1882, with the appointment of Senegal’s first civilian Governor, Rene Servatius. 
Servatius’ greatest impact on slave policy was to defy many of his own officers by 
eliminating formalities which slowed the processing of runaway slaves and made them 
vulnerable to reclamation by their masters.16 Although he died after only six months in 
office, Servatius was succeeded by other civilian bureaucrats who pursued a similar 
agenda.
It was his immediate successor, Bourdiaux, who took the legally mandated and 
extremely tardy step of extending certain anti-slavery ordinances to Waalo and Dimar.17 
Following a reaffirmation of French control of these territories in October 1882, the first 
step in a post-war re-expansion of French authority in Senegal, Bourdiaux outlawed the 
further sale and purchase of slaves in the directly administrated territories on January 8, 
188418
While Bourdiaux’s proclamation was intended to eradicate the slave trade in 
Waalo, even he was not so bold as to announce any policies carrying out his 
responsibility to eradicate the long-standing and extremely pervasive institution of 
domestic slavery in the floodplain states. Nevertheless, this failed to calm the fears of 
Fuibe, Tukolor, and Wolof slave-owners. As early as 1883, indigenous leaders had 
deduced that steps to limit their slave-owning rights would follow the 1882 ‘clarification’ 
of French authority; the more mobile Fulbe and Tukolor subsequently began to leave the 
region for the interior, some in small groups but in other cases entire clans and 
settlements.19 Servatius initially attempted to stem this flow by ordering the 
Commandant of Dagana to allow the emigrants to leave, but at the same time to 
confiscate any slaves they attempted to take with them.20 However this move only 
stoked the fears of the indigenous population, who over the next seven years departed 
in increasing numbers. By 1889 approximately 2/3 of the Fulbe and Tukolor population, 
20,000 people, had migrated to the east21, some travelling as far as Nioro in Kaarta - 
some 800 kilometres away.22 Significantly, a number of the more sedentary Wolof slave
16 Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, p.64.
17 A  functionary named Le Boucher had held the position for less than two months following Servatius’s death.
18 ANS K25, L ’Esclavage etiAOF, Deherme, 1906.
19 ANSOM Senegal 1/68, Servatius a Ministre, 20 May 1883, St. Louis.
20 ANSOM Senegal 1/68, Servatius a Ministre, 20 May 1883, St. Louis.
21 ANS K12, Ministre a Clement “Thomas, 18 December 1889, Paris.
22 ANSOM Senegal 1/68, Servatius a Ministre, 20 May 1883, St. Louis. This movement must be compared with the 
Great Trek of the Boers in 1830s southern Africa, also largely to escape abolitionist laws.
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O Qowners also fled French rule for the interior.
There is little doubt that the issue of slavery was the primary impetus for this 
migration. Yamar, the pro-French chef du Canton of Merinaghen, and his constituents 
both Fulbe and Wolof complained that limiting their right to acquire slaves “is our ruin” 
and demanded that the French “let us judge our affairs like you always let our fathers.”24 
Similarly Abdul Bokar Kane, the Bosean aristocrat who had recently risen to the 
leadership of Fuuta and a temporary French ally, warned France that “[any] who would 
have good relations with us must leave [our slaves] in our hands or we cannot remain”.25
By this time it was evident even to the civilian Governor of Senegal that Waalo 
and Dimar, the breadbaskets of the north, would be entirely depopulated if nothing were 
done to stop this emigration. Even more ominously, as the Colony expanded, it was 
becoming clear that the implementation of similar policies in other cercles would likewise 
result in mass emigration and economic destabilisation. Therefore on the 18th of 
October, 1889, Clement-Thomas formally requested that he be allowed to transform 
Waalo and Dimar into Protectorates26, similar to the disposition of the remainder of the 
region between the Senegal and Gambia rivers, the conquest of which was underway 
throughout the 1880s.27 In December 1889 the Naval Ministry agreed, writing “the sole 
means that we actually have at our disposal to stop emigration movements which have 
already affected the colony, and for [encouraging] a return resides in disannexation, and 
the constitution of small principalities placed under the protection and suzerainty of 
France.”28 The implementation and publication of this strategy, as discussed below, was 
almost immediately successful in encouraging the re-entry of large numbers of emigres 
in 1890 and 1891.29 It was clear that the slave-owners had won this round.
The policy of ‘association1: The results of the Senegal River Delta exodus?
As we have seen, a stricter colonial anti-slavery policy was being promoted from 
the metropole in the early 1880s. However the result of the attempted implementation of 
this policy in Waalo had been a massive response from indigenous slave-owners which 
effectively forced the colonial administration to back down. This confrontation was 
especially significant as it coincided with a new expansionism pursued not only by
23 Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, p.66.
24 ANS K12, Les notables du Canton de Merinaghen, Peuls et Wolofs, a Quintrie, 3 June 1888.
25 ANS 15G32, Commandant Superior du Soudan Frangaise a Clement-Clement-Thomas, 4 January 1889.
26 ANS K25, L ’Esclavage en AOF, Deherme, 1906.
27 See the following section.
28 ANS K12, Ministre a Clement-Thomas, 18 December 1889, Paris.
29 ANSOM Senegal 1/91, Lamothe a Ministre, 21 June 1891, St. Louis.
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militant Governors such as Briere de L’lsle but also promoted by metropolitan policy 
seeking to revive French glory after the disastrous Franco-Prussian War.30 The position 
of Commandant Superieur of French Soudan had been created to coordinate expansion 
along the upper Senegal, shifting administrative attention to the interior, while renewed 
importance was attached to groundnut production. The spectre of Muslim revolution had 
been largely removed with the death of Maba, but taxation and the imposition of tolls by 
chiefly officeholders still restricted the ability of French merchants to deal directly with 
peasant (and largely Muslim) farmers.
As a result it was not difficult for Governor Servatius to gather support for an 
attack on Kaajor in 1882. The justification for the offensive rested to a large extent on 
the opposition of the Darnel, Lat Joor, to a proposed railway linking St. Louis with Dakar 
and the groundnut growing regions in between.31 The conquest was completed by March 
1883, although Lat Joor managed to flee to the protection of Alburi Njaay in Jolof.32 
However, Njaay’s turn was to come several years later when, following a disastrous 
famine he placed himself under French protection and abandoned Lat Joor to defeat. 
His protected status, however, did not save him from a similar betrayal by Governor 
Clement-Thomas who turned on Njaay after the capture of Segu in 1890.33 Meanwhile 
Siin and Saalum, left weak after Maba’s defeat34, sought the protection of British forces 
in the Gambia. But this only served to enrage the French, who in April 1887 moved to 
turn the region into a protectorate.
Thus by 1890 the French were in possession of all the states of Senegal north of 
the Gambia River, as well as a significant portion of modern-day Mali.35 However the 
exact shape this regime would take remained unclear. Governor Clement-Thomas was 
hesitant to further extend the policy of assimilation, under which the population of the 
Colony was considered French citizens, not least because this would have required the 
enforcement of anti-slavery laws. Such a policy was likely to result in a repeat of the 
Waalo/Dimar exodus in other newly conquered regions, and the Governor had to 
consider that this might be especially disastrous in the economically indispensable 
groundnut-growing regions. As a result, Clement-Thomas rejected a policy of 
assimilation, and instead developed one of association which would become a pattern
30 For more on this see Charles, Eunice A., “French West African Policy and Muslim Resistance in Senegal 1880“ 
1890", Unpublished paper presented at the 16th Anual Meeting of the African Studies Association, October 31-Nov 3, 
1973, Syracuse.
31 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, pp.224-227.
32 ANSOM Senegal 1/68, Servatius a Ministre, telegramme, received 21 May 1883, Lisboa-Paris.
33 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, pp.234-237.
34 See Chapter 6.
35 See Colvin, Lucie, Historical Dictionary of Senegal, Scarecrow Press, London, 1981, p.29.
185
for French colonial policy elsewhere. Under association, the newly conquered territories 
joined Senegal as protectorates in the same manner as Waalo and Dimar, administered 
indirectly through African chiefs but with executive power retained by the French 
Commandant de Cercle.36
The conquest and formal acquisition of the Senegalese states did not prompt a 
major revision of administrative attitudes toward slavery. Colonial officers administering 
these Protectorates were quick to recognise that they had only very limited resources - 
too few administrators, limited transportation, and tiny budgets, and that they therefore 
had to rely largely on client chiefs and village headmen who were predominately slave­
owners.37 More importantly, however, it was the successful resistance of slave-owners 
that convinced the administration to implant a system of administration which could 
largely ignore abolitionist pressure from the metropoie. The resulting 1890 protectorate 
treaty signed by loyal chiefs from Waalo, Jolof, and the St. Louis region embodied 
cosmetic measures forbidding the purchase and sale of slaves and providing a 
mechanism by which slaves could liberate themselves by paying a 500 franc indemnity. 
However it failed absolutely to forbid or regulate domestic slavery.38 In fact, French 
policy was so lax that when, in 1890-1891 Britain and France redrew the borders 
between Senegal and the Gambia, a number of chiefs who found themselves on the 
Gambian side of the line moved north largely, it has been suggested, to escape British 
abolitionist laws.39
Occupations and characteristics of local slavery in the late nineteenth century
In order to analyse the strategies of slaves in these new Protectorates, it is 
necessary to discuss what we know about slave populations, characteristics, and 
occupations within these regions, particularly Waalo. My analysis of this subject is 
based on our knowledge of traditional characteristics of slavery in Senegal and the 
postulated transformations that took place during the eras of the Atlantic slave trade and 
the post-abolition period. However it is also informed particularly by the results of a 1904 
questionnaire circulated to the commandants of the various cercles within the then 
colony of Afrique Occidentale Frangaise. This document, folio K18 of the Senegalese
36 Ibid.
37 For more on this see Moitt, “Slavery and Emancipation in Senegal’s Peanut Basin”, pp.36-38..
38 Signed by the chiefs of Waalo, Jolof, Giandol and Ndiambur in 1890. ANS K12, Traite, 15 February 1890, 
Lamothe. Additional treaties signed by the chiefs o f Dimar, Toro, the independant Sereer states, Baol, Siin and 
Saalum between February and September 1890. ANS K12, Traite, 1 September 1890, Clement-Thomas.
Interestingly, the French explained their condemnation of slave trading by referring to Chapters 24 and 43 of the 
Koran.
39 Klein, Islam and Imperialism in Senegal, p.152..
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National Archives, is made up of administrators’ reports including estimates of the 
number and percentage of slaves within each region, their occupations, the ethnic group 
of their owners, their genders and ages.40
TABLE 8.1
Suggested slave statistics for protected territories of Senegal, 1904
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4 of slaves
E ' l ' Z
female s r
Kaolack Saalum Sereer 1/3
Foundiougne Town only Sereer 50 1/20
Thi&s Siin Sereer 750 1/70
Baol Occidental western Baol Sereer/Wolof 20,000 1/4
N'Diourbel eastern Baol Sereer 1000 1/45
Wolof 3000 1/7
Fulbe 1300 1/7
Petite Cote Petite Cote Sereer/Lebu 1000 1/30
Tivaouane Kaajor W olof 15000 28% 29%
Louga Waalo Wolof/Fulbe 8940 41% 29%
Dagana Dimar Fulbe 26,000 1/2
Podor Toro Wolof/Fulbc 18,609 1/5 54% 11%
Matam regions of Fuuta Fulbe 20,000 56% 9%
Bakel Gajaaga Fulbe/Tukolor 35,000
K18, Reponse aux questionnaire, 1904
Although the statistics given by Commandants de Cercle and Sergents de Villes 
are not entirely reliable, the qualitative information indicates that a number of arguments 
made by colonial officials and later by historians are correct. The first is that slavery was 
ubiquitous within the Protected territories. Slave holding extended to all ethnic groups 
during the late nineteenth century, as statistics from N’Diourbel especially reveal. 
However the responses of officers from Siin and Fundiugne suggest that the Sereer, 
who as I postulated above had a traditionally more egalitarian society, continued to hold 
a smaller proportion of slaves than other ethnic groups.
The French commercial and political order appears to have had some effect upon 
the institution of slavery. Groundnut producers, like many other cash croppers, 
perceived male slaves as better workers, which reversed the traditional Senegalese 
preference for retaining female slaves. In the interior, Fulbe and Tukolor slave-owners
40 While this data was produced after the period of this chapter, the very fact that it confirms trends and statistics 
given in anecdotal sources prior to the 1880s enables it to replace information we do not have on slaves and slave­
owners for the last quarter of the 19th century. Perhaps, therefore, I must present the following information with the 
proviso that it is largely extrapolated from sources prior to and following the period in question.
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still largely preferred women - only approximately 35% of slaves in these areas were 
adult males, compared to around 55% adult females. However in groundnut-producing 
Kaajor 43% were adult males and only 28% were adult females - the rest were youths 
for whom we have no gender statistics. Likewise, the presence of groundnuts has been 
postulated as stimulating slave owning. Supporting that is the inordinately high return of 
slaves in Saalum, unique amongst the Sereer states in supporting a population which 
was 1/3 unfree.
The origins of these slaves, on the other hand, had not changed significantly. 
Slaves still appear to have been sourced predominately from the interior, although 
warfare between Muslim reformers, traditional leaders, and the French in the 1850s- 
1880s generated large numbers of war captives, and the tyeddo were still active in some 
regions.41 More and more, however, it was Moorish slave traders who supplied the 
demands of Senegalese slave-owners 42
Slaves still largely worked in the economic capacities that they had come to fill in 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. French administrators from regions as 
separated as Kaolack, Fundiugne, and Dagana identified cultivation and harvesting as 
the primary roles of slaves, and a number were also engaged in herding sheep and 
goats.43 in most of these areas slaves were given as many as 240 days/year or as few 
as 104 days/year to cultivate their own food, working the rest of the time on their 
masters farms, herds, or groundnut fields.44 Domestic tasks such as the preparation of 
food, especially the pounding of millet, and weaving, were also carried out by slaves45, 
although not exclusively so. In addition to domestic slaves, in most regions there still 
existed a caste of royal or chiefly slaves {captifs/captives de la couronne) who largely 
occupied symbolic or military roles.46
41 ANSOM Senegal 1/71, Seignaic a Ministre, 9 May 1884, St. Louis. ANSOM K18, Reponse de Fadministrateur de 
Dagana, 1 February 1904.
42 See Chapter 9. ANSOM K18, Reponse de l ’administrateur de Dagana, 1 February 1904.
43 ANS K18, Reponse de l ’administrateur de Dagana, 1 February 1904; Reponse de Fadministrateur de Kaolack, 26 
January 1904; Reponse de la Sergent de Ville, Foundiougne.
44 ANS K18, Reponse de F administrates de Kaolack, 26 January 1904; Reponse de F administrates de Podor.
45 ANS K18 Reponse de l ’administrateur de Kaolack, 26 January 1904; Reponse de la Sergent de Ville, Foundiougne.
46 ANS K18, Reponse de Fadministrateur de Louga, 25 January 1904; Reponse de Fadministrateur de Tivuouane, 29 
January 1904; Reponse de Fadministrateur de Kaolack, 26 January 1904.
188
Slave liberation: Patents de liberte
Technically, of course, the status under which these slaves laboured was 
recognised as legal by the French government and the administration of Senegal. 
Outside of Waalo and Dimar, where between 1882 and 1890 slaves could technically 
liberate themselves under the 1848 law, the administration had rejected the 
emancipation of slaves beyond the Colony through the establishment of protectorates. 
Thus there was a fundamental division between the non-recognition of slavery on the 
Gold Coast and the Senegal administration’s sanction of slavery within the protected 
states.
In practice, admittedly, there were some very close parallels between the two 
administrations’ policies, which in both regions tended to force slaves into similar 
situations. We have seen how, during most of the 1870s and 1880s, slaves in the Gold 
Coast had to trek to Cape Coast or Accra to seek judicial support for their liberation. 
Similarly, the principal of sol affranchis, strenuously enforced following the appointment 
of Governor Servatius in 188347, meant that slaves from the interior who managed to 
escape to St. Louis, Goree, or one of the Senegal River posts could receive patents de 
liberte. In Senegal as in the Gold Coast, there were added difficulties constraining 
female slaves from seeking their freedom. The French, like the British, recognised 
children as belonging to their fathers and would not liberate them if a slave-owner 
indicated his paternity. Additionally, as Administrator Poulet noted women had little to 
gain from liberation since there was little call for them in the wage labour market and 
female runaways generally found themselves carrying out the same tasks in similar 
conditions as domestic servants in the Colony as they had as slaves.48
However the significant variance between the administrations of the two regions 
was instrumental in defining the different responses and modes of liberation of slaves. 
In the Gold Coast, enforcement of the same law throughout the Protectorate enabled 
liberated slaves to travel and settle safely as free individuals, whereas in Senegal 
patents de liberte went largely unhonoured outside of the Colony. Similarly, while in the 
Gold Coast families of pawns especially enjoyed some support from the administration 
in reclaiming their kin, masters in the Senegal Protectorate could easily and legally 
reclaim fugitive slaves unless they made the sometimes difficult journey to ‘free soil’. 
Thus it was generally only slaves with access to French territory - largely those who 
transported goods to the coast either on their backs or as laptots - who could liberate
47 Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, p.64.
48 ANS K17, Rapport sur la Captivite, Administrateur Poulet, 1905.
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themselves in this manner.
The French administrators, in fact, recognised only one legal mode of liberation 
for slaves outside of the Coiony - the rachat. After 1890 (in some regions 1893) any 
slave who could pay their masters 500 francs could legally purchase their freedom.49 
The likelihood of this was pretty low, however, for the largely rural slave population 
occupied in cultivation, herding, and domestic employment.
There is unfortunately very little known about modes of liberation in late 19th 
Century Senegal. Surprisingly, however, it appears that a relatively large number of 
slaves were able to liberate themselves by seeking refuge within the Colony, both before 
and following the loosening of restrictions in 1884. Unfortunately the quantitative 
records we have for this type of liberation, published in the Moniteur du Senegal, are not 
greatly illuminated by other, more qualitative, sources.
TABLE 8.2
Slave liberations in Senegal, 1868-1895
Y ear Total liberations
1868 102
1869 139
1870 148
1871 129
1872 91 (incomplete)
1873 55(incomplete)
1874 85 (incomplete)
1875 328
1876 278
1877 349
1878 347
1879 440
1880 609
1881 643
1882 919
1883 1266(incomplete)
1884 841
1885 1060(incomplete)
1886 676
1888 254 (incomplete)
1894 1218
1895 1438
1868-1888, Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, 1998, p.72. 
1894-5, Deherme, Esclavage en AOF, 1906.
49 ANS K12, Traite du 15 Fevrier 1890, Lamothe.
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This, unfortunately, has led to a number of misunderstandings. Renault, for 
example, saw these liberations as a direct reaction to the scandals of the 1880s. He 
hailed them as an example of “governors... achiev[ing] real redress. They were made 
aware of the necessity of ending the worst abuses.”50 Even Boubacar Barry ascribed 
the large numbers of slave liberations partly to European agency, arguing that “the 
Colony of Senegal encouraged the flight of slaves towards [French soil]. The Colony 
thus created a series of enclaves surrounding the Senegambian kingdoms.”51
I disagree fundamentally with these arguments. Although civilian Governors after 
1884 may, under pressure from France, have made it easier for runaway slaves to gain 
their emancipation, Barry and Renault provide no primary evidence to show that they 
encouraged slaves to run away. Indeed they patently did not. French administrators 
predominately regarded the liberated slave population as a drain on their resources. “In 
general”, one administrator was to comment in 1904, "all slaves who seek their liberty 
are parasites, and those who claim abuse to recover their liberty are almost always liars 
who wish to be vagabonds.”52
Liberation by patents de liberte was, in fact, generally the result of action either by 
slaves or by masters. In fact, until the mid 1880s a large, although incalculable53, 
proportion of slaves liberated were women and children brought into the Colony to act as 
concubines or domestic servants and liberated by their masters in order to legitimise the 
arrangement in the eyes of the gendarmes.54 Slave-owners trusted that the lack of 
opportunity for these individuals, imported from far away and bereft of any support 
structure, would keep them dependent on their masters, and therefore perceived no 
danger in registering them for patents de liberte. The slaves may not have even been 
informed of their freedom, or might simply have been unable to exploit it due not only to 
the lack of economic opportunity but also of housing. Females and children were 
especially chosen for importation in to the Colony in the belief that their inferior social 
position made it unlikely they would run away. Although the actual number of children 
‘liberated’ in this manner appears small, Deherme suggested that most such liberations 
went unrecorded, and the number may have been as much as three times larger.55
50 Renault, “L’abolition de 1’esclavage au Senegal”, p.37..
51 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p,214,
52 ANS K18, Reponse de Fadministrateur de Kaolack (Lefilliatre), 26 January 1904, Kaolack.
53 Klein has noted, and I agree, that the data on freed slaves is missing large chunks of information and is somewhat 
unreliable.
54 i.e. ANS AE4, Moniteur du Senegal, 24 April 1883, No. 1423.
55 ANS K25, L ’Esclavage enAOF, Deherme, 1906.
191
On the other hand, most of the patents de liberte granted after 1882 probably 
resulted from either self- or kin-liberations. While many children brought into the Colony 
were essentially slaves purchased for domestic servitude and registered by habitants 
and French administrators, others have been identified by Klein as being vouchsafed to 
relatives.56 Anecdotal evidence supports the notion that relatives may have kidnapped 
or redeemed their children or younger kin, and then had them formally liberated in St. 
Louis or Goree.57 Similarly, evidence from refugee slaves in Podor includes a number 
of stories of slaves ‘saved’ or ‘stolen back’ by their brothers, fathers, or uncles.58 Their 
family members, without having the lawful sanction for such actions enjoyed by families 
in the Gold Coast, were forced to spirit them away to safety within the Colony.
However a large number, probably the majority, of patents were granted as a 
result of slave agency. Almost all of the liberations granted at the postes were brought 
about by slaves fleeing masters or traders. Prior to 1884, such requests for liberation 
were granted only in cases where slaves could show they had been born as free 
individuals within the Colony or in regions under direct annexation (Waalo and parts of 
Kaajor), or who could prove they had been abused by their masters.59 Any others were 
expelled if claimed by their masters60, and if their masters failed to claim them, they were 
conferred upon local notables as dependants with few safeguards as to their free status. 
For example Djerry, the chief of the village of Podor, was the recipient of 14 wards 
between 1866 and 1868.
After 1884 the political situation rendered such a pragmatic solution indefensible 
and all slaves reaching French soil were in theory given certificates of liberation.61 The 
number of slaves seeking refuge had been climbing since 1880, and the news that 
slaves could expect to receive patents encouraged the increase in liberations Renault 
ascribed to administrative agency.62 Soon after, Bambara slaves from Banamba began 
to trickle into St. Louis, a drip that by 1905 would become a flood.63
Unfortunately we have little other information on who the vast majority of these
56 Klein, Slavety and Colonial Rule, p.72.
57 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15c, Chef du Service Judiciaire a Vallon, 11 October 1882, St. Louis.
58 i.e. ANS 3G124, Commandant Podor a Pinet-Laprade, 27 April 1868, Podor. Cases of Makadou Toure, Fatima 
Diop, and Seyni M’Djoro Gay.
59i.e. ANS 3G124, Cases of Ma Gone, N ’Codou Sal, Biram, Yacine. Regarding abuse see ANS 3G124. Case of 
Fatima Diop.
60 i.e. ANS 3G124. Cases of Mengueye N ’Diaye, Mabigue Couta, and Diati Gueya.
61 ANS K13, Directeur des Affaires Politiques a Administrateur de la Cercle St. Louis, Telegramme, 7 September 
1894, St. Louis.
62 ANS K13, Administrateur de Matam a Directuer des Affaires Politiques, 1 December 1894, Matam.
63ACSE, Bulletins Generaux XIV, No.7, August 1887, p.230. See the chapter on the Banamba exodus in Klein, 
Slaveiy and Colonial Rule, pp.159-179.
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fugitive slaves were. Klein has attempted to calculate their origins, and found that 
21.4% originated in Kaajor and a total of 47.6% from the Wolof and Sereer states 
(including Kaajor), while about 19.2% originated in Western Mali. However he relied 
mostly on names to distinguish points of origin and his findings are uncertain at best.64 
Perhaps our best indication comes again from the 1904 reports in the K18 files, in which 
officials highlight several likely scenarios by which slaves might chose to liberate 
themselves. Captifs de la couronne, for example, enjoyed a number of privileges of 
assimilation and rank and performed little labour and were consequently the least likely 
to seek their liberation.65 On the other hand those most likely to emancipate themselves 
appear, as in the Gold Coast, to have been recently acquired slaves who had 
accumulated none of the benefits of assimilation and whose memories and links with 
their homes were strongest.66 However, although in some ways requests for patents are 
surprisingly numerous, even as late as 1904 there was no mass self-liberation of slaves 
in the Protectorate despite arguments that they were “all more or less desirous of 
reclaiming their liberty”.67 After all, as we have seen there were at least between one 
and two hundred thousand slaves remaining with their masters at the time of the 
questionnaire; the approximately 1000 - 2000 per year seeking their liberation after 1884 
seems a drop in the bucket in light of this.
Missionaries as agents or means of liberation
In the last quarter of the 19th Century, the missionary promise of the Congregation 
de la Saint-Esprit was by no means fulfilled. After 1848 the Peres had attempted to 
expand outside of St. Louis and Goree68, but they accomplished little and made few 
conversions.69 Those few who ventured into the interior lamented the lack of resources 
and the small number of their brethren70, but it was not this that stopped them from 
having an impact on slavery in the Protectorate. Instead, the Peres largely accepted 
domestic slavery as “no more than a sort of domesticity”71 and concentrated on a policy 
of rachats. What attention the missionaries spared for slavery was aimed at purchasing
64 Klein, Slaveiy and Colonial Rule, p.73.
65 ANS K18, Reponse de Sergent de Ville de Foundiougne, 30 May 1904; Reponse de Fadministrateur de Louga, 25 
January 1904.
66 ANS K18, Reponse de Fadministrateur de Louga, 25 January 1904.
67 Ibid. See also ANS K18, Reponse de Sergent de Ville de Foundiougne, 30 May 1904; Reponse de Resident de 
Baol Occidental, 10 January 1904; Reponse de l ’Administrateur a Tivaouane, 29 January 1904.
68 Picciola, Andre, Missionaires enAfi-ique, L ’afrique Occidentals de 1840 d 1940, Denael, Paris, 1987, pp.57-58.
69 Picciola, Missionaires en Afrique, pp. 127.
70 ACSE, Missions Catholiques, XXI, 1889, p.588.
71 Ibid.
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children to act both as servants and as the core of nascent congregations; a policy 
followed by both Protestant and Catholic churches.72 Even the famous villages de 
liberte which came to house huge numbers of refugee slaves throughout French West 
Africa in the 20th Century were only begun in 1897 in the Soudan, and were never 
instituted by missionaries in the Senegal Protectorate.73 In fact, the missions were 
more the object than the instigators of liberation efforts. While not interested in 
liberating the general slave population, former converts who had been sold outside of 
the colony sometimes approached travelling missionaries. Such slaves, if they could 
recite the catechism, could count on Church support in gaining patents de liberte - 
effectively the only slaves liberated by European action outside of the Colony.74 
Similarly, young slaves in Joal sometimes turned to the Soeurs de St. Joseph de 
Ngozobil, usually after incidents of abuse, and were confiscated from their masters with 
the reluctant support of local administrators.75
Slaves seeking refuge within the Colony also found that churches were a rare 
source of food and lodging in otherwise crowded towns. The Catholic and Protestant 
missions competed for these converts to such a degree that in 1887 Monseigneur Riehl 
of the Congregation de la Saint-Esprit opened a Church Annex in Sor, across the river 
from St. Louis, in order to outflank the Protestant mission on the landward side of the 
island.76 Nevertheless, even in the Colony it was generally the fugitives who sought out 
the missionaries, rather than the other way around.
Means of existence for ex-slaves
If liberated slaves in the Gold Coast had few alternative means of existence, they 
could only be envied by their counterparts in Senegal. Most freed slaves had no choice 
at all. Lone children, for example, were simply conferred on habitants, free citizens of 
St. Louis Colony, and French officials as servants.77 Amongst these were a number who 
had been purchased by French-Senegalese citizens as slaves, legally liberated, but kept 
in virtual slavery by their purchasers despite their patents de liberte.78
72 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15d, Journal Officiel de la Republique Frangaise, 2 March 1880. ACSE, Missions 
Catholiques, XXI, 1889, p.587.
73 A  topic subjected to a thorough treatment by Denise Bouche. Bouche, Denise, Les Villages de Liberte enAfrique 
noire Frangaise 1887-1910, Mouton, Paris, 1968.
74 ACSE Missions Catholiques, IV, 1871-1872, p.696.
75 ACSE Bulletins Generaux, XII, No. 185?, May 1885, pp.667-668.
76 ACSE Bulletins Generaux, XIV, No. 7, August 1887, p.230.
77 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15e, Canard a Ministre, 23 May 1882, St. Louis. The identities of the conferees are 
discussed in detail by Klein. Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, pp.73.
78 ANS K2 5 ,L ’Esclavage enAOF, Deherme, 1906.
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Adult slaves also had few choices. While the last quarter of the 20th Century was 
a period of increased opportunity for peasants due to the growth of peanut farming, and 
while this appears to have led to a massive demand for slaves in the groundnut regions, 
free labour was not as welcomed by peasant land-holders and liberated slaves could not 
ensure that their patents would be honoured outside of the Colony. 79 They were 
therefore largely excluded from this agricultural transformation.
The military was always open to ex-slaves. The retreat of the 1870s led to a 
demand for African troops to replace French soldiers recalled to fight in France, while 
the subsequent re-expansion kept that demand so high80 that around 200 young male 
slaves were purchased and ‘liberated’ specifically for conscription.81 During subsequent 
decades, Africans remained the preferred soldiers for the more dangerous and 
unhealthy posts in the interior. However most of these recruits were slaves purchased 
directly from dealers. The French continued to specifically prefer Bambara recruits82, 
whom they viewed as a martial people, and freed slaves appear to have largely declined 
to join the military.83
Still, military service remained an option, if an unattractive one, for young male 
liberated slaves. Women and children had no such choice. “Most of the women and all 
children”, Canard reported in 1882, “serve new masters who [give] them food and 
lodging, in exchange for the profits” of their labours.84 The culture of slavery in St. Louis 
and Goree continued as largely the same arrangement under a different name, since a 
small elite still dominated both housing and employment, and many new slaves were 
simply integrated into the local economy as washerwomen, domestic servants, millet 
pounders and preparers of food.
Other than becoming dependants of habitant patrons, there was little work 
available. Governor Canard admitted in 1882 that “in effect, no institution has been 
created with the aim of regenerating these poor [people].”85 He lamented the fact that 
“slaves who we declare free... are generally terribly fitted out... [They] do not wish to 
work, [and] live on petty theft and charity” and he placed upon them the blame for “the
79 See Chapter 6. Also Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, pp.202.
80 ANSOM Senegal II/6, Memoire, Serval, 1871-1888.
81 Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts, pp.1-18.
82 See Chapter 6.
83 If the administration’s increasingly desperate attempts to recruit soldiers while large numbers of ex-slaves were still 
unemployed is anything to go by. See Klein, “Slavery and Emancipation in French West Africa”, p.176 for details on 
recruitment reforms.
84 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15e, Canard a Ministre, 23 May 1882, St, Louis.
85 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15e, Canard a Ministre, 23 May 1882, St. Louis.
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numerous fires that have broken out.”86
It was partly to capitalise on the availability of former slaves that, in the 1890s, 
various European companies and governments began to recruit labourers in the Colony 
for other parts of Africa. Local administrators at first actively encouraged the export of 
these unemployed former slaves, which they saw as beneficial both to the Colony and to 
the individuals themselves. The administration had already attempted to compel young 
male ex-slaves into working for the Directeur d’artillerie and the works commission, while 
others had been conferred upon the church.87 Furthermore, the recruitment of labour for 
overseas had a long history in Senegal.88 However, the days of forced engagement for 
other regions had been ended by a Decision imperiale of 1856 following a scandal in 
which Gabonese labourers meant for Guyana had been purchased and exported as 
slaves.89 Consequently, African labourers could no longer be legally compelled to travel 
overseas.
Nevertheless, the demand for labour in African colonies had never been higher 
than in the 1890s. Agents of Leopold of the Belgians were combing West Africa for 
soldiers and labourers to facilitate the rubber extraction process in the Congo.90 
Similarly, the administration of French Congo demanded workers and craftsmen for 
Libreville91, and seemed to prefer Senegalese recruits to act as tirailleurs.92 However 
voluntary recruits in the ports of Dakar, St. Louis, and Goree remained elusive.93 Some 
recruiters thus turned to the interior, recruiting peasants and possibly providing an 
opportunity for slaves, but this was a dangerous strategy that sometimes brought down 
the wrath of indigenous leaders.94
The largest number of recruits, however, were the “Sarakoles, Woloffs, and 
Toucouleurs who find themselves without work”95 in the Colony. The soldiers recruited 
for the French Congo were described as "porters, dockers, shoe-shine boys, about 16 to 
22 years old with little military bearing.” 96 Similarly, men recruited in Dakar for the
86 ANS K12, Canard a Ministre, 20 March 1882, St. Louis.
87 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15e, Canard a Ministre, 23 May 1882, St. Louis.
88 ANSOM Senegal XIV/24, Gouverneur de Martinique a Ministre, 7 April 1870, Fort-de-France; Senegal XIV/23b, 
Hamelin a Chef du division navale, 19 December 1856.
89 Renault, “L’abolition de l ’esclavage au Senegal”, pp.35-46.
90 ANSOM Senegal XIV/28, Lamothe a Ministre, 9 July 1894, St. Louis.
91 ANSOM Senegal XIV/28, Commissaire General du Congo Frangaise a Ministre, 21 November 1896, Libreville.
92 Martin, Phyllis, Leisure and. Society in Colonial Brazzaville, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p.25.
93 ANS K31, Maire Goree a Lamothe, 8 December 1891, Goree.
94 Note the experience of a team recruiting for Gabon along the Senegal River, who were fired upon and forced to turn 
over a number of alleged ‘slave’ recruits to local chiefs. ANSOM Senegal IV/68, Docteur Collomb a Seignac, 7 Mars 
1885, Salde.
95 ANS K31, Delaleu a Directeur de 1’Interieur, 19 May 1892, Dakar.
96 Martin, Leisure and Society, p.25.
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Belgian Congo in 1894 included massive numbers of “manoevres” and unemployed 
individuals, many of whom originated in the interior - especially Galaam and Fuuta 
Tooro.97 While not a single person enumerated in these records admits to a slave 
background, several factors indicate some may have been former slaves. The date, for 
example, is concurrent with increased slave liberations, while the interior origins of many 
recruits as well as the gender and age and lack of skilled experience suggest they may 
have included a number of runaways.
Conclusion
It is unfortunate that there is so meagre a discourse on slave liberations and 
means of existence in Senegal Protectorate in the 1870s and 1880s, but there is a 
logical reason for this in the paucity of primary information in French and Senegalese 
archives. As a result of effective resistance by slave-owners in Waalo and Dimar, the 
importance of slaves to groundnut cultivation, and a lack of conviction by local 
administrators, the French turned to the Protectorate system so as not to infringe upon 
slave-owning outside the Colony. Thus, unlike in the Gold Coast, there was no great 
threat to slave owners and the majority of slaves were unable to renegotiate their 
position. Nor would this change until after the implementation of the 1905 
Comprehensive Slavery Decree and the expansion of the navetane labour system for 
groundnut production.
There is tantalising evidence that the slave and slave-owning populations of 
Rufisque engaged in some sort of negotiations in the aftermath of the 1879 extension of 
emancipation. The situation in that town was quite unique. As early as 1874 Governor 
Valiere had warned masters in Rufisque that emancipation was imminent, and that they 
should attempt “to conserve for themselves the service of their freed slaves”98, and 
masters used the intervening time wisely. The mostly sedentary inhabitants of Rufisque, 
profiting from a burgeoning trade in groundnuts, did not have the option of fleeing 
French authority like the slave owners of Waalo, and despite Canard’s fears no such 
exodus took place.99 As I have pointed out, many slave owners probably transferred 
their slaves to villages outside Rufisque. However the temporary demand for workers 
created by the government’s programme of infrastructure improvements in Cap Vert100, 
the accessibility of sol libre even for slaves who were moved, and (according to Briere
97 ANS K31, Le delegue de l ’lnterieur [Dakar] a le Gouverneur, 28 February 1894, Goree.
98 ANS K ll ,  Valiere a Commandant de Goree, 24 March 1874, St. Louis.
99 ANS 4B64, Canard a Briere de l ’lsle, 1 December 1877, Dakar.
100 ANS 4B64, Canard a Briere de l ’lsle, 1 July 1878, Dakar.
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de I’lsle) the example of the more egalitarian neighbouring Sereer states101 may have 
created an environment in which slave owners were “forced to make ‘arrangements’ with 
their slaves.”102 It is unfortunate that I have been unable to uncover little further 
evidence regarding these arrangements.
The situation in Rufisque, however, was exceptional. By and large, slaves could 
still liberate themselves only by travelling to French soil, and there was little incentive to 
do so - especially since there was no available land in the Colony. Young male slaves 
were not only the most able to seek their liberation but also the most likely to find some 
kind of labour; either overseas or in the military. Most of them, however, and almost all 
women and children who sought their liberation, found only a continuation of their lives 
of labour for a master, despite their legally emancipated status.
Historians who write about this period agree that emancipation for most of 
Senegal’s slaves would have to wait until the twentieth century. 103 However while 
domestic captivity was tolerated by late nineteenth century colonial authorities, public 
pressure to end the ‘odious commerce’ of the internal slave trade had begun to mount. 
During the last decade of the century, Senegal’s administration was given a final 
opportunity to show the resolution and ability to eradicate one of the most abusive 
aspects of Senegalese slavery in the nineteenth century.
101 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15d, Briere de l’lsle a Ministre, 8 May 1880, St. Louis.
102 ANSOM Senegal XIV/15d, Briere de PIsle a Ministre, 8 May 1880, St. Louis.
103 Renault, “L’abolition de l’esclavage au Senegal”, p.81. Saint-Martin, Le Senegal Sous le Second Empire, p.606. 
Becker, Charles, “Les Effets Demographiques”, 1988, p.91.
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CHAPTER 9:
Toward the eradication of the overland slave trade?
The British and French policies discussed in the last five chapters were 
celebrated by turn-of-the-century historians as the gradual unveiling of a great 
teieological plan, in which the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade in the first decades of 
the nineteenth century had been the first major step.1 If we judged solely from the tone 
of their accounts and the text of their reports, the decreed abolitions of slavery in 1834 
and 1848 and the extension of emancipation policies to the Gold Coast Protectorate in 
1874 would seem to be logical rungs on a ladder stretching toward the goal of the total 
extermination of slavery in Senega! and the Gold Coast.
Such a view, however, is entirely fallacious. The settlements on the Gold Coast 
were excluded from Britain’s emancipatory policies between 1834 and 1874. The 
French emancipation of 1848 did take effect in the minuscule Colony of Senegal; 
however even the highly politicised slaves of St. Louis and Goree had simply become 
clients in a less formalised but still dependant relationship with their former masters. 
Perhaps the extension of British hegemony over the Gold Coast in 1874 was expected 
by some to transform slave-owning, but the watered-down measure eventually handed 
to the colonial administration by the Colonial Office resulted only in a gradual re- 
evaluation of dependent status for slaves rather than massive liberations. Meanwhile, 
resistance by slave-owners in Senegal was so effective that the French authorities there 
did not even attempt to emulate the Gold Coast policies after the disastrous failure of a 
prototype policy in Waalo in the 1880s.
In fact, as the nineteenth century drew to a close it became apparent that even 
the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade had been limited both in its scope and in its 
results. While the last ships smuggling slaves to the New World appear to have sailed 
in the 1860s, thousands of slaves were still kidnapped, captured in wars, and purchased 
in the African interior. Captives still made the terrible and often fatal journey to coastal 
territories where demand for them was high, and they were still to be found in the slave 
markets of Senegal and the Gold Coast. What was more, they were sold before the 
horrified eyes of the increasing numbers of missionaries and civilian, rather than military, 
administrators. Thus, as the century came to a close, the governments of the two 
colonies came under renewed agitation to definitively end the institution of slave trading. 
Their diverging responses to this pressure would indicate both a departure from and a
1 Macdonald, The Gold Coast. Ancelle, J. Les Explorations Au Senegal, Paris, 1886.
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continuity of the policies of tolerance towards slavery that had exemplified European 
colonialism in West Africa for the preceding century.
Why target the slave trade?
The long-distance slave trade into the Senegal and Gold Coast regions was 
perceived by European observers as a traditional ‘custom1, existing since “time 
immemorial”.2 However while early European travellers to the Gold Coast had noted the 
high proportion of slaves with origins in the interior, a comparable proportion of the 
region’s slaves had been acquired locally. Similarly, in Senegal prior to the Atlantic slave 
trade the commerce in slaves had generally run south-north rather than from the interior 
to the coast.3
However the long-distance slave trade had shifted radically and definitively in 
both regions during the era of the Atlantic slave trade. On the Gold Coast, well- 
positioned states such as those of the Fante and for a period Akwamu had gained 
power as “the brokers of those of the interior who supply slaves.”4 Similarly, during this 
period the Senegalese coastal entrepots trafficked largely in slaves from Gaajaga and 
other regions in the interior.5 The abolition of the Atlantic slave trade and the 
subsequent development of legitimate commerce on the coast had reinforced the 
demand for slaves from the interior both for use in labour and as domestic slaves.6
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, concurrent with increasing liberalisation 
in Europe and growing colonial responsibilities in Senegal and the Gold Coast, this trade 
in slaves from the interior became the object of the fiercest abolitionist outrage which 
soon carried over to politicians in the metropoles. The accounts of Livingstone and 
other explorers had made an impression on the public psyche, and outrage over the 
persistence of the slave trade in East Africa had promoted increased intervention by first 
Protestant missionaries, and later the Catholic White Fathers. As Miers and Roberts 
have pointed out, the work of these missionaries was impeded by “wars and raids, the
2 PRO CO 879/33, Fairfield Report, 1874.
3 See Chapter 1. Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p.31.
4 PRO T70/36, Smith and Officers to Committee, 15 March 1817, Cape Coast. See also van Dantzig, Albert, “Effects 
of the Atlantic Slave Trade”.
5 Searing, West African Slavery and Atlantic Commerce, pp.29-30. Marcson “European-African Interaction in the 
Precolonial Period”, p. 19.
6 See Chapters 3 and 4.
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hostility of slavers, and the dilemma posed by fugitive slaves”, and under Cardinal 
Lavigerie the White Fathers led the crusade to popularise abolitionism in Catholic 
Europe after 1888.7
This abhorrence of the “trafique odieux” was not entirely logical, since the 
commerce in slaves led directly to forms of domestic slavery which were generally 
accepted by the very same officials.8 However such an opinion was perhaps informed 
by the European view of the benign and assimilative nature of indigenous domestic 
slavery, which resulted in the perception of a vast distinction between settled domestic 
slaves and newly imported slaves. Missionaries, both Protestant and Catholic, supported 
this differentiation9, and so it is no surprise that it was gleefully picked up by the officials 
responsible for making policy in the colonies, who were eager to find excuses for their 
apathy towards, and support of, domestic slave-holding. Carnarvon labelled the 
importation of slaves “an outrage and a crime”10 and when Victor Schoelcher reported to 
the Senate in 1880 that “caravans freely traverse French territory”, officials in Senegal 
were quick to react.11
For Carnarvon, Strahan, and their officers on the Gold Coast, eradicating the 
slave trade also represented a logical extension of gradualist policies towards ending 
slavery. Benjamin Pine had suggested in 1857 that the importation of trade slaves be 
criminalised while domestic slavery and pawning arrangements be merely regulated.12 
While Carnarvon considered only allowing slaves to slowly purchase their freedom and 
Strahan suggested only liberating children born after 1875, both remained steady in their 
support for “the immediate and absolute prohibition of slave dealing in every form.”13
For the administrators of Senegal as well, a politically expedient attack on the 
slave trade seemed a good compromise between the demands of abolitionists and the 
administration’s reliance on the goodwill of indigenous slave-owners.14 Their inability to 
reconcile abolitionist demands with their management of newly-conquered territories in 
the 1880s and 1890s especially demanded that some kind of sop be thrown to the
7 Miers and Roberts, “The End of Slavery in Africa”, p.16.
8 ANS K17, Rapport Sur la Captivite, Administrateur Poulet, 1905.
9 ACSE Missions Catholiques XXI, 1889, p.588. Jenkins, BMS Abstracts, Zimmerman, unadressed, 26 July 1875, 
Abokobi.
10 PP 1875, l i l  (c.1139), Carnarvon to the Officer Administering the Government of the Gold Coast, August 21,
1875, London,
11 ANS K 2 5 ,L ’esclavage enAOF, Deherme, 1906. See Chapter 8.
12 PRO CO 879/33, the Fairfield Report, 1874.
13 PP 1875, LII (c.1139), Carnarvon to the Officer Administering the Government of the Gold Coast, August 21,
1875, London; (c.1139), Strahan to Carnarvon, 19 September 1874.
14 What Renault calls “a compromise between trade and public opinion, without appearing to compromise,” Renault, 
“L’abolition de l ’esclavage au Senegal”, p. 34.
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French public. Thus while promising Lat Joor of Kaajor that there would be no general 
emancipation under French protection in 1882, Minister Rouvier instructed the Governor 
to inform him that slave trading would be banned.15 Similar conditions were written into 
the 1890 Treaty of Protection that was subsequently extended over the bulk of 
Senegal.16
However, the slave trade was an obvious target for the two administrations not 
only for reasons of perception, but also of convenience. It is apparent, in light of 
evidence showing that newly acquired slaves were more likely to seek their liberation or 
leave their masters in both regions, that trade slaves were a more assured source of law 
enforcement triumphs for colonial administrations desperate to illustrate their 
commitment to abolition. Slave traders, unlike slave-owners, were often from outside 
the Colony, and their capture was less likely to alienate indigenous elites than the 
punishment of neighbours and friends. The slave trade was also, by necessity, 
conducted along waterways or major paths and large slave convoys may have been an 
easier catch than individual slaves and slave owners in domestic settings.
With all the political capital to be made out of pursuing slave traders, it is perhaps 
no wonder that Governors and magistrates conceived of policies to tackle the long­
distance trade in people. In the Gold Coast, a serious if under-resourced effort to 
eradicate this institution began in 1875, whereas in Senegal it was only the re-expansion 
of the 1880s that ushered in even the most meagre measures against it. In both 
regions, the period following the Treaty of Brussels in 1890 provided an opportunity to 
intensify the war on slave trading; but it was one that was not necessarily grasped. 
However, before we look at the methods of enforcement we must consider the nature of 
the trade in question in the two regions in the late nineteenth century.
The slave trade into Senegal
Long-distance commercial networks are rarely static over long periods of time, 
and the trade in slaves from the interior into Senegal was no exception. While trade 
routes during the era of the Atlantic slave trade were largely structured to bring slaves 
from the interior to the coastal entrepots, and later to the Senegal region generally, 
events and trends often disrupted the functioning of this distribution network.
The transportation and sale of slaves in the late 1860s is a case in point. For 
these years we have an unusually revealing record of slave experiences, since
15 ANS K17, Rapport Sur la Captivite, Administrateur Poulet, 1905.
16 ANS K12, Treatie Lamothe et Yamar of Oalo, the Bourba Djolof, Madiou of N ’Guick-M’Pal, Magnang of 
Gandiolais, and the Bour N ’Diambour, 15 February 1890.
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Commandant Jaureguiberry17 of Podor kept details of slaves seeking refuge at his post 
between 1866 and 1868. We should refrain from drawing too many conclusions from 
these documents, since the French policy of only liberating free-born individuals 
originating from Kaajor, Waalo, and the Colony mean that Jaureguiberry’s records 
include mostly slaves from those origins.18 However these files reveal that the late 
1860s were a chaotic period. French wars of expansion, conflict between secular and 
Muslim leaders, and especially the rise of Maba had led to an apparently significant 
number of free-born Senegalese - Wolof, Sereer, Tukolor, and Fulbe - becoming 
enslaved. Maba’s rebellion had an especially large impact on Jolof, where his advance 
into the territory in 186519 displaced villagers who consequently became vulnerable to 
capture by both opposing armies and brigands who wandered the area in the wake of 
his defeat.20 At the same time, in Kaajor, various tyeddo factions still operated despite 
the assertion of French authority21 Partly due to the disruption in planting and 
harvesting resulting from these conflicts, large parts of northern Senegal experienced a 
famine during this period which forced individuals to flee their villages, joining the war
oprefugees on the roads. That some of these individuals ended up in Podor indicated 
that they had been sold or transported from coastal regions into the interior - something 
of a shift from the normal trade routes.
By the 1880s, however, slave distribution networks into Senegal appear to have 
largely returned to normal operations. The system within which these networks 
functioned was largely defined by geography; the Senegal and Gambian rivers 
continued to be the most efficient means of transportation for slave traders - and slave 
dealers entered the region by crossing one or the other. On the more important northern 
route the Senegal River functioned as a long-distance pathway. In the South, the creeks 
of the Gambian delta and of the nearby Siin-Saalum delta gave slave-dealers a porous 
border through which to smuggle slaves up and down the coast.
The southern slave route was far less significant than that of the Senegal River. 
It can be deduced that this was at least partly due to the presence of more efficient
17 Later Governor and then Ministre de la Marine
18 ANS 3G124, Commandant de Podor a Pinet-Laprade, 27 April 1868, Podor.
19 See Chapter 6.
20 ANS 3G124, Commandant de Podor a Pinet-Laprade, 27 April 1868, Podor. Records of Ndeme N ’Dom, Sokna 
Koudia, Baye N ’Diaye, Mengueye N ’Diaye, and Mabique Couta. ANS 13G148, Commandant de Salde a Pinet- 
Laprade, 15 December 1865, Salde.
21 ANS 3G124, Commandant de Podor a Pinet-Laprade, 27 April 1868, Podor. Records of Fatima Guey, Sokna 
Souran, Juga N ’Dieu, and Samba N ’Diaye.
22 ANS 3G124, Commandant de Podor a Pinet-Laprade, 27 April 1868, Podor. Records of M’Baye N ’Goree and 
Moussa Diop.
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British anti-siave trade patrols at Bathurst and points along the Gambia River. Certainly 
the Gambian route had been used throughout the eighteenth century23, and groundnut 
plantations in Siin-Saalum should have increased the traditionally lower demand for 
slaves in these Sereer regions. Additionally, slaves were transported to the Gambia 
River from markets in Kayes or possibly Medine near the source of the Senegal River 
(and which also served the northerly routes), and these markets continued to function 
throughout the 1880s and 1890s. That this route diminished in favour of the Senegal 
River trade points to the effectiveness of increased British enforcement. Additionally, 
Bernard Moitt has pointed out that slaves originating from south of the Gambia River 
were during this period perhaps being redirected towards coastal Guinea.24
Nevertheless, at least some of the slaves who were purchased in Baol, Siin, and 
Saalum entered Senegal across the Gambia. In 1893 a slave from Sierra Leone was 
sold in Thies (Siin), prompting the administrateur de cercle to comment rather 
hypocritically that “I suppose that many of the English [subjects] have no other means of 
existence other than the commerce in slaves.”25 Unfortunately we do not know the 
origin of most of the other slaves who arrived in the district, but we have more 
information on their captors. There are two records of “Dioulas” bringing convoys into 
the territory - one of 40 slaves brought into Baol and another of 28 imported to 
Fundiugne.26 The designation Dioula, or juula, is often somewhat loosely applied but it 
properly refers to well-organised loosely aligned groups of Manding merchants who with 
their wide-reaching networks had the resources to transport slaves and other goods over 
long distances. In this case, they appear to have maintained long-term trading 
relationships in Siin-Saalum and Baol, especially with the Tukolor and Fulbe villages 
scattered around this mostly Sereer region.27
The more significant Senegal River slave trade worked on somewhat similar lines, 
but we know much more about the mechanisms by which it operated. Slaves entered 
this network from an enormous region of the interior, funnelled into interior markets 
where convoys were formed. One of the main transit points was Banamba, where an 
enormous market operated, processing slaves brought in from diverse regions, 
especially the bend of the Niger. Prior to conquest at the hands of Shayk Umar in 1861, 
Slaves from Segu generally reached Banamba via the market at Nyamina.28 Following
23 Curtin, Economic Change in Precolonial Aft'ica, p.33.
24 Moitt, “Slavery and Emancipation in Senegal’s Peanut Basin”, p.33.
25 ANS K13, Administrateur de Cercle Sin-Saloum a Directeur des Affaires Politiques, 10 November 1893, Thies.
26 ANS K13, Javoureux a Monsieur Couchard, avocat, 26 July 1893.
27 ANS K18, Reponse de 1*administrateur de Kaolack, 26 January 1904, Kaolack.
28 Robinson, David, The Holy War o f Umar Tal The Western Sudan in the Mid-Nineteenth Centuty, Oxford
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its conquest, both Umarian Segu and rival Sikasso supplied slaves captured in the wars 
of Shayk Umar and his heirs and Tieba of Sikasso.29 Ahmadu’s brutal suppression of 
revolts in 1876 and 1885 provided waves of captives30, as did Tieba’s wars against the 
Dogon and Senufo. The 1887-1889 conflict between Tieba and Samori Toure served 
only to increase the importance of this route.31
Slaves from Banamba and the Niger bend met slaves from Sokolo, Sarafere and 
the intermediate market of Nioro at the Upper Senegal posts of Bakel, Kayes, and 
Medine. These towns formed the major junction for the slave trade into Senegal until 
the very end of the century.32 It was here that merchants from the interior sold their 
captives to the juula traders who would transport them upriver.33
The juula operating on the Senegal River worked on a similar basis to those
University Press, London, 1985, p.245.
29 Moitt, “Slavery and Emancipation in Senegal’s Peanut Basin”, p.33.
30 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p.231.
31 Klein, Martin, “Slavery and Emancipation in French West Africa”, p. 176.
ANS K ll ,  Commandant de Dagana a Briere de l ’lsle, no date 1880, Dagana. Gouverner Soudan a Lamothe, 25 
January 1894, Kayes. ANS 15G116, Commandant Medine a Commandant Kayes, 24 August 1898, Medine.
33 ANS 2D 136 ,1899, op.cit. in Moitt, “Slavery and Emancipation in Senegal’s Peanut Basin”, p.37.
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importing slaves into Siin-Saalum. In northern Senegambia they were largely 
Soninke/Manding and Tukolor traders from Gaajaga34 who had long-standing links with 
the habitant trade, networks reaching into the interior from the coast.35 Juula traders 
transported slaves from their entrepots in Bakel and Medine, where they were quartered 
with iocal merchants, to markets along the river, the most important of which were 
French-garrisoned towns.36 Podor appears to have been an especially busy market for 
purchasers in Toro, while Dagana was active at least until the 1882 annexation as the 
terminal market serving Dimar; trading resumed here after the 1890 declaration of the 
Protectorate.37 Governor Roume noted evidence of an active trade being carried on in 
both towns as late as 1902.38
Many slaves, however, made their way into the hands of another set of 
middlemen - Moors - and were carried downriver to terminal and transitional markets in 
Waalo and the neighbourhood of St. Louis. Here a number of markets had been set up 
in the major towns of Waalo to serve the inhabitants of the Delta region as well as 
habitants who purchased slaves for service in St. Louis; and there is evidence that 
Moorish traders also transported slaves from these markets for yet another journey, this 
time to the groundnut fields of Kaajor.39 One of the largest of the Waalo markets was at 
Merinaghen, which functioned at least up to French annexation in 1882, when the 
exodus of slave-owners temporarily closed it down.40 Likewise, French officers noted a 
number of slaves brought to St. Louis from a market in Leybar in 1882.41 Similarly the 
market at Gandiole, just across the river from St. Louis, was active in the early 1880s42 
and Moorish merchants returned in the early 1890s, offering for sale female slaves 
originating in Bambara, Sangara, and Walala, despite the threat of punishment from 
colonial authorities.43 As late as 1904, the administrator responsible for N’Diambour and 
Gandiolais reported that “slave owners frequently arrive with captives”, exchanging them 
for both money and animals.44
34 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, pp. 13, 76.
35 Ibid, pp.76, 231.
36 ANS K ll ,  Commandant de Dagana a Briere de Plsle, no date 1880, Dagana.
37 Ibid. ANS K12, Chef du Service Judiciaire a Canard, 18 March 1882, St. Louis.
38 ANS K27,Roume a Secretaire-Generale, 3 December 1903, no place.
39 Moitt, “Slavery and Emancipation in Senegal’s Peanut Basin”, p.34.
40 ANS 3G124, Commandant de Podor a Pinet-Laprade, 27 April 1868, Podor. Records of Sayor Toure and Fatima 
Diop. ANSOM Senegal XIV/15e, Vallon a Ministre, 20 March 1882, St. Louis, enclosure 1.
41 ANS K12, Chef du Service Judiciaire h Canard, 18 March 1882, St. Louis.
42 ANS K12, Chef du Service Judiciaire a Canard, 18 March 1882, St. Louis
43 ANS K13, Rapport de 1’Administrateur de Cercle de St. Louis a la Directeur des Affaires Politiques, 20 March 
1894, St. Louis.
44 ANS K18, Reponse de 1’adminstrateur de Louga, 25 January 1904, Louga.
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The slave trade into the Gold Coast
in the early period of Euro-African coastal trade, the Akan and Ga-Adangme 
coast had been a net importer of slaves - and not only from the north. Ray Kea, in his 
comprehensive examination of sixteenth and seventeenth century Gold Coast societies, 
identified four major slave routes revealed by contemporary sources. The Europeans 
themselves were directly involved in only one of these: Portuguese merchants trading 
slaves for gold at Elmina.45 Much more important to Akan states - especially in the 
western interior - were Manding juula traders operating north of the forest zone. Kea has 
suggested that these merchants operated in conjunction with Malian cavalry raiders, 
capturing and exporting “thousands of captives” southwards in conjunction with Akan - 
and especially Twifo - trading networks 46 Other Mande traders from regions west of the 
Akan zone, also sent slaves along with cloth and gold to Asante and the western Gold 
Coast in exchange for guns, gunpowder, and European goods that were less easy to 
obtain from more limited Euro-African trade arrangements on the Kwakwa coast.47 
Other slaves arrived along coastal routes. Elmina and Axim were important slave 
markets for canoe-borne traders from the west, while Accra and other eastern coastal 
districts received slaves from Slave Coast sources such as Great Popo.
The slave-trading network into the Gold Coast in the late nineteenth century, 
some three hundred years later, represented both a continuation of and a divergence 
from this system. The coastal routes, for example, appear to have become largely 
disused by this period, probably because of effective enforcement by British naval 
patrols and tighter control on the exporting ports. Conversely, routes from the interior 
appear to have been reinforced by the addition of a powerful Hausa trading network 
based in Dagomba, which competed with the juula in feeding intermediate markets on 
the Volta River - especially the massive slave bazaar in Salaga. Indeed, by the latter 
half of the nineteenth century the Volta had become the largest transportation route for 
slaves into the Gold Coast, and Ada was its major main terminal and intermediate 
market48 Complementing this trade route was the continued commerce in slaves from
45 See Chapter 1.
46 Kea, Settlements, Trade and Polities, p.197-201.
47 Weiskel, Timothy, French Colonial Rule and the Baule Peoples: Resistance and Collaboration, 1889-1911, 
Clarendon Press, 1980.
48 BMS D-1.17, J. Muller, 10 June 1865, Christianborg; D-1.13b, J. Heck, 1 November 1862, Odumase. PRo CO 
96/120, Freeling to Minister, 30 January 1877, Cape Coast. PRO CO 96/222, Griffith to Minister, 24 February 1892, 
Accra, enclosure 3, Waldron to Colonial Secretary, 20 October 1891, Ada.
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savanna states in the north-west, arguably extending as far as the Niger bend, to 
markets in Asante, Gyaman, and in the 1870s Adansi, outside British control.
The main source of information regarding these commercial routes - other than 
reports by colonial officers, merchants, and less frequently the Aborigine’s Protection 
Society - are the transcripts of slavery-related court cases in the SCT files of the 
National Archives of Ghana. While these are a very rich source of data, they can be 
quite confusing due mainly to the ignorance of British officials of the interior states of 
West Africa. Slaves were commonly identified by their primary language, but sometimes 
they were asked to identify their own origins - frequently towns rather than regions or 
states. Colonial officials often simply guessed at their origins based on vague directions. 
Thus many slaves came from Grussi, Grunshie or Ingrussie - a politically fragmented 
and rather undefined region which appears to represent a territory encompassing the 
inter-Volta territories of Isala, Bulsa, Dagarti, and Lobi but not the slave-exporting town 
of Wa at its centre.49 Others slaves were clearly Mossis.50 Similarly, it is difficult to 
identify slaves’ origins from colonial-era spellings of towns - where, for example, were 
“Alhandu, Salamah, and Amabua”.51 The traditional predisposition of Europeans to 
‘ethnic’ taxonomies further complicated the matter. As already noted, British officials 
tended to place all Muslims under the moniker ‘Hausa’, and accounts of ‘Arab’ 
participation in the interior stages of the slave trade often referred to Tuareg traders. 
Sometimes such misconceptions came from the slave trade, when traders strove to 
meet European preferences for certain ethnicities (such as the French demand for 
‘martial’ Bambaras to serve in their armies of occupation), or to deceive the buyers that 
their consignments were from those preferred groups.52
It is nevertheless clear that the northern savanna region was the major point of 
provenance for slaves entering the Gold Coast Protectorate. Large numbers of slaves 
were transported by caravan, many of them to the intermediate market at Salaga at a 
navigable point on the Volta River. Fortunately, we have quite a bit of information on the 
market here, mostly from the reports of British, French, and German travellers and 
officials, many of which have been compiled and translated by Marion Johnson.53
49 e.g. NAG SCT 2/5/1, Regina v. Awah, Accra Divisional Court, 12 January 1884. SCT 17/5/8, Kasanah v. Quissa 
Pome Cudjo, Accra District Court, 11 July 1889. SCT 5/4/15, Regina v. Dafee, Cape Coast Judicial Assessors Court, 
10 March 1875.
50 e.g. NAG SCT 2/5/1, Regina v. Tuitalaboo, Accra District Court, 5 October 1881.
51 NAG SCT 2/5/1, Regina v. Timbuctoo, Accra Divisional Court, 5 October 1881.
52 Rathbone, Richard, “Resistance to Enslavement in West Africa”, in Patrick Manning, Slave Trade 1500-1800; 
Globalization of Forced Labour, Variorum, Aldershot, 1996.
53 Johnson, Marion, Salaga Papers, Vol. I, Institute of African Studies, Legon, Ghana, no date. Johnson, Salaga 
Papers.
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Gonja, of which Salaga was the chief town, had been a tributary state of Asante prior to 
1874, and the main market for its kola crop. The merchants of Salaga had generally 
paid tribute to Kumasi in slaves54, and the town consequently acted as an important 
market for slaves originating in the interior and terminating in Asante. The victory of the 
British and their allies in 1874, however, encouraged the Gonjas to rebel. The former 
Governor of Lagos, J. H. Glover reported that they simply refused to pay their traditional 
tribute55, but Gouldsbury informed Strahan that they “seized all the Ashantees in their 
country... and killed every one of them.”56 Unfortunately, this action cut Salaga off from 
the kola trade, so that by 1876 the French trader Bonnat reported that "Salaga [wa]s 
deserted and partly fallen to ruin”57, much of the trade being diverted to the new market 
of Kintampo established in north-east Asante.58 As the kola trade to Salaga declined, 
slave trading became even more important. In 1877 two African pastors, Theophil 
Opoku and David Asante, visited the market and “found trade at a standstill, excepting 
the slave trade, which was going on briskly”. 59
Throughout this period, there existed two complementary slave caravan routes to 
Salaga; one run by ‘Hausas’ from Dagomba and further east and the other originating 
from north-west of the Grunshi belt and mainly run by Mossi states.60 Dagomba 
merchants appear to have made up a significant proportion of the permanent trading 
community in Salaga61 and by the late 1880s their ranks were augmented by Hausas 
from the region of Bornu who sold slaves and bought “arms, powder and the best 
horses, to capture new slaves.” Mounted raiding parties of Dagombas and Hausas 
reportedly operated both to the north-east of Gonja and throughout the Grunshi belt, 
bringing the inhabitants of entire villages to the Salaga market.63
However the majority of slaves were reportedly imported from the north-west, 
and this route was dominated by Mossi merchants.64 Mossi merchants brought trade
54 Bowdich, T. Edward, Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee, London, 1819, pp.171,177,483.
55 J.H. Glover, Proceedings o f the Royal Geographical Society, 1874 in Johnson, Salaga Papers.
56 PRO CO 96/119, Strahan to Minister, 30 April 1876, enclosure 1, Report on G ouldsbw y’s journey into the 
interior o f the Gold Coast, 27 March 1876, Accra
57 Bonnat, M.J., Liverpool Mercury, 12 June 1876 in Johnson, Salaga Papers.
58 More on this later. Lonsdale, R., Affairs o f the Gold Coast, 1882, in Johnson, Salaga Papers. Wilks, Asante in the 
Nineteenth Century, p.282.
59 Proceedings o f the Royal Geographical Society, London, June 1884, Summary of the visits of Asante and Opoku to 
Salaga, 1877 in Johnson, Salaga Papers.
60 Johnson identifies these routes in his own analysis of the documents he collected. Johnson, Marion, “The Slaves of 
Salagah”, Journal o f African History, 1986 (27), pp. 341-362.
61 Binger, L.G, From the Niger to the Gulf o f Guinea, Paris, 1892, in Johnson, Salaga Papers.
62 Frangois, C, Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Shutzgebieten, Berlin, 1888 in Johnson, Salaga Papers.
63 Klose, H, Togo unter deutscher Flagge: Reisebilder und Betrachtungen, Berlin, 1899 in Johnson, Salaga Papers.
64 Frangois, C, Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Shutzgebieten, Berlin, 1888 in Johnson, Salaga Papers.
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goods to Salaga on the heads of slaves in enormous caravans led by professional 
caravaneers.65 The slaves were also subsequently sold, exchanging them for salt, 
money, and European luxuries.66 The arrival of two such caravans into Salaga in 1889 
was reported by District Commissioner Firminger, who was engaged in recruiting for the 
Hausa Constabulary. Firminger reported that:
In the case of the Moshi caravan the ‘maidugu’ or commander had heard news 
of my arrival... and it was only upon the solemn assurances of non-interference 
by the Prince of Leppo and Prince Yusufu of Dagomba, that he brought the
remainder of his slaves into the slave market of the town  [A second]
caravan... consisted principally of Grushi slaves captured by Gajare, the self 
styled King of Jabarema, who was then waging a slave war against the 
inoffensive and helpless Grushi nation to supply the slave markets...67
Sources such as this consistently point to the autonomous villages of the Grunshi region 
as the main point of acquisition for slaves entering the Gold Coast; but intriguingly at 
least some slaves delivered to Salaga were captured as far away as the bend of the 
Niger River68 It is entirely possible that small numbers of slaves were thus being 
acquired for sale in both the Gold Coast and Senegal in the same area. After 1886, this 
trade was largely in the hands of the ‘Jabarema’ or Zabarima.69 The Zabarima had 
originally entered this part of West Africa as mercenaries and traders, participating in 
Dagomba slave-raiding expeditions. By the late 1880s the Zabarima “had conquered 
and were probably continuously controlling an area stretching from Ougadougou to Wa” 
and had solid connections with the merchant community of Salaga.70 After 1891, the 
market became even more crowded following Samori Toure’s move to a new capital at 
Bissandugu and his subsequent search for new markets in which to sell slaves for guns.
While Salaga fed the high demand for slaves in the eastern districts of the 
Protectorate such as Krobo and Akuapem, slaves terminating west of the Pra River 
generally passed through Asante. Although a minority of these slaves were purchased
65 Johnson, “The Slaves of Salaga”, pp.347-348.
f,fi Klose, H, Togo unter deutscher Flagge: Reisebilder und Betrachtungen, Berlin, 1899 in Johnson, Salaga Papers. 
Opoku, Theophil, “An African Pastor’s preaching journey through the lands of the upper Volta”, Evangelisches 
Missions - Magazin, Basel, 1885 in Johnson, Salaga Papers.
67 NAG ADM 1/1/88, Firminger to Colonial Office, 30 April 1889, West Kensington.
68 NAG SCT 17/5/6, Regina v. Aseday, Accra District Court, 5 October 1887. Johnson, however, agrees that by the 
1890s “most of the slaves passing through the Salaga market were ‘Grunshi’”, Johnson, “The Slaves of Salaga”, 
p.347.
69 Holden, Jeff, " The Zabarima Conquest of North-West Ghana”, Transactions o f the Historical Society o f  Ghana, 
1965 (8), pp.60-86.
70 Holden, “ The Zabarima Conquest”, p.60,62.
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by Asante merchants in Salaga71, and some came in from Gyaman to the west of 
Kumasi72, the majority came through northern markets such as Kintampo in the present 
day region of Brong-Ahafo. It is not totally clear who supplied slaves to Kintampo, but we 
do know that juula trading networks based in Kong, Bouna, and Bonduku were involved 
in the cloth trade to this market after 1887, and the town is as close as Salaga to the 
Zabarima slave-trading state.73
Prior to the 1873-1874 war, Asante had acquired most of its slaves through 
payments made by tributary states.74 However the breakdown of Asante power and 
trading networks after 1874 not only cut off the flow of slaves from tributary regions but 
also enabled northerners to infiltrate the slave-trading network through Asante. Not only 
were ‘Arabs1 and ‘Haussas’ able to take over the transport of slaves to Asante, they 
even became involved in the export of slaves from Asante to the Protectorate.75 Their 
role in this part of the trade, however, was minor - Asantes appear to have continued to
7fidominate the routes south.
Asante merchants ran the slave export trade as an adjunct to the legitimate trade 
in goods to coastal towns. Women and children, who were unlikely to run away, were 
especially useful as carriers of trade goods, after which they were themselves sold.77 
This trade in porters, alongside an increasing number of slave-acquiring trips taken into 
the interior by coastal peoples themselves, seems to have entirely replaced slave 
caravans by 1897, when the District Commissioner of Cape Coast alleged that “natives 
of Cape Coast who want children go up to Gaman... and buy the children.... There is no 
trade of Natives of the Interior bringing down children or women for the sole purpose of 
selling them”.78 Coastal peoples may have been drawn to markets in the Baule interior 
by the massive influx of slaves brought into that region by Samori during his retreat from 
French forces pursuing him from the west. Timothy Weiskel has shown that the Baule 
did not actively export these slaves, largely preferring to retain them for their own use 
and allowing potential buyers to come to them. Traders from the Gold Coast engaged in
71 NAG SCT 5/4/17, Regina v. Ahinaguah, Cape Coast Judicial Assessors Court, 14 December 1875.
72 PRO CO 96/311, Hodgson to Minister, 29 January 1898, Accra, DC Cowie, Cape Coast. NAG SCT 17/5/6, Sgt. 
Mjr. Davidson v. Qwah Aryar, Accra District Court, 14 January 1887.
73 Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century, p.295. Binger, L.G, From the Niger to the Gulf o f Guinea, Paris, 1892, in 
Johnson, Salaga Papers,
74 e.g. NAG SCT 5/4/18, Regina v. Appeah Coomah, Cape Coast Judicial Assessors Court, 6 April 1876, for example, 
testimony that 2000-3000 slaves were transported to Asante from Bokum in just one convoy prior to 1873.
75 NAG SCT 5/4/15, Regina v. Dafee, Cape Coast Judicial Assessors Court, 10 March 1875. SCT 5/4/19, Regina v. 
Kofi Tando, Cape Coast Judicial Assessors Court, 2 December 1876.
16 i.e. NAG SCT 2/5/1, Regina v. Adotay, Accra Divisional Court, 12 November 1881.
77 PRO CO 96/311, Hodgson to Minister, 29 January 1898, Accra, DC Thompson, Dixcove and Chama.
78 PRO CO 96/311, Hodgson to Minister, 29 January 1898, Accra, DC Cowie, Cape Coast,
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importing gold, paim oil, and cotton from this region probably purchased slaves both to 
be porters and for their own domestic use.79
Evidence showing that inhabitants of coastal towns travelled into the interior to 
acquire slaves in the last years of the century is not surprising. Slave consumers from 
the Protectorate, at least from regions near the Volta River, had been purchasing slaves 
in Salaga for some time. While Hausa traders continued to operate in eastern districts, 
towards the end of the century slaves were increasingly purchased by individuals 
indigenous to the Gold Coast or their agents who were sent to acquire slaves in this 
northern market.
The participation of inhabitants of the Gold Coast in the acquisition and 
transportation of slaves along the Volta River probably extended back some time. The 
river was the obvious transport route for slaves, and had become more important after 
the abolition of the slave trade in 1807 as the creeks and lagoons at its mouth were 
perfect for slave smuggling.80 Throughout the century, merchants based in Ada 
continued to play a large role in that trade as well as commerce in salt and kola81, and 
their canoes bearing slaves were infrequently captured on the Volta.82
After 1874, inhabitants of the Protectorate who travelled to Salaga to acquire 
slaves were generally looking for wives83, ‘children’ - usually girls84, or less frequently 
labourers. Often, the expensive trip to Salaga involved the pooling of resources and 
appointment of an agent, and extra slaves might be purchased to be sold to neighbours 
for a profit, thus paying for the journey. For example, in the late 1870s a Krobo man 
named Odouku travelled from Odumase to Salaga to purchase four slaves. One was for 
his brother-in-law who “sent 20 dollars to pay for the child”, two others “lived with his 
people making palm oil”, while the last - a girl - was sold for profit.85
The trade carried out by Hausas into the Protectorate was run quite differently. 
After 1874, as northerners were increasingly recruited into the ‘Hausa Constabulary’ and 
otherwise immigrated to the Protectorate, they began to import slaves for their own
79 Weiskel, French Colonial Rule and the Baule Peoples, pp. 87-89.
80 See Chapter 3.
81 Count Zech, op. cit. in despatch from Martin Gosselin, 8 October 1896, Berlin, in Johnson, Salaga Papers,
Johnson also makes this argument and cites both Firminger’s report and Basel Missionary reports from 1881 and 
1893. See Johnson, “The Slaves of Salaga”, p.353.
82 NAG SCT 2/5/2, Regina v. Agbochie, Accra Divisional Court, 5 August 1885; SCT SCT 2/5/10, Regina v. Narter, 
Kudaya, Menty, and Dogati, Accra Divisonal Court, 16 July 1894,.
83 e.g. NAG SCT 17/5/12, Regina v. Tarro, Accra District Court, 30 September 1891. NAG SCT 17/5/9, Regina v. 
Tetteh, Accra District Court, 8 November 1889.
84 e.g. NAG SCT 17/5/9, Regina v. Byowra, Accra District Court, 24 March 1890.
85 NAG SCT 2/5/1, Regina v. Odouku and David, Accra Divisional Court, 9 June 1880. A  somewhat similar case is 
NAG SCT 17/5/9, Regina v. Maikie, Accra District Court, 6 March 1890.
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needs similar to the trade carried out by Akan and Ga-Adangme inhabitants of the 
Protectorate.86 However by the late 1880s immigrant merchants had used their contacts 
in the north to develop a more complex and integrated trade network originating in 
Salaga and ending in Accra. These ‘Hausa’ merchants are alleged to have conducted 
“caravans... direct from Salaga to the coast”87, although court cases indicate that these 
were probably no more than small groups of slaves led by two to four traders. As late as 
1899, such caravans were reported to be transporting slaves “in secret... down through 
the [Protectorate]... on hidden paths through the districts occupied by the Europeans.”88 
Although some slaves were sold in towns and villages in the interior and the 
coast, the largest terminus for these convoys was Salaga Market in Accra, located 
between Ussher Town and Jamestown. Slave traders brought their captives directly to 
safehouses in the Zongo, or immigrant quarter north of the market, from which slaves 
could be sold.89 One account at least suggests that slaves were stored in the house of 
‘a chief’ until their sale90, and other accounts suggest that the illicit trade was managed 
by elite individuals with strong relationships to merchants in the interior. This trade 
network apparently served much of the illegal demand for slaves in Accra. Most 
purchasers appear to have been non-northerners91, and although we have no 
quantitative evidence, there is a sense in testimonies given by defendants and slaves 
alike that this community was the place to which one went to buy slaves.
British and French actions against the slave trade prior to 1890
In the late 1870s and early 1880s, European abolitionist public opinion for the first 
time began to overcome the pragmatic concerns of colonial bureaucrats and 
administrators. While Carnarvon and Rouvier remained hesitant to attack domestic 
slavery itself, they were eager to “disparage all who would have [our people] believe 
that... the local administration tolerates the terrible traffic in slaves.”92
Initially at least, actions did not follow words. The absence of effective patrols, a 
direct result of the limited resources of the colonial administrations, crippled any efforts 
to halt the slave trade. The French, despite their commitment during this period to direct
86 e.g. NAG SCT 17/5/12, Regina v. Giwah, Accra District Court, 21 October 1891.
87 Kling, E, Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Shutzgebieten, Berlin, 1893. Visit to Salaga, 1892 in Johnson, Salaga 
Papers.
88 Klose, H, Togo unter deutscher Flagge: Reisebilder und Beti'achtungen, Berlin, 1899 in Johnson, Salaga Papers.
89 NAG SCT 2/5/1, Regina v. Timbuctoo, Accra Divisional Court, 5 October 1881.
90 NAG SCT 17/5/6, Regina v. Adesay, Accra District Court, 5 October 1887.
91 NAG SCT 17/5/6, Regina v. Adesay, Accra District Court, 5 October 1887; SCT 17/5/9, Regina v. Coffi Nelsore, 
Accra District Court, 21 April 1890.
92 ANS K12, Minister a Canard, 31 January 1882, Paris.
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administration, were unable to effectively patrol the Senegal River. Albert Grodet, the 
first civilian administrator of French Soudan, understood the challenges. “How”, he 
asked, “can a single administrator with one clerk and a few...guards, effectively police a 
stretch of the [Senegal] river banks measuring 100-150 kilometres when he has no 
means of rapid transport to patrol the river?”93 The British, meanwhile, were reluctant to 
enforce many laws outside of the coastal zones. It was only gradually that customs, 
licenses, and magisterial jurisdictions were extended into the interior - a process that 
was still uncompleted before 1890.94
The Gold Coast administration’s relative emphasis on combating the slave trade 
during these years is, however, obvious from the court records. While magistrates were 
not obliged to search out siave-owners or seriously combat pawning, slave dealing was 
treated as a serious crime by the judicial authorities. One hundred and eight out of 126 
slave-related cases heard by District and Divisional courts during this period were for 
slave dealing95, while the much more prevalent crimes of slave holding and pawning 
were largely ignored.
TABLE 9.1
Slave-Related Cases by Charge 
1874-1889
Buying a Slave 3
Misc. 6
Importing a Slave 1
Pawning 4
Receiving a Pawn 3
Slave Dealing 108
from NAG SCT cases
This state of affairs is further illustrated by the experiences of the Paramount Chiefs of 
Akyem Abuakwa and Eastern Wassaw, which suggest that the purchase or sale of 
slaves was, during the 1880s, considered beyond the pale even for chiefs cooperating 
with the administration, while owning slaves was not.96 Administrators understood that 
the Volta River continued to be the major route for slave-traders, and came up with 
schemes such as posting soldiers on the river at Kpong.97 However, such proactive
93 op.cit. Moitt, “Slavery and Emancipation in Senegal’s Peanut Basin”, p.37.
94 NAG ADM 12/3/2, Griffith to Minister, 14 June 1888, Accra,
95 District courts opened in Accra in 1882 (NAG SCT 17/5/1), Cape Coast 1887, (NAG SCT 23/5/1), most other 
districts in 1888 (NAG SCT 2/10/1).
96 See Chapter 7.
97 PRO CO 96/120, Freeling to Minister, 30 January 1877, Cape Coast.
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plans did not come to fruition, and District Commissioners’ reports in 1890 were quite 
frank in admitting that the trade in slaves continued, especially in the eastern districts.98
The British had geographically consolidated the Gold Coast Protectorate in 1874, 
only adding the regions of Sefwi and Kwahu in 1888, while events in 1880s Senegal 
were dominated by the expansion of French authority. The strategic difficulties related 
to this over-riding concern blunted the Senegal Colony administration’s ability to combat 
the slave trade just as it restricted their ability to end domestic slavery. This 
phenomenon shows up most clearly in the administration’s negotiations with Lat Joor. 
The Dame! had withdrawn his support for the crucial St. Louis-Dakar railroad in 1881.99 
French attempts to close the growing rift involved deals in which first Governor Canard 
and later Governor Servatius were authorised to promise Lat Joor they would make no 
move to end slavery, but to warn him that the sale of slaves was to be restricted.100
in the event, however, the French administration utterly failed to diminish the 
slave trade into the Protectorate in the 1880s. Limited steps were taken only to restrict 
the importation of slaves into the Colony itself. The scale of prosecutions for slave- 
trading was in no way comparable to that in the Gold Coast; but a spasm of judicial 
conscience following the Senatorial debate of 1880 led to the opening of 15 cases for 
slave dealing between May 1880 and January 1882, which nevertheless resulted in only 
two successful prosecutions. The first of these dealt with the capture, by St. Louisian 
gendarmes, of a convoy transporting 12 children onto the island101, while the second 
took place in Leybar outside of St. Louis but still technically within the Colony.102 Other 
cases were dismissed because of mitigating circumstances, the political importance or 
social standing of the defendant, various technicalities which masked the reluctance of 
the magistrates to impose a significant sentence, or arguments related to the benign 
nature of specific cases.103 It is clear from these cases that the administration’s 
commitment to abolishing the importation of slaves even to the Colony was lukewarm, 
and that very little attempt indeed was made to restrict the trade into the Protectorate.
98 PRO CO 96/208, DC McMunn to Colonial Secretary, 5 February 1890, Accra; DC Redwar-Hayes to First Assistant 
Colonial Secretary, 27 August 1889, Saltpond; DC Cole to Colonial Secretary, 7 August 1889, Ada.
99 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, p.225.
100 ANS K17, Rapport sur la Captivite, Administrateur Poulet, 1905; ANS K12, Ministre a Servatius, 31 March 1883, 
Paris.
101 ANS K12, Chef du Service Judiciare a Canard, 18 March 1882, St. Louis. Case of 1 May 1880,
102 ANS K12, Chef du Service Judiciare a Canard, 18 March 1882, St. Louis. Case of 1 November 1881.
103 ANS K12, Chef du Service Judiciare a Canard, 18 March 1882, St. Louis.
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Diverging efforts to exterminate the slave trade after 1890
The general failure of both colonial administrations to end the slave trade 
provoked a response by abolitionists in the metropoles, which was strengthened by 
international links forged between Archbishop Lavigerie’s Peres Blancs and British 
abolitionists.104 The resulting pressure was one of the causes for the governments of 
Britain, France and their European neighbours to initiate an international conference at 
Brussels in 1889-1890. In the event, the conference’s declaration was forced to 
conform to the specific concerns of each colonial power and emerged as a declaration 
of intent without any international means of regulation.105 Nevertheless, Article 7 did 
internationalise the policy of sol affranchis, and Article 17 called for a “rigorous 
surveillance to be organised by the local authorities” against “chasseurs d’hommes et de 
marchants d’esclaves.”106
Following the Treaty of Brussels, the Gold Coast administration achieved some 
limited success in eradicating the long-distance slave trade, while the Governors of 
Senegal did not. It is necessary to state this here because this divergence is in part a 
result of the varying levels of pressure which the administrations subsequently received. 
On the one hand, the Governors of the Gold Coast were almost continually harassed at 
the turn of the decade. Former District Commissioner Firminger, having returned from 
the recruiting mission to Salaga mentioned above, subsequently returned to London and 
wrote a report on the journey for the Colonial Office. Amongst his allegations were 
revelations, unsurprising to anyone serving in the Gold Coast, that ’’large numbers of 
slaves [are] still held in the protectorate” and furthermore that the interior districts of the 
Protectorate, specifically Akyem, purchased slaves from Salaga. He also suggested 
that slaves were still to be found even in Accra and spoke of his attempts to liberate a 
young girl named Aminah, whose master was, to his horror, only fined 10 shillings for his 
crime.107 Governor Hodgson didn’t even bother to deny the allegations, which were 
probably completely true. Instead, he initiated a smear campaign claiming that “Mr. 
Firminger purchased a Foulah slave girl named Fatima from a Moshi slave dealer... 
when he was in Salagha in 1887, and it appears that she lived with him as a mistress” 
and furthermore that the girl Aminah was only of interest to Firminger as she was 
Fatima’s ‘sister’.108 The scandal, however, did not pass quickly and Hodgson’s
104 Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, p.96.
105 An original copy of the treaty is held in ANS K12.
106 “hunters of men and slave merchants”, ANS K25, L ’esclavage enAOF , Deherme, 1906.
107 NAG ADM 1/1/88, Firminger to Colonial Office, 30 April 1889, West Kensington,
108 NAG ADM 13/3/2, Hodgson to Minister, 17 February 1890, Accra.
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successor was forced to further deal with Firminger’s allegations.109
For Governor Brandford Griffith, however, this was not the only allegation with 
which he had to deal. In 1890 the Aborigine’s Protection Society began a campaign to 
force the administration to increase its vigilance and enforcement. Claiming that “there 
are now in the Colony and adjacent British territories a great number of boys and girls, 
estimated at 5000 or more, who are bought and retained as slaves” and that “the 
practice of procuring these children from Salaga and other districts in the interior... still 
continues and has of late considerably increased”, the APS accused the administration 
of “apathy and connivance” with the slave trade.110 These allegations were supported by 
a surprisingly thorough set of evidence referring to specific cases, dates, and classified 
documents.
It is quite clear from whom the APS got their data - former Accra District 
Commissioner MacMunn. A fervent abolitionist, MacMunn had fallen out with his fellow 
administrators mainly over his unwillingness to cooperate with their pragmatic approach 
to slavery, but was dismissed for some “[misjconduct”111, the exact nature of which I 
have been unable to discover. Whether or not MacMunn was guilty of misconduct is 
unclear, but his attack on domestic slavery and the slave trade had definitely threatened 
the balanced policies established by successive Governors after 1874. MacMunn had 
heard an amazing 37 cases of slave dealing and slave holding in the period between 21 
October, 1889, and 26 July, 1890.112 Even more significantly, most of them had resulted 
in successful prosecutions. This impressive record was the result of an unpopular 
strategy of dispatching teams of constables ‘into the bush’ to talk to local residents, often 
uncovering instances of pawning and domestic slavery.113 MacMunn was replaced by 
LM Peregrine, who was indicted alongside Governor Griffith by the APS for their 
connivance with the slave trade. Griffith and Peregrine attempted to defend themselves 
based on minor inaccuracies and reinterpretations of specific cases114, but it is clear that 
Secretary of State Knutsford, while willing to defend his officers, was unimpressed by 
their defence and at one point he chastised them:
I am disposed to think that, except in very special cases, which must be of rare
occurrence, children should not be allowed to go back to persons who have
109 Brandford Griffith to Minister, 12 February 1890, no place, in Johnson, Salaga Papers,
110 PP LVII, 1890-1891 (c.6354), Aborigine Protection Society, 20 August 1890, no place. My italics.
111 PRO CO 96/212, Griffith to Knutsford, 26 January 1891, Accra.
112 NAG SCT 17/5/8 and 17/5/9.
113 e.g. NAG SCT 17/5/8, Regina v. Adahali, Abblah, Koo & Mamai, Accra District Court, 21 October 1889.
114 PP LVII, 1890-1891 (c.6354), Reply of Governor Griffith and Peregrine to the Aborigine Protection Society, 26 
January 1891.
217
been proved to have bought them, and that if any such case arises, a special 
report upon it should be made to the Governor,115
In the parlance of the time, this was a biting rebuke, indicative of the exasperation of the 
metropole with the failure of the administration to end slavery, and it forced a change not 
in de jure policy but in de facto enforcement. To some extent this can be tracked 
through the types of punishments handed down by magistrates.
Before 1890, although the Slave-Dealing Abolition Ordinance had authorised 
sentences of up to five years116, magistrates favoured a combination of a fine - initially 
between one and three ounces of gold, but later, as the colony’s monetary system was 
normalised, between 2 and 60 pounds sterling - and a short prison term with hard 
labour.117 Following the Firminger and APS complaints, however, fines were dropped in 
favour of stricter and longer jail sentences. In 1894 Rayner handed down the first 
maximum authorized five year prison sentence to an individual of foreign but 
indeterminate origin accused of kidnapping and attempting to sell a number of slaves on 
the Volta River.118 This punishment, while marking a general trend towards increased 
penal sentences resulting in an average prison term of 15 months for Slave Dealing, 
was not matched during the next five years. However the Criminal Code Ordinance of 
1892 had in fact introduced the seven year sentence for slave dealing119, and as the 
century ended Chief Justice Brandford Griffith handed down a seven year sentence, for 
a man accused of slave dealing, kidnapping, and rape.120
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, District Commissioners and 
magistrates, despite an expansion in both the numbers of courts and their authority, and
despite a new commitment on their part to punishing slave-dealers, heard only 54 cases
121of slave-dealing. In part at least, this has to indicate a decrease, although not a 
termination, in slave trading. Dumett and Johnson have argued that “[tjhough large- 
scale and open sale of adult slaves within the protectorate was largely suppressed, the 
smuggling of small numbers of slaves - particularly women and adolescents - continued 
at Elmina, Winneba, Accra, and other coastal towns until well into the twentieth
115 NAG ADM 1/1/96, Minister to Griffith, 29 January 1892, London.
116 PP 1874, III, (c.1139),Strahan to Carnarvon, 28 December 1874, enclosure 1, Gold Coast Slave Dealing Abolition 
Act, Article 7.
117 NAG SCT 5/4/15-5/4/19, 1874-1876.
118 NAG SCT 2/5/10, Regina v. Emmanuel Narter, Gotfred Kudaya, Timothy Menty, and Kulch Dogati, Accra 
Supreme/Divisional Court, 16 July 1894.
119 NAG ADM 4/1/16, Ordinance 12 of 1892, Title XXIX, Section 439, ‘Slave Dealing’.
120 NAG SCT 2/5/13, Regina v. Akpebley, Accra Supreme/Divisonal Court, 6 July 1899.
121 plus four cases of pawning incorrectly identified as slave-dealing, NAG SCT.
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century.”122 I would put the emphasis the other way. As early as 1889 the slave trade 
had been radically reduced in western coastal towns123, while British efforts, aided by a 
German commitment to abolition in neighbouring Togo, appears to have slashed slave- 
trading numbers even in Ada.124 Both the Police Commissioner and the District 
Commissioner in Accra reported that the trade there had also slowed to a trickle.125 
Their sometimes sincere efforts to halt the overland slave trade were further aided by 
the defeat of both Samori and the Zabarimas as the century came to a close, partially 
cutting off the supply of slaves.126 The slave trade was not eradicated, and would not be 
for some decades, but certainly the risks for slave dealers had been raised and their 
numbers diminished.
Perhaps with hindsight we can argue that the Gold Coast administration could 
have done more. However the attack on the slave trade must be compared to the 
colonial government’s laissez-faire attitude towards domestic slavery and to the policies 
of the administration of Senegal. In direct contrast to both, the attack on the overland 
slave trade into the Gold Coast represents the first major reversal of policies which had 
for the entire nineteenth century been largely controlled by the demands of economics 
and the appeasement of indigenous elites.
If events in the Gold Coast represented the first evidence of the type of 
aggressive anti-slavery policies the twentieth century promised to bring, the Senegalese 
administration’s approach toward the slave-trade consisted largely of a continuation of 
nineteenth century policies of pragmatism. The French chambre des deputes only 
ratified the Treaty of Brussels on the 26th of December, 1891 - almost one and a half 
years after the act had been published. Even then, the French executive refused to 
approve several articles - although not those dealing with the slave trade.127 Nor was 
the issue put before the Senegalese administration until April 1892. Governor Lamothe 
had been attempting to ignore the implications of the conference, but the 
Undersecretary of State, Etienne, finally broached the issue128, ordering Lamothe:
...to give the administrative and judicial authorities all the instructions... to
demolish by the most vigilant policing and the most severe repression the last
122 Dumett and Johnson, “Britain and the Suppression of Slavery”, p.82.
123 PRO CO 96/208, DC Williams to Colonial Secretary, 19 August 1889, Pram Pram; DC Heron to Colonial 
Secretary, 2 August 1889, Axim.
124 PRO CO 96/311, Hodgson to Minister, 29 January 1898, Accra, DC Holmes, Adda.
125 PRO CO 96/311, Hodgson to Minister, 29 January 1898, Accra, DC Edlin, Accra; Commissioner Kitson, Accra.
126 Johnson, “The Slaves of Salagah”, p.361.
127 ANS Bulletin Administratif du Senegal, April 1892 - Decret du President de la Republique, 12 February 1891, 
Paris.
128 in the absence of a Ministre de la Marine et des Colonies
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vestiges of the [slave] trade. You are without doubt sufficiently armed in that 
regard by the legislation already put into motion together with... the general act 
[of the Treaty of Brussels].129
Lamothe considered the implications of these orders, but probably felt that there 
was insufficient time to properly implement new policies before returning to France for 
six months of leave. Upon his return, however, he immediately authored a treaty 
intended to comply with the Brussels acts, which he had signed by pro-French Wolof 
chiefs from Waalo and Kaajor. In January 1892, the subordinate chiefs of Baol, Siin, and 
Saalum signed on as well.130
Lamothe’s treaty was a study in moderation intended for the consumption 
of the French public. While binding the signatories to end the slave trade within their 
territories, it confirmed their right and that of their citizens to purchase slaves for 
personal use outside of the Protectorate.131 In reality just another in a long series of 
pragmatic compromises, the convention was presented as a step in slowly weaning 
indigenous subjects away from their dependence on slaves. In effect, the protection of 
the right to purchase slaves for ‘personal use’ meant that merchants could import trade 
slaves with impunity, and this was clearly a loophole which traders exploited with glee. 
After having to release a slave dealer who used just such a defence, the Administrator of 
Saalum complained that “Aday Khane pretends like all merchants that the slaves we 
seized were purchased for his personal use”.132 Commandants of interior cercles 
bemoaned the continued involvement of local notables in the importation of slaves and 
the existence of slave markets in the directly administered posts of Bakel, Matam, 
Podor, and Dagana133; but at least one Administrator was instructed to ignore the 
passage of slave caravans into the Protectorate.134
Colonial administrators remained unwilling or unable to halt the slave caravans 
which continued to traverse the Protectorate delivering slaves to camps and villages and 
royal courts, to the groundnut fields and even to St. Louis itself.135 After 1890, however, 
the monarchs of protected states began to attack these caravans with impunity. The 
Teen of Baol appears to have been the first to grasp that the treaty of December 
1892/January 1893 not only gave him the right to confiscate the captives of slave traders
129 ANS 1B196, Sous Secretaire d’Etat a Lamothe, 13 April 1892, Paris.
130 ANS K 25 ,1’Esclavage en AOF, Deherme, 1906.
131 ANS K12, Traite, 12 December 1892,
132 ANS K12, Administrateur Thies a Directeur des Affaires Politiques, 11 July 1893, Thies.
133 ANS K13, Administrateur Dagana a Directeur des Affaires Politiques, 21 November 1894, Dagana.
134 op. cit. Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, p.98.
135 e.g. ANS K27, Roume a Secretaire-Generale, 3 December 1903, no place.
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who entered his territory, but actually required him to do so. The Teen realised slaves 
thus freed immediately became his clients, and by July 1893 he had seized 149 trade 
slaves “in virtue of a right that is accorded to him, he says, by the French 
government.”136 Within months, the Bur Siin and other chiefly officeholders were 
engaged in a race to confiscate as many slaves as possible.137 Admittedly these 
liberated’ captives were generally simply raised to the status of domestic slave by their 
confiscator, the same status as they would have achieved if they had simply completed 
their journey. However, the aggressive policies of indigenous rulers and the potential 
losses for slave-traders may ironically have been a greater deterrent to slave traders 
than the actions of the colonial administration.
136 ANS K13, Javoureux a Monsieur Couchard, avocat, 26 July 1893.
137 See Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, p.98.
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Conclusions:
African continuity, adaptation, and transformations
The conclusions upon which 1 have arrived in this dissertation are influenced by 
the work of a number of historians in two recent anthologies on slavery and 
emancipation in nineteenth and twentieth century Africa. The first, Suzanne Miers and 
Richard Roberts’ The End of Slavery in Africa, I first read at the very beginning of my 
research and subsequently heavily influenced the questions I asked.1 The second, 
again edited by Suzanne Miers but this time with Martin Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule 
in Africa, which I have only just completed, ties in neatly with the responses to these 
questions at which I have arrived. 2 Between them, these two volumes present the 
recent work of many of the important scholars with which I have engaged in the last nine 
chapters. Not only do they comprise studies from Miers, Roberts, and Klein, but also 
both Raymond Dumett and Marion Johnson’s chapter on emancipation in the Gold 
Coast3 and a reprint of Kwabena Opare-Akurang’s recent article from Slavery and 
Abolition.4 Of further value is the theoretical anthropological work by Igor Kopytoff that 
concludes The End of Slavery in Africa5; as well as a number of other studies from 
across the continent within both books.
The principal themes of these volumes are, respectively, the origins and impact of 
emancipation and the relationship between African slavery and colonial rule. In taking a 
comparative approach to this issue, and in focusing on the origins and development of 
indigenous slavery prior to the nineteenth century, I have concentrated on just two main 
themes. Primarily, this dissertation is an attempt to explore the centrality of Africans’ 
roles in slavery and emancipation, a place sometimes implicitly denied to them but 
developed to some degree through the works of Dumett and Johnson, Suzanne Miers, 
and others in The End of Slavery in Africa. Crucial to this undertaking is an evaluation of 
the relative roles of continuity and transformation in both the creation of nineteenth 
century slavery and in its reform. Equally important is an appraisal of the abilities and 
motivations of Africans and Europeans as it contributes to these processes.
The second objective of this dissertation is an assessment of the conditions 
under which reform, abolition, and emancipation could occur. The impact of European 
metropolitan initiatives is just the beginning of this story. More important were
1 Miers and Roberts, The End o f Slavery in Africa.
2 Miers, Suzanne and Martin Klein, eds., Slavery and Colonial Rule in Africa, Frank Cass, London, 1999.
3 Dumett and Johnson, “Britain and the Suppression of Slavery”.
4 Opare-Akurang, “The Administration of the Abolition Laws”, reprinted
5 Kopytoff, “The Cultural Context of African Abolition”, pp.488-494.
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interrelated local factors: prevailing political-economic realities within the colonies and 
protectorates, the beliefs and circumstances of slaves, the ability of slave owners to 
resist or subvert reforms, and consequently the attitude of administrators to initiatives 
imposed upon them. The interplay of these factors took place within a context both 
colonial and African, and it is this topic which forms the unifying theme of Slavery and 
Colonial Rule in Africa.
However, this study has been an attempt to advance our understanding of slavery 
and emancipation in the nineteenth century Gold Coast and Senegal beyond that 
contained in previous texts. This is enabled by the length and depth of the study, which 
is more comprehensive than any of the chapters in these two volumes could be. Prior to 
this dissertation there was no serious scholastic book-length study of emancipation 
specifically in the Gold Coast or Senegal. Although there were a number of excellent 
articles and chapters and several texts dealing with either smaller or larger areas, or 
dealing with slavery in general, the topic of emancipation in these localities had not 
formed the basis of any full-length study. The greatest strength of this dissertation, 
however, is that it does not simply attempt a local study of either area, but undertakes an 
approach that both compares the Gold Coast and Senegal and presents a narrative by 
covering a significant period of time. Through continual comparison, it brings to the fore 
themes whose existence and significance would not be evident without contrast.
Continuity and transformation of indigenous slavery: 1500-1850
Events preceding large-scale European intervention were fundamental in defining 
the post-emancipation settlement. The characteristics of pre-contact indigenous 
societies, the African role in the Atlantic slave trade, and the harnessing of slavery to 
legitimate commerce provided both a prototype and the context for subsequent 
resistance to and support for slave reform.
To a large degree, and especially in the interior, pre-contact institutions of slavery 
survived until or even beyond the late nineteenth century reforms. Fundamentally an 
expression of indigenous social and political paradigms, indigenous slavery was one 
aspect of prevailing kinship systems, and consequently was highly assimilative. 
Moreover, slavery was only one component of dominant socio-political modes of 
organisation in which political leaders were supported by a wide range of dependants, 
and land was largely owned by a lineage group or stool. Economically, the production of 
food was largely based on peasant cultivation and commodities were mostly produced 
by free or semi-dependant artisans.
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The Atlantic slave trade was a catalyst for a limited transformation of African 
concepts of slavery especially in some coastal polities. Initially, the commercialisation of 
slavery simply resulted in a diversification in acquisition methods and an expansion of 
both the brutality and magnitude of the slave trade. However over time it was to have a 
significant impact on domestic slavery as selected captives were diverted into domestic 
servitude or the nascent slave production of foodstuffs for provisioning, the supply of 
burgeoning towns, or more latterly the production of long-distance trade goods. As 
unfree individuals became more central to social, economic, and political/military roles, 
slavery was radically transformed in communities such as St. Louis, Goree, and to some 
extent Accra, where a waged and politicised slave class emerged as European and 
African cultures mixed. Such transformations would later have an affect on efforts to 
end or ameliorate slavery in these regions.
Social and economic changes which were also occurring in Senegal and Gold 
Coast regions during this period similarly had an impact on slavery reform and 
emancipation. The development of an urban elite and its close relationship with 
traditional rulers laid the groundwork for the formation of an effective resistance, as did 
the increasing reliance of both these classes on slaves for political support. Similarly, 
the introduction of a non-slave ‘legitimate’ commodity trade stimulated a slave mode of 
production, increasing the economic reliance of producers upon slave labour. Local 
wars, compounded if not caused by the slave trade, elevated the importance of slave 
soldiers. Moreover, in communities where land was communally owned, slaves 
remained an important asset and the rigid stratification of some indigenous societies, 
notably the Wolof, maintained the usefulness of slave dependants as status symbols.
For slaves themselves, traditional characteristics of slavery sustained as well as 
constrained their strategies. Assimilative domestic slavery gave slaves the hope of 
gradual manumission but limited their ability to desert or rebel. At the same time the 
politicisation of some slaves, increasing abuses attendant to the slave trade, denser 
slave populations, and the intervention of missionaries introduced new strategies for 
survival, new opportunities to belong, and new reasons to desert masters.
These patterns of change and continuity led to the evolution of a prototype of 
interaction in coastal regions in which European initiatives were negotiated between 
slave-owners, European authorities, and to some extent slaves. This system can be 
seen to have worked in the resolution of three interrelated issues during this period. The 
first of these was the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade. Initially, European powers 
were unable or unwilling to effectively enforce this prohibition, but as the trade slowly
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declined, indigenous elites were threatened with the loss of a very profitable commerce. 
Thus their initial response was to form an alliance with European and American 
smugglers to divert the trade to safer regions such as the Gambian and Volta delta 
regions.
However this response was merely a stopgap measure, and a more sustainable 
response was found in participation in ‘legitimate1 commerce. British and French 
commercial and government officials hoped that the stimulation of such trade would 
revitalise the commerce of their West African posts, and turned to coastal coffee 
cultivation and cotton and cash crop plantations in Waalo respectively. However, such 
arrangements did not meet local requirements. In Waalo an alliance of habitants who 
felt the plantations threatened their trade monopoly, local aristocrats who feared the 
alienation of their land, and Trarzas opposed to French expansion soon defeated the 
plantation projects and in preference revitalised the African-controlled gum trade. 
Similarly on the Gold Coast smallholders and merchants alike chose to concentrate on 
the highly profitable inland cultivation of oil palms rather than European-sponsored 
coffee plantations, and under Maclean the administration soon turned to policies 
designed to support palm oil cultivation, including the negotiation of a peace with Asante 
guaranteeing the safety of oil palm growing regions.
It was in St. Louis and Goree, however, that this model of interaction became a 
true prototype both in terms of the formation of a master-administrator alliance and of 
individual slave agency which was to characterise the late nineteenth century. The 
Waalo plantation projects had stimulated a proto-reformist policy, the regime des 
engages a temps, in which ‘liberated1 slaves were conditionally freed following a 
fourteen-year indenture to the administration. The metropole was convinced of the 
moral correctness of such a policy. However indigenous elites were allowed to 
participate in the system and, fearing that it threatened the profitable rental of slaves to 
the government, quickly distorted it to their own needs until it became slavery under 
another name, with little possibility of definitive manumission. The administration also 
became a party to such abuses, purchasing slaves in lieu of volunteers for military 
service and refusing to enforce policies meant to curb abuses for fear of alienating the 
habitants who held a monopoly on the gum trade, the only remaining profitable 
commerce. However at the same time the regime des engages was also an opportunity 
for a small number of slaves who, by pretending they were engages, effected their own 
liberations.
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The master/administrator alliance and patterns of resistance: 1848-1890
Thus by 1848, there existed an understanding between slave owners and local 
administrators in both Senegal and the Gold Coast to oppose or subvert proposed 
reforms of indigenous slavery. While metropolitan governments became increasingly 
abolitionist, they lacked the ability to enforce changes without the enthusiastic 
cooperation of administrators. Administrators remained unlikely to support such 
transformations even after regional hegemony had been attained. This study has 
revealed four major reasons for this reluctance. The technical difficulties of enforcing 
emancipation over large areas with the limited resources available to the administration 
was a factor of some importance; as was the intrinsic conservatism of colonial 
administrators, especially so long as important positions were filled by military personnel. 
Economically, the potential impact of emancipation, both in regard to slaves leaving their 
positions in profitable commodity production sectors and the drain on public funds 
necessary to support vagrant slaves and police emancipation was constantly cited by 
administrators as a grave danger. In Senegal, such economic concerns culminated in 
fears of a mass exodus of major portions of the population resultant from the 
promulgation of even a limited reform to slave owning. This information fits in with that 
synthesised by Miers and Klein from studies presented in Slavery and Colonial Rule.
...short of European manpower and reluctant to spend more than 
minima! sums on their colonies, [colonial governments] depended 
largely on slave-holding elites to administer their empires. They were 
convinced that without slave labour, economic activity would decline 
dramatically and the colonies would be a drain on metropolitan 
taxpayers.6
However perhaps the most significant element in the administration’s support for 
domestic slavery was the importance of slave owners in the system of indirect 
administration. Merchants and chiefly officeholders were not only often the largest 
commercial and agricultural employers of slaves, they also traditionally relied on slaves 
to fill a number of military and social functions. Furthermore, a great percentage of their 
wealth was vested in slaves, and even the 1848 indemnity offered by the French to 
habitants could not totally replace the long-term value of their slaves, while the British 
declined to offer any compensation at all. It is no wonder, therefore, that slave owners
6 Miers and Klein, “Introduction”, Slaveiy and Colonial Rule, p.4.
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remained stalwartly opposed to any attempts to regulate or eliminate their control over 
their slaves. Their resistance is one area in which little is known and to which this 
dissertation contributes much.7
In the Gold Coast, emancipation had been promulgated with the priorities of slave 
owners in mind. The two 1874 anti-slavery acts were designed as pragmatic measures 
meant to inexpensively administer a federation of states in which both political power 
and economic production remained largely in the hands of indigenous elites. This model 
of emancipation was designed to limit the impact on these slave owners and thus 
contain potential resistance. The opposition of elites was somewhat constrained by their 
political and military reliance on the British authorities, and consequently the response of 
masters was thus characterised more by a passive support for continued slave holding 
than by active resistance. Nevertheless, the feared mass desertion of slaves never 
occurred.
A similar outcome was achieved in Senegal, though through an inverse process. 
Here, the 1848 emancipation was born of republican idealism rather than imperial 
pragmatism, and promised to liberate all slaves in French territory and any who touched 
French soil. This radical programme provoked a coordinated response from an alliance 
of slave owners: political pressure from habitants, trade embargoes by allies, and the 
threat of military action by traditional opponents. As a result local administrators 
gradually countermanded, repudiated, or circumvented potentially stringent policies. 
The climax of this process was the Waalo/Dimar exodus of the 1880s, following which 
the French government was forced to abandon the policies of direct administration and 
assimilation, thus ending the threat to domestic slavery in Senegal at least for the rest of 
the nineteenth century.
The pivotal role of slaves
Thus it is obvious that reform initiatives imposed from the metropole could not 
generally compete with empowered slave owners and administrators sympathetic to 
their position. Yet the relatively strong position of slave owners cannot completely 
account for this perpetuation of institutions of slavery. In other regions, notably the 
Caribbean and Americas, nineteenth century emancipation initiatives had resulted in the 
termination of the slave system despite the socio-economic and political power of slave 
owners. That this did not occur in West Africa was largely a function of indigenous 
concepts of slavery and the actions and beliefs of local slaves.
7 “In general our knowledge of the fate of slave owners is incomplete”, Ibid., p.10.
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Slavery, for African slaves, represented not the denial of ‘liberty’ but exclusion 
from ‘belonging5.8 The very act of enslavement embodied either forcible separation 
from the kingroup or semi-voluntary sale by the victim’s family, and slaves were often 
also separated from their kin by geography and social status. The gradual 
commercialisation of slavery further removed slaves from the kinship system, and those 
who were transported overseas were subjected to definitive isolation.
For slaves who remained within African societies where kinless individuals had 
few rights and little security, attachment to their masters’ lineage at least enabled them 
to belong to a kingroup, and local institutions of assimilation held out the potential for an 
eventual position in a family. To leave such a situation generally meant forfeiting even 
these meagre benefits. It is therefore unsurprising that most slaves did not desert their 
masters even when legal recognition of slavery was withdrawn by administrations. Add 
to this the near-monopoly by slave owners of land and resources and the lack of 
administrative support for liberated slaves, and the successive ‘failures’ of emancipation 
acts in the Gold Coast and Senegal become less surprising.
However, let me again make the point that indigenous nineteenth century 
societies were both a continuation and a transformation of pre-contact African 
institutions. The fact that, following European emancipation ordinances, some slaves 
were liberated and did desert shows not only that the ‘social dependency’ of slaves upon 
their masters was not entirely hegemonic but also that when emancipation was 
promulgated certain slaves were able to overcome the social and economic obstacles 
and liberate themselves.
For most slaves, the re-establishment of links with their own family groups 
represented the ideal situation under which they could have severed their ties to their 
masters, but this was possible only for a very small minority. Barriers of geography and 
time separated them from their families. Taking the dangerous and difficult path to little 
remembered families who might have moved or been wiped out became a less attractive 
option the more assimilated slaves became, the more distant their origins, and the 
longer their servitude.
However anti-slavery reforms enabled the families of some slaves to actively 
liberate their relatives. Such kin-liberations formed a significant proportion of recorded 
emancipations in the post-1874 Gold Coast as families retrieved individuals they had 
previously sold into bondage. This phenomenon was largely limited to pawns, who 
tended to live locally to their families, as opposed to slaves who were largely from the
8 Kopytoff, “The Cultural Context of African Abolition”, pp.488-494.
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interior. The families of female slaves were also sometimes able to force their owners to 
raise them to the status of free wives. In the case of slaves from Juaben, the stool itself 
sometimes intervened to liberate its citizens from servitude. Similarly, in Senegal the 
introduction in the 1890s of formalised procedures for the repurchase of slaves allowed 
some relatives to force slave owners to accept a fee deemed reasonable by the 
administration. Inhabitants of the directly administered regions of Kaajor and Waalo and 
of the Colony could also ‘kidnap5 their freeborn relatives in servitude elsewhere, who 
upon their return to St. Louis were granted patents de liberte.
Most slaves, however, had no such assistance and, if they wished to return to 
their families, they had to do so on their own initiative, it is no wonder, therefore, that 
the majority of self-liberations for which we have records involve young males who were 
more likely to survive the hazardous journey to freedom. In the Gold Coast, newly 
acquired male slaves from the north were the most inclined to liberate themselves or 
simply desert and head for ‘home5. Likewise, the majority of slaves seeking refuge on 
the ‘free soil5 of Senegal Colony after 1880 were also young men.
The inability of most slaves to return home did not, however, dissuade all of them 
from liberating themselves. The European presence in coastal regions especially had 
led to the creation of new communities to which one could belong. Missions, of course, 
were the most prevalent of these. In Senegal, where missionary activity was largely 
restricted to the coast, the Protestant and Catholic churches competed for new converts, 
and many refugee slaves sought shelter, positions, or just a day’s sustenance within 
church walls. Basel and Wesleyan missions on the Gold Coast also provided 
opportunities for former slaves, but in both regions the scale of conversion was relatively 
small. As an alternative ‘family5 for ex-slaves, the administration proposed military 
service. Some slaves did see the constabulary as a potential replacement community 
and means of employment. Recruiting for the 1873-1874 Asante War, for example, 
attracted a number of former, current, and refugee slaves. Similarly, the post-war Hausa 
Constabulary attracted a number of former slaves. However the military was generally 
an unattractive, difficult, and dangerous option and both the Gold Coast and Senegal 
administrations were eventually forced to turn to other means of recruitment.
A slave’s abilities to find a family or community to which to belong enabled that 
individual to seek freedom, and such individual emancipations largely characterised both 
liberations in post-proclamation Gold Coast and the granting of patents in Senegal 
Colony. However while such individual cases of desertion and liberation were quite 
common, only a very few isolated mass liberations occurred in either region, and it is this
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lack of immediate disruptive response which is perceived of as the ‘failure’ of 
emancipation.
A number of structural and functional factors which tend to promote a mass slave 
response have been identified, and these were central to the outcome of slavery reforms 
in the Gold Coast and Senegal.9 These transformative stimuli are: fundamental 
modifications to the nature of local slavery; the absence of a purpose for continued slave 
owning; the introduction of a strongly abolitionist administration coupled with an 
expansion of resources; an end to the overland supply of slaves; an end to slave 
owners’ monopoly of resources; and the general acceptance of wage labour over slave 
labour by both employers and labourers. One of the great advances of this dissertation 
is the information it reveals in these areas for both the Gold Coast and Senegal and the 
way in which the strength or weakness of each factor clearly contributed to different 
outcomes.
The 1848 liberation of slaves in urban Senegal - St. Louis and Goree - is 
an example of the impact of the presence of a combination of these factors. Slaves in 
both cities served under conditions distinct from normative Senegalese slavery. Slaves 
were highly politicised; their role was largely economic. They were often paid a portion 
of the wage for which their masters hired them out, and they accepted that as their due. 
Moreover, just as their masters identified with the metropolitan bourgeoisie, slaves 
identified with the demands of the proletariat. For the administration, law enforcement 
was simplified by the small size and relatively advanced governmental organisation of 
the two towns. Consequently the introduction of a radical abolitionist metropolitan 
government and subsequently a liberal administration provided a catalyst for definitively 
ending slavery per se. Even as mass liberation of the Colony’s slaves took place, 
however, the ability of slave owners to retain control of both employment and housing 
forced their former slaves to a new and almost equally oppressive form of dependence.
Dissimilar conditions characterised the Gold Coast after 1874. The emphasis on 
a gradualist programme led to the near-elimination of the overland slave trade and 
successive administrations adopted gradually more progressive approaches to the 
practices of panyarring and slave dealing, but neither the administration’s resources nor 
its convictions were strong enough to challenge slave holding in the general population. 
Simultaneously, while British hegemony had largely removed the military function of 
slaves and restricted their usefulness as tradable assets, both elites and minor masters
9 Many of these are based on the excellent introductory chapter to Miers and Roberts, The End ofSlaveiy in Africa, 
pp. 19-27.
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still relied upon their slaves for economic and social functions, and slave owners largely 
continued to control access to land. Suspicion of wage labour and the general 
unavailability of waged employment also restricted slave opportunities. The result of 
these circumstances was the promotion of a system of negotiation in which “the 
existence of the option of emancipation could usually play into the slave’s favour as long 
as the option was not formally recognised."10 In other words, the dependence of slave 
owners upon their slaves, coupled with the administration’s lack of recognition of slavery, 
enabled slaves to force certain concessions from their masters which improved their 
position far more than desertion or liberation would have done, in fact some slaves went 
so far as to liberate themselves, only to return to their masters and engage themselves 
as free dependants. However a relatively small number of slaves actually made the full 
transition to freedom.
Yet a third example of the interplay of these factors can be seen in the failure of 
the proposed extension of direct administration, and hence emancipation, to the whole 
of Senegal in the 1880s. French administration in these territories was both tentative and 
extremely conservative; and local masters relied heavily upon their slaves and strongly 
resisted any proposed challenge to their slave holding prerogatives. Further impeding 
reform, French military administrators in the interior did not actively restrict the overland 
supply of slaves and wage labour was nearly completely unknown. As a result, there 
was little impetus for emancipation or even negotiation to take place, and only those 
slaves who could reach French soil had any chance of liberation. The exception that 
proved the rule was Rufisque. There the emergence of a wage labour market linked to 
infrastructure construction, the proximity of French authority, and a political-economic 
transformation based on groundnut cultivation appears to have enabled some sort of 
negotiations to take place.
On the Gold Coast as well there appears to have been some variation. A few 
towns such as Kyebi may have experienced a larger-than-usual exodus of slaves and 
offered land to a small number of refugee slaves, two events which were probably 
interrelated. This was largely a result of the presence of a large Basel Missionary 
community, which not only introduced wage labour to the region, but also induced its 
members to slowly manumit their slaves, somewhat changing the nature of local slavery. 
Furthermore, the presence of a mission school and highly frequented trade paths helped 
to break the slave owners’ monopoly of means of existence.
10 Kopytoff, “The Cultural Context of African Abolition”, p.499.
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The consequences of the ‘failure’ of emancipation
In history, the end of one story is the beginning of another, and the slow death of 
slavery in twentieth century West Africa was in many ways the result of nineteenth 
century policy in Senegal and the Gold Coast. This was partly a result of the 
perpetuation of pragmatic colonial policies. The policies of the French West African 
Federation (AOF), in place by 1904 with Dakar as its capital, were informed by 
Senegalese colonial experiences and attitudes. As late as 1950, the administrator 
responsible for Mauritania would voice the familiar formula that:
The colony was not yet ready for ‘mass liberation.’ There were no resources for 
the newly freed, who ‘would have nothing to do but turn to theft and 
vagabondage... The end result would be the ruin of the economy.11
In Senegal, the early twentieth century was largely distinguished by a continuation 
of administrative opposition to any real metropolitan demands for reform. Even the 1905 
Comprehensive Slavery Decree did not end official recognition of slavery, but simply 
formalised and extended the 1890 treaties that had criminalised enslavement and slave 
dealing.12
However, in French West Africa {AOF) thousands of slaves took the 1905 Decree 
as a cue and by 1910 the majority of the slave population of the western Soudan had 
deserted their masters.13 The response in Senegal was not as radical, but a number of 
political and economic changes still led to a gradual decline of slavery. The introduction 
of a stable French administration in the Soudan and the continued ‘confiscation’ of slave 
caravans by chefs de cercles slowly decreased the supply of slaves into the region, but 
more importantly the continual expansion of peanut cultivation led to a wage labour 
economy which gradually replaced slave holding. The expansion of the migrant labour 
navetane system provided a livelihood for refugee slaves not only from Senegal but from 
neighbouring territories as well. Moreover the formation of the Islamic Mouride 
brotherhood created new communities to which ex-slaves could attach themselves. The 
Mourides occupied peripheral arid regions of the interior and offered both fully 
assimilated status and access to land for former slaves. It was this reversal of political,
11 op. cit. in McDougall, E. Ann, “A  Topsy-Turvy World: Slaves and Freed Slaves in the Mauritanian Adrar, 1910- 
1950, in Miers and Roberts, The End o f Slavery in Africa, p.362.
12 See Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, pp.131-137.
13 Roberts, Richard, “The End of Slavery in the French Soudan, 1905-1914”, in Miers Roberts, eds., The End of 
Slavery in Africa, pp.282-306.
232
economic, and social realities that enabled slaves to leave. Significantly, few slaves 
applied for formal liberation, most preferring simply to desert to join the navetane 
migration or Mouride communities.14 This outcome must be seen as a success for 
French authorities, whose policy objectives were largely met as former slaves provided 
labour for both subsistence and groundnut production without causing any major political 
disruption.
The British administration on the Gold Coast similarly continued to be successful 
in providing a series of ‘soft landings’ for emancipation. Following the annexation of 
Asante after 1901, administrators there faced an even more difficult situation than their 
compatriots in the Gold Coast in 1874. Not only were they given few resources, and 
forced to rely upon the region’s established chiefly elite, but those chiefs remained 
largely hostile to British rule, unlike in the coastal regions. Thus while the officers 
appointed to run Asante were able to affect a reduction in the importation of slaves, 
these officials strongly resisted the blandishments of even Gold Coast administrators to 
regulate domestic slavery until 1908. Despite subsequent reforms, domestic slavery 
remained largely in place until the expansion of cocoa in the 1930s, which enabled both 
a limited number of self-liberations and a system of negotiations similar to that of the 
Gold Coast a half-century before.15
The formative context for all of these events was the period of negotiation, 
conflict, and resistance that characterised the attempted reform of slavery in the 
nineteenth century. This was an era in which slave owners effectively constructed their 
resistance to large-scale reform, and it was a period in which pragmatic and 
conservative policies won out over the ideals of abolitionism and patterns of 
administration-master co-operation were developed. As a result, despite the initial 
promise of emancipation clubs in St. Louis and Goree, those liberations that did take 
place were largely the responses of individuals and the majority of slaves were unable to 
significantly alter their positions.
The contrasts between British administration on the Gold Coast and French 
administration in Senegal were largely distinctions of scale and style rather than 
fundamental differences. In fact, the most interesting facet of this comparison is not the 
differences between experiences in the two regions, but their similarities. Despite the 
differing African and European origins of slavery and society in the two regions, 
emancipation in both was characterised by many of the same general motifs. Perhaps
14 Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, pp.198-202.
15 Dumett and Johnson, “Britain and the Suppression of Slavery”, pp. 95-100.
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most significantly, this comparison has shown the central role of Africans in determining 
the outcome of slave reform. The relevance of European metropoles was largely 
restricted to proclaiming reforms and providing the impetus for economic 
transformations. While the metropole created potentialities, administration often actually 
acted to oppose changes in the institutions of slavery, and were in any event largely 
incapable of enforcing any reforms they might support. Thus in each stage of the 
‘failure5 of emancipation, the power of masters was reinforced, and only when their 
hegemony over physical resources and social institutions was broken could slavery 
definitively end. This termination - whether by gradual negotiation or mass liberation - 
was enabled by metropolitan initiatives and the introduction of cash cropping or wage 
labour. However, these factors simply produced an environment in which negotiation or 
definitive emancipation could take place, it was slaves who determined the configuration 
that their response would take. Their desires, environment, social belief systems, and 
personal experiences largely shaped the transformations in slavery in the same way that 
their masters5 characterised its continuity.
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